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finding venue in D.N.J. to be proper where New Jersey plaintiff's lawsuit against California defendants arose from defendants' “failure to follow through on the portions of the agreements that would have required conduct in New Jersey”
Summary of this case from Mylifestyle Accessories, LLC v. Valor Fractal, LLCOpinion
Civ. No. 01-CV-4430(WGB)
July 12, 2002
Mark L. Stanton, Esq., STANTON STIEH, P.A., Piscataway, New Jersey, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Eric S. Hutner, Esq., LAW OFFICES OF ERIC S. HUTNER ASSOC., Ridgewood, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendants, Morse Financial and James A. Morse.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of Defendants Morse Financial and James A. Morse (collectively "Defendants") to dismiss or transfer Plaintiffs' Complaint for improper venue, or in the alternative to transfer venue for convenience to the United States District Court for the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court has jurisdiction over this diversity matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the following reasons, Defendants' motions to dismiss or transfer venue are denied in their entirety.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Print Data Corp. ("Print Data" or "Plaintiff") is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Hopelawn, New Jersey. Print Data is in the business of distributing printing, computer and office products. In the Spring of 2000, Print Data received a facsimile newsletter from a non-party financial public/investor relations firm, which offered to place Plaintiff in touch with a financial services company.
The non-party financial relations firm placed Print Data in touch with Defendants Morse Financial and James Morse. Morse Financial is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California. James Morse is the president of Morse Financial, and is a long-time resident of California.
Plaintiff, which was in need of capital, sought to obtain interim and long-term financing so as to allow Plaintiff to expand and become a publicly traded company. Relevant to this motion, in or about June, 2000, representatives of Print Data met with Defendant Morse and several other agents and/or representatives of Morse Financial, as well as agents and representatives of other non-parties, at the World Trade Center in New York City.
At the meeting, Print Data discussed long-term strategies, including expansion through mergers and acquisitions. Morse allegedly suggested entering into a contract under which Morse would obtain financing for Print Data and take Print Data Public. Based on Defendants' representations at the meeting, Print Data agreed to engage Morse Financial in connection with achieving its corporate goals.
Over the next two months, Morse Financial's attorney prepared and exchanged various iterations of a contract between Print Data and Morse Financial. On August 15, 2000, a final version of the contract was executed by Morse Financial's attorney in California, and Print Data's representative in New Jersey. The agreement read in relevant part:
Defendants claim that they never sent any materials directly to Print Data, but instead directed all correspondence to Print Data's attorneys in New York and Pennsylvania. The August 15, 2000 agreement belies Defendants' assertion, as on its face the agreement is addressed to "Joel Green, PRINT DATA CORP, 43 Brunswick Avenue, Hopelawn, New Jersey." The agreement then begins, "Dear Joel." (See Agreement, Complaint Ex. A.)
1. Morse Financial or its agents will raise, net to Print Data Corp., the ultimate sum of at least $1,500,000.00, within two and one-half (2 1/2) months of execution of this agreement . . .
(See Agreement, Complaint Ex. A). The agreement also provided that Morse Financial would find a suitable shell corporation for a merger, which would allow Print Data to go public.
Suffice it to say, financing was never obtained, no merger took place, and Print Data never went public. Plaintiff alleges that the agreement was not implemented because the various individual and corporate defendants engaged in misconduct that amounted to fraud, fraudulent inducement to enter contracts, breach of contract, and tortious interference with contract. Plaintiff alleges that between February and May, 2001, Defendants repeatedly reassured Print Data that the deal would go through; Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Morse and Defendant Todt also made extortionate demands for cash and other agreements, in order to permit conclusion of the transaction.
Both Plaintiff and Defendants have submitted affidavits relevant to the pending motion. According to Defendant Morse, he never visited New Jersey in relation to the failed financing deal, no one from Morse Financial ever dealt directly with Print Data (all relied instead on Print Data's outside attorney), and he placed no more than one phone call to New Jersey. Defendant Morse claims that he has no other general contacts to New Jersey. According to Defendant Morse, Morse financial is not authorized to do business in New Jersey, maintains no offices, employees, agents, or representatives in New Jersey, and has never consented to jurisdiction in New Jersey.
Print Data disagrees, and claims in its affidavit that Print Data's executives "engaged in multiple telephone negotiations and discussions with the Moving Defendants and/or their agents from the offices of Print Data Corp. Many of these telephone calls were initiated or scheduled by the Moving Defendants and/or their agents." (Green Aff. ¶ 6.)
II. DISCUSSION
Defendants have moved to dismiss or transfer Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) for lack of in personam jurisdiction, and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) for improper venue. Alternatively, Defendants seek to transfer this matter on convenience grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
A. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) Motions to Dismiss/Transfer 1. Personal Jurisdiction
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), if the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over one or more of the defendants, it may dismiss the action against those defendant(s). "Once a defendant properly raises a jurisdictional defense the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating sufficient contacts with the forum state to support personal jurisdiction."Electro-Catheter Corp. v. Surgical Specialties Instrument Co., Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1446, 1450, citing Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. L'Union Atlantique S.A. d'Assurances, 723 F.2d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 1983). The plaintiff can sustain its burden through "sworn affidavits or other competent evidence." North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Natural Gas Corp.,897 F.2d 687, 692 (3d Cir. 1990), quoting, Stranahan Gear Co. v. N L Indust., 800 F.2d 53, 58 (3d Cir. 1986). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(2), the Court must consider the written submissions in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. One World Botanicals Ltd. v. Gulf Coast Nutritionals, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 317, 322 (D.N.J. 1997).
District Courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the extent authorized under the law of the forum state in which the district court sits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e); accord Decker v. Circus Hotel, 49 F. Supp.2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999). Pursuant to New Jersey's long arm statute, courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. N.J. Sup. Ct. R. 4:4-4(c)(1); accord Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D.N.J. 1997).
Due process requires that in order for personal jurisdiction to exist over a non-resident defendant, he must have "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Minimum contacts are purposeful acts, directed toward a State, which make it reasonable for the defendants to anticipate being haled into court there. World Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 311 (1980). At least some act is required by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus evoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Minimum contacts can be satisfied in two ways: specific or general. General jurisdiction exists where a defendant's contacts with the forum state are so continuous and systematic that the defendant has established a presence in the state, making it amenable to jurisdiction there.American Tel. Tel. Co. v. MCI Communications Corp., 736 F. Supp. 1294, 1302 (D.N.J. 1990). More narrowly, specific jurisdiction exists when the nonresident defendant has at least some contact with the forum state and the cause of action arises out of or relates to that contact.Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 n. 8 (1984).
Plaintiff does not seriously contend that the Court has general jurisdiction over Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff has alleged that as to the moving Defendants the requirements for specific jurisdiction are satisfied, for a number of reasons.
"Specific jurisdiction exists only where the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state that it 'should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'" Mellon Bank v. DiVeronica Bros., 983 F.2d 551, 554 (3d Cir. 1993), quoting World Wide Volkswagon, 444 U.S. at 297. According to the Third Circuit, the "'constitutional touchstone' is whether the defendant purposefully established those minimum contacts." Id.
In a detailed and well-reasoned opinion that the Court finds persuasive, Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317 (1989), the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed what level of conduct was sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction for purposes of New Jersey's long-arm statute. After noting that a "'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts," quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, the Lebel court endeavored to determine whether the defendant had "purposefully created contacts with New Jersey." Id., 115 N.J. at 324.
In Lebel, the defendant Florida boat sales company was contacted by the New Jersey plaintiff at a boat show in New York. The Florida sales company made repeated calls (subsequently alleged to be fraudulent) to plaintiff in New Jersey. Plaintiff agreed to purchase a boat, and a contract was executed by mail. A third party was entrusted to deliver the boat to New Jersey from Florida, but the boat was destroyed en route before reaching New Jersey.
In finding specific jurisdiction to exist, the Supreme Court held that "the mere fact that neither defendant nor the boat was ever physically present in New Jersey does not preclude a finding that minimum contacts existed." Lebel, 115 N.J. at 327. Instead, specific jurisdiction was established in part because the defendant allegedly "telephoned the buyer in New Jersey to iron out the details of the contract, mailed the contract to the buyer in New Jersey for signing in New Jersey, and received payment from the plaintiff, who defendant knew was a New Jersey resident." Id. at 324-25.
While noting that mere transmittal of messages into a state is not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, the use of fraudulent representations to "tap an interstate market for its product" are relevant contacts to consider. Id. at 325-26 ("where a defendant knowingly sends into a state a false statement, intending that it should then be relied upon to the injury of a resident of that state, he has, for jurisdictional purposes, acted within that state.") The Court also found it important that defendant knew plaintiff was a New Jersey resident and that the boat would be shipped to New Jersey. Id. at 327. Accordingly, it concluded that "there can be no doubt that defendant was well aware that this sale would have direct consequences in New Jersey such that it should have been aware of the possibility of litigation arising in that forum." Id. at 328.
The moving Defendants' ties to New Jersey are at least as strong as the ties of the defendant in Lebel. It would not violate due process to assert specific jurisdiction over them. If Plaintiff's allegations are believed, Defendants directed a final draft agreement into New Jersey, made fraudulent representations into New Jersey, and intended to direct their product (approximately $1,500,000 in financing) into New Jersey. Although Defendants have proceeded at length with a recitation of the ties they did NOT have to New Jersey, those non-existent ties are irrelevant; Defendants can not escape the fact that they knowingly entered into an agreement with a New Jersey company to provide financing for that company. As with the boat in Lebel, that financing would ultimately have been delivered to New Jersey.
Given the nature of the agreement between the parties, it is irrelevant that Plaintiff made first contact with Defendants. Although Defendants have argued in passing that "Print Data's unilateral conduct cannot provide the minimum contacts required to give this Court in personam jurisdiction over either defendant," citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, the relevant conduct in this case was not unilateral. Unlike an action where a plaintiff attempts to hail a defendant into a foreign jurisdiction based solely on the plaintiff's contacts with the jurisdiction, Defendants had to affirmatively agree to provide financing for Plaintiff in New Jersey. If Defendants found the prospect of litigation in New Jersey sufficiently onerous, they had every right to decline to provide financing to a New Jersey company.
Based on the foregoing, the Court also finds that it would not be contrary to notions of "fair play and substantial justice" to hail Defendants into court here. Defendants should not have been surprised to be haled into a New Jersey court when an agreement to provide financing to a New Jersey company ultimately fell through. Although a Court should consider "the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, . . . the plaintiff's interests in obtaining relief[,] . . . the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies," Asahi Metal Indus. Cor. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987), given Defendant's purposeful availment and the existence of sufficient minimum contacts, for reasons that will be discussed in relation to the motion to transfer, Defendant has failed to "present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction is denied.
In their reply brief, Defendants for the first time raise the issue that one of the Moving Defendants is "a corporation that entered into a contract, [and] the other is an individual who did not." (Reply Brief, p. 6.) Defendants imply that the two Moving Defendants should be treated differently in the Court's jurisdictional analysis. In the Court's estimation, however, Plaintiffs have made a threshold showing that as to the agreement at issue James Morse's conduct was interwoven with the conduct of Morse Financial. As a result, for purposes of this motion the Court finds it appropriate to attribute the allegedly checkered conduct of one to the other.
2. Improper Venue
Once a defendant has sought dismissal or transfer on the basis of improper venue, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that venue is proper. See Shuman v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, 762 F. Supp. 114, 115 (E.D.Pa. 1991). The plaintiff must meet this burden as to each joined defendant, and must demonstrate that venue is proper for each claim.Id.; See also 15 Wright, Miller, Cooper, Federal Practice Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d, § 3808 (1986).
Each defendant in an action bears the burden to object to venue in a timely manner, or else waives the defense. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b); 15 Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3829. While the plaintiff ordinarily enjoys the advantage of choosing the forum for suit, venue is a personal privilege of the defendant. Nat'l. Micrographics Sys., Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 825 F. Supp. 671, 679 (D.N.J. 1993), citing 15Federal Practice Procedure, § 3826 at 257. "In most instances, the purpose of statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial." Id., citing 15 Federal Practice Procedure, § 3801 at 4.
Because venue is a personal privilege of the defendant, a defendant may not object to venue on behalf of another, Pratt v. Rowland, 769 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (N.D.Cal. 1991) (citing 15 Wright, Miller, Cooper, § 3829), nor may a court raise such a defense sua sponte except in rare circumstances. See Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976); Concession Consultants, Inc. v. Mirisch, 355 F.2d 369 (2nd Cir. 1966). Since Defendant Todt has not joined in the motion to dismiss or transfer, the scope of Plaintiff's motion is necessarily limited to whether venue is proper as to Defendants Morse and Morse Financial and the claims against them.
Plaintiff has recently moved for Default as to Defendant Todt.
As Defendants rightly note, where jurisdiction of an action in federal court is based solely on diversity, venue is determined in accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). In general terms, § 1391(a) provides for venue only in 1) a judicial district where all of the Defendants reside; 2) "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . ."; or, in the event no district provides proper venue under the first two provisions, a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. According to Defendants, the Central District of California would be the proper venue under the first provision, and could also be a proper venue under the second provision. Defendants further argue that because none of the substantial events giving rise to Plaintiff's claim occurred in New Jersey, venue is inappropriate here under either § 1391(a)(1) or § 1391(a)(2).
Defendants rightly note that because the Central District of California would be an appropriate venue under either of the first two provisions, venue would not be appropriate in New Jersey under § 1391(a)(3). Plaintiffs do not dispute this contention.
By way of response, Plaintiff contends that under § 1391(a)(2), venue may be appropriate in multiple districts. As this Court has found and as Defendants have acknowledged, a plaintiff "ordinarily enjoys the advantage or choosing [venue], within the constraints set forth by § 1391." Nat'l Micrographics Systems, Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 825 F. Supp. 671, 679 (D.N.J. 1993). Therefore, if venue is appropriate in the District of New Jersey pursuant to § 1391(a)(2), the Court will not dismiss or transfer the action simply because venue is also appropriate in the Central District of California.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) provides that venue is appropriate in "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." Plaintiff claims that venue is appropriate in this district because the transactions giving rise to the claim arose from and/or impacted a resident of this district, as the agreement that was breached was mailed to, negotiated from, and executed in this District by the Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff notes that injuries were suffered in this district.
The Court can dispose of Defendants' venue objections in short order. Plaintiff's Complaint contains claims for Breach of Contract, Intentional Interference with Contract, Fraudulent Inducement, and Fraud. For the Contract and Intentional Interference with Contract claims, substantial aspects of the relevant agreements would have required performance by Defendants in New Jersey (either delivery of the $1,500,000 in capital to New Jersey, or restructuring of Plaintiff's company in New Jersey from a privately held interest to a publicly traded entity). The alleged breach of and interference with those agreements stemmed directly from Defendants' failure to follow through on the portions of the agreements that would have required conduct in New Jersey. Mindful that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) can be satisfied by either "events or omissions," it is the material omissions in this case that inexorably link Plaintiff's contract-related causes of action to New Jersey.
Similarly, for the Fraudulent Inducement and Fraud claims, an essential legal element of both types of claims is detrimental reliance. Virtually all of Plaintiff's detrimental reliance on Defendants' alleged fraudulent misrepresentations occurred in New Jersey. Without Plaintiff's detrimental reliance in New Jersey, there would be no fraud-related claims, therefore a "substantial part of the events . . . giving rise to a claim" inescapably occurred in New Jersey.
Although it is Plaintiff's conduct in New Jersey that allows the Court to find venue to be appropriate as to Defendants, the factual circumstances are distinct from those cases cited by Defendant where venue is improperly based merely on injurious effects of a tort felt in a given jurisdiction. Unlike a case where a plaintiff is unexpectedly injured by a defendant's conduct somewhere in the eddies and backwaters of commerce, Plaintiff's reliance and injury in New Jersey should have been directly foreseeable to Defendants, as they allegedly induced Plaintiff to execute in New Jersey the very agreements at issue. Mindful that "in most instances, the purpose of statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial," it does not offend notions of fairness or convenience to hale Defendants into the very forum where most (if not all) of their allegedly fraudulent conduct was directed.
Accordingly, having reviewed the relevant evidence, the Court finds that venue in this District is appropriate for each claim asserted against the Moving Defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(2). Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.
B. Motion to Transfer Venue
Finally, Defendants have asked the Court to exercise its authority and transfer this action to another venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For the following reasons, the Court declines to do so.
Section 1404(a) provides that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Section 1404(a) motions are considered procedural matters and therefore are governed by federal law. See Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 877 (3d Cir. 1995).
The parties do not dispute that the action "could have been brought" in the Central District of California, therefore the Court need not address this issue.
The purpose of § 1404(a) is "to prevent the waste of 'time, energy and money' and to 'protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.'" Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (quoting Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1960)). Section 1404(a) provides for a transfer to a more convenient forum, not to a forum likely to prove equally convenient or inconvenient. Id., at 646. The party seeking transfer of venue bears the burden of proof when establishing that transfer is warranted, and must submit "adequate data of record" to facilitate the Court's analysis. In re Consol. Parlodel Litig., 22 F. Supp.2d 320, 322 (D.N.J. 1998); Ricoh Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 473, 480 (D.N.J. 1993).
Defendants' request to transfer is entirely based on the following claims: 1) most of the parties reside in California; 2) none of the witnesses (other than the Green family) reside in or near New Jersey; and 3) mindful that many of the documents relevant to the action are located in California, transfer would properly shift the cost of litigation from the non-culpable Defendants to the Plaintiff (who is, in Defendants' estimation, inconveniencing Defendants by pursuing this all-but-frivolous action (Reply Brief, p. 11)). When these three claims are weighed against the countervailing factors, however, Defendants' request fails.
The Green Family are the owners of Print Data.
While it is true that Defendants Morse and Todt live in California, and that Defendant Morse Financial is based there, it is equally true that at trial Plaintiff would be represented by more than one member of the Green family. Even if the Court gives Defendant every benefit of the doubt and assumes that Morse Financial might be represented by individuals other than Mr. Morse, this factor tips only marginally in Defendants' favor.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Morse is the only employee, officer or director of Defendant Morse Financial.
Similarly, while it is true that none of the as-of-yet named non-party witnesses reside in or near New Jersey, the Court must take into account that none of the non-party witnesses reside in or near California, either. Non-party witness Robert Gasich resides in Illinois, which is marginally closer to New Jersey than California. Non-party witness Martin McIntyre resides in Wyoming, which is marginally closer to Los Angeles than to Newark. Both witnesses are beyond the subpoena power of both courts at issue. Given the ease of travel and communication in the age of commercial aviation and video conferencing, the convenience of the witnesses must be considered a neutral factor.
Plaintiff claims without support that there are other potential non-party witnesses who were present at the World Trade Center meeting, and that these non-party witnesses could be subpoenaed in New York. Given how strongly the balance of factors tips in favor of retaining this case, Plaintiff's claim about other witnesses is of no moment in the Court's analysis.
Defendants' final contentions about the "interests of justice" are simply preposterous, as they amount to nothing more than a bald-faced attempt to shift the burden from Defendants to the Plaintiff. While the Court has little doubt that relevant documents are located at Defendants' offices in California, it is equally true that relevant documents can be found at Plaintiff's facilities in New Jersey. It is irrelevant that Defendants' theory of the case is that they are less (or even non-)culpable in this dispute; if non-culpability were a determinative factor in a Court's transfer analysis, every Defendant in the Country could make a case for it.
Weighing against transfer are a number of factors; first and foremost, that "a plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed, unless the balance of the factors is strongly in favor of the defendant." Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1988). See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981) (recognizing there is a "strong presumption in favor of plaintiff's choice of forum.") The Third Circuit has stated that "[i]t is black letter law that a plaintiff's choice of a proper forum is a paramount consideration in any determination of a transfer request." Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). See also Park Inn Int'l v. Mody Enter., 105 F. Supp.2d 370, 377 (D.N.J. 2000). As a resident of New Jersey, Plaintiff's choice of forum must be accorded great weight.
Additionally, "if the transfer would merely switch the inconvenience from the defendant to plaintiff, the transfer should not be allowed."Market Transition Facility v. Twena, 941 F. Supp. 462, 467 (D.N.J. 1996). See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 645-646 ("Section 1404(a) provides for a transfer to a more convenient forum, not to a forum likely to prove equally convenient or inconvenient.") Defendants have virtually conceded that transfer of this case would have that effect.
Additionally, while the Court has noted that the majority of key documents pertaining to Defendants' case may be located in Los Angeles, Defendants have not indicated "that the records or other documents that Defendant would utilize at trial are so voluminous that shipping them to New Jersey would create an undue burden." NCR Credit Corp. v. Ye Seekers Horizon, Inc., 17 F. Supp.2d 317, 323 (D.N.J. 1998). Accordingly, the relative ease of access to documentary evidence does not favor transfer.
Finally, the docket congestion of the Central District of California cuts overwhelmingly against transfer. In 2001, the Central District of California had an average caseload of 521 civil filings and 598 pending cases per judge while the District of New Jersey had an average caseload of 369 civil filings and 359 pending cases per judge. (Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 2001 Federal Court Management Statistics 56, 129 (2002).)
Most of the private and public interests considered by the Court do not justify transfer. No factors weigh more than weakly in Defendants' favor. Defendants have plainly failed to meet their burden and have not demonstrated that transfer to the Central District of California would be in the interests of convenience and justice. Therefore, Defendants' motion to transfer is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motions to dismiss or in the alternative transfer are denied in their entirety.
An appropriate Order follows.