Opinion
1:23-CV-00269-SPB-RAL
08-01-2024
MACARTON N. PIERRE, Plaintiff v. NURSE GARCIA, OF SCI ALBION, FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Defendant
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ECF NO. 15
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) be DENIED.
II. Report
A. Introduction and Procedural History
Plaintiff Macarton N. Pierre, an individual currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, brings this pro se civil rights action against a single defendant, Nurse Garcia, based allegations that she acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs while he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) at Albion. See ECF No. 8.
Garcia has filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and a brief in support of her motion. ECF No. 15 (motion); ECF No. 16 (brief). Pierre has responded with a brief in opposition to the motion. ECF No. 18. Garcia has filed a reply brief. ECF No. 19.
B. Material Facts
The facts below are summarized from the Complaint and accepted as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss.
In 2008, Pierre was diagnosed with a genetic eye disease called “stigmative glaucoma” that “causes progressive blindness.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 5. Although only laser surgery can cure this disease, prescription eyeglasses can slow the disease's progression by preventing an individual from having to strain or squint their eyes to see. Pierre wears prescription glasses for this reason.
On April 21, 2023, prison guards allegedly destroyed Pierre's glasses during an assault. He subsequently “advised Nurse Garcia . . . through multiple requests” “of his diagnosis,” that he no longer had his prescription glasses, that his eye condition would get worse without these glasses, and he needed her to order him a new pair of glasses because he was indigent. Id. ¶ 6. However, “Pierre was denied glasses and optometry (medical), in the months of May and June, 2023.” Id.
On July 21, 2023, Pierre experienced “symptoms of an eye (right) infection including: redness, throbbing, sensitivity to light, and severe pain that caused [his] vision to” blur and eye to swell. Id. ¶ 7. Two days later, Pierre submitted a sick call request to see the eye doctor for his blurred vision and eye pain. See ECF No. 8-1. By then, his symptoms had worsened and the “blurry black specs” in his vision had increased. Id. The next day, July 24, Pierre received Garcia's denial of his sick call request. Garcia informed him: “you were seen in Jan. 2023. Eye exams are once every two years. Next one will be in 2025.” Id ¶ 8. See ECF No. 8-1 (copy of sick call request). As a result, “Pierre suffered pain (unwanton) for (7) days until another inmate” gave him eyedrops that he had been prescribed for Pink Eye. Id.
When Pierre tried to grieve Garcia's conduct, Officer Nolen threatened him with physical violence and warned that he would be denied food “for days” if he proceeded. Id. ¶ 9. Pierre nevertheless attempted to file a grievance while in the RHU, but each attempt prompted the guards to “retaliate[] against” him by “depriv[ing] him of meals and assault[ing]” him. Id. ¶ 9.
C. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). The “court[] generally consider[s] only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering the motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1997)).
In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 (1957)).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Put another way, in assessing a motion to dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations contained in the pleading at issue as true, the Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Pierre is proceeding pro se, his Complaint will be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969). Despite this leniency, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996)).
D. Analysis
Garcia raises the following arguments to support her motion to dismiss the Complaint: (1) Pierre failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for the claim against her, in contravention of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); (2) Pierre cannot sue Garcia for deliberate indifference because she is not a medical provider; and (3) the facts alleged are insufficient to demonstrate Garcia's deliberate indifference. The undersigned will address these arguments in turn.
1. Whether Pierre exhausted his administrative remedies cannot be determined from the face of the Complaint and because Defendant has not complied with LCvR 56(B), the Court cannot properly consider her motion as requesting summary judgment in the alternative.
Garcia argues that Pierre's Complaint must be dismissed because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. “Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove; it is not a pleading requirement for the prisoner-plaintiff.” Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007)). “The PLRA requires only ‘proper exhaustion,' meaning exhaustion of those administrative remedies that are ‘available.'” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006)). It follows then that to carry her burden, Garcia must prove “that there was an available administrative remedy, and that [Pierre] did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014).
Notably, because exhaustion is not a pleading requirement, it may be considered on a motion to dismiss only when a plaintiff acknowledges his failure to exhaust on the face of the complaint and the affirmative defense “present[s] an insuperable barrier to recovery by the plaintiff.” Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 n.8 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997)). Additionally, a court may only “consider [an] exhibit[ ] attached to a defendant's motion to dismiss if it is ‘an undisputedly authentic document' and [the] ‘plaintiff's claims are based on the document.'” Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 127 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196). A court may therefore consider grievance records on a motion to dismiss “where a defendant moves to dismiss based on a failure-to-exhaust defense and ‘the exhaustion issue turns on indisputably authentic documents related to [the inmate's] grievances.'” Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 261 n.1 (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004)). Declarations from prison officials, however, “are evidentiary materials that cannot be considered on a motion to dismiss.” Berry v. Klem, 283 Fed.Appx. 1, 4 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Garcia argues that Pierre failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because “[he] never filed a grievance against [her] at any time.” ECF No. 16, at 13. To support her position, Garcia attached two grievances filed by Pierre and documents related to these grievances. See ECF Nos. 16-4, 16-5. Garcia has not provided a sworn declaration certifying that these documents constitute a complete and accurate record of Pierre's grievance proceedings; nor could the Court consider such evidence at this juncture. See Burk v. Budd, 2019 WL 3765621, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2019) (citation omitted) (“The Court may not consider declarations from prison officials in deciding a motion to dismiss” and there is no other “evidence that the Court can consider at this stage that shows the attached grievance is the only grievance Burk filed and that he did not file an appeal.”). The Court therefore may not rely upon the documents Garcia appended to her motion to assess the merits of Garcia's exhaustion defense.
Furthermore, the Complaint does not provide a clear answer as to whether Pierre properly exhausted his administrative remedies “or whether he was thwarted in his attempts to do so.” Hensley v. Trempus, 2019 WL 2412490, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019) (citing Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (“only in rare cases will a district court be able to conclude from the face of the complaint that a prisoner has not exhausted his administrative remedies and that he is without a valid excuse”)), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2410803 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 2019). Pierre contends that RHU guards prevented him from filing grievances through their retaliatory conduct. This assertion does not equate with an admission of Pierre's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. And even if it did, his reason for this failure, if true, may “render[] the administrative process unavailable.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644 (2016) (“when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation . . . such interference with an inmate's pursuit of relief renders the administrative process unavailable.”). See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that exhaustion may be excused if prison officials take affirmative steps to prevent use of grievance procedure).
A more developed record is therefore required to evaluate whether Pierre failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies and, if so, whether his efforts to grieve were thwarted. See Hardy v. Shaikh, 959 F.3d 578, 587-88 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2018) (“As in the threat context . . . a further showing-such as ‘documents, affidavits, or live testimony if deemed warranted,'-will typically be required.”). Therefore, the Court should deny Defendant's motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of the claims against Garcia based on the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Enoxh, 2023 WL 5986105, at *4. Garcia may renew her exhaustion defense at any time by filing a motion for summary judgment and concise statement of material facts that comply with LCvR 56(B).
Except where the complaint acknowledges the plaintiff's failure to exhaust, the exhaustion defense is properly raised in a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss that includes an alternative request for summary judgment. In either case, the motion must be accompanied by a concise statement of material facts with supporting record materials, including any affidavits. This ensures that a proper record is before the Court and that the plaintiff is given the opportunity to respond to the defendant's factual assertions and to assert additional facts relevant to the exhaustion defense, including, potentially, facts relating to the availability of administrative remedies or the prison's timely compliance with its own grievance procedures. See Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that the PLRA “requires only... exhaustion of those administrative remedies that are ‘available'”); Nunez v. Borstnar, 2019 WL 4393387, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4394848 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2019) (holding that the exhaust requirement is excused where prison failed to follow its own grievance procedures). Compliance with LCvR 56 is the accepted practice in this Division for presenting an exhaustion defense based on material not relied upon in the complaint. Motions to dismiss that raise failure to exhaust administrative remedies that do not comply with these requirements will be summarily denied.
2. The Complaint alleges facts to support a plausible inference of Garcia's deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Pierre alleges that “Nurse Garcia was deliberately indifferent to [his] serious medical needs of Stigmative Glycoma (sic) [and] a[n] eye-infection by denying [him] glasses [and] vision treatment/medical attention.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 11. “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)) (internal quotation omitted). To establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care, a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate: (1) he had a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that reflect deliberate indifference to that need. See Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A serious medical need exists when a “failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991). Deliberate indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the factual allegations suffice to demonstrate that Pierre's optometry needs were sufficiently serious. Although “a ‘very slight visual impairment' does not constitute a serious medical need [for Eighth Amendment purposes],” an individual's “optometry needs are serious . . . if they are sufficiently severe to cause complications such as significant blurring, double vision, dizziness, or walking or falling into objects.” Parker v. Boring, 2016 WL 3381287, at *8 (M.D. Pa. May 19, 2016) (quoting Tormasi v. Hayman, 452 Fed.Appx. 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Borelli v. Askey, 582 F.Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1984)), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 3227250 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2016). Pierre contends that he suffered from stigmative glaucoma when his prescription glasses were destroyed, that these glasses slowed the progression of the disease, and that he experienced an increase of “blurry black-specs' in [his] eyes” and “blindness” during the two months he was without these glasses. ECF No. 8, ¶ 10. He also alleges that shortly after he got new glasses, he experienced “severe eye pain,” “swelling, throbbing, redness,” light sensitivity, blurred vision, and additional and larger “blurry black-specs” in his right eye, which caused “migraines,” and “ma[de his] diagnosis of Stigmative Glaucoma worse.” Id. ¶ 10. These allegations satisfy the “serious medical need” element of Pierre's Eighth Amendment claim. See Parker, 2016 WL3381287, at *8 (Plaintiff's allegations “that he had glaucoma at the time his prescription eyeglasses were taken from him,” “this glaucoma worsened during the two months that he was without any eyeglasses,” and “[he] experienced other difficulties from his visual deficiency” at this time, “including a series of migraine headaches and a stubbed toe,” demonstrated sufficiently serious optometry needs); Tormasi, 452 Fed.Appx. at 206 (serious medical need satisfied by Plaintiff's claim that his “vision was significantly blurred, resulting in dizziness and imbalance that caused him to fall and walk into objects.”); Tormasi v. Hayman, 2009 WL 3030081, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2009) (“Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that his need for prescription eye glasses constitutes a serious medical need.”); Porter v. Hogue, 2015 WL 1245784, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2015) (“Although a ‘very slight visual impairment' does not constitute a serious medical need, eyeglasses can be considered a serious medical need . . . ”) (internal citations omitted). See also Douglas v. Vihidal, 2012 WL 1933569, at *6 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1940673 (W.D. Pa. May 29, 2012) (Plaintiff's “claim[] that he is suffering from an eye condition that ultimately required surgery . . . plead[s] the existence of a serious medical condition”). Accordingly, only the second prong of the deliberate indifference test is at issue here: whether Garcia's alleged response to Pierre's request for replacement eyeglasses and report of an eye infection manifested deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
At the outset, Garcia's principal argument is based on the assertion that she is merely “an administrator” who “schedules yearly eye appointments or appointments as directed by a medical provider.” ECF No. 16, at 6. The allegations of Pierre's Complaint, however, support a plausible inference that she acted as a medical provider and had a direct role and responsibility for Pierre's care. In his brief in opposition to the motion, Pierre elaborates that Garcia “is in charge of optometry medical care of prisoners by screening ‘request' [and] ‘sick-calls' for [e]ye-related care ([g]lasses & vision treatment) [and] scheduling prisoners to be seen by medical including [n]urses & eye-doctor ‘appointments.'” ECF 18, at 1. Whether the evidence will ultimately support these allegations is a question that must await a record developed beyond the pleadings. C.f. Parker, 2016 WL 3381287, at *8 (Plaintiff cannot show Defendants' deliberate indifference to his Glaucoma because “[he] does not allege that it was the responsibility of either Doe or Boring to ensure the provision of a new pair of glasses.”). Garcia also acknowledges that she received his sick call slip and responded to his request to “see the eye doctor,” but maintains that “Pierre had recently been examined by the eye doctor” and “did not indicate that his eyeglasses were broken, lost or unusable” or “state he had an eye infection.” ECF No. at 16, at 7. Again, however, the facts alleged in the Complaint are contrary, and the Court cannot resolve such conflict on a motion to dismiss.
Relatedly, Garcia argues that the claim against her must be dismissed because “a nonmedical person cannot be sued for deliberate indifference.” ECF No. 16, at 7. This overstates the limitation on the potential liability of administrative personnel who are involved in healthcare matters. In appropriate circumstances, a health care administrator can be liable for acting with deliberate indifference to a plaintiff's serious medical needs if “she ‘possessed actual knowledge or a reason to believe that prison doctors or their assistants [were] mistreating (or not treating) him.” Trainor v. Wellpath, et al., 2021 WL 3913970, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2021) (internal citations omitted) (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). In this case, the Complaint alleges facts to support that Garcia knew or had reason to know that Pierre was not receiving medical treatment and care for his glaucoma and eye infection. It also alleges facts to support an inference that she was involved in, and at least shared responsibility for, Pierre's care regardless of her title. See Porter, 2015 WL 1245784, at *7 (Defendants' summary judgment argument “that they cannot be held liable for Plaintiff's injuries because liability can be assessed only against persons with authority to make treatment decisions” fails because “[a]ccording to the record, Plaintiff was never under the care of a medical professional” and “the record seems to support the fact that Defendants had actual knowledge, or reason to believe, that Plaintiff was not under supervision of medical personnel during the relevant time period and thus not receiving medical treatment for his vision impairment.”).
The Complaint also alleges facts minimally sufficient to support an inference that Garcia responded with deliberate indifference to Garcia's reports and conditions.
Pierre first alleges that after his glasses broke, he informed Garcia that he no longer possessed his prescription glasses, advised Garcia of his glaucoma diagnosis, and explained that he “needed her to order him a pair of glasses to prevent his eye condition from getting worse.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 6. Pierre asserts that he communicated this information to Garcia “through multiple requests” and that he “was denied glasses [and] optometry (medical)” throughout May and June. Pierre next alleges that in mid-July, Garcia denied his “sick-call requesting to see the Eye Doctor” for his blurred vision and eye pain because “[he] w[as] seen in Jan. 2023. Eye exams are once every two years. Next one will be in 2025.” Id. ¶ 8. Pierre contends that he never received an eye doctor appointment and his symptoms improved only after he borrowed another inmate's “medicated eye drops” seven days later. Id. Pierre avers that because of “[Garcia's] denial of medical attention,” his Glaucoma worsened and he suffered “unnecessary inflictions of severe eye pain” and irritation, migraines, and increased visual impairments. Garcia argues that Pierre's deliberate indifference claim against her fails because his allegations amount at best to a disagreement in medical care.
Garcia also attached to her motion her sworn verification (ECF No. 16-2) and medical records (ECF No. 16-3). As noted above, these exhibits do not fall within any of the types of documents a court may consider when ruling on a motion to dismiss- “the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff's] claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). To consult and credit these exhibits would in effect convert her motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. But because Garcia did not move in the alternative for summary judgment, the Court did not notify Pierre of the requirements for a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and LCvR 56, and the consequences of failing to comply with these requirements. See Woods v. Harry, 2022 WL 493871, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2022) (citing Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 339-40 (citing Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992))). Conversion would therefore deprive Pierre of his right to conduct reasonable discovery, in contravention of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d)'s notice requirement, to wit: “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” For these reasons, Garcia's sworn verification and the medical records appended to her motion are not properly before the Court at this time.
It is well-settled that “an inmate's dissatisfaction with a course of medical treatment, standing alone, does not give rise to a viable Eighth Amendment claim.” Tillery v. Noel, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2018) (collecting cases). Such complaints fail as constitutional claims because “the exercise by a doctor of his professional judgment is never deliberate indifference.” Gindraw v. Dendler, 967 F.Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights.”)). “Therefore, where a dispute in essence entails nothing more than a disagreement between an inmate and doctors over alternate treatment plans, the inmate's complaint will fail as a constitutional claim under § 1983.” Tillery, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (citing Gause v. Diguglielmo, 339 Fed.Appx. 132 (3d Cir. 2009) (characterizing a dispute over pain medication as the type of “disagreement over the exact contours of [plaintiff's] medical treatment” that does not violate the constitution)). Similarly, “the mere misdiagnosis of a condition or medical need, or negligent treatment provided for a condition, is not actionable as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice standing alone is not a constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). “Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 (citations omitted). And the Third Circuit has made clear that “there is a critical distinction ‘between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those alleging inadequate medical treatment.'” Wisniewski v. Frommer, 751 Fed.Appx. 192, 195-96 (3d Cir. Oct. 3, 2018) (quoting Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017)). Thus, “courts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims where an inmate has received some level of medical care.” Hensley v. Collins, 2018 WL 4233021, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2018) (quoting Clark v. Doe, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2000)).
But “[u]nder some circumstances, the denial of eyeglasses by prison officials may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.” Whitney v. Posika, 2022 WL 4104274, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2022) (citing Porter, 2015 WL 1245784, at *5). See Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that an inmate who needed prescription eyeglasses for double vision and loss of depth perception had a serious medical need); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1331 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[s]ince equally severe harm can be occasioned by the unavailability of eyeglasses ..., we should not be any less prone to disparage these deficiencies); Kemppainen v. Aransas County Det. Ctr., 2010 WL 4918958, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2010) (plaintiff denied prescription eyeglasses and eye examinations when his eyeglasses broke, leaving him unable to attend to basic hygiene and preventing him from engaging in daily activities). C.f. Borrelli v. Askey, 582 F.Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (plaintiff suffered from only “a very slight visual impairment” of the sort that did not typically require eyeglasses and which a doctor did not expect to lead to “sustained visual deterioration or other physical difficulties”). “These precedents are solidly grounded in the fact that untreated poor vision can generate suffering and discomfort that is difficult to scientifically evaluate.” Porter, 2015 WL 1245784, at *5 (quoting Kemppainen, 2010 WL 4918958, at *7 (citing Koehl, 85 F.3d at 88)). The allegations of the Complaint also support an inference that Garcia had the requisite knowledge and mental state to support a deliberate indifference claim. See, e.g., Tormasi, 2009 WL 3030081, at *5 (“At this early stage of the proceedings, it cannot be said that Roach's alleged inaction and unresponsiveness was mere negligence” or that Plaintiff's “reasonable request for medical treatment” could “be classified as a preference for alternative treatment,” as the allegations signify that Roach “was responsible for both scheduling the optometry appointments” and “ensuring that Plaintiff received his prescription eye glasses,” and his request “went unanswered for many months”). And the absence of justification for Garcia's conduct coupled with Pierre's averment that he experienced prolonged severe eye pain and irritation that exacerbated his glaucoma symptoms permits the inference that he “needless[ly] sufferr[ed]” when Garcia denied him “simple medical care . . . without any penological purpose.” Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003). See also Estien v. Showalter, 2014 WL 4916333, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2014) (“In sum, the court will allow the claims against Corrections Defendants Dunkle and Showalter and Medical Defendant Parkes for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs based on their respective intentional delays in requesting and/or scheduling medical treatment on behalf of Plaintiff to proceed.”); Gibbs v. Coupe, 2015 WL 6870033, at *1 (D. Del. Nov. 6, 2015) (Plaintiff states a constitutional claim when alleging that “he had not been provided with prescription glasses” and that “the delay in medical care harmed him.”).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 15) be DENIED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).