MEMORANDUM

R. ALLAN EDGAR, Chief United States District Judge

Plaintiff Plantronics, Inc. ("Plantronics") brings this civil action asserting claims for trademark infringement and false designation of origin arising under the federal trademark laws, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and 1125, and related claims of unfair competition. Plantronics demands injunctive relief, an accounting of unlawful profits derived by the defendant from its alleged trademark infringement and unfair competition, damages, costs, and attorney's fees.

Defendant Clarity, LLC moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction. In the alternative, the defendant moves to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). [Court File No. 2]. In support of its motion to transfer, the defendant relies on the first-to-file rule. Plantronics opposes these motions.

After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that the case shall be TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division. In reaching this decision, the Court follows and applies the first-to-file rule. It is important to clarify that this case is not being transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court expresses no opinion whether a transfer under § 1404(a) is proper. The defendant's motion to transfer will be GRANTED, but only to the extent that it is predicated on the first-to-file rule. Moreover, because the case is being transferred pursuant to the Court's inherent authority under the first-to-file rule, it is unnecessary to address the separate question whether this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction will be DENIED as MOOT.

Three elements are commonly used to determine whether the first-to file rule is applicable: (1) the chronology of events; (2) the similarity of the parties involved; and (3) the similarity of the issues or claims at stake. For purposes of establishing the relevant chronology of events, we focus on the dates when the parties filed their original complaints. Zide Sport Shop of Ohio, Inc. v. Ed Tobergte Associates, Inc., 2001 WL 897452, at *3 (6th July 31, 2001). MSX International Engineering Services, Inc. v. Levine, 2002 WL 551041, at *4 (E.D.Mich. April 8, 2002); Smithers-Oasis Co. v. Clifford Sales Marketing, 194 F. Supp.2d 685, 687 (N.D.Ohio. 2002); Plating Resources, Inc. v. UTI Corp., 47 F. Supp.2d 899, 903-04 (N.D.Ohio. 1999).

All of the essential elements for applying the first-to-file rule are met in the instant case. This case squarely falls within the scope of the rule. Clarity, LLC is a limited liability corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Michigan with its principal place of business in Troy, Michigan. Plantronics is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business in California. On March 14, 2002, Clarity, LLC filed suit against Plantronics in the United States Disrict Court for Eastern District of Michigan seeking a declaratory judgment on the issue whether Clarity, LLC is infringing upon a trademark owned by Plantronics. Over one month later, on April 26, 2002, Plantronics filed the instant suit against Clarity, LLC in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

The parties in both lawsuits are identical. The substantive issues and claims in both lawsuits — trademark infringement — overlap and are substantially the same. If these two lawsuits were filed in the same federal district court, they would be consolidated for trial under FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). There is no question that the Eastern District of Michigan is a proper venue for Plantronic's suit against Clarity, LLC under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c), and there is no question that the Eastern District of Michigan can exercise personal jurisdiction over Clarity, LLC. Transfer of the instant case to the Eastern District of Michigan is consistent with the principle of comity, promotes judicial efficiency, avoids duplication of litigation, and avoids piecemeal litigation and the danger of inconsistent judgments.

Comity requires that federal district courts, which are courts of equal rank and coordinate jurisdiction, be careful to avoid unnecessary interference with each other's affairs. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952); West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, (5th Cir. 1985). "As between federal district courts, . . . the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation." Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); accord Smith v. S.E.C., 129 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1997); In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1088 (6th Cir. 1996).

"The first-to-file rule is a well-established doctrine that encourages comity among federal courts of equal rank." Zide Sport Shop, 2001 WL 897452, at *3. It provides that when two lawsuits involving nearly identical parties and issues have been filed in two different federal district courts, the district court in which the first suit is filed should, as a general rule, proceed to judgment. Id.; In re Burley, 738 F.2d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 1984); Smithers-Oasis, 194 F. Supp.2d at 687; Plating Resources, 47 F. Supp.2d at 903. The doctrine is grounded in principles of comity and sound judicial administration. Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999); Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Finance Corp., 121 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1997); Plating Resources, 47 F. Supp.2d at 903. It has evolved into a doctrine used to promote judicial economy and efficiency. Id.

In short, the first-to-file rule is designed to avoid the waste of duplication of effort by two co-equal district courts, to avoid rulings by one district court that may interfere with or trench upon the authority of another district court, and to avoid inconsistent or piecemeal resolution of legal issues that call for a uniform result. Save Power, 121 F.3d at 950; TPM Holdings, Inc. v. Intra-Gold Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1996); West Gulf Maritime, 751 F.2d at 729; Pakideh v. Ahadi, 2000 WL 545 896, at *7 (E.D.Mich. April 7, 2000). Where the overlap between the two lawsuits is nearly complete, the usual practice is for the federal district court that first had jurisdiction to proceed to adjudicate the controversy and the other court to defer. TPM Holdings, 91 F.3d at 4; Smith, 129 F.3d at 361 (citing with approval West Gulf Maritime, 751 F.2d at 729); MSX International Engineering, 2002 WL 551041, at *4; Smithers-Oasis, 194 F. Supp.2d 685; Albie's Foods, Inc. v. Menusaver, Inc., 170 F. Supp.2d 736, 739-40 (E.D.Mich. 2001). Plating Resources, 47 F. Supp.2d at 903.

The first-to-file rule is discretionary and should not be applied too rigidly or mechanically. Albie's Foods, 170 F. Supp.2d at 740; Plating Resources, 47 F. Supp.2d at 903. The Sixth Circuit recognizes that a district court may decline to invoke the first-to-file rule for reasons of equity. Zide, 2001 WL 897452, at **3 (district courts have discretion to dispense with first-to-file rule where equity so demands). Equitable factors that weigh against enforcement of the rule include extraordinary circumstances, inequitable conduct, bad faith, anticipatory suits, and forum shopping. Id.; Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Products, Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1991) E.E.O.C. v. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 972 (3d Cir. 1988); Smithers-Oasis, 194 F. Supp.2d at 687; Plating Resources, 47 F. Supp.2d at 905.

The Court is not persuaded that any of these equitable factors exist in the present case. The mere fact that Clarity, LLC filed its suit first in the Eastern District of Michigan does not constitute forum shopping or an anticipatory lawsuit. Clarity, LLC is a Michigan corporation and it has a valid reason for instituting a declaratory judgment action against Plantronics in the Eastern District of Michigan after receiving a demand letter from an attorney representing Plantronics. There is no probative proof of bad faith or other inequitable conduct on the part of Clarity, LLC. In sum, there are no equitable reasons here that would justify dispensing with the first-to-file rule. The Court bears in mind that although the first-to file rule is discretionary and should not be applied too rigidly, it must not be "disregarded lightly." Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir. 1979); Smithers-Oasis, 194 F. Supp.2d at 687; Plating Resources, 47 F. Supp.2d at 903.

The first-to-file rule allows this Court, in its discretion to transfer this second-filed action to the Eastern District of Michigan. Cadle Co., 174 F.3d at 606; Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 628-29; West Gulf Marine, 751 F.2d at 729 and n. 1; Smithers-Oasis, 194 F. Supp.2d 685; Plating Resources, 47 F. Supp.2d 899. Based on the facts and circumstances in this case, transfer is entirely appropriate. Instead of dismissing Plantronic's complaint without prejudice or staying this action indefinitely, the most practical solution is to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Michigan where the two nearly identical lawsuits may be consolidated and adjudicated together. Accordingly, an order of transfer will enter.

ORDER

In accordance with the accompanying memorandum opinion, the motion by defendant Clarity, LLC to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan [Court File No. 2] is GRANTED to the limited extent that said transfer is based on the first-to-file rule.

The FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) conference set at 4:30 p.m. on September 10, 2002, before the Chief United States District Judge is CANCELLED.

This civil action is hereby TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division. The defendant's alternative motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction [Court File No. 2] is DENIED as MOOT.

SO ORDERED.