Opinion
2:23-cv-04692-DCC-MGB
04-26-2024
Keith E. Jeno, Petitioner, v. Nick Gallam, Detention Captain, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Petitioner Keith E. Jeno (“Petitioner” or “Jeno”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the petition be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without requiring Respondent Nick Gallam (“Respondent” or “Gallam”) to respond.
BACKGROUND
Jeno is currently detained at the Aiken County Detention Center. According to state court records, he was arrested for criminal sexual conduct with a minor of the third degree on February 26, 2020, and posted a $30,000 bond on or around May 20, 2020.(See Case No. 2020A0210200351.) On September 24, 2020, Jeno was arrested for criminal sexual conduct with a minor of the first degree, and the Aiken County Court of General Sessions denied his motion for bond on January 5, 2021. (See Case Nos. 2020A0220500200, 2020A0220500201.) On October 11, 2021, the State brought a fourth charge against Jeno for criminal sexual conduct with a minor of the third degree, for which bond was apparently set at $25,000. (See Case No. 2021A0220500339.)
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Jeno's underlying state criminal proceedings. See https://www.sccourts.org/caseSearch/ (limiting search to Aiken County) (last visited February 28, 2024); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites).
On August 8, 2023, Jeno filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his ongoing detention on several grounds. (See Jeno v. Gallam, Case No. 2:23-cv-3907-DCC-MGB (D.S.C. Dec. 5, 2023), Dkt. No. 1.) Specifically, Jeno argued that the State had yet to present any of the aforementioned criminal charges to a grand jury for a true bill of indictment, and that he was “actually innocent” of the charges against him, as shown by certain “exculpatory evidence.” (Case No. 3907, Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4; see also Case No. 3907, Dkt. Nos. 1-3, 1-6.) The petition also suggested that the Aiken County Court of General Sessions improperly relied on a false statement made by one of the alleged victim's fathers regarding Jeno's criminal history in denying his motion for bond. (Case No. 3907, Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.) On October 3, 2023, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation concluding that the petition was subject to summary dismissal because the Court could not equitably interfere with Jeno's underlying state criminal proceedings, and the assigned United States District Judge adopted the recommendation by Order dated December 5, 2023. (Case No. 3907, Dkt. Nos. 6, 11.)
Jeno now brings a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, reiterating “his innocence” and alleging that he continues to be “held in pretrial status without these false [charges] being presented to nor indicted by a grand jury true bill” in violation of Rule 3 of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure. (See Jeno v. Gallum, 2:23-cv-4692-DCC-MGB, Dkt. No. 1 at 2; see also Case No. 4692, Dkt. No. 1-2.) Jeno also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that his public defender “will not move for a trial nor bond” (Case No. 4692, Dkt. No. 1 at 2) and informed him that “prosecutors do not have to indicte [sic] until just prior to trial” (Case No. 4692, Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2). Jeno also suggests that his attorney is refusing to “subpoena exculpatory evidence from ring.com” because it “is not a South Carolina business.” (Case No. 4692, Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3.) Based on the above, Jeno asks that the Court “order dismissal” of his pending criminal charges and “release [him] from custody without delay.” (Case No. 4692, Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) In the alternative, Jeno contends that “the issues must be presented to a grand jury . . . and that a . . . reasonable bond must be issued if true billed forthwith.” (Id.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Jeno's pro se petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts;the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; and the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply any or all of these rules to § 2241 petitions).
The narrow question before the Court is whether it “plainly appears” that Jeno is not entitled to any relief. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, his petition must be dismissed; if not, Gallam must respond. Id. Because Jeno is a pro se litigant, his petition is accorded liberal construction. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Under certain circumstances, a pretrial detainee may bring a petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.” See United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987)). It is well-settled, however, that such relief is available only if the detainee has “exhausted his state court remedies and shown the existence of special circumstances to justify federal intervention.” Brazell v. Boyd, 991 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1993) (Table) (referencing Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224-26); see also Roy-Brown v. Graziano, No. 6:22-cv-456-TLW-KFM, 2022 WL 18359176, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 15, 2022) (explaining that a pretrial detainee generally cannot challenge the constitutionality of his confinement without fully exhausting the available state court remedies), adopted sub nom. Roy-Brown v. Warden of F.C.I. Bennettsville, 2023 WL 285469 (D.S.C. Jan. 18, 2023). Where, as here, the State has not been accorded “a fair opportunity . . . to consider the issue and afford a remedy if relief is warranted, federal courts in habeas proceedings by state [detainees] should stay their hand.” Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037, 1041 (4th Cir. 1976) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
There is no indication in the petition or the available state court records that Jeno has attempted to exhaust any available state court remedies. See https://www.sccourts.org/caseSearch/ (limiting search to Aiken County) (last visited February 28, 2024).
The United States Supreme Court emphasized this principle in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), finding that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). As the undersigned explained in Jeno's previous habeas action (Case No. 3907, Dkt. No. 6 at 4), the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Turning to the instant case, the first criterion is still satisfied because Jeno's criminal proceedings remain ongoing. The second criterion is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has explained that “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). Finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Jeno can still address his claims in his pending criminal proceedings. Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (noting that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”) (referencing Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)); see also Sparks v. Mitchell Cty., No. 1:21-cv-50-MR, 2021 WL 781508, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 1, 2021) (“Under the third prong, the scheme for federal habeas review is designed ‘to give the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.”) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). Because Jeno's case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, federal habeas relief is available only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224-26 .
Similar to his previous habeas action, Jeno has not shown the type of extreme misconduct or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant federal interference in a pending state criminal case. While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention; thus, where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. See Askins v. Dir. of Florence Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 9:20-cv-2846-DCC-MHC, 2020 WL 7001015, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (referencing Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975)), adopted, 2020 WL 6110960 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2020). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Id.; see also Victoria v. Bodiford, No. 8:21-cv-1836-JMC, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021) (“If Petitioner has the opportunity to raise his constitutional arguments within the state court proceedings and appeal adverse determinations within the state court system, this court is bound by Younger to abstain from granting Petitioner the relief he requests.”).
Here, Jeno has been appointed defense counsel and is plainly able to raise his claims regarding the delays in his criminal proceedings in his underlying state court action. See, e.g., Holmes v. Grant, No. 4:22-cv-3459-MGL-TER, 2022 WL 19331394, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2022) (finding no extraordinary circumstances where petitioner argued that his criminal proceedings were not being conducted in a timely manner), adopted, 2023 WL 2717362 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2023); Westpoint v. Al Cannon, No. 9:17-cv-2137-RMG-BM, 2017 WL 5004812, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2017) (dismissing habeas petition pursuant to Younger because detainee was able to raise claims of excessive bond and procedural delays during state court proceedings), adopted, 2017 WL 5027497 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2017); Bennekin v. Baugh, No. 4:14-cv-4004, 2014 WL 6909017, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 8, 2014) (finding that plaintiff was not foreclosed from raising delayed indictment claim and having it ruled on “by the state court judge in his on-going state criminal prosecution”). Because Jeno can pursue his claims in state court, he cannot demonstrate “special circumstances,” or show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. The undersigned therefore finds that Jeno is still precluded from federal habeas relief at this time.
To that end, it is worth noting that even if Jeno eventually raises some of his claims in state court, much of his frustration appears to stem from the misconception that the failure of the solicitor to act upon his warrants within ninety days pursuant to Rule 3(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure somehow “invalidate[s]” those warrants or “prevent[s] subsequent prosecution,” which is simply not the case. See Jeffcoat v. Cartledge, No. 2:12-cv-2849-RMG, 2013 WL 4505408, at *9 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2013) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to object to violation of the 90-day rule because the objection “would not have avoided prosecution”).
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that Petitioner cannot cure the deficiencies in his petition by amendment and therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS the petition without prejudice and without requiring Gallam to respond.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to the Important Notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).