ORDER

WILLIAM PAULEY, District Judge

Plaintiff James Pettus ("Plaintiff" or "Pettus") brings this civil rights action alleging that he was denied medical care while detained at Rikers Island. Defendants Dr. Jane San Jose, Gloria Lemmott-Taylor, Michelle Bacon and Martin F. Horn (collectively, "Defendants") move for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND

On April 8, 2003, Pettus complained for the first time about an earache, nausea and dizziness. At that time, he was examined by Nurse Lemmott-Taylor and Dr. San Jose. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 3-5, 9-12, 22; Pl. Opp. Exs. 1-2.) After examining Pettus, Dr. San Jose concluded that he suffered from "an infection to his middle ear." (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22; see also Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 16, 18-21.) Thereafter, on several other occasions, Pettus was examined after complaining of earaches and dizziness. None of those subsequent examinations were conducted by Nurse Lemmott-Taylor or Dr. San Jose. (Pl. Opp. Exs. 4-6; Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 9, 31.)

On May 15, 2003, Pettus contacted Bacon, the Assistant Commissioner of Health Services at the New York City Department of Corrections (the "NYDOC"), and complained that he was not receiving adequate medical care. (Pl. Opp. Ex. 20.) Then, on June 10, 2003, Pettus wrote to Horn, the NYDOC Commissioner, reiterating his complaint of inadequate medical care and asking for help. (Pl. Opp. Ex. 21.)

On October 2, 2003, Pettus was referred to an ear, nose and throat ("ENT") specialist. (Pl. Opp. Ex. 10; Pl. Opp. Ex. 11: Evaluation Request.) After examining Pettus, the ENT specialist diagnosed Plaintiff with vertigo and tinnitus and scheduled additional diagnostic tests. (Pl. Opp. Ex. 15: Ambulatory Health Record.)

Pettus fails to mention that on several occasions he thwarted efforts to provide him with medical care. For example, on June 9, 2003, plaintiff refused to submit to an x-ray of his head, despite being informed that his failure to cooperate could result in "periorbital fracture, facial deterioration and even blindness." (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 38-40; Declaration of Hillary Frommer, dated Mar. 16, 2005 ("Frommer Decl.") Ex. G.) A week later, Pettus refused another x-ray and an urgicare evaluation, despite warnings that his failure to cooperate could adversely affect his health. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 41-42.)

Pettus claims that his vertigo and tinnitus caused several injuries and left him deaf in one ear. (Am. Compl. at 20-21; Pl. Opp. at 8.) He asserts that these injuries from Defendants' deliberate indifference to his condition and from the NYDOC's practice of frequently changing its medical staff. (Pl. Opp. at 7, 10.) Defendants respond that Pettus has failed to show any defendant's personal involvement in the alleged violations of his civil rights, or that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his condition. (Def. Mem. at 7, 13.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard for Summary Judgment

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate after sufficient time for discovery has elapsed. See Berger v. United States, 87 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that summary judgment is appropriate after discovery); see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Friedland, 758 F. Supp. 941, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that summary judgment may be granted if a court finds "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and . . . after sufficient time for discovery, the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of its case as to which it has the burden of proof." (emphasis added)). The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine dispute as to a material fact rests with the moving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1997). The movant may meet this burden by demonstrating a lack of evidence to support the nonmovant's case on a material issue on which the nonmovant has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

To defeat a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must do "more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Indeed, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); accord Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 587. In evaluating the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the "evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. Finally, because Pettus is a pro se litigant, this Court must "read his supporting papers liberally, and will interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 999 F. Supp. 526, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The Court recognizes that it must extend extra consideration to pro se plaintiffs . . .; pro se parties are to be given special latitude on summary judgment motions." (internal quotations omitted)).

II. Personal Liability of Defendants Dr. San Jose and Nurse Lemmott-Taylor

Pettus alleges that Nurse Lemmott-Taylor and Dr. San Jose were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs when they examined him. (Pl. Opp. at 7-8.)

The right to medical care is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the rights of a pretrial detainee are guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). To establish that Nurse Lemmott-Taylor or Dr. San Jose violated his Due Process rights, Pettus must prove that they were "`deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [his] serious medical needs.'" Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)); accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). In other words, Pettus must establish that "his medical condition [was] objectively . . . serious," Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104), and that Nurse Lemmott-Taylor and Dr. San Jose knew or should have known that they were ignoring his serious condition, see Weyant, 101 F.3d at 856 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "standard for assessing deliberate indifference . . . requir[es] a showing of what "the official knew or should have known"). Proving that Nurse Lemmott-Taylor or Dr. San Jose was negligent will not trigger liability. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) ("[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property"); Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005); Hill v. Gunn, 367 F. Supp. 2d 532, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("It is well settled in the Second Circuit that `more than negligent conduct by the state actor is needed in order for a cognizable § 1983 claim to exist based on violations of the due process clause.'" (quoting Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1996))).

Here, Pettus has offered no evidence that Nurse Lemmott-Taylor or Dr. San Jose "knew or should have known" that they were ignoring his condition. The record shows that on April 8, 2003, when Pettus was examined by Nurse Lemmott-Taylor and Dr. San Jose, he received complete medical attention. See Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2005) (granting defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law where medical records showed that the plaintiff was well attended to by the medical examiners). Indeed, Dr. San Jose prescribed eardrops for Pettus' ear infection. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 24.) Moreover, on April 9, when Pettus returned to the clinic complaining that he had not received the prescribed eardrops, Dr. San Jose took steps to ensure that the pharmacy promptly dispensed that medication to Pettus. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 26-27, 30-31.) Moreover, Pettus' assertion that Nurse Lemmott-Taylor and Dr. San Jose should have known that he suffered from something other than an ear infection (Pl. Opp. at 7-8), is not supported by any evidence. Accordingly, Pettus has failed to prove that either Nurse Lemmott-Taylor or Dr. San Jose was deliberately indifferent. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 295 (1991) (requiring a plaintiff to show that defendant "possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind"); see also Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994); Nunez v. Goord, 122 F. Supp. 2d 417, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting summary judgment despite evidence that a prisoner plaintiff complained that he was "experiencing problems").

III. Supervisory Liability of Defendants Bacon and Horn

Pettus also alleges that his medical condition resulted from the failure of Bacon and Horn to properly supervise the medical staff at Rikers Island. (Pl. Opp. at 10 Exs. 20, 21.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Bacon and Horn were deliberately indifferent to his rights because they did not act after he complained about his medical care. Instead, he contends that Bacon and Horn permitted the Rikers Island medical staff to change frequently even though they knew that such a policy prevented Pettus' receipt of adequate medical care. (Pl. Opp. at 7, 10.)

These claims are unsupported by any evidence that Bacon and Horn sanctioned the frequent rotation of the medical staff at Rikers Island or that the medical staff at Rikers Island changed frequently. The only evidence Pettus offers are his own letters to Bacon and Horn. They are insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish indifference, see Woods v. Goord, No. 97 Civ. 5143 (RWS), 1998 WL 740782, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1998) (stating that "failure to respond to plaintiff's letter requesting help does not in itself evince deliberate indifference to plaintiff's medical needs"); Garrido v. Coughlin, 716 F. Supp. 98, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that the fact that a supervisory official ignored a prisoner's letter was insufficient to hold that individual responsible on a theory of supervisory liability).

IV. Municipal Liability and the City of New York

By suing Defendants in their official capacity, Pettus named the City of New York as a defendant although it is not expressly joined in this action. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472 n. 21 (1985) ("[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." (internal quotation omitted)); Staley v. Grady, 371 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Pettus claims that it was the NYDOC's practice to rotate Rikers Island medical staff that led to his inadequate medical care. (Pl. Opp. at 7.) However, Pettus offers no evidence of any such policy. See supra Part III.

"Where it appears clearly upon the record that all of the evidentiary materials that a party might submit in response to a motion for summary judgment are before the court, a sua sponte grant of summary judgment against that party may be appropriate if those materials show that no material dispute of fact exists and that the other party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ramsey v. Coughlin, 94 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). Pettus' claim against the NYDOC derives from the same facts underlying his claims against Bacon and Horn and, therefore, Pettus' evidence (or the lack thereof) with respect to the complained-of policy is before this Court. See Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) ("If . . . the party [against whom a court sua sponte grants summary judgment] either cannot claim to have been surprised by the district court's action or if, notwithstanding its surprise, the party had no additional evidence to bring, it cannot plausibly argue that it was prejudiced by the lack of notice."). Because that evidence is insufficient to establish any claim against the City of New York, see supra Part III, this Court grants summary judgment against Pettus' on his claim against the City of New York.

CONCLUSION

SO ORDERED.