COOKS, Judge.

This case involves enforcement of a judgment against a sheriff's department for tortious acts occurring during a former sheriff's administration. Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Deputy, Kathy Riley, was injured when she tripped and fell on a water hose extended across the sidewalk by a trustee assigned to wash cars. Routinely, Evangeline Parish Sheriffs permitted prisoners to wash cars on the courthouse parking lot. Kathy Riley was familiar with this practice. Earlier on the date of the accident, her vehicle was washed by a trustee.

Kathy Riley filed a personal injury action against the Evangeline Parish Police Jury, the Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department, and their respective insurers, if existent, and named as "ABC and DEF" Insurance Companies. At the time of the alleged accident and filing of suit, Floyd Soileau was the Sheriff of the Parish of Evangeline.

Although Mrs. Riley's accident would fall ordinarily within the purview of the Worker's Compensation Act, injuries sustained by sheriff's deputies during the course and scope of their employment are statutorily exempted from coverage under the Act. A sheriff's officer who sustains work related injuries must seek relief under general tort law. The trial judge found former Sheriff, Floyd Soileau, vicariously liable in tort for the trustee's negligence. However, he held the judgment was not enforceable against the former sheriff, personally, or against the funds under the direction and control of the successor Sheriff, Wayne Morein.

EXCEPTION OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION

Preliminarily, we turn to address appellee's exception of no cause of action originally filed at the trial level. The trial court neither heard nor ruled on the exception. Appellee refiled and now seeks to reurge the exception before this court in accordance with Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 927 which permits filing of a no cause exception at any time prior to the judgment's finality. Essentially, the exception as lodged attacks Mrs. Riley's right to proceed against the Evangeline Parish Sheriff Department as a legal entity. The main thrust of the exception focuses on the status of Sheriff's Departments generally and their juridical existence. We will discuss the underlying question raised by the exception in due course.

However, an exception of no cause of action tests the sufficiency in law of the petition. Darville v. Texaco, Inc., 447 So.2d 473 (La. 1984). The exception aims at forcing early dismissal of an action where the law affords "no remedy to anyone for the particular grievance alleged." Meche v. Arceneaux, 460 So.2d 89 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1984). The exception must be decided by considering the facts alleged in the petition only. Procedurally, the mover is barred from contesting the truthfulness or correctness of the facts pled in the petition which must be conceded. Smith v. Cole, 541 So.2d 307 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1989). No evidence is admissible to support or defeat the exception. In deciding the merits of the exception on appeal, we are restrained from considering any defenses alleged at trial or pleadings filed by appellee below. LSA-C.C.P. 931: Bielkiewicz v. Rudisill, 201 So.2d 136 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1967). Strictly viewed, the four corners of the petition are the limited boundary of our factual inquiry. A mover may not use the exception on appeal to abort full appellate review of the case simply because the record contains valid defenses to the claims. Gustin v. Shows, 377 So.2d 1325 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1979). Furthermore, the exception may not be invoked to determine whether a particular defendant can stand ultimately in judgment in a case. Babineaux v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling Co., 261 La. 1080, 262 So.2d 328 (1972). Any such defenses must go to the merits only following examination of the full record on appeal. Gustin v. Shows, supra.

We note Riley's petition alleged the Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department is a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana capable of suing and being sued. It further alleged the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the Sheriff's Department and the Trustee; that the Trustee was negligent; and that the Trustee's tortious acts were committed during the course of his relationship with the Sheriff's Department. Accepting these pled facts as true, Riley stated a recognized cause of action in Louisiana tort law. Appellee's exception of no cause of action must fail. Accordingly, we are required to complete our review of the case.

ISSUE

As noted, the primary issue is whether tort liability occurring during a former sheriff's term is recoverable against the sheriff's department, as a legal entity; and thereby enforceable against existing funds under the control of a successor sheriff. The parties also assign as error the trial court's apportionment of fault and damages. For the following reasons, we reverse in part and affirm in part.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Appellee insists the law and jurisprudence do not mandate enforcement of a former administration's vicarious obligations against a successor sheriff or his department. We disagree.

BACKGROUND — JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGISLATION

The federal court, interpreting Louisiana's jurisprudence, in Slack v. Bishop, 444 F. Supp. 1161 (W.D.La. 1978), ruled trustees were quasi-deputies; and thus sheriffs were responsible for their negligence only in the performance of official duties. Analogous reference to the jurisprudence, relating to a sheriff's legal responsibility for the delictual acts of his deputies, initially proved troublesome to courts in defining a sheriff's liability for the negligence of others who worked under his supervision and control. This cloud in the jurisprudence often resulted in problems relating to the enforcement of judgments for negligent injuries resulting from the sheriff's operations which were not assignable to the sheriff, individually or officially. Louisiana Courts wrestled for years with different theories in attempting to determine the scope of a sheriff's liability for his deputies' torts. Early statutory law offered little aid to courts in resolving this judicial dilemma. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Gray v. DeBretton, 192 La. 628, 188 So. 722 (1939), held vicarious liability did not attach to sheriffs under the doctrine of respondeat superior or master and servant for the wrongful acts of deputies which were not committed in the discharge of "official duties or as a result of the performance of official acts." Exactly what acts constituted breach of a deputy's official duty, as opposed to his private duty, were not easily discernable. For example, in Gray suit was filed against the sheriff arising from the negligence of a deputy in driving a sheriff's unit off the road while transporting a prisoner to the parish jail, striking plaintiff and his two sons. The Court found the sheriff was not liable because the duty violated by the deputy was not an official duty, but an individual or private duty owed to all pedestrians on the highway. Gray and its progeny reflect a period in our jurisprudence of ambivalence and uncertainty regarding enforcement of judgments against sheriffs for the negligence of deputies or others working for the sheriff's department. Nielson v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 242 So.2d 91 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1970); Frank v. Pitre, 341 So.2d 1376 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977), reversed, 353 So.2d 1293 (La. 1977). The "official act standard of liability," though confusing in practice, was applied by Louisiana and federal courts prior to the Supreme Court decision in Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 402 So.2d 669 (La. 1981). Sheriffs generally were not responsible vicariously for the acts of their deputies or trustees. In stark contrast, city policemen were recognized as "officers and employees," permitting the imposition of vicarious liability against the city for wrongful injuries inflicted by officers and other employees while performing their duties. Application of pre- Jenkins jurisprudence to the facts of this case would render plaintiff's judgment unenforceable because the negligent conduct of the trustee could not be imputed vicariously to the former sheriff.

The 1974 Louisiana Constitution in Article XII, Section 10 (A) abolished governmental immunity forcing courts to revisit the issue of a sheriff's vicarious responsibility for the acts of deputies and trustees. In Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Grant Parish Sheriff's Dept., 350 So.2d 236 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977), writ denied, 352 So.2d 235 (La. 1977), we held sheriff departments were not legal entities "capable of suing and being sued." Only the sheriff, individually, was liable for the negligence of his deputies committed under his direct orders or in the performance of their official duties. We concluded a successor sheriff was not liable for the delictual acts of his predecessor. Interestingly, however, we noted in passing that LSA-R.S. 33:1450.1 allows sheriffs to contract for insurance to cover losses or damages occasioned from negligent acts committed by them or their deputies. This undoubtedly was an attempt by us to ultimately find a legal entity to assign responsibility for the sheriff's vicarious liability, i.e. an insurance company, thus avoiding obvious conflict with the Constitution's immunity prohibition.

Next, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Foster v. Hampton, 381 So.2d 789 (La. 1980), applied the "official duty standard;" but held the State vicariously liable for the deputy's tort. See also Foster v. Hampton, 352 So.2d 197 (La. 1977). The legislature quickly responded by amending LSA-R.S. 33:1433 deleting the language relied upon by the Foster Court regarding the sheriff's general immunity from liability for vicarious acts. Further, the legislature enacted LSA-R.S. 42:1441 specifically prohibiting suits against the State for the sheriff and his deputies' liability.

Nonetheless, several appellate courts joined by the Supreme Court continued to apply the Foster decision recognizing the State as a deputy's employer. See Foster v. Hampton, 381 So.2d 789 (1980), on review before the Supreme Court after enactment of LSA-R.S. 42:1441, followed by Michaelman v. Amiss, 385 So.2d 404 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1980) and Carmouche v. Oubre, 394 So.2d 805 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1981). However, in Martinez v. Reynolds, 398 So.2d 156 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1981), we interpreted the enactment of LSA-R.S. 42:1441 as legislatively overruling Foster. Accordingly, we found Section 1441 destroyed any cause of action against the State. Furthermore, upholding Section 1441, as not violating Article XII, Section 10 (A) of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, we reasoned the legislature provided plaintiffs with an adequate remedy by removing any limitation on the liability of sheriffs and thereby inferentially expressing an intent to treat sheriffs' departments as legal entities responsible for vicarious fault.

Promptly reconsidering this issue, the Supreme Court adopted the more functional approach, first employed by us in Martinez, in assigning vicarious tort liability to sheriffs in Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 402 So.2d 669 (La. 1981). Jenkins effectively overruled a long line of cases holding that sheriff's departments were not juridical entities capable of being sued. The Court reasoned:

The reality of the situation is that there does exist an employment relationship between a sheriff and his deputies. The sheriff, and not the state, hires and fires deputies, exercises direct and indirect supervision and control over them, fixes their time and place of work, and generally allocates their responsibility and assigns their duties. Although the money for the operation of the various sheriffs' departments may come from various sources of public funds (primarily fees as tax collector and in civil and criminal matters), the sheriffs disburse the allocated funds and actually pay most of the salaries of the deputies with these funds. No one but the sheriff can realistically be viewed as the employer of the deputies. Whether the sheriff is the appropriate governmental entity on which to impose liability for the employment-related torts of the deputy sheriff is a more difficult question.

The doctrine of respondeat superior is based on the rationale that the enterprise should pay for damages caused by one who is acting in furtherance of the enterprise. Here, there is no enterprise. The deputy on duty is acting in furtherance of the public good, and the damages caused by those actions of the deputy should be paid by public funds.

The Legislature, in enacting Act 318 of 1978, has clearly indicated its intention that governmental responsibility for torts committed by a public employee should be placed on the public officer most closely related to the tortfeasor. The Legislature also removed the previous statutory immunity enjoyed by the sheriff. Moreover, as noted in the discussion of the employment relationship, neither the state nor the parish (the other logical entities on which liability might be imposed) exercises any significant control over sheriff's deputies. We conclude that the sheriff is the appropriate governmental entity on which to place responsibility for the torts of a deputy sheriff.

* * * * * *

How the obligation may be enforced is one of the practical problems not solved by this decision. In this case, for example, any judgment against this sheriff in his official capacity will have to be recovered (disregarding the probability of liability insurance) from the official funds of his successor sheriff, since Cronvich is no longer in office. Future incidents can be provided for by liability insurance. [Emphasis added]

By identifying the sheriff as the "appropriate governmental entity on which to place liability," the Supreme Court has resolved the issue now before us.

POST-JENKINS JURISPRUDENCE

The jurisprudence has consistently followed Jenkins in assigning a sheriff with vicarious liability for the negligence of their deputies. Cooley v. State, 533 So.2d 124 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1988); Nall v. Parish of Iberville, 542 So.2d 145 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1989). We adopted the Jenkins holding in Sullivan v. Quick, 406 So.2d 284 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1981). The legislature also responded by enacting a comprehensive plan allowing sheriffs to pool their funds to provide "Group Self-Insurance," presumably at lower cost, to cover their expanded "liability" as recognized in Jenkins in an obvious attempt to reduce the financial impact on the sheriff's funds. See also, LSA-R.S. 33:1450.1.

We are not persuaded in this case to reach a different result by ignoring the sensible approach employed in Jenkins, followed by us in Martinez and Sullivan, as suggested by appellee. Such divergence would reintroduce confusion and inconsistency in our case law. The 1974 Constitution and subsequent legislation prevents us from jurisprudentially immunizing sheriffs and the public funds under their control from liability for the wrongful acts occasioned by their operations.

Therefore, we find the trial judge acted without legislative or jurisprudential authority in barring enforcement of the judgment against the Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department and the funds under the direct control of Sheriff Morein. We amend the judgment to permit its enforcement against the Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department, as a legal entity, and against the funds under the control of the present sheriff.

APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT

Both parties assert the trial court erred in assigning their respective comparative faults. Mrs. Riley contends her percentage of fault should be reduced; while defendant urges it should be increased. When damages are insusceptible of precise measurement, much discretion is left to the trial court to make reasonable awards. LSA-C.C. art. 1999. Absent an initial determination that the trial court's great discretion has been abused under the facts of this case, we cannot disturb the trier's award. Boswell v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., Inc., 363 So.2d 506 (La. 1978); Mitchell v. State, through DOTD, 596 So.2d 353 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1992), writ denied, 600 So.2d 680 (La. 1992). We find the trial court did not manifestly err in apportioning fifty percent (50%) of the fault to each party. Plaintiff was an employee of the Sheriff's Department. As noted by the trial judge, she knew or should have known that hoses were often stretched across the sidewalk. Her car was washed on the day of the accident. The trial judge did not manifestly err in concluding Mrs. Riley could have exercised greater care in guarding against an obvious and known danger.

The defendant's practice of allowing trustees wash cars on the courthouse parking lot by extending water hoses across the sidewalk created an unreasonable risk of injury. It was certainly foreseeable that a person using the sidewalk might slip and fall on the water hose. Defendant could have easily avoided the harm posed in this case by posting signs, roping the area, or moving the car washing activities to another area.

DAMAGES

Plaintiff complains the trial court's award of damages is inadequate under the circumstances. The judge awarded plaintiff $10,000.00 for physical and mental pain and suffering, $5,000.00 for lost wages, and $2,052.33 for medical expenses. Plaintiff cites a number of cases in which greater damages were awarded.

It is well settled that the factors which should be considered in assessing damages include the severity of pain and suffering and permanency of the disability resulting from the accident. General damages must be based upon competent medical evidence. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989).

The trial court noted plaintiff suffered from two (2) pre-existing back conditions, as well as a pre-existing mental condition. Also, the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of Dr. Douglas McKay, an orthopedist, rather than the testimony of Dr. Charles Fontenot, a general practitioner. It is well settled that reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on review. Rosell v. Esco, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989).

Dr. McKay testified the back pain suffered by plaintiff was "mechanical in origin" and plaintiff had a normal neurological examination with no disc or sciatica problems or muscle spasms in the back. From his examination of plaintiff and evaluation of diagnostic testing (including x-rays, MRI and C-Scan results), Dr. McKay concluded plaintiff did not sustain any residual disability or permanent aggravation of her pre-existing back condition. He testified that the pain and discomfort experienced by her, reasonably connected to the fall, should have subsided within one year. Based upon this testimony the trial court rendered its award for physical and mental pain and suffering. After reviewing the record, we find no clear error on the part of the trial court in quantifying the injuries. Also, the trial judge's assessment of special damages for loss of wages was not clearly wrong or abusive in light of his conclusion that the medical facts did not support a finding of "permanent" impairment or the existence of prolonged aggravation of her pre-existing disabilities which would hinder or prevent her from performing work the same as or similar to her pre-injury job.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment which barred plaintiff from executing her judgment against the Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department and the funds under the direction and control of Wayne Morein. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The costs of this appeal are assessed against defendant-appellee.

REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.

STOKER, J., dissents and assigns reasons

CULPEPPER, J. Pro Tem., dissents for the reasons assigned by STOKER, J.

COOKS, Judge.

ON REHEARING

[44] STOKER, Judge.

This case was heard by a five-judge panel and our opinion was handed down on June 2, 1993, from which there were two dissents. Thereafter, we granted a rehearing. After further consideration and again hearing oral arguments, a majority of the panel is now of the opinion that the "Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department" is not a legal entity which may be sued and stand in judgment. We so hold for the reasons set forth in our opinion in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant Parish, Etc., 350 So.2d 236 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 352 So.2d 235 (1977). We reiterated our position in Garner v. Avoyelles Parish Sheriff's Dept., 511 So.2d 8 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1987). The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit followed our view in Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 385 So.2d 578 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1980), reversed as to other issues, 402 So.2d 669 (La. 1981). Because the "Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department" is not a legal entity, the plaintiff's petition failed to set forth a cause of action against that particular defendant.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The majority opinion on original hearing set forth the essential facts and the procedural history of this case. Therefore, we need only set forth a brief summary here.

This is a suit for personal injury damages sustained by plaintiff caused by the alleged negligence of a person "under the supervision of the Evangeline Parish Police Jury and the Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department." Plaintiff dismissed her suit against the Police Jury prior to trial. Plaintiff did not name as a defendant Floyd Soileau, the Sheriff of Evangeline Parish at the time of the incident which plaintiff alleges caused her personal injuries. Although plaintiff named the DEF Insurance Company as the insurer of the Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department, apparently no such insurance ever surfaced. Consequently, this case ultimately involved only one defendant, the Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department, which as we hold had no legal status.

Prior to trial a peremptory exception of no cause of action was filed on behalf of Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department. Nevertheless, the case went to trial, and after trial, the trial judge gave judgment in favor of plaintiff reduced by 50% on a finding that plaintiff was herself 50% at fault. However, the ruling of the trial court and its judgment provided "that this Judgment may not be executed either against FLOYD SOILEAU, personally, or against the funds of the EVANGELINE PARISH SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT under the direction and control of Wayne Morein."

At the time of trial Wayne Morein had succeeded Floyd Soileau as Sheriff of Evangeline Parish.

The judgment of the trial court was appealed to this court. Before this court counsel for the defendant reurges its peremptory exception of failure to state a cause of action.

OPINION

In our opinion the exception of no cause of action should have been granted by the trial court. For the reason that we find that the sole defendant in this case, the Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department, has no legal status, we hold that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 2163.

In all of the arguments addressed to this court the plaintiff has never pointed to any constitutional or statutory provision conferring legal status to sue or be sued on sheriff's departments. Without such, we fail to see how such a functional and organizational agency as a sheriff's department or office can have legal status. The jurisprudence from this court and the fourth circuit are decidedly against such a notion. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant Parish, Etc., supra; Garner v. Avoyelles Parish Sheriff's Dept., supra; and Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, supra.

Presumably, the plaintiff considered that a suit against Sheriff Floyd Soileau would be fruitless. In the absence of an insurer and doubtful liability of the successor sheriff, plaintiff seeks to find some solvent continuum capable of standing in judgment. As we best understand plaintiff's theory, it is that because sheriffs maintain or control funds, the funds give life to a legal entity separate from that of the sheriff and that the entity is the "Sheriff's Department." Plaintiff therefore urges that such an entity survives vacation of the office of sheriff by one natural person to be succeeded by a different natural person. On the contrary, a sheriff's department is nothing more than a functional organization by and through which a sheriff carries out his official and routine duties.

We have found no Louisiana Supreme Court case which has confronted head on the issue presented in this case. In Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 402 So.2d 669 (La. 1981), the supreme court reversed one holding of the court of appeal, but it did not advert to or reverse the court of appeal's ruling that the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office was not a legal entity capable of being sued. In Jenkins the plaintiff brought suit against several parties, including Sheriff Alwynn J. Cronvick and Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office. At 385 So.2d at 579 the court of appeal said:

"As to Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, it is not a legal entity capable of being sued. It is simply an office operated by the Sheriff of Jefferson Parish whose authority is derived from the constitution. Art. 5, § 27, and Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant Parish, etc., 350 So.2d 236 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977) writs refused 352 So.2d 235."

The supreme court granted a writ to review the court of appeal ruling which held that the sheriff of a parish was not vicariously liable for the tort of a deputy sheriff committed in the exercise of the functions for which the deputy was employed. The supreme court reversed that holding, but it did not disturb the holding quoted above.

At oral argument panel members of this court brought to the attention of counsel two cases: Blair v. Tynes, 621 So.2d 591 (La. 1993) and Wagoner v. Dyson, 618 So.2d 432 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1993).

Blair v. Tynes was a wrongful death action in which various parties were sued, including the driver of a pick-up truck and "The Washington Parish Sheriff's Department through Sheriff Benny Rayburn" and "its insurer." Although the opinion indicated initially that the title used was "Department", in all other references throughout the opinion the word "Office" is substituted. The trial court found several parties at fault including the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office. The court of appeal reversed as to the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office and another defendant. The supreme court reinstated the trial court judgment.

No where in Blair v. Tynes does the supreme court ever advert to the legal issue of whether the Washington Parish Sheriff's Department (or Office) was a juridical person. The issue was not raised in the supreme court, and a reading of the court of appeal opinion shows that the issue was not raised there. Apparently, there was no reason or occasion for a challenge on this point, and two reasons would appear from the face of the opinion. First, the opinion suggests the existence of insurance covering the sheriff and the deputies who were at fault. Second, the suit against the "Department" was brought through the Sheriff, Benny Rayburn.

It would appear to us that the court of appeal and the supreme court were confronted with a case in which the pleadings as made up by the parties did not require them to attach any significance to the Washington Parish Sheriff's Department (or Office) being named as a party. As suggested by counsel for defendant in the case before us, the supreme court merely continued the use of the name and made casual use of the shorthand reference to the department or office, when in fact the true defendant was the Sheriff, Benny Rayburn. This treatment by the supreme court in no way indicates that it considers a sheriff's department or office to be a legal entity, a juridical person, which may be sued and stand in judgment.

Wagoner v. Dyson, supra, came up on appeal on a venue issue. It did not present an issue as to whether or not a sheriff's department was a legal entity. Plaintiffs sued Sheriff Raywood LeMaire and the Vermilion Parish Sheriff's Office for a tort allegedly committed by a Vermilion Parish sheriff's deputy, Walter Dyson. They also sued Dyson. Plaintiffs filed their suit in St. James Parish, the domicile of Dyson and the plaintiffs. The district court in St. James Parish dismissed the suit on an exception of venue. The court of appeal found the ruling correct but transferred the case to Vermilion Parish, the proper venue, rather than letting the dismissal stand.

In Wagoner the court referred to LSA-R.S. 13:5104 (B) governing the venue of suits against political subdivisions of the state or against an officer or employee of a political subdivision arising out of performance of official duties. Then, without any citation of authority, the court of appeal made the following statement: "There is no question that the Vermilion Parish Sheriff's Department is a political subdivision of the state and that LeMaire is an officer thereof." To begin with, we entirely disagree that a sheriff's department is a political subdivision of the state, for as we indicated earlier in this opinion, no constitutional provision or statute establishes such a department as a legal entity. Therefore, it cannot be a political subdivision of the state. For these reasons we do not subscribe to the statement quoted above from Wagoner v. Dyson.

DISPOSITION

A majority of the panel in this matter is now of the view that the majority opinion on original hearing rendered on June 2, 1993, is erroneous. The present majority is of the opinion that a sheriff's department or office, as distinct from the sheriff, is not a legal entity which may be sued or stand in judgment. Because the Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Department, the only defendant in this case, is not a juridical person, the plaintiff's suit fails to state a cause of action. We will vacate the judgment of the trial court in its entirety because the trial court did not have a cause of action before it.

The proper disposition of the case at this point has given us some concern. One member of the majority on the main issue is of the opinion that the case should be dismissed outright. The author of this opinion has reservations concerning a remand to allow the plaintiff to amend her petition to assert a cause of action, that is, to bring in other possible defendants. One judge who dissents from our holding on the main issue votes to grant the remand while maintaining his basic position that the plaintiff's petition does set forth a cause of action as indicated by him in a separate dissenting and concurring opinion. Despite reservations, the author of this opinion will join in the order to remand to allow amendment.

DECREE

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court in its entirety is vacated and set aside. We hereby order that this case be remanded to the trial court for the purpose of permitting plaintiff to amend her petition to join other parties, if she can, for the purpose of curing the failure of her petition to assert a cause of action. The plaintiff shall have forty-five days from the day this judgment becomes final to file her amendment. We assess the costs of this appeal to the plaintiff-appellant.

JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT VACATED AND SET ASIDE; CASE REMANDED.

CULPEPPER, J., concurs, except he would not remand.

THIBODEAUX, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.

COOKS, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.