Opinion
CIvil Action 7:23-cv-4058-JDA-TER
07-08-2024
TANYA ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. CHEROKEE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT and DR. DANA HALL, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
This is an employment discrimination case, arising from Plaintiff's employment with Defendant Cherokee County School District. Plaintiff alleges causes of action for discrimination, hostile work environment based on race and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. and state law causes of action for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) Plaintiff's second cause of action for retaliation and fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 11), and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 12). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(g), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
In her Response, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her retaliation cause of action. Pl. Resp. p. 2 (ECF No. 11). Therefore, the only issue before the court at this time is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is an African-American female who worked for Defendant Cherokee County School District (the school district) from 1998 until June 30, 2021. Compl. ¶ 6 (ECF No. 1). Defendant Dr. Dana Fall, white male, is the Superintendent for the school district. Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff was employed as the Principal at Mary Bramlett Elementary School (MBES) for the 2020-21 school year. Plaintiff had been an administrator for the school district since 2011. Compl. ¶ 7.
On January 19, 2021, Plaintiff was told by Dr. Fall that she would not have an administrative position for the 2021-22 school year due to her performance on the MTSS Self-Survey evaluation, which is not the standard evaluation used for principals. Compl. ¶ 10. Dr. Fall previously met with Plaintiff and other administrative staff to inform them that three schools would be closing for the 2021-22 school year, but he assured Plaintiff that she would have an administrative position. Compl. ¶ 10. Instead, Plaintiff was offered a teaching contract and told she would keep her administrative salary for one year. This demotion affected her upward mobility opportunities not only in the Cherokee County school district but in any other school district as well. Compl. ¶ 11.
Two other principals, Tracy Allison and Karen Henderson, both white females who were also at closing schools, were under consideration for administrative positions with only five years of administrative experience compared with Plaintiff's ten years of administrative experience. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13. Further, an administrative position was created at the district office for Hunter Jolley, a white male, who had less than one year of experience as a school principal. Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff believes that her offer of a teaching position was based on her race because three less experienced, white staff members were given administrative positions. Compl. ¶ 14. None of the administrative positions were posted publicly, in violation of the school district's human resources policies, which Plaintiff believes was done by Dr. Fall to prevent her from applying. Compl. ¶ 15.
Dr. Fall's actions impacted Plaintiff's physical and mental well-being, causing Plaintiff great anxiety. Compl. ¶ 15.
On February 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the school district. The school district failed to act on the grievance, and immediately after it was filed, Plaintiff's work environment because racially hostile and retaliatory. Compl. ¶ 17. Frustrated by the inaction of Dr. Fall and the board to address her concerns and as a result of the hostile work environment, Plaintiff resigned her position and requested to be released from her 2021-22 teaching contract. Compl. ¶¶ 18-19.
Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEOC) on April 20, 2021. Compl. ¶ 1a.
On May 26, 2021, Plaintiff was offered a contract with the Marion County School District for a salary of $77,202, which she accepted. Compl. ¶ 20. As a result, Plaintiff had to relocate to for the position. Compl. ¶ 21.
Plaintiff received a Right to Sue Letter from the EEOC on May 22, 2023, and filed the present action on August 16, 2023.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion examines whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Expounding on its decision in Twombly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003).
IV. DISCUSSION
As stated above in footnote 1, Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed her cause of action for retaliation. Therefore, the only matter before the court at this time is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Dr. Fall. Defendant first argues that the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), SC Code Ann. § 15-78-10, et seq., excludes claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against agents or employees of governmental entities.
The SCTCA “constitutes the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a). Specifically, §15-78-70(a) provides that “[a]n employee of a governmental entity who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his official duty is not liable therefor except as expressly provided for in subsection (b).” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a). Subsection (b) states “[n]othing in this chapter may be construed to give an employee of a governmental entity immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the employee's conduct was not within the scope of his official duties or that it constituted actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(b). Plaintiff argues that the SCTCA is inapplicable here because Plaintiff alleges individual actions by Dr. Fall that were not within the scope of his official duties. Specifically with respect to her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Fall intentionally failed to respond to Plaintiff after she told them of her racial targeting at work. Rather than coming to Plaintiff's aid, [Dr. Fall] escalated the hostile work environment against Plaintiff by continuing to deny Plaintiff a right to a grievance through his pretextual efforts to eliminate her access to administrative relief until Plaintiff was compelled to resign.” Compl. ¶ 47. These alleged actions or inactions occurred within the context of Dr. Fall's role as Superintendent of the school district and Plaintiff's supervisor. Other allegations regarding Dr. Fall arise from his role as Superintendent as well, such as not giving Plaintiff an administrative position for the 2021-22 school year and failing to post positions publically. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 15. “[T]he course of someone's employment requires some ‘act in furtherance of the employer's business.'” Frazier v. Badger, 361 S.C. 94, 102, 603 S.E.2d 587, 591 (2004) (citing South Carolina State Budget and Control Bd. v. Prince, 304 S.C. 241,246, 403 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1991)). All of Dr. Fall's conduct as alleged by Plaintiff was done in furtherance of the school district's business. Therefore, the SCTCA applies and is “the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a). . As noted by Defendants, the SCTCA explicitly excludes claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The SCTCA defines a loss as
. . . bodily injury, disease, death, or damage to tangible property, including lost wages and economic loss to the person who suffered the injury, disease, or death, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and any other element of actual damages recoverable in actions for negligence, but does not include the intentional infliction of emotional harm.S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-30(f) (2014) (emphasis added); see also Arora v. James, No. 5:14-cv-00018 JMC, 2015 WL1011341, at *3 (D.S.C. March 6, 2015) (“The SCTCA specifically excludes claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a government entity and its employees and agents.”); e.g. Tucker v. Shelton, No. 6:16-cv-313-TMC-KFM, 2017 WL 6033521, at *3 (D.S.C. November 20, 2017) (recommending that summary judgment be granted for the defendant governmental entity on the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-30(f)). Accordingly, dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) be granted as to her fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because the only cause of action asserted against Defendant Fall is intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is recommended that he be dismissed from this action. As stated above, Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed her second cause of action for retaliation.
The parties are directed to the important information in the attached page.