CHAPMAN, Justice.

The record in this case discloses that the parties hereto were first married to each other on October 14, 1929. The wife, for a period of time after this marriage, obtained employment as a secretary at a salary ranging from $2,500.00 to $3,000.00 per annum. The parties pooled their funds and established an electrical supply business in the City of Pensacola under the management of the husband. A child was born to the marriage, who is now about seven years of age. A home was purchased and it is valued at a sum between ten and twelve thousand dollars. Unhappy differences arose between the parties, which resulted later in a division of all their property, or a friendly property settlement or adjustment, and a divorce on September 15, 1947.

On December 10, 1948, the parties remarried and lived together as husband and wife until February 7, 1950, when the wife filed in the Civil Court of Record of Escambia County, Florida, the present suit under the provisions of Section 65.09, F.S.A. The wife's bill of complaint charged that the husband, in August, 1949, "knocked her down and stamped on her head and did her painful injury and on the morning of February 5, 1950, he assaulted and struck her, and on many occasions between has done the like". The bill of complaint did not pray for a divorce from her husband, but it alleged the existence of a cause or causes for divorce, such as (1) habitual intemperance and (2) extreme cruelty — charging that the husband, between the dates of August, 1949, and February, 1950, assaulted the wife and did her bodily violence, was quarrelsome, lewd in his behavior, abusive and drunken and for these reasons it was impossible for her to live with him. She alleged that she feared violence and bodily injury and therefore was forced to live separate and apart from her husband. The bill of complaint prayed: (1) for alimony and counsel fees; (2) that the husband be required to vacate the home; (3) that a writ of ne exeat issue; (4) that the husband be restrained from molesting the wife or the child of the parties; and (5) that an allowance of separate maintenance be decreed.

The answer of the husband admitted the second marriage of the parties and a cohabitation as husband and wife until February, 1950. The answer specifically denied the allegations of the bill of complaint charging: (1) habitual intemperance and (2) extreme cruelty. The husband admitted that it was the intention of the wife to live separate and apart from him, but denied the existence of any reasonable basis for so doing, or that any cause or causes for divorce exist against him or that any reasonable ground exists for fear of violence. He charged that he voluntarily left home after the wife abandoned him. He admitted that the home life of the parties had been destroyed but without fault on his part. He admits that the plaintiff-wife is not now employed but alleged that she is capable of earning a livelihood as an experienced business woman and bookkeeper. In a counter claim the husband prayed for a divorce and alleged acts of misconduct on the part of the wife which in law constituted extreme cruelty.

The Chancellor orally heard all the testimony adduced by the parties on the issues made by the bill of complaint, the answer and counter claim of the defendant and the reply of the plaintiff, and entered a final decree. The Chancellor held: (1) that the plaintiff-wife failed to sustain her prayer for separate maintenance; (2) that the husband failed to sustain his counter claim praying for a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty; (3) the parties were living apart and the custody of their minor child, Kirby L. Raley, Jr., was awarded to the mother, with visitation privileges to the father; (4) the father was ordered to pay the mother the sum of $100.00 per month "solely for the maintenance of the child"; (5) the decree required the defendant-husband to pay the plaintiff-wife's solicitor the sum of $100.00 as a solicitor's fee in the cause and costs of the proceedings.

The plaintiff-wife appealed and here contends: (1) that the Court erred in denying separate maintenance; (2) the Court erred in fixing the amount of the maintenance of the child of the parties at the sum of $100.00 per month; and (3) the Court erred in fixing the amount of the wife's solicitor's fees at the small sum of $100.00. These questions may be considered as a single assignment. It appears by the record that the wife's net worth is about $24,000.00. It is composed of the home of the parties, with an estimated value of $10,000.00 to $12,000.00, a small amount in cash, and the remainder of the $24,000.00 is invested in E Series of Government Bonds. The husband's net worth is between $75,000.00 and $100,000.00 and pays an Income Tax on approximately $19,000.00 per annum.

The wife testified as to violence inflicted on her, from time to time, by her husband. She exhibited a bruise on her leg to a Mrs. Farwell, who testified that she saw and observed the bruise. He applied to her vile epithets. On the day she filed this suit, according to her testimony, he slapped her face. As shown on page 19 of the transcript, the wife said: "`Furthermore, you have talked to me worse than you would talk to a negro woman on the street', and when I said that he got up and slapped me on the side of my face as hard as he could and said, `You want me to hit you again?' `I will knock you clean out the window'". She testified as to other occasions between the date of the second marriage and the date of filing the present suit when he struck and beat her.

The husband in his testimony admitted that on some occasions he was under the influence of whiskey, but usually drank beer. On pages 77-78 of the transcript the husband testified that he struck his wife. "I slapped her but I did not slap her hard because I caught myself". The wife testified that the husband slapped and otherwise abused her and when the husband took the stand in his own behalf he admitted striking her. He did not deny making the bruise on the wife's leg, as testified to by her. The record discloses that the husband unlawfully applied to his wife violence, and, as a result of the husband's violence, she left his home and is now living apart from him because she fears future bodily injuries.

As we study the record, the evidence adduced by the husband was legally insufficient to support a decree of divorce in behalf of the husband and against the wife. The evidence adduced by the wife as to the excessive use of intoxicants by her husband, coupled with bodily injuries inflicted on the wife by the husband, is legally sufficient to justify her in leaving his home and thereafter living separate and apart from her husband, within the meaning and spirit of Section 65.09, F.S.A. The Chancellor below omitted to assign or give any reason in the decree entered for the conclusion reached in denying the plaintiff-appellant's petition for temporary and permanent alimony authorized by Section 65.09, supra.

It is possible to sustain that portion of the final decree which denied the plaintiff-appellant temporary and permanent alimony as provided for in Section 65.09, supra, on the theory that the wife failed to establish a necessity therefor, as it appears by the record that her net worth at the time was approximately $24,000.00. The husband's net worth ranged from $75,000.00 to $100,000.00. He paid income tax on $19,000.00. As the writer breaks down the net worth of the wife in the sum of $24,000.00, it comprises the following items: (1) about $1,000.00 in cash; (2) Series E Government Bonds, maturity value $15,000.00; and (3) the home of the parties, valued at some $10,000.00 or $12,000.00. The husband points out that she can get a job and earn her living. The wife replies that she is now about forty years of age, engaged in the rearing of their child, and it is doubtful if she is qualified in a business way to earn her own living. If she were in a position so to do, then part of her salary would be spent to pay a caretaker of their child, as the monthly allowance of $100.00 is wholly inadequate to support the child and to hire a keeper during the time she was working away from home. If the decree is permitted to stand, she will simply consume, in the course of time, for costs of living her cash and bonds and reach the point of being in necessitous circumstances.

It is also contended that after her savings are exhausted and her financial necessity is apparent and she again applies to the Court for temporary and permanent alimony under the provisions of Section 65.09, supra, she may be met squarely on the record with a plea of res adjudicata, which may prevent the Court from awarding her alimony, which in the future may prove inequitable. In affirming the decree, which denied temporary and permanent alimony, in the furtherance of justice, we must conclude that it was on the ground that her net worth was approximately $24,000.00 and her necessity for alimony was not clearly established, and not on the ground that she failed to establish by competent testimony the charge of extreme cruelty on the part of her husband prior to the filing of her bill of complaint on February 7, 1950.

As to the amount of counsel fees, the allowance should rest on the fairness and justice of the controversy. In fixing the amount of the fee, we take into consideration the services rendered, responsibility incurred, the nature of the services, the skill required, the circumstances under which they were rendered, the value of the services, and the financial ability of the parties to respond. The husband's net worth is shown to be between $75,000.00 and $100,000.00 and the lower Court allowed a fee in the sum of $100.00, which is grossly inadequate. See Provus v. Provus, Fla., 44 So.2d 656. The amount of a reasonable fee to be allowed in the lower Court in this cause is the sum of $750.00.

The decree appealed from is modified as above set forth and stands affirmed as modified.

SEBRING, C.J., and ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.