Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCS026325
RIVERA, J.
Plaintiffs appeal a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment to defendants M S P Trucking, Manohar Purewal, and Amrik Bagri (collectively the trucking defendants) in this action seeking recovery for damages arising out of the death of Renee Caraska in a traffic accident. Plaintiffs are Caraska’s minor children through their guardian ad litem, Jennifer Moss. We affirm.
According to the complaint, Purewal and M S P Trucking employed Bagri, who operated the truck involved in the accident. Plaintiffs’ action also named as defendants the State of California, the California Department of Transportation, the California Highway Patrol, and pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 382, Caraska’s adult sons, Richard Caraska and Raymond Caraska. These defendants were not involved in the motion for summary judgment that is at issue here.
I. BACKGROUND
At about 10:20 on the morning of November 4, 2003, Caraska was driving eastbound on Interstate 80, approaching the Cordelia Scale Facility. A tractor-trailer driven by Bagri was in front of her. It had stopped in the fourth lane from the left of the freeway, waiting to enter the scale. Caraska drove into the rear of the truck, and the impact of the collision killed her.
A sign on the freeway before the scale station read, “ ‘All Trucks Stop At Scales.’ � Another sign read “ Weigh Station—Trucks Only.’ � Trucks were required to stop at the scales, and drivers who did not do so could be cited for violating the Vehicle Code.
The freeway at that location had five lanes. The far right lane, or the fifth lane, was a dedicated exit lane for the scale facility. The fourth lane could be used either to enter the scale facility or to continue driving on the freeway. The scale facility itself had three lanes. There were two sign bridges at the facility. Above the far left of the three truck scale lanes was a sign that read “ ‘empty five miles an hour.’ � Above the middle and right lanes were separate signs that each read “ ‘loaded three miles an hour.’ � On a second sign bridge, the sign over the far left truck scale lane read “ ‘C’ � and “ ‘empty five miles an hour’ �; one above the middle lane read “ ‘B’ � and “ ‘loaded three miles an hour’ �; and one above the right lane read “ ‘A’ � and “ ‘loaded three miles an hour.’ � Lane C did not contain a platform scale.
On the day of the accident, the truck Bagri was driving had an empty trailer. There was a line of trucks in the No. four lane of the freeway waiting to enter the scale facility, and he was waiting behind them. The weather was sunny and warm, and the roadway was dry. Christine Hall, who was driving the car directly behind Caraska’s, saw the truck waiting in the No. four lane. She testified that she could see that traffic was stopping, and she slowed down gradually as she approached the scale facility. However, Caraska did not brake, swerve, or attempt any evasive maneuvers before hitting Bagri’s truck. Hall testified that as she approached the place where the truck was stopped, she wondered why the brake lights of Caraska’s car were not on, and she said aloud, “ ‘Hit the brakes. Hit the brakes.’ � It was obvious to her that the truck was there and the cars would have to stop, and she thought Caraska must have been distracted, because her car never slowed down. Other drivers also saw that trucks were backed up approaching the scale facility.
Plaintiffs presented evidence that notwithstanding the signs in the scale facility, empty trucks were not limited to using lane C, but might use any lane within the facility, that they could exit the freeway from the fifth (or far right) lane and “cut over� to the left lane within the facility, and that at the time of the accident, there were fewer trucks lined up in the fifth lane on the freeway. They also presented evidence that at the time of the accident, the brake lights on Bagri’s truck were not engaged, and he did not have his hazard lights on.
The evidence on this last point was not entirely clear. A driver who was in the fifth lane at the time of the collision testified: “Q[:] At some point as you came closer to the Cordelia scale facility, were trucks backed up or what did it look like as you were approached [sic] the facility? [¶] A[:] When I was approached [sic] the facility, the empty lane, it got two or three trucks parked on the lane. They were, like, waiting to get off from the freeway to scale in. [¶] But my lane was—I think there was, like, one truck but it is like not on the freeway but it was like—you almost exit the freeway, not totally exit the freeway, it was on my lane, but they got two trucks sitting on the fourth lane.â€� He later testified that as he approached the facility, there was a truck in the No. five lane. A worker at the scale facility testified as follows: “Q[:] Okay. Now, when you came to the accident scene, were there big rigs lined up in the number five lane? [¶] A[:] No. [¶] Q[:] No you don’t know, or no there weren’t? [¶] A[:] No, I don’t believe so, because I drove down it[.]â€�
Plaintiffs alleged causes of action against the trucking defendants for negligence, negligent hiring and supervision, and negligence per se. These defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground the undisputed material facts established that plaintiffs could not proffer evidence Bagri negligently caused Caraska’s death. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment for the trucking defendants.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. (Weiner v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142 . . . .) In performing our de novo review, we employ a three-step analysis. ‘First, we identify the issues raised by the pleadings. Second, we determine whether the movant established entitlement to summary judgment, that is, whether the movant showed the opponent could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings. Third, if the movant has met its burden, we consider whether the opposition raised triable issues of fact.’ [Citations.] To shift the burden, the defendant must conclusively negate a necessary element of the plaintiff’s case or demonstrate there is no triable issue of material fact requiring a trial. [Citation.] If the evidence does not support judgment in the defendant’s favor, we must reverse summary judgment without considering the plaintiff’s opposing evidence. [Citation.] Any evidence we evaluate is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the losing party; we strictly scrutinize the defendant’s evidence and resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in the plaintiff’s favor. [Citation.]� (Barber v. Chang (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1462-1463 (Barber).)
B. Negligence Per Se
In their cause of action for negligence per se, plaintiffs alleged that Bagri’s actions violated Vehicle Code section 21718, which provides in pertinent part: “(a) No person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle upon a freeway . . . except: [¶] (1) When necessary to avoid injury or damage to persons or property. [¶] (2) When required by law or in obedience to a peace officer or official traffic control device. [¶] . . . [¶] (5) Where stopping, standing, or parking is specifically permitted. . . .â€�
All undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
The undisputed evidence shows that Bagri did not violate section 21718. He was required to stop at the scale facility. The fourth lane of the freeway was one of the entrances to the facility. Within the facility, the lane marked for empty trucks was on the far left, and in order to reach it from lane five of the freeway, a truck would have to “cut over,� presumably cutting off trucks that had waited their turn in lane four. Bagri was driving an empty truck. There were trucks stopped in lane four of the freeway ahead of him waiting to enter the facility, and he was waiting behind them. On these facts, we agree with the trial court that Bagri indisputably fell within the exceptions to section 21718, subdivision (a): he was required by law to stop, and he was legally permitted to pause in his lane when the traffic ahead of him had stopped. There is no triable issue of fact as to the negligence per se cause of action.
C. Negligence
In their cause of action for general negligence, plaintiffs alleged Bagri was negligent in stopping in the road without displaying any brake lights, hazard lights, or other warnings and that his negligence caused Caraska’s death. They also contend that he was negligent in not using the fifth lane of the freeway, which was not backed up with trucks standing on the freeway, rather than the fourth lane, which required him to block freeway traffic.
We see no triable issue of fact as to whether Bagri negligently caused Caraska’s death. On a dry, clear morning, Bagri stopped his truck at the end of a line of stopped traffic in the left-hand lane of the two lanes that led into the scale facility. The signs at the scale facility directed him to the far left lane within the facility. The trucks were plainly visible to the driver behind Caraska. Caraska drove into the truck without making any attempt to stop or avoid it. The evidence shows that Bagri’s truck was where it was entitled to be—indeed, where the signs indicated it ought to be—and that Bagri had properly stopped behind the other trucks stopped in the traffic.
We reject plaintiffs’ argument that there is a triable issue as to whether Bagri was negligent by failing to have his foot on the brakes in order to engage the brake lights. Plaintiff has drawn our attention to no case indicating that a driver in stop-and-go traffic must have a foot on the brake at all times in order to warn the drivers following of the need to slow down or stop. Such a result would be impractical, as such traffic by its nature has periods of “go,� in which the driver might be accelerating or releasing the brake to let the vehicle roll forward.
Plaintiffs rely on cases in which courts have held that the driver of the lead vehicle in a rear end collision might be found negligent. In Hazel v. McGrath (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 382, 387, the court concluded the jury should have been instructed on contributory negligence where there was evidence that the driver of the lead vehicle came to a sudden stop for a pedestrian without giving a hand signal. Similarly, in Stanton v. Dohmann (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 488, 491 (Stanton), the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court had properly instructed the jury on contributory negligence where there was evidence the driver of the lead vehicle had stopped her vehicle without cause at the end of a freeway approach, in a position where approaching drivers would assume she would continue onto the freeway. Here, on the other hand, the undisputed evidence shows not only that Bagri did not come to a sudden stop without cause, but that his truck, stopped or moving slowly, was plainly visible to drivers behind him.
Nor are we persuaded that there is a triable issue as to Bagri’s negligence in failing to activate his turn signal. We first note that neither the complaint nor plaintiffs’ statement of undisputed facts alleged specifically that Bagri negligently failed to use his turn signal. (See San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 314 [court need not review evidence not referenced in separate statements].) In any case, even assuming the issue was properly raised, we reject plaintiff’s argument. Plaintiffs’ complaint is not that Bagri made an unsafe turn—indeed, Bagri was not turning—but that his truck was stopped on the freeway. Section 22107, which requires a driver to “turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway� only when it can be done with reasonable safety and after giving an appropriate signal, and section 22108, which requires a driver to signal his or her intent to turn right or left to be given continuously during the last 100 feet before turning, are inapposite. For the same reason, the cases cited by plaintiffs dealing with the negligence of a driver who turned without signaling do not assist them. (See Uribe v. McCorkle (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 61, 62-64 [contributory negligence of driver who made left turn without signaling beforehand]; Hoover v. Striegel (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 833, 834, 838 [whether driver should have signaled before turning left at intersection was question of fact for jury].)
In a point not raised in their pleadings below, plaintiffs contend Bagri’s negligence is also shown by his violation of section 22504, which provides in pertinent part: “(a) Upon any highway in unincorporated areas no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the roadway when it is practicable to stop, park, or leave the vehicle off such portion of the highway, but in every event an unobstructed width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of the stopped vehicle shall be available from a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon the highway. . . .� The court in Worford v. Jiminez (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 449, 453, interpreted this statute to mean that “a vehicle shall not be stopped on a highway in any unincorporated area where there is not an unobstructed width of the highway opposite the vehicle allowing the free passage of other vehicles, unless a clear view of the stopped vehicle is available from a distance of not less than 200 feet in each direction upon the highway.� Leaving aside the question of whether the collision took place in an unincorporated area, we reject plaintiffs’ contention that stopping temporarily when traffic in a freeway lane is blocked constitutes a violation of this section. Bagri’s vehicle was plainly visible, and other lanes were available. This is not a case such as Willis v. Gordon (1978) 20 Cal.3d 629, 632, on which plaintiffs rely, in which a car was parked on a portion of the road that might have been a travelled part of the highway. Bagri’s truck was not parked, it was waiting in traffic. We have already concluded that Bagri’s behavior did not violate section 21718—a statute specifically directed toward stopping on a freeway—and we likewise conclude that the evidence shows no violation of section 22504.
Thus, we agree with the trial court that the trucking defendants met their burden to show there was no triable issue of material fact, and that plaintiffs’ opposition did not raise a triable issue. (See Barber, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1462-1463.) In reaching this conclusion, we do not imply that a rear-end collision may not be caused in part by the negligence of the driver of the lead car. (See McCown v. Berry Construction, Inc. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 319, 323; Lowenthal v. Mortimer (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.) Rather, we conclude that on these facts, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Bagri negligently caused Caraska’s death. (See Stanton, supra, 271 Cal.App.2d at p. 491.)
D. Negligent Hiring and Supervision
Plaintiffs contend the trucking defendants failed to address the cause of action for negligent hiring and supervision in their moving papers and, therefore, failed to negate any element of that cause of action. In their cause of action for negligent hiring and supervision, plaintiffs alleged that these defendants knew or should have known that “such negligent conduct as herein alleged, would be likely to cause injury to Plaintiff and others similarly situated.� (Italics added.) The trucking defendants argued in their motion that the undisputed facts showed that Bagri did not commit a negligent act that caused Caraska’s death, and that as a result they were entitled to summary judgment. Although the motion did not separately address the cause of action for negligent hiring and supervision, it clearly applied to the allegation that the trucking defendants should have known that Bagri’s negligent conduct would cause the injuries alleged.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RUVOLO, P.J., REARDON, J.