MEMORANDUM OPINION

HENRY KENNEDY, District Judge

Plaintiff, Dilia Roca, brings this action in her own right and as next friend to her son, Minor Roca ("Minor"), against the District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS") and the system's superintendent under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The Rocas initiated a due process hearing on their claim that DCPS denied Minor a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") in contravention of IDEA. Although they largely prevailed in the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer denied their request for reimbursement for approximately three months of private school tuition for Minor. Presently before the court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment [#30, 34] and the Rocas' motions to correct the administrative record [#19] and for sanctions [#24]. Upon consideration of the motions, the oppositions thereto, and the record of this case, the court concludes that the Rocas' motion for summary judgment must be granted and their motion to correct the administrative record must be granted in part, while their motion for sanctions and DCPS' motion for summary judgment must be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Congress enacted IDEA to "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services. . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). As a condition of receiving funds under IDEA, school districts must identify disabled students and create an annual "individualized education program" ("IEP") to provide each student with FAPE. Developed with the input of parents, faculty, and evaluators, the IEP sets out the needs of the student and the instruction and services to be provided in meeting those needs. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A) — (B). If the relevant public school district cannot provide the services mandated by the student's IEP, IDEA requires the student's placement in an appropriate private school, at public expense. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(B). IDEA also requires a school district, under certain circumstances, to reimburse parents for private school tuition even when they enroll their children in private school without the district's consent or referral. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) — (iii).

To safeguard the rights of disabled students and their parents, IDEA imposes additional responsibilities upon school districts. Educational agencies receiving IDEA funds must allow parents "to obtain an independent educational evaluation of [their] child," id. § 1415(b)(1), 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(b)(1) ("a parent has the right to an independent educational evaluation at public expense if the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the public agency."). Parents who objects to their child's "identification, evaluation, or educational placement" are entitled to an impartial due process hearing conducted by an independent hearing officer, id. § 1415(b)(6), (f)(1). In the District of Columbia, DCPS bears the burden of proof "based solely upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, that the action or proposed placement is adequate to meet the educational needs of the student." 5 D.C. Mun. Regs. § 3030.3. A party aggrieved by the hearing officer's determination may bring suit in federal district court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).

B. Factual History

Minor Roca, a nineteen year-old young man, entered the DCPS system as an eight year-old in 1993. Compl. ¶ 7. The Rocas allege that by 1998, if not earlier, "DCPS had reason to believe that Minor had a learning disability," but failed to undertake any of the requisite educational evaluations. Id. Poor academic performance and lack of motivation characterized Minor's academic career. Pls.' Statement of Material Facts not in Dispute ("Pls.' Statement of Material Facts") ¶¶ 1, 22, 32; Admin. R. at 71, 73, 81, 90-97. Concerned about her son's struggles with school, Dilia Roca asked DCPS, on July 27, 2001, to evaluate Minor and determine his eligibility for special education. Pls.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 7. Minor entered 10th grade at Wilson High School ("Wilson") that fall. Compl. ¶ 9. On October 23 and 24, 2001, DCPS conducted two evaluations of Minor: a psycho-educational evaluation and a speech/language evaluation. The Rocas contend that both evaluations were inadequate, Pls.' Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 12, 15, and failed to identify Minor's need for a broad range of services, including speech/language therapy ("SLT"), id. ¶ 13; occupational therapy ("OT"), id. ¶ 26; counseling, id. ¶ 17; and assistance with reading and writing, id. ¶ 16.

On November 19, 2001, DCPS diagnosed minor with "specific learning disabilities," found him eligible for special education, and convened an IEP conference. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 11. Minor's IEP called for only seven hours per week of special education, and no related services. Id. ¶ 11. DCPS also referred Minor for a social history report and OT/physical therapy ("PT") evaluations. Id. ¶ 13. Believing that this IEP did not properly address Minor's educational requirements, Ms. Roca "advised DCPS staff at the November 19 IEP meeting that she disagreed with the IEP and placement that DCPS proposed and would accept both only as an interim measure." Id. On December 3, 2001, Ms. Roca formally requested a due process hearing and asked DCPS to authorize independent educational evaluations for Minor at public expense. Id. ¶ 21; Admin. R. at 18, 21-22, 29.

As of February 2002, Minor was "failing in virtually all of his classes at Wilson" and missing school frequently. Pls.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 32. DCPS had still not prepared a social history report or conducted the OT/PT evaluations it had previously ordered. Compl. ¶ 13. Frustrated with her son's situation, Ms. Roca notified DCPS on February 4, 2002 that the district had failed to provide Minor with FAPE at Wilson. She advised DCPS that she proposed to enroll Minor at Chelsea School ("Chelsea"), a private special education school in Silver Spring, Maryland, on February 19, 2002. Id. ¶¶ 2, 33; Admin. R. at 273. At the due process hearing held on February 14, 2002, DCPS introduced no evidence and "was unable to meet its burden." Id. at 133.

February 19, 2002 added several developments to the narrative of this case. First, the Hearing Officer's Determination ("HOD") issued, finding that DCPS violated 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (requiring an independent educational evaluation at public expense); authorizing Ms. Roca to obtain an independent educational evaluation of Minor, including OT and psychoeducational evaluations; and ordering DCPS to convene an IEP conference within ten days of receiving the last independent evaluation report. Admin. R. at 134-35. Also on this day, DCPS reconvened a meeting to discuss Minor's IEP. However, one of Minor's two special education classroom teachers missed the conference and failed to provide any information on Minor's classroom performance, and DCPS had still not conducted the OT/PT evaluations it had called for several months prior. Compl. ¶ 17. Finally, on February 19, 2002, Minor began classes at Chelsea. Ms. Roca "heard nothing further from DCPS," which "did not respond to her request for placement" and "made no move to complete its testing of Minor or to remedy the shortcomings of its IEP." Id. ¶ 19.

Ms. Roca obtained the independent educational evaluations in February and March 2002, Admin. R. at 141-66, and forwarded them to DCPS on April 18 and May 13, 2002. Id. ¶ 21. DCPS, the Rocas contend, did not review these evaluations or implement any of their recommendations. Id. ¶ 25.

On April 19, 2002, Ms. Roca requested a second due process hearing, this time to determine whether DCPS violated its obligations to identify Minor as a disabled student in the years prior to his arrival at Wilson, and sought compensatory education. Admin. R. at 55. On June 28, 2002 the second due process hearing convened, and the HOD issued twelve days later. This second HOD found that DCPS had denied Minor FAPE in failing to identify his disabilities from 1998 through 2001, and ordered compensatory education in the form of OT and tutoring in reading. Id. at 118-19. The July 10, 2002 HOD also found that DCPS had denied Minor FAPE by failing to convene the required IEP conference upon receipt of Minor's independent educational evaluations, id. at 115, and determined that Chelsea provided Minor with educational benefit. Id. at 118. The Hearing Officer ordered Minor placed at Chelsea for the 2002-03 school year if DCPS failed to provide him with FAPE within ten days, and ordered DCPS to reimburse Ms. Roca for Minor's tuition at Chelsea from May 24, 2002 through the end of the school year. Id. at 118-19. The Hearing Officer, however, denied the Rocas' request for tuition reimbursement from February 19, 2002, when Minor began attending Chelsea, through May 23, 2002. The Rocas now appeal the reimbursement denial to this court.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Upon a motion for summary judgment in an IDEA case, a district court shall review the administrative record, hear additional evidence presented at the request of the parties, and based "on the preponderance of the evidence shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (emphasis added). In making this assessment, the district court is to undertake an independent review of the evidence, while giving the HOD "due weight," Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). This "modified de novo" standard of review, see, e.g., JH ex rel. JD v. Henrico County Sch. Bd., 395 F.3d 185, 196 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted), accords less deference to the hearing officer than is "conventionally granted" in administrative review cases. Diatta v. District of Columbia, 319 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Furthermore, "a court upsetting the [hearing] officer's decision must at least explain its basis for doing so." Kerkam, 862 F.2d at 887. Finally, the Supreme Court has held that § 1415(e) "confers broad discretion on the court" to order relief "`appropriate' in light of the purposes of the Act." Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985).

B. Reimbursement

IDEA allows parents to unilaterally place their disabled children in private school, and then to obtain reimbursement from the school district, "if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Reimbursement may be denied or limited if the parents fail to object to their child's public school placement at the most recent IEP meeting, or fail to give the district written notice of their intent to remove their child from public school. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I).

Parents who unilaterally withdraw their children from a public school system during the pendency of review proceedings "do so at their own financial risk," Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373-74). Nonetheless, a court reviewing an IDEA administrative hearing may order a school district to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private school education if (1) the student's public school IEP was inappropriate, thereby denying the student FAPE; and (2) the private school placement is proper. Florence County, 510 U.S. at 10-11.

1. Denial of FAPE

The Hearing Officer determined that DCPS denied Minor FAPE by failing to convene an IEP meeting as directed by his February 19, 2002 HOD. Admin. R. at 115, 118. In addition, the Hearing Officer noted, in response to a witness's statement that Minor's November 19, 2001 IEP was inadequate, that he had "already directed a finding for the parent" on that issue. Id. at 347. Ample evidence in the record of the June 28, 2002 hearing supports the HOD on this issue.

The Rocas have convincingly demonstrated that the evaluations DCPS made of Minor prior to convening the November 19, 2001 IEP conference were incomplete. Three types of evaluations are relevant here: psycho-educational, OT, and speech/language evaluations. First, the psychoeducational evaluation DCPS conducted on October 23, 2001, found that Minor was approximately six years below grade level in reading comprehension, written expression, and spelling, which "strongly suggest[s] a pattern of learning disabilities." Admin. R. at 8. The evaluator recommended a speech/language evaluation, "purposeful reading techniques," instruction in the process of writing, multi-sensory teaching, and a vocational assessment. Id. at 12-13. Nonetheless, the Rocas contend that the evaluator failed to perform necessary diagnostic testing to determine the source of Minor's deficits in reading and written expression, Pls.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 16, and made no recommendations "concerning the level of program or placement that Minor required." Id. ¶ 19.

The Rocas' independent psycho-educational evaluation was conducted on February 25 and 28, 2002 by clinical psychologist Ruth Spodak ("Dr. Spodak") and her associates. Admin. R. at 151, 166. The evaluators administered a variety of tests covering memory, auditory comprehension, reading comprehension, cognitive abilities, and psychological condition. Her evaluation report noted Minor's "history of learning difficulties" and "deficits in speech/language, perceptual organization, and memory, all of which cause significant learning disabilities," id. at 160-61, and recommended that Minor's IEP be reviewed and modified. Specifically, she found that "Minor needs a self-contained special education setting with a small teacher to student ratio," "multi-sensory" teaching, "very explicit structure," weekly psychotherapy, and a "comprehensive speech-language evaluation and appropriate speech/language therapy." Id. at 162-64.

Second, the Rocas assert that DCPS' speech/language evaluation, conducted on October 24, 2001, failed to identify Minor's weaknesses in expressive and receptive language, id. at 161, language organization and word-retrieval deficits, id., and failed to identify his need for SLT. Id. at 162-63; see id. at 14-15; Pls.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 13. The speech/language report included only one test (plus "informal evaluations"), found Minor to have "average receptive and expressive language processing skills," and made no recommendation for SLT. Admin. R. at 14-15. No independent speech/language evaluation was made in spring 2002, although the HOD of July 10, 2002 ordered Chelsea to undertake such an evaluation.

Third, DCPS did not conduct any OT or PT evaluations when it tested Minor in October 2001. The independent OT evaluation took place of March 7, 2002. The evaluator conducted a battery of seven tests to measure Minor's gross, ocular, and fine motor skills; visual perception; and visual-motor integration and handwriting. Id. at 141-47. She observed "difficulties with fine motor coordination, speed, sustained visual perception and visual-motor integration," noted processing speed concerns, and "strongly recommended" that Minor receive weekly OT. Id. at 147-48.

Because DCPS' evaluations were incomplete, the resulting IEP that DCPS developed was not appropriately tailored to Minor's educational needs. The IEP called only for three-and-a-half hours per week each of English and "Reading Resource[s]," id. at 5, and did not provide the OT, SLT, and counseling that the independent educational evaluations, conducted in February and March 2002, showed Minor to require. Id. at 147-48, 164; Pls.' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 28. DCPS did not refute any of the foregoing evidence at the administrative hearing, and does not do so now. In light of this concession, and upon review of the record evidence, the court finds that DCPS was not providing FAPE to Minor under the November 19, 2001 IEP.

2. Proper Placement

The Hearing Officer found that Chelsea was an appropriate placement for Minor, and ordered that he be placed there at DCPS' expense, "if DCPS fails [to] make FAPE available to Minor 10 days before the beginning of the 2002-03 School Year." Admin. R. at 118. This determination was proper. According to the Program Observation Report of the Rocas' educational consultant, David McBride, Chelsea provides small classes with "multi-sensory strategies and methods . . . specifically designed for students like Minor who have significant spatial relations, fine motor, language, reading and writing processing difficulties." Id. at 172. At Chelsea, Minor also received necessary related services (OT) and individual tutorial support specifically designed to help him improve his reading and writing skills, id. at 173, key deficits identified by the independent psycho-educational and OT evaluations. His school participation and attendance "markedly improved" and his task completion, academic performance, and self-esteem have likewise progressed since he began attending Chelsea. Id. at 174-75. The Rocas also introduced Minor's fourth quarter/semester grade reports from spring 2002, revealing completion of assignments and attendance to be ongoing struggles for Minor but noting his "strong enthusiasm to learn, especially in a one-on-one situation." Id. at 188-95. Finally, both Dr. Spodak and Tom Lilly, Chelsea's director of related services, testified that they believed that Minor obtained educational benefit from Chelsea. Id. at 348-49 (Tr. at 56). DCPS offered no evidence to the contrary at the administrative hearing. Accordingly, the court upholds the HOD's determination that Chelsea was an appropriate placement for Minor.

3. Effective Date of Reimbursement

Despite finding that DCPS denied Minor FAPE during his attendance at Wilson, and that Minor obtained educational benefit from Chelsea, the Hearing Officer only granted the Rocas tuition reimbursement from May 24, 2002 through the end of the school year. Id. at 115, 118. He gave no explanation for his decision to deny reimbursement for Minor's first three months at Chelsea. Indeed, the Hearing Officer noted at the hearing that since DCPS violated his previous February 19, 2002 HOD, "an interim placement is in order, certainly, from that date." Id. at 299 (Tr. at 6). He also indicated an awareness of the Rocas' right to reimbursement upon the determination that Minor had previously been denied FAPE and was receiving educational benefit from the private placement, noting that once "a unilateral placement is made, the requirement is, in order for the placement to be reimbursed is for the child to receive educational benefit there." Id. at 330 (Tr. at 37).

DCPS does not attempt to rebut any of the evidence the Rocas presented either at the administrative hearing or in the present case to show that (1) DCPS' evaluations of Minor were inadequate, (2) he was denied FAPE while at Wilson, or (3) he obtained educational benefit from Chelsea. Nor does DCPS assert that Ms. Roca failed to notify the district of either her dissatisfaction with her son's IEP or her intention to remove him from Wilson and place him in private school, as required by IDEA. Instead, the district posits that despite its own shortcomings, Ms. Roca should absorb the cost of three months' tuition because she moved Minor "prematurely." Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 11. DCPS' argument that it was "ready willing and able to provide Minor with the Wilson Senior High School educational program provided in his IEP and offered this as a FAPE in a public setting," id., seriously misses the point. Ms. Roca did not initiate the due process hearing to protest DCPS' failure to implement the November 19, 2001 IEP; rather, she claims that the IEP itself constituted a denial of FAPE since DCPS had failed to properly evaluate Minor and consequently failed to identify and address the full range of his educational needs.

DCPS correctly states that parents who move their children during the pendency of review proceedings do so at their own financial risk. Id. (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. 359). Risk, however, does not equal denial of reimbursement. The cases the district cites provide no support for its claim that the Rocas should bear the cost of Minor's first three months at Chelsea even though he enrolled there due to DCPS' inability (or unwillingness) to provide him with FAPE. On the contrary, they emphasize that the right to reimbursement depends upon the parents meeting the two-part test required by Burlington, a showing the Rocas successfully make. Consequently, the court will reverse the HOD and order DCPS to reimburse the Rocas for Minor's tuition at Chelsea from February 19, 2002 through May 23, 2002, in the amount of $11, 315.07.

C. Attorney's Fees

Plaintiffs also seek recovery of their attorney's fees related to the underlying administrative action. Under IDEA, the court has discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to a "prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Parents who obtains a favorable decision in an IDEA administrative hearing are a "prevailing party" for purposes of IDEA, and may pursue attorney's fees from DCPS by initiating a suit in district court. Kaseman v. District of Columbia, 329 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). To recover fees, the parents need not obtain all the relief they originally sought. Krichinsky v. Knox County Schs., 963 F.2d 847, 849-50 (6th Cir. 1992). Except for the $11,315.07 in tuition reimbursement, the Rocas prevailed in the administrative hearing and thus may properly obtain their attorney's fees from DCPS.

D. Corrections to the Administrative Record

The Rocas next ask that the court order DCPS to correct the administrative record it lodged on December 13, 2002, contending that DCPS improperly included pages unrelated to the June 28, 2002 hearing. Specifically, they ask that pages 1, 52-53, 120-21, 123, and 279-93 be stricken from the administrative record. Pls.' Mot. to Correct Admin. R. at 1. The Rocas contend that most of these disputed pages (pages 1, 123, and 279-93) concern a subsequent administrative hearing they initiated, conducted on October 2, 2002, for which they are not seeking review in the present action. The other allegedly extraneous records (pages 52-53 and 120-21), they assert, were "extracted from the personal files" of the DCPS attorney who represented the district at the June 28, 2002 hearing, id. at 6 n. 6, and therefore are not properly part of the administrative record.

DCPS' argument that "plaintiffs' attorney approved of the submission of every document that defendants submitted," Defs.' Opp'n at 2, which the Rocas' counsel disputes, may explain why the district did not weed these pages out earlier but does not justify their continued inclusion. DCPS does not, however, contest that the documents in question either pertain to a subsequent administrative hearing or are DCPS internal memoranda. Because the twenty-one pages the Rocas have identified are demonstrably not a part of the record of the underlying June 28, 2002 administrative hearing, they are hereby stricken.

Additionally, the Rocas ask that the court require DCPS to correct the certificate of service it filed with the administrative record, bearing a mailing date of December 12, 2002. The Rocas' counsel contends the package containing the administrative record was actually postmarked on December 16, 2002, and that therefore the certificate of service must be amended to reflect the later date. This issue is moot because the Rocas obtained the administrative record long ago and there is no indication that they suffered any prejudice from the delay.

E. Sanctions

Finally, the Rocas ask the court to sanction DCPS under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 for including the extraneous pages in Minor's administrative record, for averring that it mailed the record to the Rocas' counsel on December 12, 2002, and for defending such actions in subsequent court filings. The purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to "protect the court from frivolous and baseless filings that are not well grounded, legally untenable, or brought with the purpose of vexatiously multiplying the proceedings." Cobell v. Norton, 157 F. Supp. 2d 82, 86 n. 8 (D.D.C. 2001). The court retains the discretion to determine "whether a Rule 11 violation has occurred and what sanctions should be imposed if there has been a violation." Long v. Dep't of Justice, 207 F.R.D. 4 (D.D.C. 2002) (citations omitted).

Here, while the district's arguments against the Rocas' motion to correct the administrative record may be unpersuasive, the court does not find that they were raised to "frustrate judicial proceedings," and thus do not merit the "extreme punishment" of Rule 11 sanctions. Naegele v. Albers, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___ (D.D.C. 2005), 2005 WL 13294 at * 6 (citing Trout v. Garrett, 780 F. Supp. 1396, 1428 (D.D.C. 1991)).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is this 14th day of March, 2005, hereby

ORDERED, that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that DCPS reimburse plaintiffs for Minor Roca's tuition expenses in the amount of $11,315.07; and it is further

ORDERED, that plaintiffs shall file an accounting of their attorney's fees by no later than March 28, 2005; and it is further

ORDERED, that pages 1, 52-53, 120-21, 123, and 279-93 of the administrative record are hereby stricken;

ORDERED, that plaintiffs' motion for sanctions is DENIED.