Opinion
No. CV03 0083011S
February 10, 2004
FACTS
The plaintiff has sued the defendant for alleged false arrest and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA").
On November 28, 2003, "[p]ursuant to Connecticut Practice Book Sections 13-7 and 13-9," the plaintiff moved for an extension of time of thirty days to January 15, 2004, to respond to the defendant's interrogatories and requests for production. (No. 105).
On December 4, 2003, the defendant objected "to the extent that the plaintiff seeks to file any objections to the defendant's discovery requests of October 3, 2003. Any such objections, pursuant to Sections 13-7 and 13-10, would have had to be made within thirty days, or November 3. The plaintiff did not file any objections and is precluded from doing so now." (No. 106). Because the plaintiff failed in a timely manner to object or to preserve his right to do so, the plaintiff waived his right to object to the discovery requests. The defendant did not object to the plaintiff's motion to extend the time for him to respond to the interrogatories and requests for production. This court granted the requested extension of time. On January 2, 2004, "[p]ursuant to Connecticut Practice Book Sections 13-7 and 13-9," the plaintiff filed a second motion for extension of time to February 16, 2004, to respond to the defendant's interrogatories and requests for production. (No. 107). This motion is currently pending before the court.
DISCUSSION CT Page 1389
Although it seems to be a common practice to move for serial or consecutive extensions of time to respond to interrogatories and requests for production, neither Practice Book § 13-7 nor § 13-10 permit that practice.
Practice Book § 13-7(a), in relevant part, provides that interrogatories shall be answered under oath and such answers shall be served within thirty days after either the date of (i) certification of service or (ii) if applicable, the notice of interrogatories, unless one of four exceptions applies. These exceptions are (1) a written stipulation extending the time "within which answers or objections may be served"; (2) one request for extension of time of not more than thirty days; (3) a motion for an extension of time for more than thirty days which is granted by "the judicial authority;" or (4) [o]bjections to the interrogatories, and the reasons therefor are filed and served within the thirty-day period."
Practice Book § 13-7(c) states that an objection to certain of the interrogatories does not relieve a party of the obligation to answer the interrogatories to which there is no objection within the thirty-day period. Section 13-7(c) clarifies § 13-7(a)(4), to make it clear, that a party's obligation to respond to the interrogatories to which there is no objection is not automatically deferred until the objections are ruled upon.
With the exception of § 13-7(a)(4), where an objection to some of the interrogatories could be combined with (i) a stipulation pursuant to § 13-7(a)(1) to extend the time to answer the interrogatories to which there is no objection, (ii) one request pursuant to § 13-7(a)(2) for up to a thirty-day extension of time to answer the interrogatories to which there is no objection or (iii) a motion pursuant to § 13-7(a)(3) for an extension of time longer than thirty days to answer the interrogatories to which there is no objection, none of the provisions concerning extensions of time relating to interrogatories refer to or are intended to be applied after one of them has been previously utilized as a basis for seeking an extension.
The court is aware that the specific delineation of and limitation in § 13-7(a)(2) to "one request" for up to a thirty-day extension of time may provide a basis to argue under accepted principles of statutory construction that no such limitation was intended to be applied to the other subsections. See, e.g., Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 267 Conn. 524 (2004). Because of the general construction of § 13-7, the court is not persuaded that this result was intended. By way of example, if § 13-7 were interpreted to provide multiple opportunities to seek extensions of time, a party hypothetically would be able (i) to obtain by request one "automatic" thirty-day extension, (ii) then by stipulation another more than thirty day extension without the need for a court order or the opportunity for court review of the time period, (iii) then again by stipulation another more than thirty day extension also without the need for a court order or the opportunity for court review, (iv) then by motion, if granted by the court, another more than thirty day extension, and (v) then again by motion, if granted, another extension. The ostensible purpose of the rule is to have interrogatories responded to within a reasonable time, e.g., approximately sixty days. A reading of the rule that allows multiple extensions over a period of months is inconsistent with this result and delays the advancement of a case. The continuing duty to update answers and other discovery responses set forth in Practice Book § 13-15 also supports the conclusion that interrogatories are to be answered within a reasonable time, even if the answers are not complete, and the answers are thereafter to be amended or supplemented as new or additional information becomes available.
Another possible argument, despite the absence of any language in § 13-7, for finding the authority to grant serial or consecutive extensions of time is that a "good cause" standard applies. The phrase "good cause" does not appear in § 13-7, although it does appear in other sections of Chapter 13 of the Practice Book. Such term appears (i) in § 13-5 in connection with the issuance of protective orders; (ii) in § 13-9 in connection with the disclosure of electronically stored data; (iii) in § 13-11 in connection with the physical or mental examinations, other than in personal injury cases; (iv) in § 13-20 concerning the protection of judginent debtors and third parties; and (v) in § 13-27 concerning the increase or decrease of time in which to take a deposition. A Westlaw search of the Practice Book (including the appellate rules) reveals that the phrase "good cause" appears a total of 118 times. (Such phrase appears 233 times in the General Statutes.) Thus, if the judges of the superior court intended "good cause" to be the standard upon which serial or consecutive extensions of time are to be determined, they would have set forth that in § 13-7.
With respect to requests for production, Practice Book § 13-10(a) provides that the party to whom a request is directed or such party's attorney shall respond in writing within thirty days after the date of (i) certification of service or, if applicable (ii) the notice of the requests, unless one of the following three exceptions applies: (1) that counsel file a written stipulation extending the time for response; (2) one request for extension of time not to exceed thirty days; (3) upon motion, the court allows an extension of more than thirty days.
Pursuant to § 13-10(b), objections are permitted to any, some or all non-standard requests. Section 13-10(b) contains a provision that an objection to some portions of the request "shall not relieve that party of the obligation to respond to those portions to which that party has not objected within the thirty-day period."
With the exception of § 13-10(b), where an objection to a portion of the request for production could be combined with (i) a stipulation pursuant to § 13-10(a)(1) to extend the time to serve written responses, (ii) one request pursuant to § 13-10(a)(2) to respond to the portions of the request to which there is no objection, or (iii) a motion pursuant to § 13-10(a)(3) for an extension of time longer than thirty days to respond to those portions to which there is no objection, none of the provisions concerning extensions of time to respond to requests for production refer to or are intended to be applied after one of them has been previously utilized as a basis for seeking an extension. Like interrogatories propounded pursuant to § 13-7, requests for production pursuant to § 13-10 are expected to be responded to within approximately sixty days. As with interrogatory responses, production requests under § 13-15 must be supplemented as new or additional documents become available.
Many decisions have held that all Connecticut courts are circumscribed by the terms and scope of the Practice Book rules. In City of Norwalk v. Farrell, 80 Conn. App. 399, 404, 835 A.2d 117 (2003), the Appellate Court determined that because a foreclosure committee was not a party within the scope of the rules of appellate procedure, it could not as of right participate in the appeal. Additionally, because the plaintiff did not comply with Practice Book § 18-5 in filing a bill of costs, the trial court had no authority to tax the plaintiff's costs of the sale against the defendant. See id. 409-10. In National Elevator Industry Pension, Welfare Educational Funds v. Scrivani, 229 Conn. 817, 824, 644 A.2d 327 (1994), our Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court because it acted in a manner not authorized by the rules of practice. The Supreme Court stated: "The Appellate Court's order was not authorized by either Practice Book § 443 or Practice Book § 4183 and was not a necessary or appropriate exercise of its authority under General Statutes § 51-197a." In Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 532-33, 429 A.2d 964 (1980), our Supreme Court held that, although the Practice Book authorized family relations officers to "attempt the reconciliation and adjustment of differences" between parties, it did not authorize the Superior Court to allow a family relations officer to divide personal property if the parties were unable to reach an agreement.
See also Vitale v. Gargiulo, 144 Conn. 359, 362, 131 A.2d 830 (1957) ("The rules do not permit this court to examine the transcript of testimony . . ."); Case v. Topping, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 254, 255, 249 A.2d 851 (1968) (assignment of appeal issue did not comply with Practice Book form); Alberino v. Criscuolo, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 132, 133, 208 A.2d 761 (1964) (Practice Book authorizes appeals only from final judgments); Town of Seymour v. Buckley, Superior Court, 1997 WL 41228 (1997) ( 18 Conn. L. Rptr. 583) (a motion for summary judgment on a special defense is improper because the Practice Book makes no provision for it); Langerman v. John Morganti Sons, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 03-0348185 (September 18, 2003, Bellis, J.) ( 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 492) (motion denied because it exceeded the scope of Practice Book § 13-5); Wood v. East Lyme, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 552603 (February 10, 2003, Hurley, J.) (nonsuit granted because plaintiffs filed a revised complaint two and one half years beyond the time allowed by the Practice Book); Pavarini v. Pavarini, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. FA 00 0177374 (March 3, 2003, Harrigan, JTR) (agreement rejected because "it goes well beyond what is permitted by Practice Book § 25-2(a)(1)"); Aultman v. Tsianco, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 98 0261101 (December 11, 2002, Fischer, J.) ( 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 539) (motion to set aside verdict and for additur denied because it was filed after the time permitted by the Practice Book); Leary v. LoJack Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 97 0402978 (April 6, 1999, Silbert, J.) (24 Conn. L. Rptr.) (pursuant to statute and the Practice Book, a counterclaim can be filed only if the plaintiff has made a demand on the defendant; no other basis for a counterclaim is authorized); Ford v. Featherstone, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 96 0151528 (October 13, 1998, Hickey, J.) ( 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 247) (trial court lacks the power to accept an attorney trial freferee's report that does not comply with the Practice Book time requirements); Chinnici v. Breakwater, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 92 0295110 (May 24, 1996, West, J.) (the filing of repeated motions to strike is not authorized by he Practice Book); Herrmann v. City of Stamford, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 88 0254069 (July 21, 1992, Lewis, J.) (summary judgment on fewer than all causes of action in a count is not permitted under the Practice Book); Glastonbury Bank Trust Co. v. Corbett Construction, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 521355 (October 15, 1992, Walsh, J.) ( 7 Conn. L. Rptr. 519, 7 C.S.C.R. 1320) (counterclaim struck because it was not permitted by the Practice Book); Mohsen v. Peters, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 90 033154 (June 20, 1991, Hodgson, J.) ( 4 Conn. L. Rptr. 239, 6 C.S.C.R. 673) (sections of Practice Book limit what can be raised as a special defense; allegations outside those sections cannot be pleaded as a special defense); Bachenheimer v. Pryor, 1989 WL 516493 at *1 (Conn.Super., May 13, 1989) (motion to dismiss not permitted because it was filed beyond the time period provided for in the applicable Practice Book section).
Accordingly, this court concludes that while there may be circumstances based on good cause in which more than one extension of time to answer interrogatories or to respond to requests for production may be hypothesized, postulated or identified, the Practice Book does not currently authorize any such extension:
The desirability of a procedure does not, unfortunately, establish its existence; and individual judges of the Superior Court are not authorized to expand the rules of court adopted by the judges as a body pursuant to General Statutes § 51-14.
Ney v. Brandi, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 95 0368932 (September 27, 1995, Hodgson, J.)
The plaintiff's second motion for extension of time is denied. The plaintiff is ordered to answer the pending interrogatories and to respond to the requests for production on or before March 1, 2004.
The Court
By Stuart David Bear, J.