JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge:

The plaintiff-appellant, Stella Reyes, sued under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 and general maritime law for the death of her husband, Florentino Reyes, a member of the crew of defendant-appellee's SS NATIONAL DEFENDER. Reyes was employed as a seaman on board NATIONAL DEFENDER at the time of his death. The lower court found that the vessel was not unseaworthy in any respect, the Master, Officers and crew were not negligent and the sole, proximate cause of Reyes' death was his own negligence in attempting to swim in the ocean. The court rendered judgment for the shipowners and the widow appeals. We reverse the finding of fault but remand for a determination of damages.

Reyes was 44 years old at the time of his death. He was an American seaman employed as an oiler aboard NATIONAL DEFENDER. The ship departed Houston, Texas, on July 27, 1973, to carry a cargo of wheat to Russia and ultimately to proceed to Libya.

On October 1, 1973, the ship was anchored and moored at a terminal approximately one mile off the northern coast of Libya, loading a cargo of oil through underwater pipelines. A number of other vessels were moored nearby, similarly loading oil. The weather was calm and clear. In addition to the regular crew there was a Loading Master on board to supervise the loading operation. On that day, Reyes stood his regular watch in the engine room of the ship from 4:00 a. m. until 8:00 a. m., after which he ate breakfast in the crew's messroom. At approximately 9:00 a. m. he began working overtime, painting an emergency generator room of the ship.

At approximately 11:15 a. m., the ship's chief cook, Ramiro Gonzales, observed Reyes entering the messroom. Reyes was wearing a pair of cut-off blue jeans and was carrying a towel. He stated that he was going swimming, a statement that was not particularly unusual since the ship had its own swimming pool. At approximately 11:30 a. m., Reyes went to the ship's rail on the port side of the emergency generator room deck (approximately 35 feet above the water), hung his towel over the rail, placed his shower shoes on the deck, and then sat momentarily on the rail with his feet and legs hanging over the rail. He then let out a loud yell and jumped down into the ocean below.

He began swimming strongly away from the ship toward a mooring buoy which was located off the stern of the ship, approximately 300 feet away. Several members of the crew, including his work partner, Sokolic, observed Reyes swimming, and for a brief time he could have been reached by a life ring or line. During this time, however, he was swimming easily and the crew made no attempt to assist him.

After Reyes swam outside the lee of the ship, he encountered a current, but continued to swim toward the buoy. When he was approximately 280 feet away from the ship and only about twenty feet short of the buoy, Reyes abruptly stopped swimming and lay motionless, face down, with his arms outstretched. At no time prior to this did Reyes ever cry for help or go beneath the surface of the water. No alarm was sounded by anyone on the ship, no life ring or life line was thrown to Reyes and no line-throwing apparatus was available or employed, although by the time he was motionless, a crowd of crew members had gathered to watch.

As Reyes swam away from the vessel some of the crew members became concerned. They were yelling and screaming that Reyes was overboard . . . was in the water. Chief Engineer Scott, hearing the commotion, ran from the deck to the Captain's midship office. The Captain, accompanied by the Loading Master, hurried onto the deck to assist Reyes. The Captain observed Reyes floating behind the buoy and realizing the urgency of the situation, told the Loading Master to call a work boat from a nearby ship to pick up Reyes.

NATIONAL DEFENDER was equipped with four lifeboats, only one of which was motorized. At the time of the incident, all of the boats were in their customary positions, suspended high above the water in davits. There was evidence before the court below that these lifeboats could be lowered to their embarkation points within four minutes after they are reached and manned by a four-member crew including an engineer. When Reyes was swimming in the water, however, the ship's position was such that the motorized boat would have had to travel completely around it, a distance of 810 feet in length and 104 feet in breadth, in order to reach Reyes.

The Captain decided to employ the workboat of the nearby ship to pick up Reyes. It was immediately summoned by the Loading Master and directed to Reyes' body. At that time a doctor ashore was also alerted and told to stand by with emergency equipment. The workboat picked up Reyes but instead of going immediately to shore, went instead to NATIONAL DEFENDER where Chief Engineer Scott boarded it with Reyes' papers for the Libyian authorities. Then the workboat met a boat from shore with a doctor on board who attempted resuscitation, to no avail.

Reyes' body was returned to Houston, Texas, where a postmortem examination was conducted. The autopsy report indicated that death was caused by asphyxia due to drowning. The blood analysis indicated the presence of .185% alcohol.

Before NATIONAL DEFENDER departed Houston on her voyage to Russia, officials of the ship's owners ordered the Captain of the ship to maintain a quantity of beer aboard the vessel for sale to crew members. The practice of operating such a beer store or floating dram shop was unfamiliar to the Captain, however, and he questioned the advisability of doing so. He nonetheless complied with the ship owners' instructions, and added 350 cases of beer to his previous stock of 50 cases before the ship departed for Russia. There was evidence that the crew members availed themselves of the opportunity to drink beer while aboard ship. In fact, so much alcohol was consumed during the voyage that the Captain felt compelled to purchase 50 additional cases of beer in the port of Odessa, Russia in order to have an adequate supply for the remainder of the voyage.

The Findings Below

The District Court found that the vessel was not unseaworthy by selling beer aboard. To the contrary, it found that while somewhat unusual, the practice was a measure of goodwill toward the crew. It further found that the Master, the Officers and the crew acted with all prudence and diligence in undertaking to assist and to rescue Reyes. Were it not for the autopsy report — the court held — the evidence would not suggest that Reyes was to any degree intoxicated. While apparently he had partaken of intoxicants in moderate amounts, this did not affect his conduct or behavior and was in no sense responsible for or a proximate cause of his difficulties. The sole and only cause of his death was Reyes' conduct in undertaking to swim in the ocean. Based on these findings of fact, the court ruled as a matter of law that,

while the law imposes upon the vessel and her Captain a paternalistic duty to protect a seaman, even from his own injudicious conduct, where circumstances permit, where as here the sole and only cause of the disaster is that of the seaman's own negligence; and where the officers and crew did all within their power to rescue the victim when his danger came to their knowledge, there is no liability.

Throw Out the Life Line

The fatal flaw in the opinion of the lower court lies in its disregard of the violation of Coast Guard regulations by NATIONAL DEFENDER, specifically, 46 C.F.R. § 94.45-1 et seq. The regulations require that all vessels of 150 gross tons and over in ocean or coastwise service maintain line-throwing appliances for rescue operations. The Captain of NATIONAL DEFENDER testified that the vessel did not have such equipment and that he thought it was illegal to use them. Vessels of 500 gross tons and over are required to have impulse-projected rocket type line throwers. The appliances must have lines of at least 1,500 feet in length and a breaking strength of at least 9,000 pounds.

In Marshall v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 5 Cir. 1964, 334 F.2d 131, 1964 AMC 1686, there was a violation of the Coast Guard regulations relating to the shipment of hazardous articles. There we said,

[t]he law is well established that violations of a statute which is intended to protect the class of persons to which a plaintiff belongs against the risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred is negligence in itself. Inherent in this statement of the legal principal are three questions which must be resolved before liability could be imposed in this case on a negligence per se theory. What proof makes out a violation of the regulations? Were the regulations designed to protect the [plaintiffs]? Were they intended to protect against the risk of the kind of harm that occurred here . . ..

Id. at 134 (citations omitted); see Phipps v. S.S. Santa Maria, 5 Cir. 1971, 418 F.2d 615; Manning v. M/V Sea Road, 5 Cir. 1969, 417 F.2d 603; Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv. Inc., 5 Cir. 1969, 412 F.2d 1011, 1969 AMC 1513; Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 4 Cir. 1968, 399 F.2d 347, 1968 AMC 1437; Provenze v. American Export Lines, Inc., 4 Cir. 1963, 324 F.2d 660; Simmons v. Gulf and South American S.S. Co., (E.D.La. 1966), 260 F. Supp. 525, aff'd, 5 Cir. 1968, 394 F.2d 504, 1968 AMC 1978.

In the application of these requirements to Reyes, the shipowners have made no attempt to dispute the testimony of the Captain that the ship was in fact not equipped with the safety appliance required by the regulations. Since the testimony was undisputed, we accept the proof on non-compliance. Reyes passes the first test.

Second, it is clear that Reyes was meant to be a beneficiary of the protective regulations. The purpose of the safety appliance is to rescue persons in distress. Whether they got in distress through their own carelessness or through the fault of another is irrelevant. A person in distress needs to be rescued. Indeed, so far as responding to the high calling of the sea, it matters not that the person in distress is a stranger to the vessel. The line-throwing appliance was intended to rescue persons beyond the reach of ordinary life rings or life lines. The endangered person's status as a seaman makes the duty to rescue even greater due to the hazards of the sea. The very nature of the seaman's occupation is such that he is continually exposed to the hazards of the deep. If he is "cast into the sea by the violence of the elements or by misfortune or negligent conduct, he is completely dependent for care and safety upon such succor as may be given by the members of the crew." Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 4 Cir. 1931, 50 F.2d 866, 868, 1931 AMC 1303. Reyes passes the second test.

Were the Coast Guard regulations intended to protect against the risk of the kind of harm that occurred? Clearly they were. The line thrower is designed to project a life line over a much greater distance than it could be thrown by hand, enabling the ship to rescue persons at greater distances. Reyes was not farther than 300 feet from the ship at the greatest distance and would have been within reach of the line-throwing appliance had it been available for use. The failure to make it available under our three-pronged test constitutes negligence per se.

A finding of negligence per se does not end our inquiry. In a trial by jury such a finding would have the effect of taking the question of negligence out of the province of the jury and requiring the court to charge the jury that negligence had been established. In the lower court this case was tried without a jury. Had the proper legal analysis been applied by the lower court the next inquiry would have been to determine whether the failure to comply with the statute was excusable, whether the negligence of the defendant proximately caused the harm to the plaintiff and whether certain defenses will mitigate the damages.

Violation of a safety statute may be excused under certain circumstances. Thus where non-compliance was due to an emergency situation, or where compliance would be more dangerous than non-compliance, strict compliance has been excused. See Chase v. Tingdale Bros., 1914, 127 Minn. 401, 149 N.W. 654 (child dashes into the street); Cameron v. Stewart, 1957, 153 Me. 47, 134 A.2d 474 (walking on the wrong side of the street where sidewalk is defective). There has been no showing of any justification for failure to comply with the statute here. Indeed, the only explanation for the breach was the belief by the Captain that the line-throwing appliance was illegal, a completely mistaken belief.

Once it is established that there has been an inexcusable violation of the statute causation adds no problem. We conclude that the district court erred in ruling that Reyes' negligence was the sole, proximate cause of his death. Our conclusion is based in part on the standard of causation applicable under a Jones Act case. The test is not a strict measure of proximate cause but the more lenient measure of legal cause. A ship owner's negligence under the Jones Act need not be the sole proximate cause of an injury to result in liability, but may merely be a contributing cause. Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 5 Cir. 1975, 507 F.2d 216; Hern v. Moran Towing Transp. Co., 2 Cir. 1943, 138 F.2d 900; Johnson v. Griffiths S.S. Co., 9 Cir. 1945, 150 F.2d 224, 1945 AMC 887; Norris, The Law of Seamen § 693 (3rd ed. 1970); cf. Andrews v. Chemical Carriers, Inc., 3 Cir. 1972, 457 F.2d 636, 1972 AMC 1113, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874, 93 S.Ct. 120, 34 L.Ed.2d 126; Restatement 2d Torts § 430, Com. b.

The question of proximate cause in an action under the Jones Act turns on whether the actions of the defendant contributed to the injury even in the slightest degree. Proximate cause is not destroyed merely because the plaintiff may have also contributed to his own injury.

Sanford Bros. Boats, Inc., v. Vidrine, 5 Cir. 1969, 412 F.2d 958, 1969 AMC 1706.

The negligence of the defendant in failing to provide the statutorily required rescue equipment must have contributed to the death of Reyes since it was shown that several crew members were watching as he was swimming, they saw him encounter the strong currents and while they may not have had time or the authority to send out a life boat, or could not have thrown a life ring so far, they could certainly have discharged a line thrower, had it been available. As we said in Spinks, supra, since seamen are wards of admiralty and employers owe a high duty of care to them, "it would be anomalous to allow an overly strict interpretation of proximate cause to defeat the remedial purposes of admiralty tort law." 507 F.2d 216, at 223. Thus we hold that the ship owners' negligence was the legal cause of Reyes' death.

Comparative fault determines the extent, if any, of the seaman's negligence. The defense of assumption of risk is not available in these circumstances. While the seaman does assume the risk of those perils of the sea which are inescapable, no risk that can be reasonably controlled by the ship owner is assumed by the seamen. No matter how glaring the negligence of the seaman that may be said to have contributed to his injury, assumption of risk never rises to the level of even a partial defense. Beadle v. Spencer, 1935, 298 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 712, 80 L.Ed. 1082; The Arizona v. Anelich, 1935, 298 U.S. 110, 56 S.Ct. 707, 80 L.Ed. 1075, reh. denied, 298 U.S. 692, 56 S.Ct. 945, 80 L.Ed. 1409.

While we reject the finding and legal conclusion that the injury was due to the sole negligence of Reyes, we do not find clearly erroneous that it was due impliedly in part to Reyes. But we are unable to determine the extent of which his own actions contributed to the death.

As the process is a comparative one we must dispose of the other charges against the ship which the District Judge rejected. We find one such finding clearly erroneous. The others we sustain.

We are amazed at the failure of the District Court to rule that Reyes was drunk at the time of his death. Perhaps it was the logical quandry: if he held Reyes drunk, it was because he had drunk too much. Since Reyes drank too much in the confined areas of a ship whose master (and owner) had supplied the intoxicants to the likely detriment of the seaman and the whole crew without any supervisory control of its use, the vessel must bear at least part of the fault. Were this an automobile case and had Reyes' blood analysis revealed that percentage of alcohol, he could have been arrested for driving while intoxicated in almost every state in the union. The practice of selling alcohol in such great quantities to the crew should not have been overlooked, or impliedly neglected by the District Court in its findings. Surely had this man not been drunk he would never have gone swimming in the ocean initially. It is the opinion of this Court that the practice revealed by this record of operating a floating dram shop makes a ship unseaworthy, and if not that, at least clearly negligent. Certainly the sea holds enough perils for a sailor, even a sober one. But for his employer to supply the beer without adequate control and then complain that Reyes was negligent for being drunk on board ship is indeed ironic.

The other contentions of negligence raised by Reyes, failure to have life boat drills, failure to post a gangway watch, failure of the crew to respond, and failure of the officers to give directions, are not well taken. The evidence showed that the Captain in fact had life boat drills but did not record them in the ship's log. The failure to post a gangway watch adds nothing to the case. It is doubtful that had there been a gangway watch he could have done any more than was done under the circumstances, given the lack of adequate rescue equipment. The inaction of the crew members can be attributed to their inability to give orders. Certainly they did all they could be expected to do. The officers responding to the shouts of the crew acted with haste and good judgment, again, under the circumstances. Their failure to save Reyes was due to the ships' lack of a line thrower.

It is necessary to remand this case to determine either on this record, if sufficient, or on a record supplemented as the parties and the trial court feel appropriate or necessary, the extent of negligence of each. We caution on this remand that the trial court could not hold that Reyes was 100% negligent. Manning v. M/V Sea Road, supra.

REVERSED and REMANDED.