Opinion
6:20-cv-02551-JD-JDA
03-12-2021
Daniel J. Perry, Plaintiff, v. Charles Lancaster, Juan Olalde, Jr., Sgt. May, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff and Defendants. [Docs. 35; 36.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff filed this action pro se, asserting various constitutional claims arising from two separate incidents against three Greenville County deputies in their individual and official capacities. [Doc. 1.] On December 28, 2020, the Clerk docketed a motion for summary judgment by Plaintiff. [Doc. 35.] On January 11, 2021, Defendants filed a document, which the Clerk docketed as both a motion for summary judgment and a response to Plaintiff's summary judgment motion. [Docs. 36; 39.] The next day, the Court issued an Order in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment procedure and of the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 41.] On January 21, 2021, the Clerk docketed a response from Plaintiff opposing Defendants' summary judgment motion. [Doc. 45.] The summary judgment motions are now ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
Viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as is appropriate on consideration of Defendants' summary judgment motion, the undersigned gleans the following facts.
The First Incident
On April 2, 2019, at approximately 3:45 a.m., Defendant Deputy Charles Lancaster observed Plaintiff commit several moving violations, and he initiated a traffic stop. [Doc. 36-1 ¶ 2.] When Lancaster asked Plaintiff for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance, Plaintiff told Lancaster that he did not have his license with him, but he could show Lancaster a picture of it on his cellphone. [Id. ¶ 3.] When Lancaster asked Plaintiff if he had any weapons in the vehicle, Plaintiff told him that he was wearing his pistol. [Id.] In answer to whether he had a concealed weapons permit, Plaintiff admitted that he did not. [Id.] Plaintiff added that he was under the impression South Carolina's castle doctrine allowed him to wear his pistol while he was driving, but Lancaster explained that it did not. [Id.] Lancaster removed the pistol from Plaintiff's waist at that time. [Id.]
When Lancaster entered Plaintiff's information into the computer in his patrol car, Lancaster learned that Plaintiff's South Carolina driver's license had previously been suspended. [Id.] Lancaster subsequently advised Plaintiff that he was being arrested for unlawful carrying of a handgun and second-offense driving under suspension non DUI. [Id.]
The Second Incident
On September 1, 2019, at approximately 4:10 a.m., Defendant Deputy Juan Olalde observed Plaintiff fail to stop at a stop sign. [Doc. 36-2 ¶ 2.] Olalde activated his blue lights to initiate a traffic stop, at which time he also noticed that the tag light on the vehicle was inoperable. [Id.] Once Plaintiff pulled over, Olalde advised Plaintiff and his passenger why he had stopped them, and he asked for Plaintiff's driver's license. [Id.; BWC Olalde 19-148902, at 0:23-0:35.] Plaintiff answered that he did not have the license and that it was suspended. [Doc. 36-2 ¶ 3.] A second officer arrived on the scene, and Olalde then returned to his vehicle and entered Plaintiff's information into his computer, at which time he confirmed that Plaintiff's driver's license was suspended. [Id. ¶ 4.] He also learned that Plaintiff was wanted for failing to comply with the terms of his bond for General Sessions charges of trafficking methamphetamine and trafficking heroin and that Plaintiff had several outstanding arrest warrants. [Id.]
Olalde returned to Plaintiff's vehicle and asked Plaintiff to step out of the vehicle. [Id. ¶ 5.] Plaintiff refused, however, telling Olalde that he knew Olalde planned to arrest him. [Id.] Olalde then explicitly informed Plaintiff that he was under arrest and asked him not to escalate the situation. [Id.] Plaintiff then stated, “I'll go ahead and escalate it just fine, ” as he sped away. [Id.]
Olalde did not pursue Plaintiff. [Id.] Rather, he traveled to the Greenville County Law Enforcement Center. [Id. ¶ 6.] After reviewing Plaintiff's criminal history, Olalde obtained warrants for driving under suspension, second offense; failure to stop for blue lights, first offense; and resisting arrest (“the Second Incident Warrants”). [Id. ¶¶ 6-7; id. at 9-11.]
Plaintiff's Claims
In this action, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Regarding the First Incident, Plaintiff alleges that Lancaster profiled him while he was driving his vehicle. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff alleges Lancaster approached his vehicle and began to discriminate and make verbally derogatory comments; that he provided Lancaster with a valid Tennessee drivers license; and that Lancaster then searched his vehicle and found a weapon and then secured arrest warrants for driving under suspension and unlawful carrying of a firearm. [Id.] Regarding the citation Lancaster prepared for driving under suspension, Plaintiff alleges Lancaster improperly entered the information from his South Carolina license that had been suspended rather than his valid Tennessee license. [Id. at 8-9.] As for the unlawful carry charge, Plaintiff contends that he was legally permitted to possess the weapon and that the search of his vehicle was unlawful and based on discrimination. [Id. at 8.] He alleges that the stop, arrest, and seizure of his firearm all were unreasonable seizures that violated his Fourth Amendment rights. [Id. at 12.] Especially considering the allegedly discriminatory aspect of Lancaster's treatment of him during the initial stop and the arrest, Plaintiff alleges that Lancaster violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [Id. at 10-13.]
Although Plaintiff does not explain in his Complaint the basis on which he is alleging that he was being profiled, the Court's review of the video recording of the incidents in question suggests that he is referring to his status as a former illegal drug user.
Regarding the Second Incident, Plaintiff alleges that when he stopped for the officers' blue lights, Olalde asked him to roll down his window, but Plaintiff refused because he did not feel safe. [Id. at 17-18.] Plaintiff alleges that he showed Olalde his Tennessee driver's license and registration through the window and that Olalde wrote down the information. [Id. at 18.] Plaintiff alleges that Olalde told him he had been pulled over for running a stop sign and failing to use his turn signal, both of which Plaintiff denied. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that Olalde informed him that his South Carolina license was suspended and that the he was being arrested. [Id. at 19.] Plaintiff alleges that he refused and drove away, and that as he did so, Olalde tried to jerk his door open and both officers fired their weapons at them. [Id. at 19-20.]
Plaintiff alleges that, upon returning to his home, he spoke with Defendant Sgt. May on the telephone about the incident. [Id. at 20.] Regarding the question of whether Olalde appropriately used the information from Plaintiff's suspended South Carolina license rather than the information for the Tennessee license that Plaintiff gave Olalde, May told Plaintiff that “[h]is men could use whatever information they wanted to because they made the rules, ” that “they would write up any warrants for [Plaintiff] they wanted to, ” and that “‘[h]e was coming to hunt [Plaintiff's] ass.'” [Id. at 21.] Plaintiff also alleges that on September 20, 2019, he was served with the Second Incident Warrants, which had been issued by Olalde and May. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that on December 27, 2019, a judge dismissed all three warrants. [Id.] On that basis, Plaintiff contends that his incarceration for 99 days from September 20, 2019, to December 27, 2019, constitutes unlawful confinement. [Id. at 21-22.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends that he has suffered the loss of enjoyment of life, loss of his home, loss of his vehicle, loss of religious materials, loss of his income, loss of his family due to his confinement, defamation of his character, public embarrassment, invasion of his privacy, loss of expectation in the fairness related to his pending criminal action, incarceration without cause, fear and anxiety, loss of trust for law enforcement, among other things. [Id. at 25.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks the Court for money damages in the amount of $3,000,000, for a “full and accurate audit of all actions of the Greenville Sheriff's Office to hold all acts of misconduct accountable, ” and for summary dismissal of the warrant from April 2, 2019. [Id. at 26.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Plaintiff's claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed."Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying ‘the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not “violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity does not protect an official who violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id. Further, qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
“In determining whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015). The first concerns whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a federal right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The second “asks whether the right was clearly established at the time the violation occurred such that a reasonable person would have known that his conduct was unconstitutional.” Smith, 781 F.3d at 100. For purposes of this analysis, a right is “clearly established” if “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
District court judges are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If a court decides in the negative the first prong it considers-i.e., the court decides the plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right or the right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation-the court need not consider the other prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See Id. at 243-45; Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding the court “need not formally resolve” the constitutional question of “whether the [plaintiffs] were arrested without probable cause” to address the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim; the court stated that it “need only determine whether [the defendant]-a deputy sheriff performing within the normal course of his employment-acted with the objective reasonableness necessary to entitle him to qualified immunity”).
DISCUSSION
Eleventh Amendment Immunity as to the Official-Capacity Claims
Defendants argue that claims against them for monetary damages in their official capacity must be dismissed based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. [Doc. 36-4 at 10-12.] The Court agrees.
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to ‘arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity, ” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted), because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself, ” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. Because South Carolina sheriffs and sheriff deputies are state employees, Edwards v. Lexington Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 688 S.E.2d 125, 127 n.1 (S.C. 2010), to the extent Plaintiff has alleged a claim for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities under § 1983, Defendants are entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. See Wirtz v. Oconee Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 8:13-1041-RMG, 2013 WL 5372795, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2013) (“Defendant Oconee County Sheriff's Department has Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit for damages under § 1983.”). Accordingly, to the extent these Defendants are sued in their official capacities, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims should be dismissed.
Moreover, “state officials sued in their official capacity for monetary relief are not ‘persons' subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983.” Burns v. Cook, No. 6:18-cv-00073, 2018 WL 4935457 (W.D. Va. Oct. 11, 2018).
Qualified Immunity as to the Constitutional Individual-Capacity Claims
Section 1983 actions premised on malicious prosecution or false arrest are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”); Curtis v. Devlin, No. 1:04-cv-409, 2005 WL 940571, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2005) (explaining that § 1983 actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment). The same is true of such claims complaining of due process violations. Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C. , 85 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment provides all of the pretrial process that is constitutionally due to a criminal defendant in order to detain him prior to trial.”).
To state a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was arrested without probable cause. Sowers v. City of Charlotte, 659 Fed.Appx. 738, 740 (4th Cir. 2016). And “a § 1983 claim for damages due to false imprisonment is akin to a malicious prosecution claim.” McCormick v. Wright, No. 2:10-cv-00033-RBH, 2010 WL 565303, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2010); Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2000) (“What is conventionally referred to as a ‘§ 1983 malicious prosecution' action is nothing more than a § 1983 claim arising from a Fourth Amendment violation.”). “To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, to prevail on any of his § 1983 claims, Plaintiff must show that he was arrested without probable cause.
“Whether probable cause [to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed] exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Davenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)); see also Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 334 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[P]robable cause exists where <the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.'”) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). The analysis ?turns on two factors in combination: the suspect's conduct as known to the officer, and the contours of the offense thought to be committed by that conduct.” Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992). ?To prove an absence of probable cause, [a plaintiff] must allege a set of facts which made it unjustifiable for a reasonable officer to conclude that []he was violating the [law].” Brown, 278 F.3d at 368.
The relevant inquiry in the Fourth Circuit regarding the facts known to the officer is what was reported to the officer. See Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1974) (?We do not think the fourth amendment should now be interpreted to prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed outside an officer's presence.”); United States v. Rivera, No. 7:15-cv-101, 2018 WL 6625080, at *3 n.7 (W.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2018) (noting that “[m]ore recently, the Fourth Circuit declined to address the presence issue further, but recognized that several other circuits have held that the Fourth Amendment contains no ‘in the presence' requirement for misdemeanors, ” that “district courts in this Circuit have routinely adopted the Street holding, ” and that “[t]he Supreme Court has refused to address the issue”).
The Claims Arising from the First Incident
As for the First Incident, Plaintiff alleges that Lancaster lacked probable cause to execute the traffic stop and then lacked authority to take his pistol off his person and arrest him. [Doc. 1 at 12.] The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not forecasted sufficient evidence to support such claims, however. Video of the traffic stop shows Plaintiff entering the public roadway and immediately crossing over several lanes of travel and into the median without employing his turn signal. [In Car Lancaster-First View-19-055949 0:02-0:25.] Accordingly, Lancaster had probable cause to stop Plaintiff for his failure to signal. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”).
Plaintiff alleges that Lancaster did not inform him at the time of the stop that he had been stopped because of the traffic violation [Doc. 1 at 6], suggesting that any traffic violation may not have been the true reason that he was pulled over. However, bodycam video plainly shows Lancaster informing Plaintiff that he was being stopped for cutting across all three lanes and turning behind the median and Plaintiff acknowledging that he had indeed cut across three lanes of traffic. [BWC Lancaster - 19-055949, at 0:45-1:36.] In any event, to show an illegal seizure, Plaintiff must show that the seizure was objectively unreasonable, which here requires showing that there was no objective justification for the stop based on the information that the officer possessed; Deputy Lancaster's subjective motivation for executing the stop is immaterial. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”) And, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that Lancaster violated procedural rules that did not violate Plaintiff's statutory or constitutional rights, including Plaintiff's claim that Defendants failed to properly verify his driver's license [Doc. 35 at 4], the officers state a § 1983 claim for such violations. Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Lancaster appeared to assume or suggest that Plaintiff was in the area to buy illegal drugs [Doc. 45 at 4], such language does not amount to a constitutional violation. See Petion v. Md. State Police, No. CCB-17-2842, 2018 WL 3549789, at *4 (July 23, 2018) (holding that “the use of harsh language alone [does not] amount to a constitutional rights violation”).
Additionally, because Plaintiff admitted at the time of the stop that he was wearing a pistol but did not have a concealed weapons permit, Lancaster had probable cause to arrest him for unlawfully carrying a handgun. See Iacobucci v. Town of Bonneau, No. 2:18-cv-00152-DCN-BM, 2019 WL 4686433, at *5 (“It is unlawful in South Carolina to keep a handgun in a vehicle without securing it in a glove compartment, console, trunk, or other closed container without a proper concealed weapons permit.”). South Carolina Code § 16-23-20 provides that “[i]t is unlawful for anyone to carry about the person any handgun, whether concealed or not, except as follows, unless otherwise prohibited by law.” The statute then sets out 16 enumerated exceptions. Plaintiff argues that exceptions (8) and (9) are applicable [Docs. 35 at 6-9; 45 at 3], but the Court disagrees. Exception (8) applies to “a person in his home or upon his real property or a person who has the permission of the owner or the person in legal possession or the person in legal control of the home or real property.” Plaintiff was not in his home or on his real property when Lancaster pulled him over on April 2, 2019. Exception (9) is applicable if the weapon is properly secured within the vehicle or if the person has a valid concealed weapons permit, and here Plaintiff freely admitted when he was pulled over that he had his handgun on his person and that he had no concealed weapons permit. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion be granted regarding Plaintiff's claims arising from the First Incident and that Plaintiff's summary judgment motion be denied as to those claims.
Plaintiff appears to argue that the mechanic's lien or materialmen's lien statutes in South Carolina somehow justify a conclusion that Plaintiff was on his real property because he was in his car. [Doc. 35 at 6-7.] The Court frankly does not understand Plaintiff's argument but notes that the term “real property” is not defined in the statute, and it generally refers to “[l]and and anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may be severed without injury to the land.” Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In any event, even assuming that Plaintiff could satisfy the first qualified immunity prong by forecasting sufficient evidence that his argument was correct and the real-property exception applied, he could not satisfy the second qualified-immunity prong because he does not explain how it was clearly established on the date of the arrest that his vehicle constituted real property for this purpose.
Plaintiff also alleges that Lancaster is no longer an employee of the Greenville Sheriff's Office and that that state of affairs “violates [his] rights to challenge my accuser.” [Doc. 1 at 12.] However, Plaintiff does not explain in what sort of claim he is attempting to assert.
The Claims Arising from the Second Incident
Defendants claim that Plaintiff has not forecasted admissible evidence that, even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, could establish a constitutional violation arising from the Second Incident. [Doc. 36-4 at 6-9, 13-14.] The Court agrees.
Plaintiff does not forecast any admissible evidence to rebut Olalde's statement in his affidavit that he observed Plaintiff disregard a stop sign and noticed that he had no light illuminating his license plate. [Doc. 36-2 at 1.] Rather, Plaintiff argues that because the charges in the Second Incident Warrants were eventually dropped by the Solicitor's Office that Olalde violated his constitutional rights by issuing the warrants in the first place. However, that the charges were eventually dismissed does not demonstrate that there was no probable cause to charge Plaintiff with the offenses in the first place. See Smith v. Township of Clinton, 791 Fed.Appx. 363, 367 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (“The fact that the criminal charge . . . was later dismissed does not establish that there was no probable cause for the arrest, as probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion be granted and Plaintiff's summary judgment be denied regarding the Second Incident.
The Court notes that Plaintiff may also be attempting to assert a claim for excessive force based on Olalde's attempt to jerk open Plaintiff's vehicle door as Plaintiff drove away and the officers' firing their weapons at the vehicle. [Doc. 1 at 19-20.] To the extent his is so attempting, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. “[A]ll claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness' standard . . . . ” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The Fourth Amendment test is “an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397. The test of reasonableness is “not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining the reasonableness of the use of force, the court must balance “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests” against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts have “long recognized that the right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. Assuming Olalde attempted to open Plaintiff's vehicle door as he began to drive away, that was a reasonable attempt to make an arrest. And the body cam video clearly shows that no gunshots were fired by Olalde during the traffic stop. [BWC Olalde 19-148902 at 11:32-11:45.] And, it is unclear if Plaintiff intends to makes some sort of claim arising out of May's alleged aggressive statements to him, including that “[h]e was coming to hunt [his] ass.” [Doc. 1 at 21.] However, especially given the context that Plaintiff had resisted arrest and driven off and that there was several warrants for his arrest, the Court sees no evidence of any constitutional violation. See Petion, 2018 WL 3549789, at *4. Accordingly, the Court concludes that May is entitled to summary judgment on any such claim asserted against him. As the Court has noted, as long as probable cause existed for arresting Plaintiff on at least one of the charges, whether probable cause supported the other charges is immaterial because Plaintiff ?has no cognizable Fourth Amendment claims associated with [the other charges].” Smith, 126 Fed.Appx. at 93. In any event it appears that independent of the three charges at issue, Plaintiff was in custody for a number of other outstanding charges.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion [Doc. 36] be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's summary judgment motion [Doc. 35] be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.