Opinion
20-CV-4682 (KAM)(MMH)
2022-02-01
Pedro Enrique QUISPE, Plaintiff, v. STONE & TILE INC. and Lazer Mechelovitz, Defendants.
Abdul Karim Hassan, Abdul Hassan Law Group, PLLC, Queens Village, NY, for Plaintiff. Dov Ber Medinets, Gutman Weiss, P.C., Brooklyn, NY, for Defendants.
Abdul Karim Hassan, Abdul Hassan Law Group, PLLC, Queens Village, NY, for Plaintiff.
Dov Ber Medinets, Gutman Weiss, P.C., Brooklyn, NY, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
MARCIA M. HENRY, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Pedro Enrique Quispe ("Plaintiff") brings this wage and hour action against Defendants Stone & Tile Inc. ("Stone & Tile") and Lazer Mechelovitz ("Mechelovitz") (collectively, "Defendants") pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. ; the New York Minimum Wage Act, New York Labor Law ("NYLL") §§ 2 and 650 et seq. ; and NYLL §§ 190 et seq. Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to pay minimum wage and overtime wage, severance/separation pay, and accrued paid time/benefits, and failed to provide proper wage notices and statements. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Settlement Approval pursuant to Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc. , 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015). (Mot., ECF No. 11.) Defendants join in Plaintiff's request for the Court to approve the settlement agreement. (Id. ) For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
As alleged in the Complaint, Mechelovitz owns and manages Stone & Tile, a for-profit corporation in Brooklyn, New York which distributes and installs granite and marble countertops. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 8, 11, 13.) Defendants employed Plaintiff as a "manual worker" whose job functions included lifting, packing, moving, and installing granite for approximately eight years ending in or around July 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16.) Defendants employed Plaintiff as an hourly employee whose last reported hourly rate was $19.13 per hour. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff worked 55 to 60 (or more) hours each week, yet Defendants paid him the same rate for all hours and did not pay him an overtime rate for time worked over 40 hours a week. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.) Plaintiff also claims that Defendants failed to provide him with legally required wage notices and wage statements. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22.)
Plaintiff commenced this action on October 1, 2020. The Honorable Sanket J. Bulsara, the previously assigned magistrate judge, referred the parties to mediation on April 22, 2021. (Apr. 22, 2021 Order.) On June 28, 2021, Plaintiff moved for approval of a settlement. (Mot., ECF No. 11.) The Honorable Kiyo A. Matsumoto referred the Motion to the undersigned on August 19, 2021. (Aug. 19, 2021 Order.)
The case was assigned to the undersigned on June 7, 2021.
On August 24, 2021, the parties appeared for a Cheeks motion hearing at which the undersigned requested supplemental briefing regarding, inter alia , Plaintiff's damages calculations and a more fulsome analysis of the factors discussed in Wolinsky v. Scholastic Inc. , 900 F. Supp. 2d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). (Aug. 24, 2021 Minute Entry Order.) Plaintiff submitted supplemental letter briefs on September 1, 2021 and September 3, 2021. (1st Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 12; 2d Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 14.) The parties also consented to the undersigned's jurisdiction over this motion. (Consent, ECF No. 15.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
"In the Second Circuit, ‘parties cannot privately settle FLSA claims with a stipulated dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 absent the approval of the district court or the [United States] Department of Labor.’ " Cano v. Cherry Lawn Farms, Inc. , No. 19-CV-9469 (AEK), 2021 WL 2481489, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2021) (quoting Fisher v. SD Prot. Inc. , 948 F.3d 593, 599 (2d Cir. 2020) ). A reviewing court must ensure that the proposed agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant " ‘reflects a reasonable compromise of disputed issues rather than a mere waiver of statutory rights brought about by an employer's overreaching.’ " Rotthoff v. New York State Cath. Health Plan, Inc. , No. 19-CV-4027 (AMD)(CLP), 2021 WL 1310220, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2021) (quoting Le v. SITA Information Networking Computing USA, Inc. , No. 07-CV-86 (JS)(MLO), 2008 WL 9398950, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2008) ); Santana v. Los Limones Grocery Corp. , No. 17-CV-5264 (CLP), 2018 WL 6061340, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2018) (same). The Court's review must be based on the totality of the circumstances. Cano , 2021 WL 2481489, at *1.
Courts generally consider a non-exclusive list of factors to determine whether a settlement is fair and reasonable:
(1) the plaintiff's range of possible recovery; (2) the extent to which the settlement will enable the parties to avoid anticipated burdens and expenses in establishing their respective claims and defenses; (3) the seriousness of the litigation risks faced by the parties; (4) whether the settlement agreement is the product of arm's-length bargaining between experienced counsel; and (5) the possibility of fraud or collusion.
Fisher , 948 F.3d at 600 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Wolinsky , 900 F. Supp. 2d at 335–36 ); see also Jun Cui v. O2 Korean BBQ , No. 19-CV-2794 (DLI)(SJB), 2020 WL 7034369, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2020). Conversely, the following factors can weigh against approving a settlement:
(1) the presence of other employees situated similarly to the claimant; (2) a likelihood that the claimant's circumstance will recur; (3) a history of FLSA non-compliance by the same employer or others in the same industry or geographic region; and (4) the desirability of a mature record and a pointed determination of the governing factual or legal issue to further the development of the law either in general or in an industry or in a workplace.
Abreu v. Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar Meats & Poultry, Inc. , 17-CV-272 (KAM)(LB), 2019 WL 2526087, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2019) (quoting Wolinsky , 900 F. Supp. 2d at 336 ).
"The Court must also separately assess the reasonableness of plaintiffs’ attorney's fees, even when the fee is negotiated as part of a settlement rather than judicially determined." Lliguichuzhca v. Cinema 60, LLC , 948 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). "[C]ourts must ... carefully scrutinize the settlement, including to ensure that counsel's pecuniary interest ‘did not adversely affect the extent of relief counsel procured for the client[ ].’ " Abreu , 2019 WL 2526087 at *4 (quoting Wolinsky , 900 F. Supp. 2d at 336 ). To enable the Court to evaluate the reasonableness of the proposed fees, counsel must submit evidence supporting their requested fees including, for example, billing records. Wolinsky , 900 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
B. Terms of the Settlement
The motion for settlement approval includes a fully executed "Settlement Agreement and Release" that sets forth the parties’ agreed-upon terms. (Mot. Ex. 1, ECF No. 11-1.) The proposed settlement agreement provides for a total settlement payment of $60,000, of which $39,686 will be paid to Plaintiff and $20,314 will be paid to his attorney in fees and costs. (Id. ¶¶ 2(a)–(c).) In consideration for the payment, Plaintiff will withdraw all claims underlying this action and any other wage and hour claims. (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendants, in turn, agree to release Plaintiff from "any and all claims, debts, obligations or liability whatsoever, whether known or unknown, that they had or may have against Plaintiff ...." (Id. ¶ 2(f).) As set forth below, based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable. Wolinsky , 900 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
1. Factors Supporting Reasonableness
a. Plaintiff's Range of Possible Recovery
A plaintiff can show the range of recovery based on, inter alia , facts alleged in the Complaint or revealed through discovery. Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC , 96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 176–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (rejecting FLSA settlement where the parties did not provide estimated number of hours worked or applicable ranges); Douglas v. Allied Universal Sec. Servs. , 371 F. Supp. 3d 78, 83–84 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), reconsideration denied , 381 F. Supp. 3d 239 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (collecting cases). Plaintiff alleged that his most recent hourly rate was $19.13 per hour (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 17), and his overtime premium would be half of his normal rate—i.e. , $9.565 per hour. Plaintiff also claimed that he worked approximately 55–60 hours per week, or an average of 17.5 hours of overtime per week. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 18; 1st Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 12 at 2.) Based on Plaintiff's damages calculations, Plaintiff was not paid overtime for 292 weeks under the six-year NYLL statute of limitations period, representing approximately 49 weeks per year. (1st Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 12 at 2.) Multiplying the overtime premium of $9.565 by 17.5 hours per week for 292 weeks yields unpaid overtime wages of $48,877. Plaintiff also alleges damages of $5,000 for a wage notice violation, and an additional $5,000 for a wage statement violation. (Id. ) The total damages for unpaid overtime wages, wage notice violations, and wage statement violations are $58,877. (Id. )
This calculation assumes Plaintiff took off from work for approximately three weeks each year.
Under the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff will receive $39,686, or approximately 67.4% of the total alleged damages. This recovery is reasonable and consistent with settlements approved in this Circuit. See Valdez v. LF Food Mkt. Corp. , No. 17-CIV-8387 (HBP), 2019 WL 4194189, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2019) (approving settlement when plaintiff recovered 60% of total alleged damages); Cumbe v. Peter Pan Donuts & Pastries Inc. , No. 16-CV-392 (AMD)(SJB), 2018 WL 3742689, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2018) (approving settlement where plaintiff received 53% of maximum recovery), report and recommendation adopted , No. 16-CV-392 (AMD)(SJB), 2018 WL 3742634 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2018) ; Chowdhury v. Brioni Am., Inc. , No. 16-CIV-344 (HBP), 2017 WL 5953171, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2017) (finding settlement of 40% fair and reasonable when defendants disputed the number of hours plaintiffs claimed to have worked and defendants claimed to have compensated plaintiffs fully). Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of reasonableness.
b. Avoidance of Burdens and Expenses
The proposed Settlement Agreement will allow the parties to avoid significant litigation costs, including the costs of discovery (which has proceeded only minimally), motion practice, trial preparation, and potentially trial. See Chowdhury , 2017 WL 5953171, at *3 ("[T]he settlement will entirely avoid the burden, expense and aggravation of litigation. No depositions have taken place yet.... The settlement avoids the necessity of conducting this discovery."). Obtaining an immediate recovery and avoiding an unpredictable and costly litigation weighs in favor of approving the settlement agreement. See Reyes v. Buddha-Bar NYC , No. 08-CIV-2494 (DF), 2009 WL 5841177, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2009).
c. Seriousness of the Litigation Risks
The Proposed Settlement Agreement also "avoids the serious risks of litigation" that Plaintiff faces. Sanchez v. DPC New York Inc. , 381 F. Supp. 3d 245, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ; see also Lopez v. Poko-St. Ann L.P. , 176 F. Supp. 3d 340, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (settlement amount is fair "in light of the legal and evidentiary challenges that would face the plaintiffs in the absence of a settlement."). The primary risks include "disagreement between the parties as to the hours worked, wages paid and whether Plaintiff was exempt from the overtime protections in the first place." (1st Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 12 at 2.) In addition, "[t]he circumstances of Plaintiff's termination and other conditions of his employment are under review and investigation" and Plaintiff reserved his right to raise claims relating to his wrongful termination. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 32.) In light of these disputes, Plaintiff's recovery is substantial and provides him with certainty regarding the resolution of the case. See Sanchez , 381 F. Supp. 3d at 245 (approving a settlement where the plaintiff obtained only 19% of the maximum possible recovery; further litigation required overcoming the significant question of whether the defendants even qualified as employers under the FLSA). Accordingly, this factor supports a finding of reasonableness.
d. Arm's Length Bargaining
The proposed settlement agreement appears to be the product of arm's length bargaining between experienced counsel. "Counsel for each party has participated in numerous FLSA and NYLL matters before this Court," which supports a finding that they negotiated the settlement terms seriously. Strauss v. Little Fish Corp. , No. 19-CV-10158 (LJL), 2020 WL 4041511, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2020). In this case, counsel for Plaintiff, Abdul Hassan, and counsel for Defendants, Dov Medinets, have appeared in numerous FLSA actions. (1st Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 12 at 3–4 (listing Plaintiff's counsel's FLSA cases in which settlements have been approved).) See also, e.g. , Jones v. E. Brooklyn Sec. Servs. Corp. , No. 11-CV-1021 (JG)(SMG), 2012 WL 3235784 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2012) (Defendant's counsel representing party accused of FLSA and NYLL violations); Camacho v. Midtown Ctr. Auto Repair Inc. , No. 19-CV-9505 (LJL), 2020 WL 1082466, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020) (Defendant's counsel appearing in FLSA action where settlement was approved as reasonable). The equal strength and experience of counsel support a finding that the negotiations were fair and fulsome, and support a finding of reasonableness.
e. No Fraud or Collusion
The final factor also weighs in favor of approving the proposed settlement agreement because there is no evidence of fraud or collusion. "[B]ecause Plaintiff is no longer employed by Defendants, the risk of coercion—a concern in other cases—is minimal to non-existent." Strauss , 2020 WL 4041511, at *4 ; see also Kaveh v. 1/0 Cap., LLC. , No. 16-CV-3494 (JMF), 2017 WL 10436077, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2017) (coercion "concerns are not as relevant when the plaintiff no longer works for the defendant"). Specifically, Defendants terminated Plaintiff's employment before Plaintiff pursued legal action. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15, 32.) As a result, it is unlikely that Defendants held any undue influence over Plaintiff when negotiating the Settlement Agreement.
2. Factors Weighing Against Reasonableness
A significant factor weighing against a finding of reasonableness is Mechelovitz's alleged failure to comply with the FLSA in the recent past. Cabrera v. CBS Corp. , No. 17-CV-6011 (CM)(BCM), 2019 WL 502131, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2019) (rejecting a zero-pay settlement when the employer had previously settled a $10 million FLSA lawsuit). In 2016, a former employee sued Mechelovitz, Nachman Mechelovitz, and Lazer Marble & Granite Corp. for failing to pay overtime wages and failing to provide proper wage statements or wage notices. Cohetero v. Stone & Tile, Inc. , No. 16-CV-4420 (KAM)(SMG), 2018 WL 565717 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2018). The parties soon settled the dispute for $22,500 and explained that Lazer Marble & Granite Corp. had been dissolved. (Mot. for Settlement, Cohetero ECF No. 14 at 1–2.)
In Cohetero and the instant case, Mechelovitz controlled entities whose employees alleged FLSA and NYLL violations. Mechelovitz signed the Cohetero settlement agreement as the CEO of, inter alia , Stone & Tile, the corporate defendant in this action. (Settlement Agt., Cohetero ECF No. 14-1 at 5.) Additionally, records from the New York Department of State list the same address for Lazer Marble & Granite Corp., a co-defendant in Cohetero , and Stone & Tile, the co-defendant here.
The Cohetero settlement documents refer to "Lazer Mechlovitz" while the documents in the instant case list "Lazer Mechelovitz" as a defendant. (Compare Settlement Agt., Cohetero ECF No. 14-1 at 5 with Mot. Ex. 1, ECF No. 11-1 at 4.) It is undisputed, however, that Mechelovitz was the CEO of Stone & Tile in both cases.
Entity Information for Stone & Tile Inc., Dept. of State, Division of Corporations , https://apps.dos.ny.gov/publicInquiry/#search (Search "Stone & Tile Inc." as Entity Name and navigate to "Kings County" entry); Entity Information for Lazer Marble & Granite Corp. (Search "Lazer Marble & Granite Corp." as Entity Name and navigate to either entry).
This shared ownership is problematic because Mechelovitz employed Cohetero and Quispe during overlapping years in similar positions. Mechelovitz employed Cohetero for approximately 23 years, from 1993 through January 21, 2016. ( Cohetero Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1–2, 43.) During this period, Quispe worked for Mechelovitz from approximately 2012 to July 2020. (See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 15.) Cohetero worked as a marble cutter and polisher, while Quispe performed various physical tasks including installing granite. (Compare Cohetero Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 1, with Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15–16.) For approximately three and a half years, between 2012 and January 2016, Mechelovitz apparently failed to pay Cohetero and Quispe overtime wages or provide proper wage statements. (Compare Cohetero Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 45–55 with Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15, 18–22.) Mechelovitz settled with Cohetero in 2018, nearly two years before Quispe filed this case. (Feb. 7, 2018 Order Voluntarily Dismissing Case, Cohetero 16-CV-4420.) Yet Mechelovitz also apparently failed to correct the pattern of behavior which precipitated the Cohetero action.
3. The Totality of the Circumstances
Under the "totality of the circumstances," however, the proposed settlement agreement in this case is still fair and reasonable. As set forth in detail above, several Wolinsky factors support a finding of reasonableness. Moreover, none of the Wolinksy factors weighing against reasonableness are present. For example, "[a]s Plaintiff no longer works for Defendants, his circumstances will obviously not recur. Although an argument could be made that maturation of this record could lead to further legal development in FLSA cases, this factor alone does not require the Court to reject the proposed settlement agreement." Canales v. Norwich Serv. Station Inc. , No. 20-CV-4759 (JMW), 2021 WL 5759727, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2021). Additionally, the settlement agreement does not include the typical provisions that preclude approval, including (1) overbroad releases; (2) highly restrictive confidentiality provisions; (3) non-disparagement provisions that bar truthful statements; and (4) prohibitions on future employment. See, e.g. , Brittle v. Metamorphosis, LLC , No. 20-CIV-3880 (ER), 2021 WL 606244, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2021) (denying approval of FLSA settlement agreement containing a bar on reemployment, an overly broad confidentiality provision, and an overly broad release); Torres v. Mc Gowan Builders , No. 18-CV-6099 (RML), 2020 WL 5369056, at *2–4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2020) (rejecting a FLSA settlement agreement with an overly broad confidentiality provision, a high liquidated damages provision, a non-disparagement provision, and a general release of claims). Finally, as described below, counsel's proposed attorney's fees are also fair and reasonable.
C. Attorney's Fees
Agreements for attorney's fees must be reviewed for reasonableness, no less than any other part of an FLSA settlement. Caceres v. Brentwood Farmers Market, Inc. , No. 20-CV-3476 (AKT), 2021 WL 3276637, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2021) ("FLSA settlements entered into pursuant to a stipulated dismissal with prejudice represent a special type of contract because district courts are required to review these settlements for reasonableness ... The obligation extends to the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees and costs.") (quoting Fisher , 948 F.3d at 606 ) (internal citations omitted). "[T]here is no explicit limit on attorneys’ fees in FLSA actions[,]" and "a fee may not be reduced merely because the fee would be disproportionate to the financial interest at stake in the litigation." Fisher , 948 F.3d at 603–04 (quoting Kassim v. City of Schenectady , 415 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2005) ) (internal quotations omitted).
"The Second Circuit favors the percentage-of-the-fund method of calculating attorney's fees because it ‘directly aligns the interests of [Plaintiff] and [his] counsel.’ " Gonzalez v. Citusa Park Ave., LLC , No. 20-CIV-2326 (AT), 2020 WL 8920703, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. , 396 F.3d 96, 121 (2d Cir. 2005) ). Based on a retainer agreement with Plaintiff, Plaintiff's counsel requests one-third of the value of the proposed settlement—specifically, $19,843 in attorney's fees, $400 for filing costs, and $71 for service costs, totaling $20,314. (Mot., ECF No. 11 at 2; 1st Suppl. Mot., ECF No. 12 at 3; Retainer Agt., Mot. Ex. 2, ECF No. 11-2. ) "Contingency fees of one-third in FLSA cases are routinely approved in this Circuit" and are acceptable here. Gonzalez , 2020 WL 8920703, at *2 ; Shamsundar v. FCS Grp. LLC , No. 18-CV-2514 (KAM)(LB), 2019 WL 3716198, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2019) ("Courts in this district generally find 33% of the overall settlement, mirroring the one-third contingency fee arrangement to be reasonable ...."); see also Gonzales v. 27 W.H. Bake, LLC , No. 15-CIV-4161 (PAC)(HBP), 2018 WL 1918623, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2018) (collecting cases).
Pursuant to the Retainer Agreement, Plaintiff's counsel will collect the greater of: "(a) a reasonable percentage fee which is one-third (1/3) of all sums recovered on Client's behalf," (b) "[a] reasonable hourly fee which is the amount of Attorney's hourly rates ... times the number of hours spent by the Attorney on Client's behalf," or (c) "[a] separate recovery of fees such as where a court or other tribunal awards attorney's fees or where a defendant(s) settles a demand for fees." (Retainer Agt., Mot. Ex. 2, ECF No. 11-2 ¶ 12.)
"As a check on the reasonableness of attorney's fees, however, courts still calculate the total cost of attorney's hours billed, previously known as the lodestar method[,]" even where a retainer agreement exists. Gonzalez , 2020 WL 8920703, at *2. Courts must determine if the hourly rate is "what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay." Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany & Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections , 522 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2008). "This rate should be based on rates ‘prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’ " Dacas v. Duhaney , No. 17-CV-3568 (EK)(SMG), 2020 WL 4587343, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020) (quoting Gierlinger v. Gleason , 160 F.3d 858, 882 (2d Cir. 1998) ), report and recommendation adopted , No. 17-CV-3568 (EK)(SMG), 2020 WL 4586371 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2020).
In this district, law firm partners in FLSA cases generally receive between $300 and $450 per hour. See, e.g. , Lopez v. 1923 Sneaker, Inc. , No. 18-CV-3828 (WFK)(RER), 2021 WL 1845057, at *9–10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2021), report and recommendation adopted , No. 18-CV-3828 (WFK)(RER), 2021 WL 1259623 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2021) (collecting cases correlating rates to numbers of years of experience and awarding $375 an hour to a founding and managing partner of a labor and employment firm with eighteen years of experience); Marshall v. Deutsche Post DHL , No. 13-CV-1471 (RJD)(JO), 2015 WL 5560541, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015) (describing the prevailing rate as between $300 and $400 for partners).
Plaintiff's counsel, a solo practitioner with over 20 years’ litigation experience, submitted billing records reflecting 28.59 hours worked at a rate of $500 an hour, equaling $14,296.67. (1st Suppl. Mot. Ex. 1, ECF No. 12-1.) The records reflect appropriate tasks and time spent for an attorney representing a single plaintiff in a wage and hour case that settled before extensive discovery and motion practice. Accepting counsel's reported hours and billing rate, the requested attorney's fees of $19,843 are approximately 1.4 times the lodestar amount. "In other words, Plaintiff's counsel will recover an award of attorney's fees that is greater than the lodestar amount." Gonzalez , 2020 WL 8920703, at *2. While there is some debate about the proper range for a lodestar multiplier, the multiplier here is below the point of controversy and is therefore reasonable. Compare Sakiko Fujiwara v. Sushi Yasuda Ltd. , 58 F. Supp. 3d 424, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("In this Court's opinion, a multiplier near 2 should, in most cases, be sufficient compensation for the risk associated with contingent fees in FLSA cases.") with Monserrate v. Tequipment, Inc. , No. 11-CV-6090 (RML), 2012 WL 5830557, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2012) ("Courts regularly award multipliers from two to six times the lodestar.") (collecting cases).
The Court notes that 28.59 hours worked at a rate of $500 per hour equals $14,295.
Plaintiff's counsel also seeks costs of $471, which consists of the $400 filing fee and service costs of $71. These costs are fair and reasonable. Caceres , 2021 WL 3276637, at *3.
Accordingly, as either a percentage of the settlement or as a lodestar value, the requested attorney's fees are reasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion for Settlement Approval is granted. The parties shall file a fully executed stipulation of dismissal with prejudice consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 by February 17, 2022 .