MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAVID H. COAR, United States District Judge

This case comes before the Court on Defendant Risk Management Alternatives Motion to Dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated in the opinion below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Debra Pleasant ("Plaintiff" or "Pleasant") received a letter from Defendant dated June 13, 2002 offering her a "one time settlement." The letter offered to settle her debt for half the amount owed on one condition: the settlement amount had to be received by June 26, 2002. The letter also contained the following sentence: "If settlement amount is not received by the date indicated above, the offer will be null and void and the entire balance outstanding will be due."

On September 27, 2002, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in this court. The complaint alleged that the letter Plaintiff received violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that the "statement that the offer must be accepted within 13 days is false and violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e." (Comp. ¶ 10) On November 27, 2002, Defendant Risk Management Alternatives, Inc. ("Defendant") filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proceduare 12(b)(6).

Discussion

The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not in decide the merits of the case. In evaluating the motion, the Court accepts as true all facts and allegations in the complaint and makes all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 2000). Complaints should only be dismissed it' it is clear that no set of facts in support of the claim would entitle the plaintiff to relief. See Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69. 73 (1984)).

In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant relies heavily on the doctrines of contract Law. Defendant characterizes its letter to Plaintiff as a settlement offer with a specific time limitation. Defendant urges further that if Plaintiff sought to settle the matter for a similar amount after the expiration of the initial offer, Defendant would be legally free to consider and accept that as a counter-offer from Plaintiff. As a matter of contract law, Defendant may be absolutely right. Unfortunately for the Defendant, Plaintiff is not pursuing a breach of contract theory with respect to their "one time settlement" offer.

Plaintiff is plainly seeking relief under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a Federal statute whose remedies extend beyond the mechanistic offer/counter-offer approach of the law of contracts. In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA "to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection on practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692(e) (West 1998). The portion of the statute Plaintiff references in her complaint forbids debt collectors to "use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e (West 1998). Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the "one time" settlement otter was not, in fact, a "one time" offer at all. Accepting this to be true, that portion of the letter indicating that the offer was "one time" would be deceptive, misleading, and false.

Under the federal rules, the complaint states a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.