Opinion
02 CIV. 10266 (DLC; (HBP)
September 26, 2003
Kenneth Pyle, Warwick, New York, for Petitioner
Darian B. Taylor, Esq., New York, NY, for Respondent
OPINION AND ORDER
On December 27, 2002, Kenneth Pyle's ("Pyle") petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 2254 was received by the Pro Se Office of this Court. Pyle claims he was denied parole in violation of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pyle does not make claims concerning his plea or sentencing. On January 22, 2003, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman for a Report and Recommendation ("Report"), which was issued on July 3. The Report recommends that the petition be denied on the merits and that a certificate of appealability not issue. Both parties have filed objections. For the reasons that follow, the Report is adopted, and the petition is denied.
Background
Pyle is currently serving a sentence of eight and one-third to twenty-five years' imprisonment arising out of a conviction, based on a guilty plea, for manslaughter in the first degree. Pyle's conviction stems from the 1989 killing of his former girlfriend, Irene Rinaldi ("Rinaldi"). According to statements made by petitioner in connection with his presentence report and appearances before the Parole Board, the homicide occurred as follows. On the night of the killing, Pyle and Rinaldi had gone out drinking, and used cocaine and marijuana. The two wound up at Pyle's apartment, where an argument ensued. The argument escalated, and Pyle choked Rinaldi until she "became quiet." Later that day, Pyle dumped Rinaldi's body in a wooded area in Ronkonkoma, New York. Rinaldi's corpse was discovered approximately six weeks after the homicide, and upon questioning, Pyle confessed to the killing.
Petitioner was denied parole in March 1998, March 2000, and March 2002. The Parole Board's March 2002 decision denying parole found that:
Parole is denied, hold 24 months . . . You are presently serving a term for manslaughter first degree . . . You had abused both drugs and alcohol at the time. . . . We note a prior criminal record extending back to 1986 with three violations and one violation of probation. Your instant offense represents both a continuation of that pattern of misconduct and the serious escalation in violence [sic]. Your history is also replete with substance abuse. [You demonstrate] little insight in your criminality or actual remorse for your victim. These factors demonstrate that you present a serious threat to community safety and welfare and belie discretionary release. The decision [to deny parole is] due to prior board action, use of excessive violence against [a] person in the offense, you caused the death of the victim, history of drug abuse, history of alcohol abuse, continuous involvement with the criminal justice system, escalation of criminal behavior.
In his timely habeas petition, Pyle seeks relief on the basis of two alleged constitutional violations committed by the Parole Board. First, Pyle alleges that the denial of parole violates due process. Pyle claims that the Parole Board's decision is not supported by any evidence, is arbitrary and capricious and is the product of political and public pressure to deny parole to offenders who have committed violent felonies. Related to this claim, Pyle contends that the Parole Board, allegedly deferring to the view of New York's Governor, improperly gave controlling weight to his criminal history. Second, Pyle argues that the denial of parole constitutes a violation of equal protection because parole was allegedly granted to other similarly situated inmates but denied to him.
Discussion
Pyle did not seek judicial review of the denial of parole in state court and his claims are, therefore, unexhausted. An unexhausted claim may be denied on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(2). Since the parties have objected to the Report, the petitioner's claims are reviewed de novo. See Rule 72(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.
Due Process Claim
Pyle's due process claim is without merit. "In order for a state prisoner to have an interest in parole that is protected by the Due Process Clause, he must have a legitimate expectancy of release that is grounded in the state's statutory scheme." Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 170 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam). New York's parole system does not create a protected liberty interest in early release. Id. at 171. See also Marvin v. Goord, 255 F.3d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 2001). Parole in New York is discretionary, and may not be granted merely as a reward for good behavior. N.Y. Exec. L. § 259-1(2)(c)(A). Thus, Pyle has no liberty interest in parole, and cannot benefit from the protection of the Due Process Clause.
Pyle's objections to the Report's findings assert that he has stated a viable Due Process claim because New York law forbids "the injection of political and public pressure in parole release decision-making." Pyle, however, does not identify any improper political interference directed towards his individual parole application. While he assets that New York State's elected officials have emphasized the consideration of certain factors in the review process, these factors are the same ones named by the pertinent New York statute. Pyle has not identified any liberty interest in parole, or any due process violation.
Equal Protection Claim
In his equal protection claim, Pyle asserts that other inmates convicted of similar crimes were granted parole while he was denied parole without a rational basis for the difference in treatment. He identifies three other individuals convicted of first degree manslaughter and granted parole whose criminal records, he asserts, were either comparable to or worse than his own. Petitioner's equal protection claim is also without merit.
This type of equal protection claim is governed by the Supreme Court's "class of one" holding in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam). In Olech, the Court held that a successful equal protection claim may be "brought by a `class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.'" Id. at 564. In interpreting Olech, the Second Circuit emphasized that a petitioner asserting a "class of one" claim must still show that he was subjected to "`irrational and wholly arbitrary' acts" and "intentional disparate treatment." Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 751 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Olech, 528 U.S. at 565) (emphasis in original).
The petition does not provide a basis to find an irrational or illicitly motivated decision by the Parole Board. The Parole Board considered several aspects of Pyle's crime and sentence, as well as his criminal history, experience with substance abuse, and possible future threat to community safety. Its denial of parole cannot be characterized as irrational. Pyle also fails to show that the Parole Board intentionally discriminated against him. The Report analyzes the histories of the three paroled inmates identified by Pyle, and shows that "it is by no means clear that petitioner has, in fact, been treated more harshly" than they were. Since Pyle does not show that the Parole Board's decision was irrational, and he cannot show that he intentionally received disparate treatment, his equal protection claim must fail.
In Brown v. Thomas, Judge Lynch faced nearly identical arguments. Judge Lynch succinctly dispatched the claims, stating:
In fact, Pyle's claims are identical to claims raised by a number of inmates in custody at the Mid-Orange Correctional Facility. See generally Davis v. Thomas, No. 03-C0395 (VM), 2003 WL 21436255, at *2 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2003) (noting that approximately twenty inmates of Mid-Orange have filed the identical habeas petition challenging the denial of parole).
[Petitioner] does not claim that the Board acted on the basis of any suspect classification or invidious motive. . . . [t]he number and variety of factors bearing on the seriousness of the underlying offense and the likelihood that an offender will be a danger to the community make it impossible to conclude . . . that the petitioner has been singled out from among all homicide offenders for disparate treatment. To establish such a claim that a party constitutes a `class of one,' singled out for arbitrary mistreatment from others similarly situated, petitioner must show that he was similarly situated to others and received different treatment from them, and was subjected to `irrational and wholly arbitrary acts' and `intentional disparate treatment.'"
2003 WL 941940, at *2 (quoting Giordano, 274 F.3d at 751) (emphasis supplied). Judge Lynch's analysis has been followed in a number of recent cases in this District. See, e.g., Davis v. Thomas, 256 F. Supp.2d 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Manlev v. Thomas, 255 F. Supp.2d 263, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
In his objection to the Report, Pyle cites a recently decided Second Circuit case, DeMuria v. Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2003), as support for his equal protection claim. Pyle's reliance on DeMuria is misplaced. In DeMuria, the Second Circuit overruled the district court's dismissal of a complaint. DeMuria held that petitioners asserting a "class of one" claim need not "identify in [a] complaint actual instances where others have been treated differently for the purposes of equal protection." Id. at 707. Instead, it is sufficient to plead "the more general allegation" that similarly situated persons were treated differently. Id. DeMuria is inapposite, however, because it discusses pleading standards for a motion to dismiss. "Different standards are applicable to a habeas petition, which should set out substantive facts that will enable the court to see a real possibility of constitutional error." Hairston v. Thomas, No. 02-C9301 (NRB), 2003 WL 22126662, at *2 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 12, 2003) (citation omitted). Moreover, to the extent DeMuria addressed the merits of a "class of one" equal protection claim, it left undisturbed the requirements that a plaintiff show "irrational and wholly arbitrary" acts and "intentional disparate treatment." DeMuria, 328 F.3d at 707.
The State of New York's sole objection to the Report concerns Magistrate Pitman's characterization DeMuria as "`eliminat[ing] the need [for a petitioner] to identify comparators' when raising a `class of one equal protection claim.'" The State is concerned that the language used by Magistrate Judge Pitman could be construed as relieving a plaintiff of the burden to identify the persons from whom he is allegedly being treated differently. In his Report, however, Judge Pitman clearly states that DeMuria's holding applies only to the pleading requirements for an equal-protection claim based on a "class of one." To the extent there is any confusion, the Court reiterates that both DeMuria and Olech address the pleading requirements needed to establish a valid claim under this theory of equal protection in civil complaints, not the showing required to succeed in a habeas petition.
In a second objection to the Report, Pyle points out that every manslaughter conviction necessarily entails an unjustified loss of life. Consequently, basing a denial of parole on the "serious and violent" nature of his offense constitutes an irrational difference in treatment among those granted parole. In a similar vein, Pyle argues that, since a percentage of persons convicted of manslaughter are released each year, the Parole Board's denial of his application based on the nature of his crime must have been irrational. A parole decision is too fact bound to support the inference on which Pyle's argument rests. In any event, he has failed to show a basis to find that he was a victim of intentionally disparate treatment.
Conclusion
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. The petitioner has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a federal right and appellate review is, therefore, not warranted. Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 241 (2d Cir. 1998). In addition, I find, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith. Coppedqe v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
SO ORDERED.