Summary
holding that a movant's disagreement with the court's reasoning for denying a motion for summary judgment does not meet the burden necessary for reconsideration
Summary of this case from Clifford v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co.Opinion
1:04-CV-0475 (GLS).
January 28, 2005
HAROLD L. ROSENBERGER, Plaintiff, Pro se, Highland, NY, for Plaintiff.
HON. ELIOT J. SPITZER, Office of the Attorney General, The Capitol Litigation Bureau Albany, NY, for Defendants.
LISA ULLMAN, ESQ., Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel.
DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Harold L. Rosenberger (Rosenberger) moves under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Rule (L.R.) 7.1(g) for reconsideration of this court's December 20, 2004 Decision-Order dismissing the complaint against the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Robert Doar and the Ulster Family Court (defendants). For the following reasons, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
II. Background
The facts and the procedural history underlying this litigation are comprehensively stated in the court's December 20, 2004 Decision-Order, familiarity with which is presumed. See Dkt. No. 19. However, a brief procedural history is a necessary prerequisite to the disposition of the motion.On April 29, 2004, Rosenberger filed a complaint alleging that New York's income-based child support guidelines under the Family Court Act (FCA) § 413 and Domestic Relations Law (DRL) § 240 infringed upon "his fundamental right to privacy and property rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ." See Compl. ¶¶ 1-3, Dkt. No. 1. Specifically, Rosenberger alleged that the state infringed on his fundamental right of "how much money a parent spends for the care and maintenance of his or her child." See id. ¶ 5. On June 22, 2004, an entry of default was entered against the defendants for failing to timely answer. See Dkt. No. 7. On June 23, the defendants moved simultaneously to set aside the Clerk's entry of default and to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). See Dkt. Nos. 8, 9. Rosenberger responded by filing cross-motions seeking to enter default judgment and to strike defendants' motion to dismiss. See Dkt. Nos. 10-12.
In support, Rosenberger attached the Findings Decision Order of the state court judgment pertaining to his child custody payments. See Compl., Ex. 2, Dkt. No. 1.
On December 20, the court issued a Decision-Order and entered judgment vacating the entry of default against the defendants and dismissing the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). See Dkt. No. 19. On December 29, Rosenberger filed the present motion seeking reconsideration of the court's dismissal of his complaint. See Dkt. No. 21. Defendants filed their opposition. See Dkt. No. 22. Rosenberger then filed a reply brief without seeking leave of this court and in violation of L.R. 7.1(g). Accordingly, Rosenberger's reply brief was rejected and his subsequent request for leave to file a reply brief was denied. See Dkt. Nos. 23,24.
In his request for leave to file a reply brief, Rosenberger argued that defendants raised "de novo issues relating to the controversy and standing requirements" in their opposition brief by attaching the Second Circuit Summary Order in Rosenberger v. Pataki, et al., Dkt. No. 04-0312, 2005 WL 78768 (2d Cir. Jan. 11, 2005) (unpublished opinion). See Dkt. No. 24. Contrary to Rosenberger's assertion, defendants did raise the issue of Article III controversy and standing in their moving papers and there is no de novo issues before this court. See Def.'s Br. p. 8, Dkt. No. 8. Regardless, since the " Rooker-Feldman doctrine affect[ed] the threshold issue of the district court's subject matter jurisdiction," this court considered it first and does so again in this decision. See Walker v. New York, 345 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287 n. 2 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2004)).
III. Discussion
A. Rosenberger's Motion for Reconsideration 1. Standard of ReviewGenerally, the prevailing rule "recognizes only three possible grounds upon which motions for reconsideration may be granted; they are (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence not previously available, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." In re C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship, 182 B.R. 1, 3 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). "[A] motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). "[A]ny litigant considering bringing a motion for reconsideration must evaluate whether what may seem to be a clear error of law is in fact simply a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant." Gaston v. Coughlin, 102 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations omitted).
2. Application of Standard
In the present case, Rosenberger only relies on the third ground in his motion for reconsideration, namely to correct a "clear error of law." See Pl.'s Br. p. 4, Dkt. No. 22. He first argues that the court "fail[ed] to address whether the plaintiff's federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court's judgment." See id. at 5. Secondly, he contends that the court failed to address his "general challenge to the constitutionality of the . . ., FCA and DRL [provisions] . . ., that mandate child support. . . ." See id. at 6.
However, a review of Rosenberger's brief and this court's Decision-Order demonstrates that these issues have been considered at length. See December 20, 2004 Decision-Order, pp. 15-18, Dkt. No. 19. This court has provided Rosenberger with a detailed analysis that the complaint was "inextricably intertwined" with his facial challenge and was "in essence call[ing] upon [this court] to review the state-court decision." See id. at p. 16 (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483-84 n. 16 (1983) and Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993)). Additionally, this court would be outside the bounds of its jurisdiction in addressing subjects of domestic relations which clearly "belong to the laws of the States. . . ." See id. at 17 (citing Neustein v. Orbach, 732 F. Supp. 333, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)).
While Rosenberger may disagree with this reasoning, he has articulated no clear error of law or any other grounds that would induce the court to grant a motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Offices, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 427, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying motion for reconsideration where movant "reargue[d] the points it made during the initial briefing and . . . explain[ed] to the Court how its analysis is 'erroneous'"); United States v. Delvi, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1672, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2004) (denying motion for reconsideration where movant "point[ed] to no facts or law that the Court overlooked in reaching its conclusion, and instead simply reiterate[d] the facts and arguments that the Court already considered and rejected"). A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity for "a second bite at the apple." Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court's findings and ruling remain unchanged.
IV. Conclusion
After careful review of the submissions and for the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that Rosenberger's motion for reconsideration is DENIED and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Decision-Order to the parties.