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Robinson v. Hanrahan

U.S.
Oct 24, 1972
409 U.S. 38 (1972)

Summary

holding notice of forfeiture proceeding was inadequate where government officials knew vehicle owner was jailed and mailed notice was unlikely to reach him

Summary of this case from United States v. Rivera-Valdes

Opinion

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

No. 71-6918.

Decided October 24, 1972

Notwithstanding its knowledge that appellant was in the Cook County jail awaiting trial, the State of Illinois mailed notice of automobile forfeiture proceedings to appellant at his home, which he did not receive until his release, when he learned that the car had been forfeited. The circuit court rejected appellant's motion for rehearing. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Held: The procedure followed here did not comport with due process requirements as the State made no effort to provide appellant with notice "reasonably calculated" to apprise him of the pendency of the forfeiture proceedings.

52 Ill.2d 37, 284 N.E.2d 646, reversed and remanded.


On June 16, 1970, appellant was arrested on a charge of armed robbery and, immediately thereafter, the State of Illinois instituted forfeiture proceedings against appellant's automobile pursuant to the Illinois vehicle forfeiture statute, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 36-1 et seq. (1969). Appellant was held in custody in the Cook County jail from June 16, 1970, to October 7, 1970, awaiting trial. Nevertheless, the State mailed notice of the pending forfeiture proceedings, not to the jail facility, but to appellant's home address as listed in the records of the Secretary of State. It is undisputed that appellant, who remained in custody throughout the forfeiture proceedings, did not receive such notice until his release. After an ex parte hearing on August 19, 1970, the circuit court of Cook County ordered the forfeiture and sale of appellant's vehicle.

Under Illinois law, the address of a vehicle owner must be registered in the office of the Secretary of State. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 95 1/2, § 3-405 (1971). The Illinois vehicle forfeiture statute authorizes service of notice by certified mail to the address as listed in the records of the Secretary of State. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 36-1 (1969).

Appellant was tried on October 7, 1970, for the offense of armed robbery. The court, sitting without a jury, found appellant guilty only of plain robbery and sentenced him to probation for three years, the first four months of which to be served in the Cook County jail. In light of appellant's pretrial detention, the four-month requirement was "considered served" and appellant was released immediately on his own recognizance.

Upon learning of the forfeiture after his release, appellant filed a motion for rehearing, requesting that the order of forfeiture be set aside because the manner of notice did not comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The circuit court of Cook County denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois, three justices dissenting, held that, in light of the in rem nature of the proceedings, substituted service as utilized by the State did not deny appellant due process of law. People ex rel. Hanrahan v. One 1965 Oldsmobile, 52 Ill.2d 37, 284 N.E.2d 646 (1972). We cannot agree.

In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), after commenting on the vagueness of the classifications " in rem, or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or more vaguely still, `in the nature of a proceeding in rem,'" this Court held that "the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are so elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary from state to state." Id., at 312. "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id., at 314. More specifically, Mullane held that notice by publication is not sufficient with respect to an individual whose name and address are known or easily ascertainable. Similarly, in Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956), we held that, in the context of a foreclosure action by the town, notice by mailing, posting, and publication was inadequate where the individual involved was known by the town to be an incompetent without the protection of a guardian. See also Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); New York v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953).

In the instant case, the State knew that appellant was not at the address to which the notice was mailed and, moreover, knew also that appellant could not get to that address since he was at that very time confined in the Cook County jail. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the State made any effort to provide notice which was "reasonably calculated" to apprise appellant of the pendency of the forfeiture proceedings. Accordingly, we grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Since we dispose of this case on the notice question, we do not reach the additional issues raised by appellant.


Summaries of

Robinson v. Hanrahan

U.S.
Oct 24, 1972
409 U.S. 38 (1972)

holding notice of forfeiture proceeding was inadequate where government officials knew vehicle owner was jailed and mailed notice was unlikely to reach him

Summary of this case from United States v. Rivera-Valdes

holding notice of forfeiture sent to address State knew to be inaccurate or defective insufficient

Summary of this case from Plemons v. Gale

holding that mailing that the government knew would not accomplish notice was insufficient

Summary of this case from Plemons v. Gale

holding notice inadequate when "the State knew that [the owner] was not at the address to which the notice was mailed and, moreover, knew also that [the owner] could not get to that address since he was at that very time confined"

Summary of this case from Armendariz-Mata v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration

holding that mailing to address which was known to be invalid did not provide notice which was reasonably calculated to notify party of pending forfeiture

Summary of this case from Aero-Medical, Inc. v. U.S.

holding that service regarding state foreclosure proceedings sent to the last known address of a prisoner was not "reasonably calculated" to reach the prisoner when the State knew that the prisoner was not at the address to which the notice was mailed

Summary of this case from Matter of Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc.

holding that the State of Illinois failed to provide notice when it knew the appellant was confined in the Cook County jail and mailed notice to his home

Summary of this case from Rowell v. Ewing Bros. Towing Co.

holding notice of forfeiture proceedings sent to a vehicle owner's home address was inadequate when the State knew that the property owner was in prison

Summary of this case from Grice v. Colvin

holding notice of forfeiture sent to address State knew to be inaccurate or defective insufficient

Summary of this case from Moore v. Kagler

holding that the State's “notice of the pending forfeiture proceedings” was unreasonable, where “the State knew that appellant was not at the address to which the notice was mailed and, moreover, knew also that appellant could not get to that address since he was at that very time confined in the Cook County jail”

Summary of this case from Mikhaylov v. United States

holding that when state had actual knowledge that vehicle owner was in jail, it could not initiate vehicle forfeiture proceedings by mailing notice to his home address

Summary of this case from Olson v. Comm'r of Revenue

holding that notice of a property forfeiture was inadequate despite compliance with Illinois' forfeiture statute because the State knew that the appellant was incarcerated at the time the notice was sent

Summary of this case from State v. Nelson

holding that a notice of forfeiture sent to an owner's home was inadequate when the state had knowledge that the owner was in prison

Summary of this case from City of Phila. v. Morris Park Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses

holding that state's notice of forfeiture proceeding sent to individual's home is insufficient where he was incarcerated in that state

Summary of this case from Commonwealth v. Cintron-Colon

finding a Mullane violation where the government mailed notice of a forfeiture proceeding to the claimant's parent's address when the government knew the claimant was not at the address, and knew he could not get to that address because of his incarceration

Summary of this case from United States v. Rodgers

In Robinson v. Hanrahan, we held that notice of forfeiture proceedings sent to a vehicle owner's home address was inadequate when the State knew that the property owner was in prison.

Summary of this case from Jones v. Flowers

In Robinson, the State, having arrested petitioner and having detained him in county jail, immediately instituted forfeiture proceedings against his automobile and mailed notice of those proceedings to his residential address. 409 U.S., at 38.

Summary of this case from Jones v. Flowers

In Robinson, we noted that Illinois law required each vehicle owner to register his address with the secretary of state, and that the State's vehicle forfeiture scheme provided for notice by mail to the address listed in the secretary's records.

Summary of this case from Jones v. Flowers

In Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 40, 93 S.Ct. 30, 31-32 (1972), the Supreme Court invalidated a forfeiture notice mailed to the property owner's home address while the owner was in custody awaiting trial throughout the relevant time period.

Summary of this case from Yeung Mung Weng v. United States

In Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972), the Court considered whether notice of forfeiture proceedings against an arrestee's vehicle mailed to the arrestee's home address was sufficient to satisfy due process requirements when the arrestee was incarcerated.

Summary of this case from Wilson v. Farris

noting that the State knew the plaintiff was in jail but instituted forfeiture proceedings and mailed notice of the pending forfeiture to the plaintiff's home address

Summary of this case from Wilson v. Farris

noting that the State ordered the forfeiture and sale of the plaintiff's vehicle

Summary of this case from Wilson v. Farris

In Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 93 S.Ct. 30, 34 L.Ed.2d 47 (1972), the Supreme Court held that notice mailed to a prisoner's home address by the state in whose custody he was held failed to meet the standard set forth in Mullane.

Summary of this case from Nunley v. Dept. of Justice

In Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972), the Court held that notice of forfeiture proceedings against an automobile sent to the registered owner's address as listed in state records did not comport with due process when the state knew the owner of the automobile was in jail at the time the notice was sent.

Summary of this case from Berrum v. U.S.

In Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 93 S.Ct. 30, 34 L.Ed.2d 47 (1972), the State of Illinois instituted forfeiture actions against appellant, who then sought to recover the assets seized.

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Giovanelli
Case details for

Robinson v. Hanrahan

Case Details

Full title:ROBINSON v . HANRAHAN, STATES ATTORNEY OF COOK COUNTY

Court:U.S.

Date published: Oct 24, 1972

Citations

409 U.S. 38 (1972)
93 S. Ct. 30

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