Opinion
C. A. 6:22-cv-00456-TLW-KFM
03-15-2022
Jermal Stephon Roy-Brown, Petitioner, v. Kristen Graziano, Respondent.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The petitioner, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas relief. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
The petitioner's § 2241 petition was entered on the docket on February 11, 2022 (doc. 1). By order issued on February 24, 2022, the petitioner was informed that his case was not in proper form for judicial screening (doc. 5). The petitioner complied with the Court's Order, bringing his case into proper form for judicial screening. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the petitioner's § 2241 petition be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file an answer or return.
ALLEGATIONS
The petitioner, a pretrial detainee currently located in the Al Cannon Detention Center (“the Detention Center”) brings this § 2241 action asserting that his rights have been violated in his pending criminal proceedings in the Charleston County General Sessions Court (doc. 1). Of note, the petitioner has three pending charges (and one probation violation charge) in the Charleston County General Sessions Court. See Charleston County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Charleston/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the petitioner's name and W10200042, 2020A1010200374, 2020A1010200376, 2020A1010200378) (last visited March 15, 2022).
As ground one for relief in this matter, the petitioner asserts that he did not live at the residence where a search warrant, which led to his pending criminal charges, was issued (id. at 6). As ground two for relief, the petitioner alleges that although a search warrant was issued, he was wrongfully arrested because an arrest warrant was never issued for his arrest (id.). Ground three for relief is that the materials that were found in the residence belonged to the homeowner, not the petitioner (id.). Ground four is that the petitioner was not indicted or provided a preliminary hearing for his charges (id. at 7).
For relief, the petitioner seeks suppression of all evidence that was wrongfully seized as well as to have his charges dismissed for a lack of evidence (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The undersigned has reviewed the petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; and other habeas corpus statutes. As a pro se litigant, the petitioner's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The mandated liberal construction means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The petitioner, a pretrial detainee, filed this action seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. However, as outlined below, the petition is subject to summary dismissal.
Exhaustion Requirement
A habeas corpus application allows a petitioner to challenge the fact, length, or conditions of custody and seek immediate release. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1973). A pretrial detainee's exclusive federal remedy for alleged unconstitutional confinement is to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), but only after fully exhausting the available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added); See United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995); Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037, 1041 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting that “[u]ntil the State has been accorded a fair opportunity by any available procedure to consider the issue and afford a remedy if relief is warranted, federal courts in habeas proceedings by state [inmates] should stay their hand.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1918) (“It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial.”); Watkins v. Cartlege, C/A No. 3:13-cv-01129-CMC, 2013 WL 3282913, at *4 (D.S.C. June 26, 2013) (“Hence, pretrial detainees involved in state criminal proceedings who seek to bring challenges to their custody pursuant to § 2241, as well as state prisoners who seek to challenge their custody on any basis that may properly be raised pursuant to § 2241, must first exhaust their state-court remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus relief.”).
Here, as noted above, the petitioner's criminal charges are still pending. See Charleston County Public Index (enter the petitioner's name and W10200042, 2020A1010200374, 2020A1010200376, 2020A1010200378) (last visited March 15, 2022).
The petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies in the trial and appellate courts, and as outlined below, has alleged no exceptional circumstances sufficient to excuse this failure. As such, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the petition without prejudice.
Younger Abstention
Alternatively, the court may not proceed with this action because federal courts cannot interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings, absent extraordinary circumstances. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Here, the first criterion is met, as the petitioner is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. As for the second criterion, the Supreme Court has stated that the “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting “‘that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Here, the petitioner can challenge and move to suppress the alleged illegally seized evidence, and argue that he was wrongfully denied a preliminary hearing in his pending state criminal proceedings. See Kugler, 421 U.S. at 124. Moreover, the petitioner has not made a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” justifying federal interference with the state proceedings. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where ‘extraordinary circumstances' exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm.”). For example, in examining extraordinary circumstances, courts have essentially analyzed whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention - meaning no extraordinary circumstances are shown where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, such as that evidence should be suppressed or a preliminary hearing was not held (as alleged in this matter). See Brown v. Dir. of Florence Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 2:20-cv-02951-JD-MGB, 2021 WL 6139411, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Oct. 5, 2021), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 6137483 (D.S.C. Dec. 29, 2021). Therefore, to the extent the petitioner seeks suppression of evidence in his pending criminal charges and to have the charges dismissed for lack of evidence, this court should abstain from hearing this action.
Of note, the public index for the petitioner's pending criminal charges indicates that after requesting a preliminary hearing on February 5, 2020, he waived it on March 2, 2020. See Charleston County Public Index (enter the petitioner's name and W10200042, 2020A1010200374, 2020A1010200376, 2020A1010200378) (last visited March 15, 2022).
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the petitioner cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his petition. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, 807 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2015). As noted in more detail above, the instant action is subject to dismissal because the petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies as well as based upon the petitioner's pending criminal charges. Thus, the undersigned recommends that the court decline to automatically give the petitioner leave to amend his petition, as these pleading deficiencies cannot be corrected at this time. Accordingly, it is recommended that the petitioner's § 2241 petition be dismissed without requiring the respondent to file a return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).