Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:02CV287.
June 23, 2008
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on defendant Harris' Motion to Supplement Trial Record [280]. The Court, having reviewed the motion, the response, the authorities cited and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds as follows, to-wit:
That the motion is well-taken and should be granted.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant Harris' Motion to Supplement Trial Record [280] is well-taken and should be, and hereby is, GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is to supplement the record herein with the municipal defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Jury Instructions. Said objections are attached hereto as Exhibit A.
SO ORDERED.
MUNICIPAL DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS
COMES NOW Municipal Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, and offer the following objections to Plaintiff's jury instructions:
Municipal Defendants are the City of Greenwood, Mississippi and Officers Curtis Lee and Henry Harris.
Plaintiffs Jury Instruction No. 3
On page one (1) of Instruction No. 3, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Lee and Harris violated his "right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law" and asserts a claim of "the right not to be arrested without due process of law." Municipal Defendants object on the basis that a due process claim has never been asserted, is not a listed claim in the Pretrial Order, and was not addressed in any way by the Court in its January 31, 2005 Order.
On page one (1) of instruction No. 3, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Lee and Harris violated "[t]he constitutional right to bring criminal charges against a person or persons perpetrating a crime against him as well as the constitutional right to lodge a citizen's complaint against Lee with the Greenwood Police Department." Plaintiff reasserts this claim on page two (2) of Instruction No. 3 by stating "[f]inally, he has the constitutional right to bring criminal charges against a person or persons perpetrating a crime against him and the constitutional right to lodge a citizens complaint against a police officers with the department employing him." Municipal Defendants object on the basis that there is no such constitutional right. Plaintiff offers no legal authority in support of this instruction. In American jurisprudence, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. Linda R.S. v. Richard D. and Texas, et al., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973), Nedab v. Neal, 2007 WL 589018 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2007). As a general matter, there is no constitutional right to basic governmental services, such as law enforcement protection. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2459 (1982); Piotwowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 582 (5th Cir. 2001) (municipality cannot be liable to a member of the public for failing to prosecute a known wrongdoer).
On page three (3) of instruction No. 3, Plaintiff asserts that "you must decide whether the defendant(s) were acting within or beyond the bounds of their lawful authority under the laws of the [S]tate of Mississippi. If the defendant(s), Lee and Harris, acted within the limits of their lawful authority under Mississippi law, then they did not deprive Chris Reed of any right `without due process of law.'" Municipal Defendants object on the basis that there is no due process claim asserted and this is an incorrect statement of law. As detailed above, there is no due process claim in this case. With the exception of the sole state law claim of reckless disregard against the City pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, which will be decided by the Court, there are no state law claims asserted to be decided by the jury. Mississippi law is irrelevant as to the determination of the federal constitutional claims asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 neither provides a general remedy for the alleged torts of state officials nor opens the federal courthouse doors to relieve the complaints of all who suffer injury at the hands of the state or its officers. It affords a remedy only to those who suffer, as a result of state action, deprivation of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. Villanueva v. Mclnnis, 723 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1984). See Doe v. Rains County Independent School Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1409 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he enforcement of state law is the job of the states, and the federal civil rights statute may not be used to bootstrap alleged violations of state law into federal claims.").
On page three (3) of instruction No. 3, Plaintiff states "you are instructed that under Mississippi law a police officer, such as [O]fficer Lee has the right to arrest a person without a warrant whenever the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed a misdemeanor offense in the presence of the officer. This application of Mississippi law as to probable cause to arrest continues onto page four (4) of instruction No. 3. Municipal Defendants object because Plaintiff instruction is an incorrect statement of law and Mississippi law is inapplicable to determination of probable cause to arrest under federal law. Under federal law, which applies in this case, if an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
On page four (4) of instruction No. 3, Plaintiff makes apparent argument that Officer Lee "contends that when he arrested Chris Reed he reasonably believed Chris Reed was either unlawfully blocking the intersection or had unlawfully refused to comply with his order to move Reed's tow truck." Plaintiff then states "[i]f you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Curtis Lee's alleged belief was not reasonable, then verdict should be for Chris Reed and against Curtis Lee on this part of Reed's claim." Municipal Defendants object because Plaintiff's instruction is an incorrect statement of law. Probable cause is an objective standard and is not determined by the subjective belief of an officer.
On page five (5) of instruction No. 3, Plaintiff states the purported elements for a claim of false imprisonment and continues discussing the incorrect standard through page six (6) of instruction 3. Municipal Defendants object because Plaintiff's instruction is an incorrect statement of law. The correct standard should note that where there is probable cause to arrest, there cannot be a claim of false imprisonment. Haggarty v. Texas Southern Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655-56 (5th Cir. 2004).
On pages six (6) through eight (8) of Instruction No. 3, Plaintiff realleges his claim to a constitutional right to file criminal charges and/or a citizens complaint. Municipal Defendants object on the basis that there is no such constitutional right. As detailed in the discussion above, no such constitutional right exists.
Plaintiff's Jury Instruction No. 6
On page two (2) of Instruction No. 6, Plaintiff lists purported elements of damage, including "[l]oss of capacity for the enjoyment of life" and "loss of the ability, if any, to compete competitively in the sport of amateur archery." Municipal Defendants object on the basis that this is an improper instruction pursuant to Mississippi law regarding damages. Both of these instructions are improper separate claims for hedonic damages. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-69, "there shall be no recovery for loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages apart from pain and suffering damages, and there shall be no instruction given to the jury which separates loss of enjoyment of life from pain and suffering."
Plaintiff's Jury Instruction No. 8
Plaintiff's Instruction No. 8 is for punitive damages. Municipal Defendants object to Plaintiff's instruction on the grounds that this instruction is premature and should be considered by the Court only if a verdict is returned in favor of the Plaintiff. Consequently, a consideration of the issue of punitive damages should be bifurcated.Plaintiff's Jury Instruction No. 9
Plaintiff's Instruction No. 9 is an additional damage instruction and also references punitive damages. Municipal Defendants object to Plaintiff's instruction on the grounds that this instruction is premature and should be considered by the Court only if a verdict is returned in favor of the Plaintiff. Consequently, a consideration of the issue of punitive damages should be bifurcated. Municipal Defendants also object on the grounds that it is needlessly duplicative.Plaintiff's Jury Instruction No. 10
Plaintiff's Instruction No. 10 offers a description of the federal crime of misprision of a felony. Municipal Defendants object to Plaintiff's instruction on the grounds that it is an incomplete statement regarding 18 U.S.C. § 4, which also requires that the individual committing such a crime takes affirmative steps to conceal knowledge of the felony. Plaintiff's instruction also contains inappropriate argument. Municipal Defendants refer the Court to Municipal Defendants' Instruction No. 12A.Plaintiff's Jury Instruction No. 11
Plaintiff's Instruction No. 11 offers Plaintiff's incorrect assertion that the "eggshell skull" theory of damages should apply to the instant case. Municipal Defendants object to Plaintiff's instruction on the grounds that it is inapplicable to the instant case and the Fifth Circuit has held that it cannot apply when the preexisting condition was mental rather than physical. As an initial point, the Fifth Circuit, in reviewing a Northern District of Mississippi case, has expressly held that the eggshell skull theory doctrine, which requires defendant to compensate plaintiff for unforeseeable injury flowing from a preexisting condition, does not extend to situations in which plaintiffs preexisting condition was "mental" rather than physical. Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 1991).
Secondly, this negligence-based doctrine is inapplicable to claims pursuant to Section 1983, where negligence, and even gross negligence, is not a cognizable claim. See Hare v. Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1996). The eggshell skull doctrine requires a defendant to compensate a plaintiff for unforeseeable injuries flowing from some pre-existing physical condition. Dahlen v. Gulf Crews, Inc., 281 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Munn and REST. 2D OF TORTS § 461 (1977)). Section 461 of the Restatement Second of Torts defines the doctrine more specifically as follows:
The negligent actor is subject to liability for harm to another although a physical condition of the other which is neither known nor should be known to the actor makes the injury greater than that which the actor as a reasonable man should have foreseen as a probable result of his conduct.
This definition, therefore, requires that the actor be negligent first, before the doctrine can come into play. Since negligence is not a cognizable claim, the doctrine is inapplicable to this Section 1983 case.
Plaintiffs Jury Instructions No. 13 and 14
Plaintiff's instructions thirteen (13) and fourteen (14) are identical instructions as to the role of a police office in a repossession dispute. Municipal Defendants object to Plaintiff's instruction on the grounds that Plaintiffs instruction are predominately improper argument. Municipal Defendants refer the Court to Municipal Defendants' Instruction No. 12B.
Plaintiffs Jury Instructions No. 15
Plaintiff's instruction fifteen (15) deals with a discussion of state law proximate cause. Municipal Defendants object to Plaintiff's instruction on the grounds that Plaintiff is improperly asserting Mississippi negligence-based law to federal claims pursuant to Section 1983. This is evident by Plaintiffs sole citation to Mississippi authority with no federal authority to support this instruction. Municipal Defendants also object on the grounds that the instruction is convoluted and confusing and not designed to actually insist the jury.