Opinion
No. CV 02 0079543 S
March 24, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON THE PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was instituted by the plaintiff, Charles Pulaski, seeking damages against the defendants HealthSouth Rehabilitation Center of Connecticut, LLC (HealthSouth) and Megan Sevigny. HealthSouth is a facility providing physical therapy to patients referred to it by medical care providers. Sevigny is a physical therapist employed by HealthSouth. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff received physical therapy from HealthSouth, through its employee, Sevigny, to help rehabilitate a surgically repaired right shoulder. The complaint further alleges that this physical therapy was performed negligently resulting in damages to the plaintiff.
After a trial to a jury, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, awarding $25,000. The plaintiff has filed the following motions: a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial as to damages, a motion for additur, and a second motion for mistrial. For the following reasons these motions are denied.
The evidence on which the jury based its verdict consisted of the following. In January 2000, the plaintiff experienced a fall injuring his right shoulder. To treat this injury, the plaintiff's orthopedist, Dr. Belkin, performed a non-surgical manipulation of the plaintiff's shoulder on October 2, 2000. On October 2, 2000, after the manipulation, the plaintiff went to the HealthSouth's facility for physical therapy, and continued this therapy the next day. The therapy on these days included flexibility exercises and manipulation of his arm. On October 4, 2000, the plaintiff received additional therapy, which included the use of a Cybex machine. The plaintiff's right arm was strapped to this machine and the machine was programmed to raise and lower the plaintiff's arm to facilitate flexibility. As discussed below, the plaintiff claims that he was injured during his use of this machine. On October 5 and 6, 2000, the plaintiff returned to the HealthSouth facility for therapy. The evidence was conflicting about whether the plaintiff used the Cybex machine on either of those days. There is no dispute, however, that the plaintiff saw Dr. Belkin on October 8, 2000, and was diagnosed with having a dislocated shoulder.
The plaintiff testified that after he was strapped to the Cybex machine and was left unattended, the machine malfunctioned, rapidly jerking his arm and causing him severe pain. The plaintiff offered the testimony of both an expert, Dr. Portnow, and the treating physician, Dr. Belkin, indicating that the dislocation of the plaintiff's right shoulder occurred on October 4, 2000, during this use of the Cybex machine. The plaintiff also provided evidence indicating that the dislocation resulted in a brachial plexus injury, with permanent impairments to his right hand and right shoulder.
The plaintiff submitted the deposition testimony of Dr. Belkin, the plaintiff's treating physician, indicating that the plaintiff suffered a 3 percent permanent partial impairment to this right hand and a 10 percent permanent partial impairment to his right shoulder. Dr. Portnow was called by the plaintiff and he opined that the plaintiff had suffered a 40 percent permanent partial disability of the whole person as a result of his injuries. The facts that the plaintiff suffered a dislocated shoulder, and as a consequence, experienced permanent impairments of some degree were not disputed by the defendants.
The issue of causation was hotly contested by the defendants. The defendants not only denied that the Cybex machine malfunctioned, but they also argued that the plaintiff could not meet his burden of proving how or when his shoulder was dislocated. The defendants emphasized that the plaintiff continued with physical therapy for two days after the alleged malfunction of the Cybex machine, and that he was not diagnosed with having a dislocated shoulder until October 8, 2000, four days later. The defendants offered the testimony of an orthopedist, Dr. Cassels, who examined the plaintiff and reviewed the general operation of a Cybex machine. Dr. Cassels testified that it was unreasonable to conclude that the plaintiff dislocated his shoulder while using such a passive motion machine. Dr. Cassels opined that the plaintiff was injured during the manipulation procedure performed by Dr. Belkin, but this opinion was neither clear nor unequivocal.
Initially, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding economic damages of $12,861.03 and no non-economic damages. This award of economic damages compensated the plaintiff for all the past medical expenses claimed by him. The plaintiff filed a written motion for mistrial, arguing that on the basis of the evidence, the jury's failure to award noneconomic damages was error. The court denied this motion, choosing instead to recharge the jury on the issue of damages. After receiving these additional instructions, the jury returned a verdict of $25,000, consisting of $12,861.03 for past medical expenses, $2,138.97 for past non-economic damages and $10,000 for future non-economic damages. The court will discuss additional facts of the case as necessary to address the parties' arguments.
In the Appendix, the full text of the court's recharge to the jury is provided as Document 1, and the jury's verdict and interrogatory answers are provided as Document 2.
DISCUSSION The Second Motion for Mistrial and the Motion to Set Aside the Verdict and for a New Trial
"Any motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be granted except on substantial grounds." Burr v. Lichtenheim, 190 Conn. 351, 355, 460 A.2d 1290 (1983). The court has the authority to set aside a verdict when the jury could not reasonably and legally have reached its verdict. Bound Brook Associates v. Norwalk, 198 Conn 660, 667, 504 A.2d 1047, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819, 107 S.Ct. 81, 93 L.Ed.2d 36 (1986). "The basic question which the trial court has to decide is whether upon all the evidence an injustice has been done." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burr v. Lichtenheim, supra, 190 Conn. 355.
"[A] mistrial should be granted only as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot have a fair trial . . . and the whole proceedings are vitiated . . . If curative action can obviate the prejudice, the drastic remedy of a mistrial should be avoided . . . The decision whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taft, 258 Conn. 412, 418, 781 A.2d 302 (2001).
As previously explained, in its initial verdict, the jury awarded economic damages without awarding non-economic damages, and the plaintiff moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion for mistrial and recharged the jury on the issue of damages. In both the second motion for mistrial and the motion to set aside the verdict, the plaintiff argues that it was error for the court to deny the motion for a mistrial and to recharge the jury.
The plaintiff does not contest the substance of the supplemental instructions. The text of these instructions was prepared by the court for the specific purpose of recharging a jury that awards economic damages without non-economic damages in circumstances where such a verdict suggests error. The instructions reemphasize that the jury must base its decision on the evidence and the law, and that the plaintiff is legally entitled to an award of non-economic damages if he has met his burden of proof. The instructions further explain the relationship between medical expenses and non-economic damages, as well as the inconsistency in providing compensation for expenses incurred in the treatment of painful conditions without awarding damages for the painful conditions themselves. [See Appendix, Document 1.]
These instructions were drafted in response to the increased occurrences, experienced by this and other courts, where juries award economic damages providing full compensation for medical expenses, without awarding any compensation for the medical conditions and disabilities necessitating the medical treatment. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, 259 Conn. 325, 789 A.2d 459 (2002); Elliot v. Larson, 81 Conn.App. 468, 840 A.2d 59 (2004); Parks v. Merrill, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 01 0448192 (July 9, 2004, Corradino, J.) ( 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 457); O'Neil v. Merritt, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 010382341 (June 27, 2003, Stevens, J.); Neysmith v. Pagan-Hart, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 379224 (May 7, 2003, Levin, J.) ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 583).
The crux of the plaintiff's argument is that the jury committed error by only awarding economic damages, and then after the recharge, rushing to a verdict without a fair consideration of the plaintiff's damages. The implication of the plaintiff's argument is that the jury's initial disinclination to award non-economic damages so evidences prejudice or bias by the jury that it could not fairly evaluate damages.
More specifically, the plaintiff states the question as follows: "[W]hether the jury, in fact, gave proper credence and attention to the Court's instructions in light of the fact they were out approximately twenty minutes [after the recharge] and only increased their verdict from $12,861.03 to $25,000, which certainly does not reflect the extent of the pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life's activities, future medical expenses and permanency incurred by the Plaintiff in this case." (Memorandum of Law In Support of Plaintiff's Second Motion For Mistrial, p. 5.)
The plaintiff acknowledges that the court has broad discretion to recharge the jury. See generally, General Statutes § 52-223. Moreover, as previously stated, when curative instructions are feasible, they are preferable to the drastic remedy of a mistrial. State v. Maldonado, 193 Conn. 350, 356, 478 A.2d 581 (1984) ("If curative action can obviate the prejudice, the drastic remedy of a mistrial should be avoided").
General Statutes § 52-223 provides in relevant part: "[t]he court may, if it judges the jury has mistaken the evidence in the action and has brought in a verdict contrary to the evidence, or has brought in a verdict contrary to the direction of the court in a matter of law, return them to a second consideration . . ."
The court agrees with the plaintiff that a problem was indicated by the jury's initial verdict awarding economic damages and no non-economic damages. The court's recharge and the jury's final verdict, however, sufficiently addressed this particular issue. The court disagrees with the plaintiff's contention that the jurors displayed any "jovial" or cavalier attitude toward their work as jurors. Furthermore, the settled law is that misconduct rarely can be inferred from the duration of a jury's deliberation. See Baldwin v. Jablecki, 52 Conn.App. 379, 384, 726 A.2d 1164 ("A short deliberation, rather than being indicative of a lack of diligence, may in fact attest to the strength of the [prevailing party's] case"). Thus, the court rejects the plaintiff's argument that any procedural error was committed by the court in denying the plaintiff's motion for mistrial and instead recharging the jury. The essence of the plaintiff's argument is that the jury's final verdict is simply too low to be fair and equitable. The merits of this contention will be addressed as part of the court's consideration of the plaintiff's motion for additur.
The plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict also alleges that the jury interrogatories were "unnecessarily complex." The plaintiff opines that the interrogatories confused the jury because the questions emphasized the allegation of the complaint that applied only to the defendant HealthSouth. This claim is without any merit.
In his complaint, the plaintiff asserted one negligence claim — negligent supervision of the defendant Sevigny — that was directed only to the defendant HealthSouth. Consequently, the jurors were given interrogatories asking them to indicate whether a plaintiff's verdict was based on this claim and was only against HealthSouth, or whether a plaintiff's verdict was against both defendants premised on the other allegations of the complaint. The allegations of the complaint and the interrogatories were explained to the jury during the court's instructions to the jury. (The text of the jury interrogatories and the jury's answers are provided in the Appendix.) The plaintiff has failed to explain, in any sensible or understandable way, how these interrogatories were confusing. The inquiry was necessitated by the plaintiff's own pleadings. Moreover, the jury's verdict against both defendants and the jury's interrogatory answers fail to suggest any confusion by the jurors or any prejudice to the plaintiff relating to the structure or format of the questions.
Motion for Additur
The law is well established that the court's consideration of a motion for additur is guided by the parties' constitutional right to have factual disputes determined by the jury. The constitutional right of a party to have damages decided by the jury "is one obviously immovable limitation on the legal discretion of the court to set aside a verdict, since the constitutional right of trial by jury includes the right to have issues of fact as to which there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men passed upon by the jury and not by the court." Gladu v. Sousa, 52 Conn.App. 796, 800, 727 A.2d 1286, (1999), aff'd., 252 Conn. 190, 745 A.2d 798 (2000).
In evaluating the adequacy of a jury's verdict, the court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the jury simply because this court would consider or weigh the evidence differently. Mere doubt as to the adequacy of a verdict or a conclusion that the jury exercised poor judgment are insufficient grounds to order an additur. Wochek v. Foley, 193 Conn. 582, 587, 477 A.2d 1015 (1984). On the other hand, "it is the court's duty to set aside the verdict when it finds that it does manifest injustice, and is . . . palpably against the evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Malmberg v. Lopez, 208 Conn. 675, 679-80, 546 A.2d 264 (1988). The standard controlling this consideration is "whether the award of damages falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation in the particular case, or whether the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury [was] influenced by partiality, mistake or corruption." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wood v. Bridgeport, 216 Conn. 604, 611, 583 A.2d 124 (1990). A key consideration in applying this standard is the extent to which the evidence conflicts. "The existence of conflicting evidence limits the court's authority to overturn a jury verdict. The jury is entrusted with the choice of which evidence is more credible and what effect it is to be given." Skrzypiec v. Noonan, 228 Conn. 1, 11, 633 A.2d 716 (1993).
As explained by the plaintiff, on the issue of damages, he offered evidence indicating that he "suffered a right shoulder dislocation; a brachial plexus injury; a 3% permanent partial impairment to the right hand . . .; a 10% permanent partial impairment to the right shoulder . . .; and a 40% permanent partial impairment to the whole person . . . The plaintiff testified that he fears the loss of his left hand because this would leave him disabled." (Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law In Support of Plaintiff's Request For An Additur, November 11, 2004, pp. 2-3.)
The plaintiff also submitted the testimony of an expert, Dr. Portnow, that the plaintiff would incur future medical expenses for pain management and physical therapy. However, the jury did not include in its award any recovery for future medical expenses. Additionally, the plaintiff offered evidence that his disability would require him to incur the following yearly expenses or losses: $240 for laundry; $400 for snow removal; $600 for yard maintenance; $150 for house painting; $50 for gutter cleaning; and $2,400 for lost income. The jury's award did not include compensation for any of these claimed losses either.
The defendants did not contest the existence of the plaintiff's injuries. More specifically, the defendants did not contest that the plaintiff suffered a dislocated shoulder resulting in a brachial plexus injury, which, in turn, resulted in a permanent impairment in the plaintiff's right hand and shoulder. The evidence indicated that the plaintiff suffered a permanent, loss of function in his right hand, which is his major hand. The independent medical examiner retained by the defendants, Dr. Ylagan, stated in his report that the plaintiff suffered permanent impairments resulting from a dislocated shoulder.
As previously stated, the defendants strenuously contested the issue of causation. The defendants' expert witness, Dr. Cassels, testified that it was unlikely that a Cybex machine operating within normal limits could have dislocated the plaintiff's shoulder, but he admitted that he did not examine the machine used by the plaintiff. The defendants further rely on Dr. Cassels' testimony to argue that "the manipulation under anesthesia performed by Dr. Belkin on October 2, 2000, before [the plaintiff] began physical therapy with HealthSouth, may have caused the plaintiff's dislocation, and that Dr. Belkin's post-operative positioning of the plaintiff's right arm caused the brachial plexus injury." (Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition, December 1, 2004, p. 6.) To further exemplify the uncertainty about the cause of the plaintiff's injury, during closing arguments, the defendants pointed to a paragraph of the complaint averring that the plaintiff may have suffered an "aggravation of a pre-existing anterior dislocation of right shoulder caused and/or precipitated by the physical therapy . . ." Consequently, in opposing the plaintiff's motions, the defendants contend that "the jury could have reasonably concluded that Pulaski had a pre-existing right shoulder injury caused either by the January slip and fall or by Dr. Belkin's October 2, 2000 manipulation under anesthesia." (Defendants' Memorandum In Opposition, December 1, 2004, p. 8.)
The evidence at trial is not as clear as the defendants contend. There was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, indicating that the plaintiff dislocated his shoulder when he fell in January 2000. The evidence established that he developed adhesive capsulitis from this fall, which did not respond to conservative treatment, resulting in Dr. Belkin performing a non-invasive, surgical manipulation on October 2, 2000. Although there was a question about whether Dr. Belkin's postoperative positioning of the plaintiff's arm could have caused the dislocation, Dr. Cassels declined to offer this opinion at trial.
Dr. Cassels testified as follows on cross-examination:
Q. [In your report of May 17, 2004] did you state that "I believe that it was the post-operative positioning of the plaintiff's arm over his head that caused him a brachial plexus injury?" (Testimony of Dr. Cassels, October 27, 2004, p. 45.)
A. Yes, I did write that, yes.
Q. And you didn't tell us that this morning, did you. You didn't give an opinion based upon reasonable degree of medical probability that that was the cause of his injury?
A. No, I didn't.
Dr. Cassels' testimony on whether the dislocation and the brachial plexus injury were caused by Dr. Belkin during the manipulation procedure was inconsistent. At one point during his testimony he indicated that he could not say, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, whether the dislocation was caused by the manipulation. During another part of his examination, however, he testified that, in his opinion, the manipulation was the most likely cause of the dislocation.
During direct examination, Dr. Cassels testified as follows:
Q. So, based on your reading of Dr. Belkin's operative report do you have an opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether an injury was sustained during Dr. Belkin's closed manipulation?
A. I can't state to what degree the injury there is because we don't have any X-rays to look at this thing, we don't have an immediate evaluation. (Testimony of Dr. Cassels, October 27, 2004, p. 23.)
To clarify what appeared to be conflicting testimony, Dr. Cassels was asked the following on cross-examination:
Q. [D]o you have an opinion as to how he dislocated his shoulder based on reasonable medical certainty?
A. I think it happened during the manipulation.
* * *
Q. Are you saying now that you think the shoulder was dislocated on October 2nd during the manipulation?
A. Yes. (Testimony of Dr. Cassels, October 28, 2004, pp. 27-28.)
It was the jury's responsibility to evaluate Dr. Cassels' conflicting testimony and determine what weight this testimony should receive and whether it should be credited. This court must view the evidence offered at trial in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services, 249 Conn. 523, 534, 840 A.2d 59 (1999) (a court "must determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the jury's verdict"). As the defendants contend, the jury was presented with evidence sufficient to allow a finding that their actions aggravated a shoulder dislocation that existed before the physical therapy. Assuming that the defendants aggravated a preexisting condition, the court cannot find it unreasonable for the jury to award all the medical expenses that may have been associated with the treatment of this aggravation, but not to award all the non-economic damages associated with the dislocation itself. The jury was instructed by the court that to the extent the plaintiff had a preexisting condition that was injured by the defendants' therapy, the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation for the preexisting condition itself, but would only be entitled to recover for those damages proximately caused by the defendants' negligence, which would include any worsening or aggravation of the condition.
Although the court viewed this pre-existing condition charge as being warranted particularly by the initial shoulder injury sustained by the plaintiff in January 2000, the text of the charge was not so limited and did not preclude the jury's appropriate use of the instruction to any findings that it might make.
Whether, on the basis of the totality of this record, the defendants' negligence caused an aggravation to a preexisting condition, and if so, the manner in which the plaintiff's total damages associated with the injury should be evaluated and allocated are all matters peculiarly within the province of the jury. The conflicting evidence on these issues necessarily circumscribes the court's discretion to change the jury's verdict. Skrzypiec v. Noonan, supra, 228 Conn. 11.
Consequently, based on these considerations, the court cannot conclude that the jury's evaluation of the evidence and its award of $25,000 "so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury [was] influenced by partiality, mistake or corruption." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wood v. Bridgeport, supra, 216 Conn. 611. The jury's verdict is not so palpably against the evidence that an award of $25,000 is outside the "uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation in [this] particular case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's postjudgment motions are denied and the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants for $25,000 is ordered accepted as the final judgment of this case, plus costs.
So ordered this 24th day of March 2005.
Stevens, J.
APPENDIX TO MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL MOTIONS IN THE CASE OF CV02-0079543 S CHARLES PULASKI VS. HEALTHSOUTH REHABILITATION CENTER OF CONNECTICUT, LLC AND MEGAN SEVIGNY DOCUMENT ONE SUPPLEMENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ISSUE OF ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES [SUPPLEMENTAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS]THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, as a result of yesterday's verdict, I have found it necessary to provide some additional information to you, and require you to deliberate further in light of this additional information. In reviewing the interrogatories that you have completed and in reviewing the verdict which you have issued, you have made findings in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants on the issues of negligence and causation. Taking into account those findings on negligence and causation, my following comments to you are directed solely to the findings that you have made in regard to the issue of damages. Thus, I am going to give you the following instructions in light of those findings on causation and negligence and in taking those findings into account.
As the jury, as I indicated to you previously, it is your function to determine the facts and to issue the verdict, but there nevertheless are guidelines and rules that you as the jury must follow. Your verdict must be consistent with the evidence and consistent with my instructions to you regarding the law. In reaching your verdict you cannot disregard my instructions and you cannot disregard the evidence.
Now, specifically, in regard to your verdict and your award of damages, you awarded $12,861.03 for economic damages, but nothing for non-economic damages. I am going to ask you to reconsider this award of damages as part of the verdict in light of the following information and instructions.
In regard to the plaintiff's claim for economic damages, you must consider the plaintiff's allegation that there is a relationship between his claim for economic damages and his claim for non-economic damages. This relationship, according to the plaintiff, is that the medical expenses were incurred to treat painful conditions. If the plaintiff has met his burden of proving this relationship then you are required to award non-economic damages because it is error, on one hand, to award economic damages for the medical treatment of painful conditions or injuries proximately caused by a defendant's negligence, but on the other hand, not award non-economic damages for the painful conditions and injuries themselves for which the treatment was received. Under Connecticut law, any pain, suffering, emotional stress, loss of enjoyment of life's activities or permanent disabilities associated with any injuries or conditions for which medical care was received are items that must be compensated for in addition to the costs of the care and the treatment of these painful conditions. In short, the law requires the plaintiff to recover monetary compensation for both economic and non-economic damages proximately caused by the defendants' negligence.
As I indicated to you earlier as part of my initial charge, if you have any other notions or opinions about the recovery of economic or non-economic damages that are different from what I have explained to you then you are ordered to disregard whatever these opinions might be and follow the law as I have given it to you. Doing so is part of the obligation you undertook when you took the oath as jurors in this case.
Now, because you are the trier of fact, it is your function to determine the verdict, and therefore, you are not required to change your verdict. However, I am going to ask you to review your verdict further on the basis of these instructions that I have given you today and on the basis of the final charge that I gave you yesterday and the day before.
Again, if you have any questions about anything I have explained to you today or about any other issue, follow the procedure previously described by placing the question in writing and providing it to us. I am going to provide to you a second set of jury interrogatories. It is a completely clean sheet, but obviously, the issues which I am requesting you to review again are the questions under sections 3b and c. I am also giving you another plaintiff's verdict form. The plaintiff's verdict form that is headed against HealthSouth Rehabilitation and Megan Sevigny, again, in light of the findings which you already made on the issue of negligence and causation. And again, it reads: "We the jury find the issues for the plaintiff as against HealthSouth Rehabilitation and Megan Sevigny, and hereby award damages as follows," and you are to indicate the total amount of damages which you are awarding. Thank you very much.
DOCUMENT TWO PLAINTIFF'S VERDICT FORM AND JURY INTERROGATORIES PLAINTIFF'S VERDICT FORM AGAINST HEALTHSOUTH REHABILITATION AND MEGAN SEVIGNY
We the jury find the issues for the plaintiff as against the defendant HealthSouth Rehabilitation Center of Connecticut and Megan Sevigny, and hereby award damages as follows:
TOTAL DAMAGES: $25,000.00 Date 11/3/04 Stephen Anderson FOREPERSON
JURY INTERROGATORIES
1. A. Did the plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant HealthSouth Rehabilitation Center of Connecticut deviated from the acceptable and appropriate standard of care and skill applicable to a reasonably prudent physical therapist because it failed to properly supervise the defendant Megan Sevigny in the proper use of the CYBEX machine?
YES ____ NO X
B. Did the plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants' treatment of the plaintiff deviated from the acceptable and appropriate standard of care and skill applicable to a reasonably prudent physical therapist in any other way as alleged in the complaint?
YES X NO ____
If EITHER A or B is answered YES, proceed to question 2. If BOTH A and B are answered NO, please go no further and complete the DEFENDANT'S VERDICT form.
2. Did the plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any deviation from the acceptable and appropriate standard of care proximately cause injury to the plaintiff?
YES X NO __
If question 2 is answered YES, proceed to question 3. If question 2 is answered NO, please go no further and complete the defendants' verdict form.
3. A. The plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence fair, just and reasonable compensation for economic damages as follows:
Past medical expenses: $12,861.03 Future medical expenses: $ Past lost wages: $ Future lost wages: $
B. The plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence fair, just and reasonable compensation for non-economic damages as follows:
Past non-economic damages: $ 2,138.97 Future non-economic damages: $10,000.00 Total Damages: $25,000.00
(The sum of all items of A and B)
[If question 3 is answered AND question 1.A is answered YES AND question 1.B is answered NO, please complete the PLAINTIFF'S VERDICT FORM AGAINST HEALTHSOUTH REHABILITATION ONLY and indicate the Total Damages award on that form.]
[If question 3 is answered AND question 1.B is answered YES, please complete the PLAINTIFF'S VERDICT FORM AGAINST HEALTHSOUTH REHABILITATION AND MEGAN SEVIGNY and indicate the Total Damages award on that form.]
DATE 11/3/04 Stephen Anderson FOREPERSON