ORDER AND REASONS

LANCE AFRICK, Magistrate Judge

Before the Court is the objection of plaintiff, Ranger Insurance Company ("Ranger"), to the magistrate judge's order granting the motions to intervene filed by Davey Bickford, Daveyfire, Inc. ("Daveyfire"), and Eddie Benoit, Jr., Eddie Benoit, Sr., and Margie Benoit ("the Benoits"). For the reasons stated herein, the objection to the magistrate's order is OVERRULED.

On July 21, 2004, the magistrate heard oral argument and "[p]ursuant to the hearing and having found all the criteria met for intervention as of right as to each of the putative intervenors," granted the motions. On August 2, 2004, Ranger filed its objection pursuant to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the magistrate's order granting the motions to intervene as of right was a clear error of law because Rule 24(a)'s requirements were not satisfied.

A district court will disturb a magistrate's ruling on a nondispositive matter only when the ruling is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); see 14 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 72.02 (3d ed. 2002). The party challenging the magistrate's action in a non-dispositive matter has the burden of "showing that the Magistrate's ruling was clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Granito v. Sunu, 594 F. Supp. 410, 413 (D. Haw. 1984).

Background

Ranger's declaratory judgment action relates to a coverage issue for an insurance policy issued by Ranger to Events, Inc., d/b/a Classic Fireworks ("Classic"). The entire controversy stems from a December 31, 1998, explosion that occurred in the cargo compartment of a truck owned by Classic, killing Jason Stamps and Scott Benoit and severely injuring Eddie Benoit, Jr., while they were loading fireworks. The insurance policy issued by Ranger provided coverage on the truck at the time of explosion.

Sometime before inspection by several interested parties, the cargo compartment of the truck and its contents were destroyed, allegedly while in the possession and control of Classic and Ranger. The destruction of this crucial piece of evidence has added more issues to the controversy.

The first case in this matter ("the St. Tammany action") was filed on July 13, 1999, by Classic in state court, seeking a declaration that Eddie Benoit, Jr., Scott Benoit, and Jason Stamps were all employees of Classic at the time of the explosion, thereby immunizing Classic from tort liability. The state court ruled that the men were independent contractors working on a job-to-job basis and that the work they were performing, dismantling a fireworks show, was ultrahazardous activity. Therefore, the court reasoned that Classic was not eligible for immunity from tort liability.

On November 18, 1999, the Benoits and the Stamps estate filed a second lawsuit in state court, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death. The lawsuit was filed against Daveyfire, the manufacturer of the electric firework ignitors involved in the accident, and later amended to include Davey Bickford (hereinafter "Bickford"), the French parent company to Daveyfire. Daveyfire then filed a third party petition against both Classic and its insurer, Ranger, based on negligent or intentional disposal of evidence ("spoliation of evidence claims") on December 6, 2001. On June 25, 2002, the Benoits and Stamps amended their petition to add similar claims against Classic and Ranger. Finally, on February 27, 2004, Bickford filed a cross-claim against Classic and Ranger on the same grounds and asserted rights to indemnity, contribution "or otherwise" from one or both of the entities. Ranger is defending Classic in both state actions under a reservation of rights.

In the instant action, filed October 8, 2003, Ranger is seeking a judgment, declaring that the policy it issued to Classic does not cover any of the claims against Classic in the state court tort action and that it is not required to defend or indemnify Classic. Specifically, Ranger seeks declarations that: 1) an employee indemnification and employer's liability exclusion preclude coverage as to the personal injury claims (notwithstanding the state court's ruling that the workers were independent contractors and not Classic's employees); 2) the spoliation claims are not covered under the policy because such claims do not constitute either claims for bodily injury or property damage "caused by an accident arising from the ownership, maintenance of use of a covered auto;" 3) Daveyfire's contractual indemnity claims against Classic are not covered (i.e., Daveyfire did not have an "insured contract" with Classic); and 4) there is no coverage at all considering that the damages sought by Classic do not result "from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a covered auto" and because the commercial automobile liability policy only covers claims arising out of accidents resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a covered auto. Classic answered Ranger's complaint on December 30, 2003.

The Motions to Intervene

Rule 24 is liberally construed and any doubts are resolved in favor of the proposed intervenor. Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467, 472 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1158 (8th Cir. 1995); Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 983 F.2d 211, 216 (11th Cir. 1993); see United States v. Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating "the inquiry under subsection (a) (2) is a flexible one, which focuses on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each application . . . [and] intervention of right must be measured by a practical rather than a technical yardstick"). However, failure to meet any one of the four requirements results in denial of the motion. See Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994). Ranger maintains that the intervenors fail on all four elements.

Ranger does not oppose allowing the movants to intervene to litigate the coverage issues before the Court. It does object to any intervention in this action for the purpose of expanding the scope of the proceedings beyond the narrow issue of insurance coverage.

1. Timeliness

Timeliness of the intervenor's motion applies to both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365, 93 S. Ct. 2591, 2602-03, 37 L.Ed.2d 648 (1973). With regard to timeliness, the Fifth Circuit set forth the factors to consider in Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263-66 (5th Cir. 1977). The four factors for determining timeliness under Rule 24 are as follows: 1) the length of any delay; 2) the prejudice to existing parties; 3) prejudice to the would be intervenor should the intervention be denied; and 4) any unusual circumstances which militate for or against a determination that the application is timely. Id. at 263-69.

There is no absolute measure of timeliness. Id. at 266. Courts should look into all of the facts and circumstances. Id. at 263. The Fifth Circuit instructs that the "requirement of timeliness is not a tool of retribution to punish the tardy would be intervenor, but rather a guard against prejudicing the original parties by the failure to apply sooner." Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga., 297 F.3d 416, 422 (5th Cir. 2002).

A.

The first timeliness factor favors the movants. Bickford filed its motion for leave to intervene on July 6, 2004. The Benoits filed their expedited motion to intervene on July 13, 2004, and Daveyfire filed its expedited motion to intervene on July 16, 2004. The movants argue that the first factor supports intervention because they promptly moved for intervention once their interest in this action became apparent, i.e., just over one month after learning of this declaratory judgment action. Bickford contends that it did not learn of the instant action until May 21, 2004, thereby making the motion to intervene prompt and timely. Daveyfire allegedly learned of Ranger's federal declaratory judgment action earlier the same day at the St. Tammany trial. The Benoits submit that they also became aware around the same time. The three motions were heard together. Therefore, the delay between the movants' knowledge and filing was not unreasonable.

B.

Ranger contends that allowing intervention would postpone summary judgment resolution of the coverage issues. However, any possible effect the intervention could have with regard to the swiftness of this Court's resolution of Ranger's insurance coverage issues is of no consequence to a timeliness inquiry. See Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1206 (5th Cir. 1994). This timeliness factor relates to prejudice to the existing parties with regard to the movants' delay, not the possibility that intervention will prejudice the existing parties by complicating the litigation. Id. (stating "prejudice must be measured by the delay in seeking intervention, not the inconvenience to the existing parties of allowing the intervenor to participate in the litigation").

C.

The third timeliness factor is the extent of prejudice the would-be intervenor would suffer if its petition for leave to intervene is denied. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 265-66. This factor also favors the movants.

Bickford argues that it will be prejudiced should the parties in this action seek rulings regarding whether any act or failure to act gives rise to a claim for spoliation. Bickford claims that Ranger bases its argument for no coverage on the employee exclusion contained in the policy, despite the ruling of the court in the St. Tammany action to the contrary. The Benoits and Daveyfire suggest the same. It is possible that with respect to the coverage issue, the factual issues could be decided differently by this Court than by the state court. The movants would suffer prejudice if they were unable to present their arguments to this Court because their motions for intervention were denied.

D.

The final factor in determining timeliness of the intervention is the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against the timeliness issue. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 266. This factor weighs against Ranger. Despite discovery requests for information regarding any pending cases arising out of this incident, Ranger did not inform Bickford of this declaratory judgment action.

In light of the relatively brief time between the movants' knowledge of this action and the filing of their motions for intervention, the remoteness of prejudice to the existing parties resulting from this delay, and the likelihood of prejudice to the movants if intervention was denied, the Court concludes that the motion to intervene was timely.

2. Interest of the Applicants

In order to demonstrate an interest relating to the litigation sufficient to support intervention as of right, the movant must have a "direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 465 (5th Cir. 1984). The movants' interests in this litigation are substantial.

Bickford has its own state action pending against Classic and Ranger for indemnity and contribution arising out of the same incident. Bickford also has a financial interest in the action, as a finding of no coverage could potentially lead to a judgment without a solvent defendant to collect against.

Daveyfire contends that the instant declaratory judgment action is an attempt on the part of Ranger to avoid its obligations which are the subject of the state court lawsuits. Daveyfire argues that intervention is necessary to protect its right to participate in discovery and brief issues which could ultimately become res judicata in the parallel state court proceedings. It submits that the outcome of Ranger's federal action directly affects Daveyfire's defenses in the state court litigation. In sum, Daveyfire submits that, without its participation, coverage under the policy will be adjudicated in a piecemeal fashion and incompletely. Similarly, the Benoits assert a direct interest in the complete resolution of coverage under the policy at issue. See Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that underlying insurance claimant-intervenor in insurance declaratory judgment action, brought by insurer against insured, satisfied the requirements for intervention as of right).

The proposed intervenors stand to gain or lose by the legal effect of this Court's judgment on Ranger's complaint. In seeking a declaratory judgment that it is not liable under the insurance policy with regard to the state actions, Ranger cannot now claim that the intervenors (the state action plaintiffs, third party plaintiffs, and/or cross claimants) lack a sufficient interest to oppose such declaratory judgment. See United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1168 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Crider, 58 F.R.D. 15, 18 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Accordingly, the intervenors' interest in the subject matter of this litigation is a "substantial, legally protectable interest."

3. Whether disposition of the action might impair or impede applicants' ability to protect their interests

The Fifth Circuit has held that having to contend with the stare decisis effect of rulings impairs or impedes a party's ability to protect its interest. Ranger Ins. Co. v. United Housing of New Mexico, Inc., 488 F.2d 682, 683 (5th Cir. 1974). The disposition of this action may impair movants' ability to protect their interest as determinations could be made regarding the acts or failures to act by Classic and/or Ranger, the relationship between the two parties, and other issues relating to claims against the two parties in the state court action. Furthermore, considerations of judicial economy guide this Court to allow intervention in order to avoid duplication of litigation. Therefore, if intervention were not allowed, any disposition of this action might practically impair or impede movants' possible recovery in their state court action.

4. Whether the existing parties adequately protect applicants' interest.

Finally, Fifth Circuit law establishes that the proposed intervenor's burden in proving inadequate representation is "minimal." Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit has found representation inadequate when the record reflected a "sharp disalignment" between the existing parties and the applicant for intervention. Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996). Bickford's interest is not adequately protected by Classic or Ranger as they are both directly adverse to Bickford in the state court action. The Benoits are also directly adverse to both parties. Likewise, Daveyfire has named both parties in a third party action. Specifically, Classic, despite its general interest in a finding of insurance coverage, cannot be expected to adequately represent movants' interest with regard to the claims for spoliation of evidence against both Ranger and Classic. Given the minimal burden, the movants have satisfactorily shown that their interests in this litigation may be insufficiently represented by the existing parties.

Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED that the objection of plaintiff, Ranger Insurance Company, to the magistrate's order granting intervention is OVERRULED.