Stengel, J.

MEMORANDUM Stengel, J.

This action relates to a mortgage foreclosure on a property located at 218 E. Wood Street in Norristown, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleges over two hundred statutory and common law violations by the defendants—the mortgage holder and agents of the mortgage holder involved in the foreclosure of the Wood Street Property. The mortgage foreclosure action is still pending in state court. The defendants move to dismiss this case under the Younger abstention doctrine. For the reasons stated below, I will grant their motion in part and deny it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

a. Allegations in This Action

Gennaro Rauso brings this case as the alleged "assignee" of Elliotte Brown, Twenty Six Schappert Terrace, LLC (TSST), and D & B Property Investors Corporation (D & B). Brown, TSST, and D & B were each allegedly the owners of 218 E. Wood St. in Norristown, Pennsylvania at different points from 2001 to the present.

Elliotte Brown purchased the Wood Street property on October 12, 2001. He obtained a mortgage on the property for $56,000 from BNC Mortgage, Inc. The mortgage named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the mortgagee and BNC's nominee. The mortgage was recorded on October 31, 2001. Fairbanks Capital Corporation serviced the mortgage from October 12, 2001 to March 23, 2003. Thereafter, Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS) became the servicer. MERS assigned the note and mortgage to US Bank.

Brown first fell delinquent on his mortgage payments on August 1, 2002. On September 24, 2002, Fairbanks sent Brown a notice of intent to foreclose as required by Pennsylvania's Act 91, 35 P.S. § 1680.401c. On October 26, 2002, he entered into a Forbearance Agreement with Fairbanks. Brown again went into default. On February 22, 2003, Attorney Barbara Fein filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint on behalf of US Bank (US Bank, et al. v. Brown, Montco. Pa. No. 2003-2538). On May 27, 2003, Brown seemed to have cured his deficiencies and the court entered a "settle, discontinue and end" order for that first foreclosure action.

Brown again fell behind on payments. On March 30, 2005, SPS sent Brown a second intent to foreclose notice required by Act 91. On June 24, 2005, Martha Von Rosenthiel, an attorney for US Bank, filed a second foreclosure complaint (US Bank v. Brown, Montco. Pa. No. 2005-16950).

On October 19, 2005, Brown allegedly signed, acknowledged, and delivered a durable power of attorney (POA) to the plaintiff Gennaro Rauso, appointing him as Brown's agent-in-fact. Brown appeared to be living in Arkansas at that time. The POA was recorded on December 9, 2005 with the Montgomery County Recorder of Deeds.

That same day, Brown, Rauso, and D & B allegedly entered into an agreement for the purchase/sale of the Wood Street property. As part of this agreement, D & B took title of the property. Brown allegedly notified SPS of the transfer and the title change was recorded on December 7, 2005. Rauso allegedly made numerous repairs to the property after D & B took ownership. He did so in both his personal capacity and as an agent of D & B, of which he was the sole shareholder and officer.

On March 23, 2007, Rauso, acting as Brown's agent-in-fact, negotiated and entered into a forbearance agreement with SPS on Brown's behalf. D & B made a payment of $11,125.00 to SPS to cure delinquencies on the mortgage. D & B continued to make monthly payments of $2105.58 until December 2009. As part of this arrangement, Rauso notified SPS that all future notifications for Brown should be sent to 712 Ash Ave., Collingdale, PA 19023. On May 11, 2009, Rauso and/or D & B made sufficient payments on the property to satisfy the judgment in the second foreclosure action. This action was vacated, discontinued, and ended.

From December 2009 to December 2011, Rauso allegedly made payments on the Wood Street property. These payments of $600 to $700 a month were either Rauso's personal funds or made through D & B. The costs paid as part of the forbearance agreement included fees and costs incurred as part of the first and second foreclosure actions. Fairbanks and SPS allegedly charged Brown impermissible fees and costs related to the first foreclosure action.

On May 4, 2010, the Wood Street property was transferred from D & B to TSST. The deed was recorded that same day. TSST allegedly notified SPS. In August 2010, Rauso notified SPS in writing that Brown's new address was 957 Rt. 33, Suite 146, Hamilton Square, NJ. On October 15, 2010, Rauso then allegedly purchased the Wood Street property from TSST.

On February 8, 2012, Fein sent Brown a third notice of intent to foreclose as required by Pennsylvania Act 6, 41 P.S. § 403. Four copies of the notice were sent to four separate addresses by certified mail. Three of the notices were addressed to Elliotte Brown at three different addresses: the Wood Street address, another Norristown address, and a Forrest City, AR address. One notice was addressed to TSST at the Collingdale address. Allegedly the notice sent to the Collingdale address was never delivered. On March 26, 2012, Fein on behalf of US Bank filed a third foreclosure complaint against Brown (US Bank v. Brown, et al., Montco. Pa. No. 2012-7312).

On January 23, 2013, Rauso, as Brown's agent-in-fact, "assigned himself personally all of Brown's rights, title, interests claims and defenses of every kind and nature whatsoever." On this same day, he also assigned himself all of TSST's rights, title, interests, etc. as TSST's agent-in-fact and its sole shareholder/officer. On February 4, 2012, Rauso—as sole stockholder, President, Vice President, and Treasurer of D & B—assigned himself personally all of D & B's rights, title, and interests.

On January 29, 2013, Rauso filed a motion to intervene in the third foreclosure action. On February 6, 2013, he filed this pro se action, in both his personal capacity and in his role as assignee for Brown, TSST, and D & B, against Fein, Von Rosenthiel, US Bank, Fairbanks, SPS, MERS, and BNC. He asserts 205 counts under 12 causes of action. Two causes of action are based on federal law: the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). The remaining causes of action are based in state law: Pennsylvania's Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act (FCEUA), 73 P.S. § 2270.1, et. seq.; Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), 73 P.S. § 201-1, et seq.; Act 6, 41 P.S. § 101, et. seq.; breach of contract; negligence/trespass; accounting at law; quiet title; and fraud. The plaintiff also requests: 1) punitive damages against Fein on behalf of Brown and Rauso in his personal capacity for her "fraud on the court" in the state foreclosure proceedings; 2) an injunction of the state foreclosure action; and 3) a declaratory judgment that US Bank's rights in the mortgage are void.

On June 23, 2013, Rauso amended the complaint, as a matter of right. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). While their motion was pending, defendant BNC filed a notice of bankruptcy on December 13, 2013. This case was stayed on December 19, 2013. On July 21, 2014, BNC notified the court that the bankruptcy court had confirmed its reorganization plan and the automatic stay could be lifted. This case was returned to the active docket on September 10, 2014. BNC was also permitted to join the defendant's motion to dismiss. The parties were ordered to supplement their briefing on the motion to dismiss.

b. Judicially-Noticed Facts From the Public Record

Both parties have asked the court to take judicial notice of certain facts located in other court documents. A court "must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information." FED. R. EVID. 201(c). Judicial notice can be taken at any stage of a case. FED. R. EVID. 201(d). Matters of public record or facts that can be accurately and readily determined to be accurate may be judicially noticed. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b); City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 1998). See also Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)("[A] court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document."). I will take judicial notice of the information contained in two other legal actions, as requested by the parties, outlined below.

1. Mortgage Foreclosure Action in State Court

Both parties have asked the court to take judicial notice of the third mortgage foreclosure action pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (US Bank v. Brown, et al., Montco. Pa. 2012-7312). See State Court Third Foreclosure Compl., Doc. No. 30, Ex. M-3. US Bank, represented by Fein, is the plaintiff in that action. US Bank asserts it has standing to prosecute the action, as the assignee of MERS (the nominee of BNC) and as an agent for SPS.

That case was filed on March 26, 2012 against TSST and Brown. That complaint claims that the transfer made from Brown to D & B and D & B to TSST, without prior written consent by the lender, violated the mortgage agreement under paragraph 18. The complaint further alleges other breaches of the mortgage agreement and outlines fees and costs requested as part of the foreclosure. The complaint also outlines what steps US Bank took prior to filing the complaint, in order to comply with Pennsylvania's Act 6.

On January 29, 2013, Rauso petitioned to intervene in the action. The trial court held a telephonic hearing on the motion. Judge Garrett Page, who is presiding over the state court case, ordered the transcript of that telephone conference be introduced into the record of this case. The defendants ask that I take judicial notice of this transcript as well.

The Montgomery County court denied the plaintiff's motion to intervene on June 10, 2013 because the court found he had no property interest in the Wood Street property and, therefore, did not have standing in the case. Rauso appealed the decision to the Superior Court. On May 15, 2014, the Superior Court quashed the appeal as being not final and as unappealable. The Superior Court denied Rauso's application for reargument on July 17, 2104. Rauso appealed the intermediate court's decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision to quash Rauso's appeal on December 30, 2014. The third foreclosure action is still pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County.

2. Prior Federal Criminal Charges Against the Plaintiff

The defendants also ask the court to take judicial notice of the fact that the plaintiff pled guilty to federal charges of mail fraud and tax evasion on July 13, 2010. See United States v. Gennaro Rauso, 2:10-cr-406-MMB. Those charges related to a scheme by which Rauso, through D & B, fraudulently obtained title to over 200 homes on the verge of mortgage foreclosure. He promised the homeowners that he would prevent foreclosure if they signed over their titles and granted him a power of attorney. He then filed bankruptcy proceedings on their behalf to stay the foreclosures. At the same time, he allowed them to remain in their homes but had them pay him rent. The homeowners believed the rent was being paid towards their mortgages. Instead, he evicted some or simply let others' homes eventually go into foreclosure, after pocketing substantial rents. Rauso carried out this "property-title skim scheme" from 2005 through 2008. He was sentenced to 160 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release on June 20, 2011.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

a. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1): Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a respondent may seek dismissal of an action because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Rule 12(b)(1) motions may be facial or factual in nature. "In a facial attack, a defendant argues that the plaintiff did not properly plead jurisdiction, . . . [whereas] a 'factual' attack asserts that jurisdiction is lacking on the basis of facts outside of the pleadings." Smolow v. Hafer, 353 F. Supp. 2d 561, 566 (E.D. Pa. 2005)(citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). Facial attacks are similar to motions brought under Rule 12(b)(6): they are afforded the presumption that the allegations in the complaint are true. Id. District courts are only permitted to consider allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record in deciding the motions. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

Factual challenges, however, operate differently. They are not afforded the same presumption as facial challenges. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. Because a factual 12(b)(1) motion challenges the trial court's jurisdiction, the trial court has the authority "to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Id. "[I]n a factual attack under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider and weigh evidence outside the pleadings to determine if it has jurisdiction." Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)(citations omitted). See also Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 752 (3d Cir. 2000)(citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891)("Because the government's challenge to the District Court's jurisdiction was a factual one under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), we are not confined to the allegations in the complaint (nor was the District Court) and can look beyond the pleadings to decide factual matters relating to jurisdiction."); Smolow, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 566 (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891)("A 'factual' attack asserts that jurisdiction is lacking on the basis of facts outside of the pleadings, and it invokes the Court's authority to consider any affidavits and other evidence submitted.").

The plaintiff has the burden of proof that the district court has jurisdiction over the case. Id. See also Dev. Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Housing & Health Care, 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995).

b. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In such cases, the District Court must "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Because the plaintiff brings this suit pro se, the court must construe the complaint liberally in that plaintiff's favor. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21(1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir.1992).

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has federal question jurisdiction over the plaintiff's FDCPA and TILA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(d), 1640e and 12 U.S.C. § 2614 and supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this actions occurred in this district. The defendants offer several jurisdictional reasons for this case to be dismissed.

A. Younger Abstention

The defendants argue that this court should abstain from hearing the plaintiff's action under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), because the state court mortgage foreclosure case is still pending. They claim this action is either duplicative of that case or that a disposition in this case could interfere with the disposition of the foreclosure proceeding.

As a general rule, a pending state court proceeding is not a reason for a federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction. Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2005). One exception to this rule is the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger. Id. The "Younger abstention doctrine" "espouse[s] a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). For Younger to be invoked, three prerequisites must be met: "(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims." Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010)(citation omitted). Younger has been applied in the context of federal cases seeking to enjoin state court foreclosure proceedings. See, e.g., Gray v. Pagano, No. 07-3433, 287 Fed.Appx. 155, 157-58 (3d Cir. Jul. 23, 2008)(affirming dismissal of complaint relating to ongoing state foreclosure action under Younger); Smith v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, No. Civ.A.04-02846, 2005 WL 289927, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2005).

Many of Rauso's claims relate to the state foreclosure action and the defendants' right to foreclose on the property. Abstention under Younger may be appropriate if all the prerequisites are met.

1. Ongoing State Court Proceedings

First, there certainly is an ongoing state court proceeding. The state foreclosure case is still pending in Montgomery County. Though Rauso's motion to intervene in the case was denied, TSST and Brown remain parties to the case. Rauso's appeal of his denial was quashed as essentially being unripe for disposition. Once the state court foreclosure has been decided, Rauso, Brown, and TSST will need to exhaust their appellate remedies (i.e. appeal to the Superior Court and then state Supreme Court) before that case would be considered finalized under Younger. See Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 110 (3d Cir. 1989)("'[A] necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party [wishing to contest in federal court the judgment of a state judicial tribunal] must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court.'"(quoting New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2518 (1989)). See also Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975). From the facts provided, the state foreclosure case as to all parties is still "ongoing."

2. Important State Interests

The defendants argue that the pending state court foreclosure proceedings implicate the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's interest in determining property rights and resolving issues related to real property. They contend this is an important state interest warranting Younger abstention. I agree.

Though Younger was originally applied to criminal proceedings, it has since been extended to non-criminal proceedings between private parties that implicate "important state interests." See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10 (1987); Schall, 885 F.2d at 107 ("Pennzoil was the first Supreme Court case to hold that Younger can sometimes bar an injunction against a pending civil action between two private parties."). This prong asks "if the State's interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and the National Government." Schall, 885 F.2d at 107 (quoting Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 10). While Younger is not to be applied "whenever a civil proceeding is pending in state court," it should be considered satisfied under prong two when "federal relief would render the state court's orders or judgments nugatory." Shall, 885 F.2d at 108 (discussing Pennzoil).

Pennsylvania has both an important interest in resolving disputes related to real property within its jurisdiction and in preserving its authority in ruling over such disputes. A ruling by this court—specifically regarding the plaintiff's requests for quiet title, breach of contract, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief—would interfere with these important state interests. Prong two under Younger is satisfied.

3. Opportunity to Raise Federal Claims in State Court

The majority of the plaintiff's claims are state law claims pendant to claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Most of these state law claims are duplicative of the claims raised in the state foreclosure actions or are directly implicated in the state foreclosure action such that a decision in this case could interfere in that one. The breach of contract, negligence/trespass, accounting at law, Act 6, and fraud claims involve the same issues before the state court—namely, whether US Bank and/or SPS can foreclose on the property and for how much money. Rauso's claims of "legal malpractice" by Fein are also implicated by the state court proceedings. Rauso requests quiet title of the Wood Street property, an injunction of the state court proceedings, and a declaratory judgment on US Bank's rights in the Wood Street property. All of these remedies, if granted by this court, would interfere with the state court's ability to resolve the pending mortgage dispute. These claims can and have been raised in the state court proceeding. The state court proceeding itself will resolve the dispute about who has what rights under the mortgage agreement and note, leaving little to nothing for this court to decide in that regard. These claims are all barred by Younger and will be dismissed.

Whether the federal claims under the FDCPA and TILA can be asserted in the state court mortgage foreclosure action is a different question. The ability of a plaintiff to assert rights under consumer protection statutes in a Pennsylvania mortgage foreclosure action depends upon the remedy being sought. In a mortgage foreclosure action, "only those counterclaims are permitted that are part of or incident to the creation of the mortgage relationship itself." Cunningham v. McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054, 1057 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). Counterclaims or defenses which seek to rescind the mortgage agreement may be raised as part of the mortgage foreclosure action. Green Tree Consumer Discount Co. v. Newton, 909 A.2d 811, 812 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). However, claims seeking monetary damages for violations of consumer protection laws cannot be asserted in a mortgage foreclosure action as either a counterclaim or a defense. New York Guardian Mortg. Corp. v. Dietzel, 524 A.2d 951, 953 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Fleet Real Estate Funding Corp. v. Smith, 530 A.2d 919, 925 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). In Pennsylvania, "[a]n action in mortgage foreclosure is strictly an in rem proceeding, and the purpose of a judgment in mortgage foreclosure is solely to effect a judicial sale of the mortgaged property." New York Guardian Mortg. Corp., 524 A.2d at 953 (citing Meco Realty Co. v. Burns, 414 Pa. 495, 200 A.2d 869 (1964)). The disposition of a state mortgage foreclosure may not necessarily preclude a consumer protection claim for monetary damages brought in a separate federal suit.

The claims the plaintiff brings under the FDCPA seek monetary damages for misrepresentations made in defendant's notice of intent to foreclose on the Wood Street property or in the third foreclosure complaint itself. The TILA claims also seek monetary damages for violations of that act, not for rescission of the mortgage agreement. Under Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff would not be able to assert these claims in the state mortgage foreclosure action. They would not be barred by Younger.

The same rationale appears to be true of the plaintiff's analogous state law claims under the FCEUA and UTPCPL. Both are seeking damages for statutory violations, not rescission. Under Pennsylvania case law, they could not be asserted in the mortgage foreclosure. See In re Soto, 221 B.R. 343, 357 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998)("As this section reveals, the only remedy available to private litigants under the UTPCPL are monetary damages. Because of this, even if the Debtor succeeded on her UTPCPL claim, she would not be entitled to have the Mortgage declared void; rather, her relief would be limited to monetary damages."); In re Randall, 358 B.R. 145, 161-62, 166 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006)("While plaintiff could have litigated her claim that the mortgage loan was previously rescinded, she could not have litigated her claims for damages and recoupment under federal or state consumer protection statutes."). For this reason, I will not dismiss them under Younger.

B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The defendants also argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine serves as a jurisdictional bar. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state's highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that are 'inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] in a judicial proceeding.'" Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 (1983)); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414 (1923). However, "a district court is not divested of subject-matter jurisdiction [under Rooker-Feldman] simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court." Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006).

In this case, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not be a basis to decline jurisdiction. The plaintiff is not asking this court to review a judgment by the state court. He filed this action before the state court made a ruling on his motion to intervene. His claims in this case are not caused by a state-court judgment—since none has been rendered yet—but instead stem from alleged violations of law that preceded the state-court case or any finalized judgment in that case. See Turner, 449 F.3d at 547 (explaining how federal claims "not caused by the state-court judgment but instead attributable to defendants' alleged [federal law] violations that preceded the state-court judgment" were not within scope of Rooker-Feldman (emphasis in original)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not a jurisdictional bar.

C. Standing

Lastly, the defendants challenge Rauso's standing to assert rights related to Brown's mortgage or the Wood Street Property. Rauso claims that D & B, TSST, and Brown suffered monetary damages as a result of the defendants' "illegal actions." He argues their rights, which were assigned to him, provide for these damages. Rauso would only be entitled to the same rights afforded his assignors. See Himes v. Cameron Co. Construction Corp., 444 A.2d 98, 100 (Pa. 1982)("[A]n assignee can succeed to no greater rights than those of his assignor...").

It is not clear whether Brown, D & B, or TSST have rights in the Wood Street property. This is a question put before the state court in the mortgage foreclosure action. Once that question has been answered, this court can better assess what rights Rauso may have (if any) based on those assignments and whether he has standing to assert those rights in this case.

Rauso also claims that he himself has a property right premised on a series of transfers of the Wood Street property: first from Brown to D & B, then D & B to TSST, and finally TSST to Rauso himself. Rauso could only have standing to assert his own rights in the property if each of these transfers or assignments were valid under the mortgage agreement and note. Rauso moved to intervene in that action, thereby putting the question of his rights to the state court. Rauso himself argued in his motion to intervene that the only issue presented by his motion is whether he had standing in the state court foreclosure matter. The only basis for Rauso's own property rights could be the transfers of the property or the assignments of rights. As part of the mortgage foreclosure case, the state court will need to address the validity of those transfers and assignments.

For these reasons, I cannot proceed to the merits of the plaintiff's remaining claims. There is a chance that the state court's decision could preclude Rauso from asserting standing to bring some or all of the remaining claims in this case. If I were to continue analyzing the plaintiff's claims, I would first need to address the validity of the transfers and the assignments in order to determine if the plaintiff has standing. My rulings on this point may contradict and/or interfere with the state mortgage foreclosure proceeding.

IV. THE REMAINING CLAIMS WILL BE STAYED

Given that a decision on the remaining consumer protection law claims could interfere with the state court's foreclosure case, I am inclined to stay those claims until the state foreclosure action has ended. A district court may invoke the Younger abstention doctrine as to some of the plaintiff's claims but retain jurisdiction over those which Younger does not implicate. See, e.g., Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Township of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 414-15 (3d Cir. 2005)(finding that some claims could be dismissed based on Younger abstention but that the district court erred in dismissing, not staying, federal claims unaffected by Younger). When a federal court determines that abstention under Younger is appropriate in order to prevent interference with a state court proceeding, the federal court should stay rather than dismiss federal claims for monetary relief and attorney's fees which will not be redressed by the state court proceeding. See id. (citing Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1988)("[A] district court, when abstaining from adjudicating a claim for injunctive relief, should stay and not dismiss accompanying claims for damages and attorney fees when such relief is not available from the ongoing state proceedings." (citation omitted)). The plaintiff's FDCPA, TILA, and analogous state law consumer protection claims for damages—which are not duplicative of the state court claims and cannot be asserted in the state court action—will be stayed in order to prevent interference with the state court proceeding.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the following counts will be dismissed under Younger as duplicative of those presented in the state court mortgage foreclosure action:

• Count 187: an Act 6 claim made on Brown's behalf;
• Count 188: an Act 6 claim made on TSST's behalf;
• Count 191 and 192: breach of contract claims made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 193 and 194: negligence and trespass claims made as Brown's assignee and/or in his personal capacity;
• Count 197: accounting-at-law claim based on the breach of contract claim made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 198 and 199: quiet title claims made in Rauso's personal capacity;
• Count 200: an action for "punitive damages" for Fein's "fraud on the court" made as Brown's assignee;

• Count 201: action for "punitive damages" for Fein's "fraud on the court" made in his personal capacity;
• Counts 202 through 204: a request for an injunction of the third foreclosure action made as Brown's assignee; and
• Count 205: a request for declaratory judgment that US Bank is not the holder of the note or mortgage.

The following counts will be stayed pending the final adjudication in the state court mortgage foreclosure action:

• Counts 1 through 7: FDCPA claims regarding the Third Foreclosure Act 6 Notice made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 8 through 15: FDCPA claims regarding the Third Foreclosure Act 6 Notice made as TSST's assignee;
• Counts 16 through 20: FDCPA claims regarding amount in the Third Foreclosure Act 6 Notice made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 21 through 25: FDCPA claims regarding the amount in the Third Foreclosure Act 6 Notice made as TSST's assignee;
• Counts 26 through 32: FDCPA claims regarding the legal status of the debt in the Act 6 Notice made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 33 through 39: FDCPA claims regarding the legal status of the debt in the Act 6 Notice made as TSST's assignee;
• Count 40: a FDCPA claim regarding the legal status of the debt in the Act 6 notice made as Brown's assignee;
• Count 41: a FDCPA claim regarding the legal status of the debt in the Act 6 notice made as TTST's assignee;
• Counts 42 through 46: FDCPA claims regarding the collection of amounts not authorized by the note through the Act 6 Notice made as Brown's assignee;

• Counts 47 through 51: FDCPA claims regarding the collection of amounts not authorized by the note through the Act 6 Notice made as TSST's assignee;
• Counts 52 through 56: FDCPA claims for misrepresentations in the third foreclosure complaint made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 57 through 61: FDCPA claims for misrepresentations in the third foreclosure complaint made as TSST's assignee;
• Counts 62 through 65: FDCPA claims for misrepresentations of the amount in the third foreclosure complaint made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 66 through 71: FCDPA claims for misrepresentations of the amount in the third foreclosure complaint made as TSST's assignee;
• Counts 72 through 74: FCDPA claims for misrepresentations of the legal status of the debt in the third foreclosure complaint made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 75 through 77: FCDPA claims for misrepresentations of the legal status of the debt in the third foreclosure complaint made as TSST's assignee;
• Counts 78 through 82: FDCPA claims regarding the collection of amounts not authorized by the note through the third foreclosure complaint made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 83 through 87: FDCPA claims regarding the collection of amounts not authorized by the note through the third foreclosure complaint made as TSST's assignee;
• Counts 88 through 113: FCEUA claims regarding the amount of the debt in billing statements (from February 9, 2011 through April 30, 2013) made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 114 through 139: FCEUA claims regarding the use of false representations to collect a debt via account statements (from February 9, 2011 through April 30, 2013) made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 140 through 165: FCEUA claims regarding the collection of a debt note authorized by the note (from February 9, 2011 through April 30, 2013) made as Brown's assignee;
• Counts 166 through 178: TILA claims made as Brown's assignee;
• Count 179: an UTPCPL claim made as D & B's assignee;
• Counts 180 through 183: UTPCPL claims for deceptive practices in collecting a debt made as Brown's assignee;

• Counts 184 through 186: UTPCPL claims for deceptive practices in collecting a debt made as TSST's assignee; and
• Counts 195 and 196: for negligent servicing of the mortgage made on Brown's behalf.

An appropriate Order follows.