Summary
In Rubio the jury's award of $750,000 for past pain and suffering and $1,684,615.40 for future pain and suffering over 14.6 years was reduced to $500,000 [pps] and $500,000 [fps], respectively.
Summary of this case from Thompson v. ToscanoOpinion
2012-10-11
Wallace D. Gossett, Brooklyn (Lawrence A. Silver of counsel), for appellant. Pollack Pollack Isaac & De Cicco, New York (Brian J. Isaac of counsel), for respondent.
Wallace D. Gossett, Brooklyn (Lawrence A. Silver of counsel), for appellant. Pollack Pollack Isaac & De Cicco, New York (Brian J. Isaac of counsel), for respondent.
ANDRIAS, J.P., FRIEDMAN, MOSKOWITZ, FREEDMAN, MANZANET–DANIELS, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol E. Huff, J.), entered January 25, 2011, upon a jury verdict, awarding plaintiff the amounts of $750,000 for past pain and suffering, $1,684,615.40 for future pain and suffering over 14.6 years and $30,000 for past medical expenses, unanimously modified, on the facts, to vacate the awards for past and future pain and suffering and order a new trial as to such damages, unless plaintiff stipulates, within 30 days of service of a copy of this order with notice of entry, to a reduction of the awards for past and future pain and suffering to $500,000 and $500,000, respectively, and to entry of an amended judgment in accordance therewith, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
The court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in allowing plaintiff's expert to testify on the proper use of a bus' kneeling mechanism based upon, inter alia, his 35 years of experience in the transportation industry and familiarity with kneeling mechanisms ( see Melo v. Morm Mgt. Co., 93 A.D.3d 499, 940 N.Y.S.2d 83 [1st Dept. 2012] ). Defendant's objections to the expert's qualifications go to the weight and not the admissibility of his testimony ( see Williams v. Halpern, 25 A.D.3d 467, 808 N.Y.S.2d 68 [1st Dept. 2006] ). The expert's reference to defendant's internal rules did not improperly suggest a higher standard of care than that required under common law ( see Lopez v. New York City Tr. Auth., 60 A.D.3d 529, 530, 875 N.Y.S.2d 467 [1st Dept. 2009],lv. denied13 N.Y.3d 717, 2010 WL 156648 [2010] ).
The court did not err in limiting the introduction of plaintiff's medical records concerning preexisting conditions not alleged to have been exacerbated or aggravated in the accident where defendant failed to establish relevance ( see e.g. Arroyo v. City of New York, 171 A.D.2d 541, 543, 567 N.Y.S.2d 257 [1st Dept. 1991];compare McGlone v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 90 A.D.3d 479, 934 N.Y.S.2d 161 [1st Dept. 2011] ). Contrary to defendant's claim, plaintiff did not place his entire pre-accident medical condition at issue by testifying as to his general health.
Defendant's argument that statements made by plaintiff's counsel during summation warrant a new trial is unpreserved ( see Lucian v. Schwartz, 55 A.D.3d 687, 689, 865 N.Y.S.2d 643 [2d Dept. 2008],lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 703, 876 N.Y.S.2d 704, 904 N.E.2d 841 [2009] ). In any event, the statements complained of constituted either fair comment on the evidence or a response to defendant's arguments with respect to witness credibility, and are not the type that could have deprived defendant of a fair trial ( see Bennett v. Wolf, 40 A.D.3d 274, 275, 835 N.Y.S.2d 148 [1st Dept. 2007],lv. denied9 N.Y.3d 818, 852 N.Y.S.2d 14, 881 N.E.2d 1201 [2008] ).
Plaintiff, who was 62 years old at the time of the accident and had a preexisting biceps tear, suffered a rotator cuff tear, for which he underwent an unsuccessful surgical repair, resulting in a permanent reduction in strength and range of motion. Under the circumstances, we find that the awards for past and future pain and suffering deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation to the extent indicated (CPLR 5501[c]; compare Bernstein v. Red Apple Supermarkets, 227 A.D.2d 264, 642 N.Y.S.2d 303 [1st Dept. 1996],lv. dismissed89 N.Y.2d 961, 655 N.Y.S.2d 881, 678 N.E.2d 493 [1997];Guillory v. Nautilus Real Estate, 208 A.D.2d 336, 624 N.Y.S.2d 110 [1st Dept. 1995],lv. dismissed and denied86 N.Y.2d 881, 635 N.Y.S.2d 943, 659 N.E.2d 766 [1995] ).
We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.