REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MALACHY MANNION, Magistrate Judge

Before this court is the plaintiff's criminal complaint. (Doc. No. 1.) For the following reasons, the court recommends that the complaint be dismissed.

I. Background

On May 5, 2006, the plaintiff, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Dallas, Pennsylvania, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed what he styles a "criminal complaint" against thirty-six officials, including the state secretary of corrections, the state attorney general, and numerous prison staff. (Doc. No. 1.) The plaintiff raises thirty-five allegations, all alleged violations of United States Code, title 18. The allegations include "principals"; "accessory after the fact"; misprision of felony; conspiracy against rights; deprivation of rights under color of law; various fraud, theft, and extortion offenses; ransoming; kidnaping; hostage taking; obstruction; various peonage, slavery, and forced labor offenses; subornation of perjury; interference with commerce; various racketeering and money laundering offenses; various counterfeiting offenses; criminal infringement of copyright; torture; treason; misprision of treason; and war crimes. The plaintiff provides no factual basis for the charges, but merely reiterates the statutory language. He asks "that a warrant of arrest or a summons be issued and that the defendant be required to answer the charges I have made." (Id.)

The plaintiff has included several exhibits with the complaint. These include a security agreement, apparently with himself as both debtor and creditor; a notarized "certification of non-response" indicating that the plaintiff has not received any correspondence from various state officials and attorneys; a copy of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13; an "inmate's request to staff member" challenging the authority under which he is imprisoned; several receipts for confiscated property; a misconduct form for the plaintiff's use of trademark symbols and violations of the Uniform Commercial Code; the hearing report; the appeals application; and, inmate grievances. (Id.) There are two other documents, one of which is titled "VERIFIED ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE," that the court is unable to make sense of. (Id.)

Also attached to the complaint is an "affidavit of probable cause." (Id.) The plaintiff presents a "plain statement of facts," but the twenty-one paragraphs of so-called facts are anything but plain. (Id.) In reviewing the affidavit, the court could make little sense of the plaintiff's rambling, incoherent statements. The plaintiff appears to accuse defendant Beard of somehow violating the laws governing contracts, commercial dealings, corporations, and debtors and creditors. For instance, the fourth paragraph states:

[D]efendant, JEFFREY A. BEARD, Ph.D. d.b.a. "Secretary of Corrections, for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a principal, . . . was given Verified Actual and Constructive Notice, i.e. defendant hereinafter "Presenter/Offeror/Borrower," was notified of Secured Party's acceptance for value, i.e. Banker's Acceptance of his Presentment/Offer of Debt i.e. "COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DC-16E, SENTENCE STATUS SUMMARY in re inmate #:FP7306®, INMATE NAME: PETER, DUANE©.

The plaintiff also appears to accuse defendant Beard's of infringing the plaintiff's "commonlaw copyright," presumably on his name. (Id., aff. at ¶ 11.) The plaintiff further appears to contend that Pennsylvania is a fictitious entity.

The court could comprehend only two averments. First, the plaintiff contends that defendant Beard is committing "acts of aggression against complainant's natural person" by wrongly imprisoning the plaintiff pursuant to a "Pretended Sentence . . . issued by an undisclosed authority, operating under an undisclosed jurisdiction under an undisclosed flag." (Doc. No. 1, aff. at ¶ 17.) Second, defendant Beard is mistreating and physically and sexually abusing the plaintiff. (Id., aff. at ¶ 17.)

The plaintiff also includes thirteen "stipulations" in his affidavit. (Id., aff. at ¶ 21.) These include stipulating that defendant Beard is acting "under alleged `authority' of some war powers" and "is self-confessed to be operating on alleged authority, under a `Title of Nobility,' of a letter of marque and reprisal issued by an undisclosed Party." (Id.)

The complaint is signed "Duane-Bartholomew; Peters©, sui juris," followed by the printed name "Duane-Bartholomew; Peters, Auth. Rep.," and is undertaken "By Order of: DUANE BARTHOLOMEW PETERS© by Duane Bartholomew; Peters, Auth. Rep., without Prejudice," as well as by "PETER, DUANE© FP7306® by Duane-Bartholomew; Peters© Auth. Rep. Without Prejudice, Without Recourse. UCC § 1-103, 1-104, 1-207. AS 45.05.006." (Doc. No. 1.) The affidavit is signed "By Order of: `DUANE BARTHOLOMEW PETERS' `PETER, DUANE, FP7306' BY Duane-Bartholomew; Peters© Auth. Rep. E.I.D.# 0847-48305." (Id., aff.) Following the signature is the caption, "Duane-Bartholomew; Peters©, private man, sui juris. Executed in sovereign, unlimited liability capacity. Without Prejudice. Without Recourse. U.C.C. 1-103, 1-207. AS 45.05.006." (Id.) The signature is witnessed by two witnesses and is notarized. (Id.)

II. Discussion

A. Private persons cannot prosecute federal criminal complaints

A private person may not prosecute a federal criminal complaint. Prosecution of a federal crime is the prerogative of the United States through the attorney general and his delegates, the United States attorneys. 28 U.S.C. § 516 ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General."); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868) ("Public prosecutions, until they come before the court to which they are returnable, are within the exclusive direction of the district attorney, and even after they are entered in court, they are so far under his control that he may enter a nolle prosequi at any time before the jury is empaneled for the trial of the case, except in cases where it is otherwise provided in some act of Congress."); Keenan v. McGrath, 328 F.2d 610, 611 (1st Cir. 1964); United States v. Stone, 8 F. 232, 261 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1881) ("[U]nder our federal practice from the earliest times . . . the district attorney is the only prosecutor known to our law."); United States ex rel. Savage v. Arnold, 403 F.Supp. 172, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Panza, 381 F.Supp. 1133, 1133-35 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (reciting history of rule); United States ex rel. Pope v. Bruckno, 330 F.Supp. 793, 794-95 (E.D. Pa. 1971). If the complaint warrants action, the magistrate judge may refer it to the United States attorney for action. Savage, 403 F.Supp. at 174; Brown v. Duggan, 329 F.Supp. 207, 210 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (citing United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).

In this case, the plaintiff may not bring his criminal complaint because he is a private person. In addition, the court finds that the complaint is meritless and will not refer it to a United States attorney for further investigation. Accordingly, the court recommends that the plaintiff's criminal complaint be dismissed.

B. The complaint is procedurally insufficient

The commencement of a criminal action is governed in part by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 and 4. Rule 3 provides: "The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It must be made under oath before a magistrate judge or, if none is reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer." Rule 4 provides that an arrest warrant can only issue "[i]f the complaint . . . establish[es] probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Rules 3 and 4 are designed to preserve a defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, which provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing . . . the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. 4; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958). In reviewing a complaint, a magistrate judge "should not accept without question the complainant's mere conclusion that the person whose arrest is sought has committed a crime." Id. at 486. Rather, the magistrate judge must be persuaded by the adduction of "facts and circumstances" sufficient "`to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed.'" Id.; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162-62 (1925) (quoting Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1978)).

In this case, the plaintiff has failed to comport with Rules 3 and 4. First, he has not established the essential facts of any offense. The complaint contains no facts. The facts in the affidavit of probable cause that purportedly supports the complaint are insensible, indeed nonsensical, conclusions that cannot sustain a criminal complaint or warrant. Second, the plaintiff has not properly sworn out the complaint. The plaintiff failed to appear before a magistrate judge or other authorized official to bring his complaint. Finally, the plaintiff has not shown probable cause. Because the plaintiff has adduced no comprehensible facts, he has not connected any defendant with any alleged crime. Thus, the plaintiff's complaint does not comport with the rules governing the institution of criminal proceedings, and the court accordingly recommends that the plaintiff's criminal complaint be dismissed.

C. The complaint is frivolous

A district court must dismiss any case proceeding in forma pauperis "if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(I) (2006). "[A] complaint . . . is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989);accord Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989) (dismissal required where the complaint raises an "indisputably meritless legal theory" or "clearly baseless factual contentions"). In this case, the complaint is clearly frivolous. First, as discussed above, the plaintiff has raised claims that he is not entitled to bring in federal court. Second, the plaintiff's claims have no legal base and are meritless. Third, the factual predicate for the plaintiff's claims is incomprehensible nonsense and, hence, "clearly baseless." Accordingly, the court recommends that the plaintiff's criminal complaint be dismissed.

III. Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the plaintiff's criminal complaint (Doc. No. 1) be DISMISSED. chy E. Mannion