Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:03-CV-0116-C.
July 28, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On this day the Court considered the Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, together with Appendix, filed by Defendants NOLAN COUNTY, TEXAS ("County") and NOLAN COUNTY SHERIFF DONNIE RANNIFELD ("Rannifeld") (collectively, "Defendants") on May 3, 2004. The Court also considered the Response in Opposition and Brief in Support, together with Appendix, filed by Plaintiff, JULIE ROGERS ("Plaintiff"), on May 24, 2004. The Court did not consider Defendants' Reply, filed without leave of the Court on June 8, 2004, See http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judges ¶ II.B., Requirements for District Judge Sam R. Cummings. Also before the Court is Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence, filed on June 8, 2004.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 5, 2001, Plaintiff turned herself in to the Nolan County Sheriff's Department and was incarcerated in the Nolan County Jail because of a warrant on a motion to revoke her probation for theft by check. At the time of Plaintiff's incarceration, she was under treatment by MHMR for depression and bi-polar disorder. Plaintiff was taking four different prescription medications, including lithium, which continued to be administered to her by the jail employees during her incarceration. On July 7, 2001, Plaintiff became ill from a sore throat and began to run a fever. On July 8, 2001, Plaintiff submitted a written request to see a doctor as was required by the jail policy. On July 12, 2001, at approximately 12:00 a.m., Plaintiff was taken to the emergency room at Rolling Plains Memorial Hospital, where she was administered antibiotics and then returned to the County jail. Defendants continued to administer Plaintiff's mental health prescription medication along with her newly prescribed antibiotics four times each day for the duration of her incarceration. On or about July 18, 2001, Plaintiff began to suffer uncontrollable tremors in her hand and notified several deputies about the problem, at first telling them it was just a reaction to her medication that would go away and that she did not need to see a doctor.Over the next two weeks, Plaintiff's condition worsened as the tremors moved from her hands into her legs, and she began to experience hallucinations in early August. At this time, Plaintiff was having difficulty eating, walking, or taking care of herself. On August 4, 2001, Plaintiff's mother visited her at the jail. Two days later, on August 6, 2001, Plaintiff's cell mates called Plaintiff's mother to inform her of her daughter's medical difficulties. Plaintiff's mother reported this to jail officials that same date and requested medical attention for her daughter. Plaintiff's cell mates also informed jail deputies about Plaintiff's worsened condition and need for medical attention. The deputies instructed the cell mates to make sure Plaintiff was taking her medications. That same day, when a Deputy Hill ("Hill") asked what was wrong, Plaintiff mentioned her hallucinations for the first time. She informed Hill that she was not taking some of her medication and that was the likely source of her difficulties. Deputy Hill called MHMR to discuss Plaintiff's failure to take her medication and was told to bring Plaintiff in for an appointment at 9:00 a.m. on August 7, 2001.
At 7:15 a.m. on August 7, 2001, Deputy Hill was again informed by Plaintiff's cell mates of her condition, including her hallucinations, and Plaintiff was transferred first to an isolation cell and then to the Nolan County MHMR office ahead of the time scheduled for her appointment. The doctor at MHMR examined Plaintiff and had her transferred to the Rolling. Plains Memorial Hospital Emergency Room. At the hospital, Plaintiff began to suffer seizures and went into respiratory distress. As a result, Plaintiff was airlifted to Covenant Medical Center in Lubbock, Texas, where she was treated for the next ten days for complications associated with an elevated lithium level. Plaintiff was then transferred to Big Spring Hospital for psychotherapy and to begin a new medication regimen and was released twenty days later.
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants on July 3, 2003. Plaintiff sues the County and the County's Sheriff, Donnie Rannifeld, in his official capacity. She also sues various unknown deputies in their individual capacities. Plaintiff alleges a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments that occurred as a result of the County employees' alleged failure to treat her medical needs while she was incarcerated in the County jail. Plaintiff further alleges various state-law violations for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff has no or at least insufficient evidence of a deprivation of her constitutional rights or that the County had a policy or custom that led to any deprivation of Plaintiff's rights, along with various arguments precluding Plaintiff's claims under state law.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not clearly state that Sheriff Rannifeld is being sued in his individual capacity, although she does make such a claim in her Response. However, Plaintiff does not allege that Sheriff Rannifeld directly committed any of the acts she complains of and further states that she does not believe he had any personal knowledge of her medical condition while she was in jail. [App. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 153-54]. Therefore, there is no basis for him to be sued in his individual capacity or supervisory capacity, and this Court determines that he is sued only in his official capacity. See Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring defendant's actual knowledge of (or at least willful blindness to) serious risk for claim of supervisory liability).
Plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Rannifeld in his official capacity are in reality claims against the County. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985); Russell v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 406 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A suit against a person in his official capacity is merely another way of pleading a cause of action against the governmental entity itself and should be dismissed. Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001). Consequently, the official-capacity suit against Sheriff Rannifeld is duplicative of the suit against the County and summary judgment dismissing Sheriff Rannifeld is appropriate.
Defendants' arguments against Plaintiff's charges under § 1983 improperly invoke a claim of sovereign immunity in their section labels. Sovereign immunity only protects a state against claims in a § 1983 suit and offers no protection for a county and its subdivisions. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-01, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1176-77, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979); Crane v. State of Tex., 759 F.2d 412, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, Defendants' arguments do assert the proper grounds for defending against a § 1983 claim.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255.
Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward, after adequate time for discovery, with significant probative evidence showing a triable issue of fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Rather, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find in the non-movant's favor. Id.
Finally, in reviewing the summary judgment evidence, "Rule 56 does not impose upon this Court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment." Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Rather, the Court need rely only on those portions of the submitted documents to which the nonmoving party directs the Court's attention. Id. See also Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1536-37 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that two volumes of summary judgment evidence were insufficient to preclude summary judgment when plaintiffs failed to identify specific portions which supported their claims). Moreover, Local Rule 56.5(c) expressly requires that a party filing an appendix "must include in its brief citations to each page of the appendix that supports each assertion that the party makes concerning the summary judgment evidence." This Court will only consider the admissible summary judgment evidence discussed and specifically identified in the parties' motions and responses.
III. DISCUSSION
Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants on July 3, 2003, bringing a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments that occurred as a result of the County employees' alleged failure to treat her medical needs while she was incarcerated in the County jail. In order to succeed on her claim for municipal liability against the County, Plaintiff must be able to show that one of the County's employees violated her civil rights as a result of a County policy or custom, See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Thus, the County cannot be liable unless one of its employees has committed a constitutional violation under § 1983. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 1573, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (per curiam) ("If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized [unconstitutional action] is quite beside the point.") (emphasis in original); Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 191 n. 18 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Heller's holding "that if no claim is stated against officials — if plaintiff does not show any violation of his constitutional rights — then there exists no liability to pass through to the county."). Consequently, the Court must first address whether or not the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find that any county jail employee violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment.
Of course, the protections provided by the Eighth Amendment are generally applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2925 (1989). However, Plaintiff raises specific constitutional violations based on claims that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. In this sense, Plaintiff's incarceration implicates the Fourteenth Amendment only if she has alleged that her treatment was a form of punishment for a crime for which she had not yet been convicted. See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 104 (5th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff was jailed pursuant to revocation of her probation, her incarceration was pursuant to a prior conviction, and consequently her claims only state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 106 n. 8.
Although Defendants asserted qualified immunity in their Answer, they have not raised the issue in their Motion for Summary Judgment. Instead, Defendants rely solely on their argument that no evidence or insufficient evidence exists to support a finding that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. Accordingly, the Court addresses only that issue.
Plaintiff has sued unnamed, unknown County deputies for violating her Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that would be sufficient, if believed by a jury, to permit that jury to find that any of them violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. In order to raise a genuine issue of a violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the context of this case, it would be necessary for Plaintiff to present some evidence to show that an individual had acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs while incarcerated. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Deliberate indifference encompasses only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of mankind. See id. at 104-06, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292-92; McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has adopted a subjective standard for deliberate indifference: "[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment . . . unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); see also Lawson v. Dallas County, 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The deliberate indifference standard is a subjective inquiry; the plaintiff must establish that the jail officials were actually aware of the risk, yet consciously disregarded it.").
Although Plaintiff suggests in her Response that she is prepared "to amend her complaint to name the unknowns" if granted leave to do so, it is not necessary that the names be known in order for this Court to determine whether summary judgment is proper on the issue of municipal liability. However, any amendment by Plaintiff now to substitute a named party or parties for those "Unknown Deputies" could not relate back to the date of Plaintiff's Original Complaint unless her failure to name the proper party was due to mistake or misidentification. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(3); Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 1998). Because Plaintiff's § 1983 cause of action would have accrued at the latest in August 2001, when she was released from incarceration and came under the treatment of MHMR and Covenant Medical Center, Plaintiff's suit under § 1983 against any substitute parties is time-barred and consequently would be futile. See id. at 318 (applying the forum state's personal injury limitations period to a § 1983 action); TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 16.003(a) (setting two-year statute of limitations for personal injury lawsuits in Texas).
Furthermore, the Court also notes that any amendment would be futile for the additional reasons stated in the remainder of this Opinion, e.g., that Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence that any jail employee violated her Eighth Amendment rights. Because Defendants have not moved for summary judgment as to the § 1983 claims against the "Unknown Deputies," this Court accordingly determines sua sponte that these claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
Deliberate indifference is manifested when jail officials intentionally deny or delay access to medical care or intentionally interfere with the treatment once prescribed. Id. at 104-05 (citation and footnotes omitted); see also, Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle for same proposition). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, the prisoner must show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, "[b]ecause society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). Negligent medical care does not give rise to a § 1983 claim, and a delay in medical care is actionable only "if there has been deliberate indifference, which results in substantial harm." Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993).
Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff suffered from a medical condition that presented a serious medical need while she was incarcerated. Neither do Defendants dispute Plaintiff's evidence that she suffered substantial harm because of lithium toxicity that occurred while she was in the County jail. Rather, Defendants' argument rests on their contention that there is no or insufficient evidence to support Plaintiff's claim that Defendants were deliberately indifferent. In an attempt to show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent, Plaintiff alleges violations of numerous rules adopted by the Texas Commission on Jail Standards ("TCJS") as well as articles of various state codes. Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to show a violation of at least some state statute or regulation, this is not the same as showing that Plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[o]fficials, sued for violation of constitutional rights, do not forfeit their immunity by violating some other statute or regulation. Rather, these officials become liable for damages only to the extent that there is a clear violation of the . . . rights that give rise to the cause of action for damages [under § 1983]." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n. 12, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019 n. 12, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). Although the Supreme Court in Davis was addressing the objective component of the good-faith test for qualified immunity, which is not before this Court, the Supreme Court made it clear that violation of statutory standards of conduct alone is not sufficient to establish that a defendant's actions transgressed "clearly established" constitutional rights. Id. at 194. Likewise, the Fifth Circuit has said that "the enforcement of state law is the job of the states, and the federal civil rights statute may not be used to bootstrap alleged violations of state law into federal claims." Bush v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1209 (5th Cir. 1986).
The Court here is referring to Plaintiff's depression and bi-polar disorder for which she was being treated and prescribed medication by MHMR. The Court is not referring to Plaintiff's complaints regarding her fever and sore throat symptoms shortly after being jailed. Although Plaintiff does not deny she received treatment for those symptoms, she nevertheless claims that the care she received was so inadequate as to violate her Eighth Amendment rights. Nothing about that incident indicates the presence of a serious medical need. See Jackson v. Walton, 2003 WL 22846399, *2 (N.D. Tex., 2003) ("Nothing about plaintiff's initial complaint of fever and a sere throat would indicate a medical emergency or even a serious medical need and it is commonly recognized that doctors can do little about a cold virus,"). Defendants, however, do not dispute the seriousness of the fever and sore throat symptoms but rely on the fact that the evidence does not show that any deputy was deliberately indifferent to that particular medical need. Indeed, the evidence shows that jail officials responded promptly to Plaintiff's written requests for medication to treat her symptoms, made an appointment to see a doctor for the next day after receiving her written request, and followed up by promptly obtaining and administering the antibiotics prescribed by the doctor for those symptoms. [App. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 17-27, 120-28]. The conduct of the jail officials, as described by Plaintiff in her deposition testimony and confirmed by the jail's business records, does not constitute deliberate indifference to any serious medical need and cannot sustain a claim that any individual defendant violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights with regard to her fever and sore throat symptoms.
Plaintiff has failed to include in her brief citations to those pages of her Appendix that support her assertion of statutory and regulatory violations. However, the Court is willing to grant that some of her deposition testimony might be some evidence that violations did occur.
The Court in Davis recognized an exception to this rule, e.g., where state law may bear upon a claim under the Due Process Clause when the property interest violated is itself created by state law. See also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (recognizing that States "may under certain circumstances created liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause,"). However, no state-created interests are at issue in this case.
As the Fifth Circuit made clear in Doe v. Rains County Independent School District, the question of whether a constitutional violation has occurred is separate from the question of whether a state statute has been violated and therefore "[a] state employee's breach of a duty does not by itself establish her liability under § 1983." Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1408 (5th Cir. 1995). Rather, as the Doe court noted, a constitutional violation must be established separately from the issue of a state statutory violation, after which the state statute can help identify those parties who are responsible under state law. Id. at 1409. "In short," the Doe court continued, "once we determine that a constitutional violation has occurred, we are no longer barred from finding another person liable under § 1983 for constitutional injury, even if the breach itself does not independently satisfy the elements of a constitutional claim." Id. Consequently, evidence that any of the defendants failed to follow state statutes or regulations does not establish that they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs.
Thus, this Court must determine whether any other evidence adduced by Plaintiff raises a genuine issue of whether her serious medical needs were treated with deliberate indifference by any of the defendants. Plaintiff claims that Defendants provided her with no mental health care or access to any mental health care professional during her incarceration, and only limited medical care, and consciously ignored her clear manifestation of mental illness and repeated requests to see a mental health care provider. However, Plaintiff's allegations are not supported by the evidence. The evidence, in the form of Plaintiff's deposition testimony, shows that when she first began exhibiting symptoms such as tremors, on about July 18, 2001, and for approximately the next two weeks, she assured the jail officials that it was nothing to be concerned about, that the tremors would go away, and that she did not need to see a doctor. [App. to Pl's, Resp. at 297-99; App. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 129].
Plaintiff's deposition testimony also establishes that, even after she claims the tremors became more serious and moved into her legs at sometime during the next few weeks, she never followed the jail procedures to request a form to submit a written request to see a doctor, even though she was aware of the procedures and had followed them on a previous occasion. [App. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 148]. The evidence shows that during this time the jail officials never varied from or neglected Plaintiff's prescribed medical treatment. [ Id. at 28-37]. Plaintiff presents no evidence of an outwardly discernable difference in her symptoms or of any verbal requests to see a doctor until, at the earliest, August 4, 2001. On this date, which was the first day her mother visited her in jail, Plaintiff claims she began to experience hallucinations. [ Id. at 61 (jail visitor log) and 131-32]. Plaintiff's deposition testimony establishes that some time that day or the next Plaintiff began to inform various jail officials that her symptoms had changed and she needed to see someone from MHMR. [App. to Pl's. Resp. at 324-26]. The evidence also establishes that although her mother visited her on August 4, 2001, Plaintiff did not request help from her mother in getting a doctor appointment until she had one of her cell mates call her mother on August 6, 2001. [App. to Pl's. Resp. at 324-25]. Plaintiff's mother made the request to the jail staff on the afternoon of that same day, stating in her opinion they did not appear to be too interested and did not call her back to report on Plaintiff's condition. [ Id. at 3, ¶ 3-4]. However, the evidence shows that by the time Plaintiff's mother had called, Deputy Johnson had already left word for Deputy Hill at 6:20 a.m. that morning on the information log that Plaintiff had been throwing up and was unable to eat and needed to be taken to see the doctor. [App. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 39]. Two hours later, after talking to Plaintiff and discovering that she had quit taking some of her medicine, Deputy Hill called MHMR to discuss Plaintiff's condition, and MHMR scheduled an appointment for 9:00 a.m. the next day. [ Id.]. The following morning, Deputy Hill placed Plaintiff in a separate observation cell, called MHMR, and took Plaintiff to see the doctor 45 minutes ahead of her scheduled appointment time. [ Id. at 41].
Although Plaintiff states that she began informing the jail officials of her more serious problems about four days prior to the first time she informed Deputy Hill of her hallucinations (on August 6, 2001) [ see App. to Pl.'s Resp. at 327], she acknowledges her mental state made her very confused about time during this period [App. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 133-38], and she did not tell any other jail officials about her hallucinations prior to informing Deputy Hill on August 6, 2001 [App. to Pl's. Resp. at 314-15; App. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 133, 145]. The evidence establishes that the earliest date for her heightened complaints and verbal requests to see a doctor was August 4 or 5, 2001. Plaintiff also acknowledges in her own deposition that she talked to Deputy Hill once she "realized what was happening and the severity of it and . . . was mentally conscious to do so," [App. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 145], i.e., when she "knew that [she] evidently had moved to the next deal [stage or level of toxicity] and that [she] knew that it was not normal and that it was something that had to do with [her] medication," [App. to Pl's. Resp. at 310]. Although Plaintiff's testimony in some places attempts to paint a more drawn-out time line for her complaints and requests, other of her testimony as well as other evidence draws a more limited time frame of two or possibly three days at the most. Although courts must resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, there must be an actual controversy; that is, both parties must have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). The evidence based on facts that are established by reference to other known events and dates, i.e., the mother's visit, the phone call to the mother, and the conversation with Deputy Hill, clearly establishes the shorter time frame.
Considering the standard for deliberate indifference, this Court has been presented with no evidence of an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on Plaintiff at the hands of any jail employee or deputy that is repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Nor is there any evidence that any jail employee or deputy intentionally denied or delayed Plaintiff's access to medical care or intentionally interfered with any treatment once it was prescribed. On the contrary, once the jail deputies became aware of the seriousness of Plaintiff's medical condition, based on symptoms they could observe and what was told them by Plaintiff, her cell mates, or her mother, they took appropriate action within a matter of hours, informing others on duty of her symptoms, placing her in isolation for observation, calling MHMR to discuss her condition and to make an appointment, and even taking her in early for her appointment. That any of these steps might have been taken somewhat more quickly is, at most, evidence of negligence. It is certainly not evidence of any deliberate indifference. Absent any underlying constitutional violation, there is no basis for Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the County, and summary judgment as a matter of law is appropriate as to the County as well.
State-law Claims
Plaintiff also brought state-law claims against Defendants, under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, sections 101.021, et seq., for injuries from inadequate medical care allegedly caused by the negligence of an employee acting within the course and scope of his employment through the use of tangible property, and also for intentional infliction of emotional distress. A federal court's exercise of jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims is provided for as follows:
[I]n any civil action in which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 2003). Furthermore, the district court may decline to exercise this supplemental jurisdiction if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." § 1367(c)(3).
Because this Court in this Order dismisses or grants summary judgment for Defendants on all § 1983 claims, it declines to exercise its jurisdiction over the pendent state-law claim for liability under the Texas Tort Claims Act, and determines that Plaintiff's state-law claims should be dismissed without prejudice to being re-filed in state court. A federal court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims is construed as a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the Texas "savings statute," which is designed to protect litigants from the running of limitations in certain circumstances. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064(a) (West 1997); see Vale v. Ryan, 809 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, no writ). Plaintiff accordingly has 60 days to re-file her claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act in state court. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064(a)(2).
CONCLUSION
The Court, having concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs, hereby orders that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED on the issue of liability for all claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Nolan County. In addition, the Court DISMISSES with prejudice all § 1983 claims against Sheriff Donnie Rannifeld and the Unknown Deputies. Furthermore, the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's pendent state-law claims, and those claims are herewith DISMISSED without prejudice to being re-filed in state court. Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence and all other pending motions in this matter are denied as moot.
All relief not expressly granted herein is denied.
SO ORDERED.