Opinion
Index No. 156236/2021
08-30-2024
Ron Rivas, Plaintiff, v. International Academy of Hope, DISABILITY FUND, INC A/K/A DISABILITY OPPORTUNITY FUND, YOUNG ADULT INSTITUTE, INC., PAUL A JUHASZ, VINCENT MASSARO, CHARLES HAMMERMAN, KEVIN CAREY, MATTHEW DONOHUE, JEFFREY MORTARA, CAMERON BROWN, Defendants.
Attorney for Plaintiff: Amy L. Bellantoni, Esq. Attorney for Defendants: Daniel C. Moreland, Esq. and Ian-Paul A. Poulos, Esq.
Unpublished Opinion
Attorney for Plaintiff: Amy L. Bellantoni, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants: Daniel C. Moreland, Esq. and Ian-Paul A. Poulos, Esq.
Leslie A. Stroth, J.
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL.
Plaintiff commenced this action alleging he was subjected to discrimination and a hostile work environment because of his disability, and that he was retaliated against for making such a complaint, all in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). Plaintiff alleges eight causes of action in his complaint, six of which allege violations of NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Plaintiff further alleges that defendants were negligent, and that defendants are vicariously liable via respondeat superior for acts and omissions of individual defendants.
Defendants International Academy of Hope (iHOPE), Young Adult Institute, Inc. (YAI), Paul A. Juhasz (Juhasz), Vincent Massaro (Massaro), Kevin Carey (Carey), Matthew Donohue (M. Donohue), Jeffrey Mortara (Mortara), and Cameron Brown (Brown) (collectively, Moving Defendants) move pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and (a)(1) to partially dismiss certain causes of action. Plaintiff filed and served written opposition. For the reasons below, the defendants' motion is denied.
An answer was filed on behalf of defendants Disability Fund, Inc. a/k/a Disability Opportunity Fund and Charles Hammerman (Doc. 21, answer). As such, the court does not address claims against these defendants.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are taken from the complaint and are presumed to be true for the purposes of this motion.
Davis v Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262, 268 [2014] (on a motion to dismiss, procedural posture requires courts to "accept as true each and every allegation made by the plaintiff and limit [the] inquiry to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim" [citation omitted]).
Plaintiff was employed by iHOPE as a paraprofessional (NYSCEF Doc. No. (Doc.) 1, complaint at ¶¶ 47, 60). Juhasz was the chief administrative officer and human resources manager of iHOPE and was plaintiff's supervisor (id. at ¶¶ 13, 15, 56, 57). Around January 2016, plaintiff was employed in supervisory roles of paraprofessional manager and operations manager (id. at ¶ 48). Plaintiff had previous experience in management and supervisory positions (id. at ¶ 39). As the paraprofessional manager, plaintiff was responsible for supervising, training, hiring, firing, scheduling paraprofessional employees, and payroll and employee reviews (id. at ¶ 49). As operations manager, plaintiff was responsible for overseeing iHOPE's daily operations (id. at ¶ 51). Around July 2017, plaintiff's job title changed to "Logistics Manager," but his responsibilities remained essentially the same (id. at ¶ 67). Until August 2017, plaintiff received favorable reviews for his work performance (id. at ¶ 66).
In August 2017, plaintiff experienced "the acute onset of psychiatric and/or psychological disorders," which included anxiety, depression and acute manifestations of bipolar disorder (id. at ¶ 71, 72,73). Plaintiff consumed large quantities of alcohol and over-the-counter sleep aids outside of work and was ultimately hospitalized and admitted to a psychiatric facility for treatment (id. at ¶¶ 82-85). Plaintiff was diagnosed with depression with bipolar disorder (id. at ¶ 92). Plaintiff was out of work for several weeks and his supervisor Juhasz was informed that plaintiff needed time off from work due to his diagnosis (id. at ¶¶ 94-95). Juhasz was provided with plaintiff's medical and mental health information regarding plaintiff's diagnosis (id. at 96). Plaintiff returned to work in September 2017 when his then-treating psychiatrist advised plaintiff that he could do so (id. at ¶ 100).
When plaintiff returned to work, plaintiff learned that Juhasz had told other iHOPE employees about plaintiff's medical diagnosis and the events leading up to it (id. at ¶ 104). Employees approached plaintiff and told him that Juhasz had told employees about plaintiff's medical diagnosis and that he tried to commit suicide (id.). Juhasz admitted that he informed employees of plaintiff's mental health condition and his attempt to commit suicide (id. at ¶¶ 116-117). Juhasz also told employees that plaintiff could not be trusted (id. at ¶ 119). Plaintiff's condition was discussed by other employees at the workplace, causing him to feel embarrassment, humiliation, nervousness, stigmatization and shame. (id. at 107). Plaintiff became isolated and was avoided by employees, including his supervisors and subordinates (id. at ¶¶ 109-110).
In October 2017, Juhasz reassigned plaintiff to a different work location and duties (id. at ¶¶ 120-121). Plaintiff was transferred to iHOPE's legal and administrative office, had his duties curtailed, and was instructed not to enter iHOPE's main building (id. at ¶¶ 121-122). Plaintiff met with Patrick Donohue (P. Donohue), then-CEO and chair of the Board of iHOPE (Board), and informed P. Donohue that Juhasz had disclosed plaintiff's private information to iHOPE employees, and that Juhasz threatened to fire plaintiff and mocked his mental health condition (id. at ¶ 129). P. Donohue met with Massaro, then-president of iHOPE and plaintiff's and Juhasz's supervisor, and informed him of Juhasz's disclosure of plaintiff's health information, including plaintiff's suicide attempt (id. at ¶¶ 17, 18, 131). P. Donohue advised that Juhasz's employment should be terminated but Massaro declined to terminate him (id. at ¶¶ 133-134).
P. Donohue met with Juhasz, gave him a termination notice, and informed Juhasz that he was not permitted at iHOPE or its offices (id. at ¶ 137). However, Juhasz refused the termination letter stating he did not recognize P. Donohue's authority (id. at ¶ 138). Thereafter, P. Donohue received a call from Brown, a board member and Audit Committee member of iHOPE until January 2018, demanding that Juhasz's termination be rescinded (id. at ¶¶ 29, 141). P. Donohue informed Massaro of Juhasz's termination, which Massaro continued to oppose (id. at ¶ 145). P. Donohue met with the administrative team and informed them about the circumstances for which Juhasz was terminated, including disclosing plaintiff's private mental health matters (id. at ¶ 146). P. Donohue also met with iHOPE staff and began an internal investigation into plaintiff's complaint regarding Juhasz's disclosure to employees of plaintiff's private health and mental health status and his attempted suicide (id. at ¶ 147). P. Donohue retained Perlman & Perlman to conduct the investigation into the allegations concerning Juhasz's termination (id. at 149).
In October 2017, Matthew Donohue (M. Donohue), then-iHOPE board member, board secretary, and chair of iHOPE's Audit Committee, and Massaro called for a special board meeting (id. at ¶¶ 27, 148). At this meeting, the Board rescinded Juhasz's termination and placed him on administrative leave pending an internal investigation (id. at ¶¶ 150-151). P. Donohue explained to the Board the reasons Juhasz was terminated; however, the Board stripped P. Donohue of all managerial authority and referred oversight of Juhasz's internal investigation to the Audit and Governance Committee (id. at ¶¶ 152, 154-155). The day after the special board meeting, Massaro informed iHOPE senior staff that Juhasz would be returning (id. at ¶ 157). During this time, iHOPE staff complained to P. Donohue that Mayra Diaz, Associate Program Director, pressured employees to sign a letter in support of Juhasz's return because Ms. Diaz advised that Juhasz would soon be returning to iHOPE (id. at ¶ 158). Additionally, M. Donohue retained Effective Human Resources' consultants Rick Maher (Maher) and Kevin Main (Main) to conduct the internal investigation into the allegations against Juhasz, thereby replacing Perlman & Perlman (id. at ¶ 159).
In November 2017, P. Donohue provided the Board with plaintiff's letter indicating that he had been approached in an inappropriate manner by Main and M. Donohue and had received additional pressure from Massaro and Courtney Nelson, Associate Director of Human Resources (id. at ¶¶ 146, 161). P. Donohue told the Board that he believed there was a conflict of interest with Effective HR, Maher, and/or Main conducting the internal investigation regarding Juhasz; however, the Board permitted M. Donohue, Effective HR, Maher, and Main to continue with the investigation (id. at ¶¶ 162-163).
Maher met with the plaintiff to discuss his work status and other matters concerning iHOPE (id. at ¶ 164). Plaintiff discussed his duties at iHOPE and Juhasz's conduct and disclosure of plaintiff's private medical and mental health diagnosis and circumstances (id. at ¶¶ 165-166). Plaintiff informed Maher that he previously requested permission to file a formal complaint against Juhasz and made the request again; however, Maher told plaintiff that he could not file a complaint because there was an ongoing investigation regarding the subject matter of plaintiff's interview (id. at 167-169). On or about November 22, 2017, plaintiff filed a formal complaint and submitted it to Massaro (id. at 170). However, Juhasz continued to disparage plaintiff while he was on administrative leave (id. at ¶¶ 172-176).
In December 2017 or January 2018, Charles Hammerman (Hammerman), president and CEO of Disability Opportunity Fund, became CEO and board chair of iHOPE, replacing P. Donohue (id. at ¶¶ 19, 177). Hammerman was informed by P. Donohue of the matters concerning plaintiff and Juhasz (id. at ¶ 179). Hammerman met with plaintiff to discuss Juhasz's disclosure of plaintiff's private information and the circumstances surrounding it, plaintiff's mental health status, and his fitness for employment at iHOPE (id. at ¶¶ 182-188). Plaintiff told Hammerman he was fit to perform his job (id. at ¶¶ 192-195). Juhasz was present during this entire meeting (id. at ¶ 189). Thereafter, the plaintiff was stripped of almost all his prior responsibilities and his new duties consisted mostly of errands or other tasks (id. at ¶¶ 197, 206). Hammerman informed the plaintiff that he would not be working at iHOPE's location and reassigned him to the administrative office at a different location (id. at ¶ 204). Plaintiff worked at the administrative office and performed the reduced tasks until July 2018 when he was terminated from his employment (id. at ¶ 207).
In January 2018, Massaro, Mortara, and Brown stepped down from the Board while Carey was appointed to the Board and named treasurer (id. at ¶¶ 198, 202). In February 2018, at the direction of Hammerman and Carey, YAI began managing iHOPE's human resources (id. at ¶ 203).
Plaintiff commenced this action on June 30, 2021, alleging he was subject to discrimination and a hostile work environment because of his disability, retaliated against for making such a complaint, that defendants were negligent in handling his private medical and mental health information, and that defendants are vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of their employees.
Plaintiff's affidavit states that he submitted his letter of resignation in January 2018 because Hammerman threatened to terminate his employment if he did not do so (Doc. 38 at ¶¶ 28-29). However, iHOPE continued to pay his salary and benefits until July 2018 (id. at ¶ 30). P. Donohue's affirmation and attachments show emails from P. Donohue to Hammerman regarding payments of salary and benefits for the months of February, March, and April 2018, and directing that said that payment should be made to "The Patrick Donohue Law Firm, PLLC" (Doc. 37). The April 2018 invoice was on the letterhead of "The Patrick Donohue Law Firm PLLC" (id.).
Carey's affidavit asserts that documents were maintained in business records of iHOPE and YAI (Doc. 25 at ¶ 3). These documents include (1) plaintiff's letter of resignation dated January 29, 2018 (Doc. 26); (2) plaintiff's termination of benefits letter dated January 30, 2018 (Doc. 27); (3) the Exit Interview Checklist showing, among other things, that payroll was notified of plaintiff's termination on January 31, 2018 (Doc. 28); (4) plaintiff's 2018 W-2 (Doc. 29); (5) plaintiff's earnings record from December 1, 2017, through July 30, 2018 (Doc. 30); (6) the Management Services Agreement between YAI and iHOPE executed on February 27, 2018 (Doc. 31); and (7) the Board's minutes for February 2018, showing, among other things, Carey's election to the Board that month (Doc. 32).
DISCUSSION
On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, the complaint is afforded a liberal construction (Leon v Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87 [1994]). The court is required to give the plaintiff "the benefit of every possible inference, and determin[e] only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Kolchins v Evolution Mkts, Inc., 128 A.D.3d 47, 57 [1st Dept 2015], affd, 31 N.Y.3d 100 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). However, "allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions... are not entitled to any such consideration" (Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 N.Y.3d 137, 141 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). A complaint must be dismissed "if the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery" (id. at 142).
For a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(1), dismissal is granted only if documentary evidence conclusively shows a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law (id.). The defendant has the burden to show that the documentary evidence "resolves all factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively disposes of the plaintiff's claim" (Fortis Fin. Servs., LLC v Fimat Futures USA, Inc., 290 A.D.2d 383, 383 [1st Dept 2002] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "Where documentary evidence flatly contradicts the factual claims, the entitlement to the presumption of truth and the favorable inference is rebutted" (Scott, 282 A.D.2d at 183). Affidavits are not documentary evidence for a CPLR 3211(a)(1) motion (Johnson v Asberry, 190 A.D.3d 491, 492 [1st Dept 2021]). However, emails are sufficient as documentary evidence (Kolchins, 128 A.D.3d at 58-59).
The moving defendants have failed to produce sufficient documentary evidence to conclusively show a defense to plaintiff's asserted claims as a matter of law as required for them to be successful on a CPLR 3211(1) motion to dismiss. Defendants have produced Plaintiff's resignation letter, and documents showing the absence of any recorded payments to Plaintiff for his salary and benefits past his alleged resignation in January 2018, and other documents outlined above. However, the plaintiff's Affidavit alleges that he was coerced into signing the letter of resignation. In addition, the Affirmation in Support and annexed documentation from former i-HOPE in-house counsel, CEO and Board Chairman Patrick Donohue flatly refute defendants' claims by conclusively showing that iHOPE continued to pay plaintiff's salary and benefits well past his alleged resignation in January 2018.
Defendants have failed to establish their burden under CPLR3211(a)(1); the documentation submitted in support of their motion neither resolves all factual issues as a matter of law nor conclusively disposes of plaintiff's claims. As such, defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(1) is denied.
For a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the applicable standard "is whether, within the four corners of the complaint, any cognizable cause of action has been stated" (Scott v Bell Atl. Corp., 282 A.D.2d 180, 183 [1st Dept 2001], affd as mod sub nom. Goshen v Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 98 N.Y.2d 314 [2002]). However, the court may consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint and the criteria is "whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one" (Leon, 84 N.Y.2d at 88 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
Given that Plaintiff has stated facts that support cognizable causes of action for discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of NYSHRL and NYCHRL in his detailed complaint, which has been supplemented with his own detailed affidavit, as well as the Affirmation in Support and annexed documentation from Patrick Donohue, Esq., who held positions of iHOPE in-house legal counsel, CEO and Board Chairman when the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (7) cannot and does not lie.
To establish a prima facie case on a claim for discrimination under both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, a plaintiff must prove that (1) they are members of a protected class; (2) they are qualified to hold the position; (3) they suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Stephenson v. Hotel Empls. & Rest. Empls. Union Local 100 of AFL-CIO, 6 N.Y.3d 265, 270 (2006). To state a claim for retaliation under New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws, a plaintiff must show that (1) he has engaged in protected activity, (2) his employer was aware that he participated in such activity, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action based upon his activity and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the retaliatory or other adverse action. See Executive Law 296(7); Administrative Code of City of NY Section 8-107(7), Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 305 (2004).
Discrimination Claims Under NYSHRL And NYCHRL
The first and third causes of action allege that defendants subjected plaintiff to discrimination due to his mental health disability in violation of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, respectively. Plaintiff argues that he was treated differently because of his disability after Juhasz learned of plaintiff's mental health condition, diagnosis, and hospitalization. Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that Juhasz prevented him from entering the iHOPE premises, relocated plaintiff to iHOPE's administrative offices, and had his responsibilities diminished. Further, plaintiff asserts that submitting his resignation letter was forced by Hammerman, who indicated that if he did not, he would be fired.
The NYSHRL and NYCHRL makes it an unlawful practice to discriminate against an employee in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment based on, inter alia, an employee's disability (See Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Administrative Code of the City of NY § 8-107 [1] [a] [3]). Court have held that "[t]o establish a prima facie claim of discrimination, the plaintiff must show (1) they are a member of a protected class; (2) they were qualified to hold the position; (3) they were terminated from employment or suffered another adverse employment action; and (4) the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 305 [2004]). To prevail on the fourth element, the plaintiff must sufficiently plead that unlawful discrimination was at least one of the motivating factors (Askin v Dept. of Educ. of City of NY, 110 A.D.3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013]).
When analyzing claims under the NYCHRL, "the NYCHRL should be construed more broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible" (Watson v Emblem Health Servs., 158 A.D.3d 179, 182 [1st Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Thus, to establish a discrimination claim under the NYCHRL, the plaintiff only needs to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they were treated less well than other employees because of their protected status (Mihalik v Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 [2d Cir 2013], citing Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 78).
Finally, employment discrimination cases are generally reviewed under a notice pleading standard whereby the plaintiff is not required to give specific facts but rather only provide the defendant with fair notice of the nature and grounds of the plaintiff's claims (Vig v New York Hairspray Co., L.P., 67 A.D.3d 140, 145 [1st Dept 2009]).
Nonetheless, plaintiff describes in his detailed summons and complaint the factors constituting the discrimination he experienced and the roles the various defendants played. Plaintiff sufficiently pleads facts to support his claim that defendants had a discriminatory animus towards him because of his disability.
Plaintiff's discrimination claims against all defendants may proceed, and defendants' motion to dismiss these causes of action is denied. The complaint pleads sufficient facts to support plaintiff's cause of action for discrimination against iHOPE, Juhasz and the other named defendants. Plaintiff has established a prima facie case for discrimination in that: (1) as a disabled person, diagnosed with severe anxiety, depression and bi-polar disorder, he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is qualified to hold the position, as he has held supervisory positions such as paraprofessional manager, operations manager and logistics manager prior during his years at iHOPE; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, as his supervisor violated his privacy rights in revealing Plaintiff's protected mental health issues to colleagues and others in the workplace, stripped or severely diminished his duties, instructing him not to return to the iHOPE campus but to work offsite at the administrative offices, prevented him from entering iHOPE's campus, and allegedly pressured him to resign or be fired; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred after plaintiff's supervisor Juhasz learned of the plaintiff's mental health episode which resulted in him being rushed to the hospital and remaining in a psychiatric hospital for a significant period of time while he was recovering and being treated by medical professionals. Thus, plaintiff has shown that the adverse actions occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
As plaintiff has established a prima facie case for discrimination, Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to these causes of action is denied.
Hostile Work Environment Claims Under NYSHRL And NYCHRL
The second and fourth causes of action allege that defendants subjected plaintiff to a hostile work environment due to his mental health disability in violation of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, respectively.
Plaintiff asserts that, under the totality of circumstances, defendants subjected him to a hostile work environment. Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that Massaro, Brown, Mortara, and M. Donohue colluded with iHOPE employees to champion Juhasz's return following his initial removal for his actions toward plaintiff by P. Donohue. In so doing, plaintiff was forced to work from a different location out of humiliation, embarrassment, and mental anguish. Plaintiff also argues that Juhasz disclosed plaintiff's private mental health information, gossiped about it, including his attempted suicide, with other employees, mocked plaintiff, and told other employees that plaintiff could not be trusted. Juhasz continued this behavior while on administrative leave. Plaintiff contends that defendants Massaro, Brown, Mortara, and M.Donohue disregarded his complaints about Juhasz and colluded with others to ensure Juhasz's return to iHOPE.
Plaintiff also argues that YAI and Carey did not make any efforts to restore civility at iHOPE. Plaintiff argues that YAI and Carey were made aware of plaintiff's complaints regarding Juhasz and made no remedial efforts. Further, plaintiff contends that YAI and Carey are properly named as defendants because, inter alia, Carey, as CFO of YAI, conducted an audit of iHOPE's legal and financial liabilities and status pertaining to liability issues stemming from plaintiff's allegations against Juhasz; and Carey became a board member of iHOPE in January 2018.
NYSHRL was amended in 2019 to be more akin to the more liberal NYSCRL. Prior to the 2019 amendment, a plaintiff claiming a hostile work environment stemming from discrimination in violation of the NYSHRL was required to show that the complained-of conduct in the workplace was "severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment" (Forrest, 3 N.Y.3d at 310 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). However, since the 2019 amendment became effective on October 11, 2019 (see L 2019, ch 160, §§ 2, 16 [b], [d]), the requisites to establishing a NYSHRL hostile work environment claim are identical to those required under the NYCHRL. The NYSHRL now states that harassment is actionable "regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims" (Executive Law § 296 [1] [h]). A plaintiff now needs to show that they were subjected "to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's membership in one or more of these protected categories" (id.)
A plaintiff claiming hostile work environment under the NYCHRL need only show that they were treated less well than other employees because of the relevant characteristic (Reichman v City of New York, 179 A.D.3d 1115, 1118 [2d Dept 2020]). The alleged conduct must "exceed what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial inconveniences and mere personality conflicts will not suffice to establish a hostile work environment" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Forrest, 3 N.Y.3d at 309 and Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 80).
For the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, the plaintiff must plead that the defendant had a discriminatory animus for a hostile work environment claim (Llanos v City of New York, 129 A.D.3d 620 [1st Dept 2015]). Failure to do so may defeat a plaintiff's hostile work environment claim (id.).
The NYSHRL and NYCHRL impose liability on individuals that aid and abet unlawful discriminatory conduct (Patrowich v Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 542 [1984]; (Doe v Bloomberg, L.P., 36 N.Y.3d 450, 459 [2021]; see also Executive Law § 296 [6]; Administrative Code of the City of NY § 8-107 [6]). The standard for providing aiding and abetting is that the defendants participated in the alleged discriminatory conduct (Forrest, 3 N.Y.3d at 328).
Here, plaintiff sufficiently pleads facts to show that he was subjected to a hostile work environment by defendants Massaro, Mortara, M. Donohue, and Brown. Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to show that these defendants participated in the alleged discriminatory conduct toward him. Further, under the totality of the circumstances, and taking the facts alleged as true as is required when a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss is made, plaintiff shows that Massaro, Brown, Mortara, and M. Donohue had the requisite discriminatory animus for a hostile work environment claim, given that no other reason was given for the actions they took, all of which followed plaintiff's hospitalization and treatment for his mental health episode and his supervisor's revelation of same at iHOPE.
Retaliation Claims Under NYSHRL And NYCHRL
The fifth and sixth causes of action allege that defendants retaliated against plaintiff because he complained of disability discrimination in violation of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, respectively. Defendants move to dismiss these causes of action for any allegations that happened after January 29, 2018; and for defendants YAI, Carey, Massaro, Mortara, M. Donohue, and Brown for allegations that happened before January 29, 2018.
Defendants argue, inter alia, that plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead facts for retaliation claims. Defendants assert that plaintiff neither suffered an adverse action nor was deterred from engaging in protected activity, nor was there a causal connected between when plaintiff complained of discrimination and any alleged retaliation because plaintiff resigned in January 2018 and virtually all the allegations are made against Juhasz and iHOPE. Defendants contend that YAI and Carey were not involved with iHOPE until February 2018, after plaintiff resigned. Defendants also argue that plaintiff failed to plead facts that YAI, Carey, M. Donohue, Massaro, or Brown caused plaintiff an adverse employment action in retaliation for protected activity. Rather, defendants assert that plaintiff's allegations are made against Juhasz and iHOPE.
Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that he has a viable claim of retaliation. Plaintiff contends that (1) he engaged in protected activity when he complained to P. Donohue of Juhasz's discriminatory conduct and hostile work environment; (2) defendants had actual knowledge of the complaint when P. Donohue handed Juhasz's letter of termination and informed the Board of the situation, that Massaro, M. Donohue, and Brown spoke with iHOPE staff about the allegations to support Juhasz's return to work, and that YAI and Carey also had knowledge because P. Donohue informed them; (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse action when Board members colluded with iHOPE staff to ensure Juhasz's return and discredit plaintiff's complaint and that plaintiff was forced to submit a false resignation letter for these reasons and that he was caused embarrassment and humiliation when he was reassigned to another facility and barred from returning to the iHOPE campus; and (4) there is a causal connection because the retaliatory conduct occurred close in time after plaintiff's complaint was made.
A plaintiff asserting a claim of retaliation under the NYSHRL must show that (1) they engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of the plaintiff engaged in the protected activity; (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action based upon their activity; and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action (Forrest, 3 N.Y.3d at 313). However, the 2019 amendment instructs courts to apply a liberal construction of the statute so thus the approach of the NYCHRL should be applied in reviewing retaliation claims under the NYSHRL (Brown, 2023 NY Slip Op. 30106[U], *19 [Sup Ct, NY County 2023]).
To make a claim for retaliation under the NYCHRL, the plaintiff must allege that (1) they participated in protected activity known to the defendants, (2) defendants took an action that disadvantaged the plaintiff, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action (Fletcher v Dakota, Inc., 99 A.D.3d 43, 51-52 [1st Dept 2012]). "The causal connection needed for proof of a retaliation claim can be established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action" (Herskowitz v State of New York, 222 A.D.3d 587, 588 [1st Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
Constructive discharge occurs "when the employer, rather than acting directly, deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation" (Morris v Schroder Capital Mgt. Intl., 7 N.Y.3d 616, 621 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). To establish an employer's deliberate conduct, the plaintiff must show more than the employer's lack of concern and mere negligence or ineffectiveness (Polidori v Société Générale Groupe, 39 A.D.3d 404, 405 [1st Dept 2007]).
Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts that demonstrate he suffered an adverse employment action by Massaro, Mortara, M. Donohue, and Brown. As Board members who were aware of plaintiff's mental health episodes, disability, and Juhasz's actions in unlawfully sharing plaintiff's private information, and were actively involved in the alleged discriminatory actions that followed, Mortara, Massaro, M. Donohue, and Brown affected plaintiff's employment. Although they voted to place Juhasz on administrative leave pending an investigation because of the allegations made by plaintiff, their initial actions as alleged were improper.
Negligence and Respondeat Superior Claims
The seventh cause of action alleges that Juhasz was negligent regarding plaintiff's private medical information. The eighth cause of action alleges that iHOPE, DOF, and YAI are liable for the acts and omissions of the other individually named defendants via respondeat superior.
Defendants argue that the Workers' Compensation Law (WCL) bars employees from asserting common law negligence claims against their employer, and by extension bars respondeat superior claims. Defendants contend that Juhasz's improper distribution of plaintiff's medical information occurred in the context of Juhasz's role as supervisor and Human Resources Manager, and thus the exclusive remedy would be through the WCL. Defendants also assert that YAI was not managing operations for iHOPE when plaintiff was at iHOPE and thus cannot be held liable.
Plaintiff's opposition does not put forth arguments against defendants' contentions. As such, defendants reply and assert that plaintiff has abandoned these claims because of his failure to oppose defendants' arguments.
As a general matter, the WCL is the exclusive remedy for compensation or benefits when an employee is injured by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ (See Workers' Compensation Law § 29 [6]). The WCL bars common law negligence claims against employers unless an intentional tort was committed by the employer or at the employer's direction (Martinez v Canteen Vending Servs. Roux Fine Dining Chartwheel, 18 A.D.3d 274, 275 [1st Dept 2005]). Similarly, WCL is the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow employee and thus a claim of work-related negligence against the employee is barred by the WCL (Miller v National Prop. Mgt. Assoc., Inc., 191 A.D.3d 1341, 1342 [4th Dept 2021], citing Thomas v Northeast Theatre Corp., 51 A.D.3d 588, 589 [1st Dept 2008]; Martinez, 18 A.D.3d at 275). However, a plaintiff may overcome the WCL's exclusivity by pleading sufficient facts to invoke the intentional tort exception (Jean-Louis v Hilton Hotels Corp., 68 A.D.3d 406 [1st Dept 2009]).
Respondeat superior is a theory of liability where the employer "may be vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees only if those acts were committed in furtherance of the employer's business and within the scope of employment" (N.X. v Cabrini Med. Ctr., 97 N.Y.2d 247, 251 [2002]). Respondeat superior is not an independent cause of action (Spruill v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 32648[U], *17 [Sup Ct, NY County 2022], see also Still v Paws & Rec, Inc., 79 Misc.3d 535, 537 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023]).
Failure to oppose an argument against a claim in a motion to dismiss provides an independent basis for dismissal of that claim (Saidin v Negron, 136 A.D.3d 458, 459 [1st Dept 2016]).
The seventh cause of action as against Juhasz and the eighth cause of action as against iHOPE and YAI are dismissed. The WCL is the exclusive remedy for work-related negligence claims against a fellow employee-defendant and plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to overcome WCL's exclusivity provision. Additionally, respondeat superior is a theory of liability and not an independent cause of action. Further, plaintiff did not oppose defendants' arguments, which acts as independent grounds for dismissal.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby:
ORDERED that, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7), defendants' motion to dismiss the first and third causes of action for discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, respectively, is denied for YAI, Carey, Brown, Donohue, Massaro, and Mortara, iHOPE and Juhasz; and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7), defendants' motion to dismiss the second and fourth causes of action for hostile work environment under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, respectively, is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7), defendants' motion to dismiss the fifth and sixth causes of action for retaliation under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, respectively, is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7), defendants' motion to dismiss the seventh cause of action for negligence is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7), defendants' motion to dismiss the eighth cause of action for respondeat superior is granted for iHOPE and YAI; and it is further
ORDERED that, within 20 days from entry of this order, defendants shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre Street, Room 119); and it is further
ORDERED that such service upon the Clerk shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the "E-Filing" page on the court's website at the address www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh).
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.