Opinion
19-CV-1966 TWR (DEB)
07-01-2021
ROE, a minor, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Justin Slagle, Plaintiff, v. GROSSMONT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 62)
Honorable Todd W. Robinson, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Roe has moved for default judgment against Defendants John Doe (now, Seth Grosch), and his parents, Heidi Grosch and Garrett Grosch (collectively, the “Grosch Defendants”). (ECF No. 62.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion.
BACKGROUND
On October 10, 2019, Plaintiff Roe, a minor and proceeding through her Guardian ad Litem, filed suit based on events that occurred at West Hills High School in Santee, California. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).) Plaintiff asserted two causes of action against the Grosch Defendants. First, she asserted a claim for sexual battery against Seth Grosch, who was a sophomore in high school when he committed the underlying act. (Id. ¶¶ 111-17.) Second, she asserted a claim against Seth Grosch's parents, Heidi and Garret Grosch, for vicarious liability based on their son's intentional acts. (Id. ¶¶ 111-22.) Plaintiff reached a settlement with Grossmont Union High School District and the named school administrators, who were also Defendants in this case. (ECF No. 53.)
Seth Grosch is now 18 years old. (ECF No. 62 at 3.)
On December 20, 2019, Plaintiff served the Grosch Defendants, and on January 8, 2020, she filed the Proofs of Service of Process. (ECF Nos. 12-14.) None of the Grosch Defendants made an appearance. On August 4, 2020, Plaintiff moved for entry of default against the Grosch Defendants (ECF No. 42), and Judge Bencivengo granted the motion. (ECF No. 43.) On August 5, 2020, the Clerk of Court entered default accordingly. (ECF No. 44.) Now, Plaintiff moves for default judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 sets forth a two-step process for obtaining a default judgment. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). “First, a party must obtain a clerk's entry of default under Rule 55(a), ” and second, “the party may seek entry of default judgment under Rule 55(b).” Doe v. Jeffries, No. 18CV2021-MMA (JMA), 2018 WL 6582832, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2018) (citing Symantec Corp. v. Glob. Impact, Inc., 559 F.3d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 2009)). The Court considers seven factors in determining whether to grant default judgment: “(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. “The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
To begin, Plaintiff has met all the requirements to move for default judgment. As noted above, Plaintiff has properly served the Grosch Defendants and filed the Proofs of Service of Process. (ECF Nos. 12-14.) Defendants never responded nor made an appearance. Plaintiff then moved for an entry of default (ECF No. 42), which Judge Bencivengo granted. (ECF No. 43.) The Clerk of Court entered default accordingly. (ECF No. 44.)
Plaintiff now moves for default judgment. The Court held a hearing for this motion on May 19, 2021, where the Grosch Defendants made their first appearance and were granted two weeks to file a response. (See ECF No. 63.) But despite having this opportunity, the Grosch Defendants did not submit anything before the Court, nor did they make a request for additional time. On June 10, 2021, the Court held a second hearing on the Plaintiff's default judgment motion, which the Grosch Defendants attended. (See ECF No. 68.) During that hearing, Defendants made no arguments that warranted the setting aside of default. The Court now proceeds to consider the Eitel factors below and GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for default judgment.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c), the court may “set aside an entry of default for good cause.” “To determine ‘good cause,' a court must consider[ ] three factors: (1) whether [the party seeking to set aside the default] engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default; (2) whether [it] had [no] meritorious defense; or (3) whether reopening the default judgment would prejudice the other party.” United States v. Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standard is disjunctive, so “a finding that any one of these factors is true is sufficient reason for the district court to refuse to set aside the default.” Id. At the hearing, the Court found that Defendants had failed to establish a meritorious defense, which requires plaintiffs to allege “specific facts that would constitute a defense.” Id. at 1094. The Grosch Defendants conceded they had no defense. Further, the Court found that setting aside the default would prejudice Plaintiff.
1. Possible Prejudice to Plaintiff
Without entry of default judgment, Plaintiff would suffer prejudice. She would “be denied the right to judicial resolution of the claims presented, and would be without other recourse for recovery.” Elektra Ent. Grp. Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 392 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citation omitted). The first factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment.
2. Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint
Second, Plaintiff's Complaint is meritorious and sufficient. Under California Civil Code § 1708.5(1), a person “commits a sexual battery when he or she (1) acts with intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results, [or] (2) acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another by use of his or her intimate part, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results.” Taylor v. Ron's Liquors, Inc., No. C 10-00694 SI, 2011 WL 4634091, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts that, when taken as true, state a claim for sexual battery. (Compl. ¶¶ 111-17; ECF No. 62 at 4-5.)
In addition, Plaintiff has met her burden against Heidi and Garrett Grosch. Under California Civil Code Section 1714.1(a), “[a]ny act of willful misconduct of a minor that results in injury or death to another person … shall be imputed to the parent or guardian having custody and control of the minor for all purposes of civil damages, and the parent or guardian having custody and control shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages resulting from the willful misconduct.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.1. Here, because Heidi and Garrett Grosch are the biological parents of Seth Grosch, who intentionally committed sexual battery (see Compl. ¶¶ 11, 118-22), Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged her claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.1. The second and third factors favor an entry of default judgment.
3. Sum of Money at Stake in the Action
The sum of money at stake also weighs in favor of default judgment. As noted above, the factual allegations of a complaint are accepted as true “except those relating to the amount of damages.” TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 917-18 (citation omitted). “The court must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant's conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2002). “In determining if the amount at stake is reasonable, the court may consider plaintiffs' declarations, calculations, pay stubs, and other documentation of damages.” Dist. Council 16 N. Cal. Health & Welfare Fund v. Mortensen's Carpets, Inc., No. C 09-02069 RS, 2010 WL 1956725, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2010) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has met her burden of proving damages in this case. In particular, Plaintiff has submitted an uncontested declaration that estimates her treatment to cost a maximum of $583, 450. (ECF No. 62-2 at 3-4.) Plaintiff has also provided uncontested declarations by Dr. Judy Ho (ECF No. 57-3), her father (ECF No. 57-5), and herself (ECF No. 57-4), describing the emotional trauma that she continues to suffer. According to Dr. Ho, Plaintiff “believes that others may be out to harm her” and has become “isolative and mistrusting of others' intentions.” (ECF No. 57-3 at 9.) Plaintiff's conditions meet the criteria for Generalized Anxiety Disorder and very likely satisfy the “full criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) At the very least, Plaintiff's conditions reflect “Other Specified Trauma and Stressor-Related Disorder.” (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff's father describes Plaintiff as “withdrawn, angry” and “exceedingly uncomfortable and anxious when she is around men she does not know.” (ECF No. 57-5 ¶ 13.) And Plaintiff herself claims that she suffers from “extreme emotional distress, fear, anxiety, emotional scarring, night terrors, emptiness, shame” and even “suicidal ideations.” (ECF No. 57-4 ¶ 6.) She goes on to state that the sexual battery affected her attendance and grades, and in turn, the opportunity to go to a four-year college and become a nurse, as she had always wanted. (Id. ¶ 12.) She has “lost interest in things that [she] loved to do” and shuts down “when around new males in social settings, believing that people are out to harm [her].” (Id. ¶¶ 8, 17.) Lastly, Plaintiff has provided two state court verdicts that have awarded similar sums. (See ECF No. 62-3.) And although Defendant Seth Grosch disagreed with the amount at the hearing, he provided no rebuttal evidence to show that the requested amount was unreasonable. See Chevron Env't Mgmt. Co. v. Env't Prot. Corp., No. 119CV00807LJOJLT, 2019 WL 4387346, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 119CV00807LJOJLT, 2019 WL 4879179 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2019) (“Despite the size of the award sought, there is no evidence showing that the [requested sum] is in dispute.”) (emphasis added). Here, the Court finds that a sufficient showing has been made to award the requested damage amount. See JANE DOE, Plaintiff, v. STUART DINNIS, Defendant., No. 18-CV-05393-DMR, 2020 WL 9422326, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020), No. 18-CV-05393-YGR, 2020 WL 9422398 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020) (finding that the plaintiff's requested amount of $1, 310, 537.45 in damages was adequate based on emotional distress and for loss of past and future income caused by the defendant's battery and sexual assault). This factor weighs in favor of default judgment.
This figure is based on estimates provided by Dr. Judy Ho, a psychologist who evaluated Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 57-3.)
4. Possibility of Dispute over Material Facts
There is no possibility of dispute over material facts. The Grosch Defendants have not responded to any of the pleadings, and since upon default, the factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true, see TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 917-18 (citation omitted), no dispute over material facts exists. This factor weighs in favor of default judgment. See United States v. Armstrong, No. 08-CV-69-H (CAB), 2010 WL 11684781, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2010) (finding no possibility of dispute over material facts because the defendants “have not appeared or filed a response to the complaint.”).
5. Excusable Neglect
Defendants' failure to appear and litigate this case is not due to excusable neglect. Not only have Defendants failed to respond to the Complaint, which was filed in October 2019, but they have also failed to respond to the request for an in camera review of Seth Grosch's student records. (See ECF Nos. 41, 45.) Further, Defendants never responded to Plaintiff's motion for default, which was submitted almost one year after the Complaint was filed, and the entry of default thereafter. (See ECF Nos. 42, 43.) At the hearing, Defendants claimed that they did not receive notice, but the record shows that they had been served, and properly so. (See ECF Nos. 12-14.) No excusable neglect has been shown. See Elektra Ent. Grp. Inc., 226 F.R.D. at 393 (finding the likelihood of excusable neglect to be “remote” because (1) the defendant had not responded to the complaint and the motion for default judgment and (2) based on the length of time that had passed since the complaint was originally served and when the clerk had entered default).
6. Strong Policy of Deciding Cases on the Merits
Finally, the last factor weighs in favor of default judgment. Even if there exists a strong preference to decide cases on the merits, “Defendant's failure to answer Plaintiffs' Complaint makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177; see also HD Supply Facilities Maint., Ltd. v. Karam Managed Properties, LLC., No. 09-CV-2421-H (WVG), 2010 WL 11684792, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2010) (“Although the Court recognizes the strong policy favoring resolution of cases on their merits, proceeding with the instant litigation against Defendant would be futile given [the Defendant's] failure to appear.”).
In sum, the Eitel factors clearly weigh in favor of entering a default judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for entry of default judgment against Defendants Seth Grosh, Heidi Grosch and Garrett Grosch, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1, 372, 000.00. The joint and several liability of Defendants Heidi and Garrett Grosch, collectively, is limited to $42, 100.00 pursuant to California Civil Code Section 1714.1. Further, because the Court finds that the underlying conduct of Defendant Seth Grosch was not only repugnant, but also “willful and malicious, ” the full amount of this judgment as to Defendant Seth Grosch shall be nondischargeable, even in bankruptcy. See In re Su, 290 F.3d 1140, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002) (The “willful injury requirement” under Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides certain scenarios where an individual debtor may not be discharged from his debt, is met “only when the debtor has a subjective motive to inflict injury or when the debtor believes that injury is substantially certain to result from his own conduct.”).
The Clerk of Court is directed to issue a judgement and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.