MICHAEL R. SONBERG, J.

Petitioner moves by writ of habeas corpus for dismissal of a parole warrant on the basis that he is being illegally detained. Specifically, petitioner contends that because he was not expressly informed by the sentencing court of a period of postrelease supervision and as there is no mention of postrelease supervision in the plea proceedings or in the commitment papers, the Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") cannot modify his sentence to include postrelease supervision. Petitioner claims that DOCS exceeded its authority when it imposed postrelease supervision and, as he is being held on a parole warrant pursuant to an alleged violation of the conditions of postrelease supervision, his due process rights have been violated. He seeks vacatur of the parole warrant as well as the period of postrelease supervision.

On February 26, 2002, in Supreme Court, New York County (A. Silverman, J.), petitioner pleaded guilty to a Class "B" violent felony of attempted murder in the second degree (PL §§ 110/125.25) and was sentenced, as a first time felony offender, to a determinate sentence of five years imprisonment. PL § 70.02. Although postrelease supervision is a mandatory component of such a sentence as required by Penal Law § 70.45 , it is undisputed that neither the plea nor the sentencing proceedings referred to postrelease supervision and there is no reference to postrelease supervision in the commitment order.

On April 17, 2007, petitioner was released but was made subject by DOCS to five years postrelease supervision. It is unclear when the condition of postrelease supervision was imposed by DOCS; however, petitioner was to be supervised by Division of Parole until March 7, 2011. On August 27, 2007, respondent Division of Parole (hereafter "respondent") issued parole warrant #483245, charging petitioner with various violations of the terms of postrelease supervision. Petitioner is currently being held at Rikers Island Correctional Facility, pending the completion of his parole revocation proceedings.

Respondent argues that a writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate forum to seek relief of a postrelease supervision claim. Rather, it contends, the proper remedy is a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL § 440.10 or a direct appeal. Respondent cites as its authority the recent Court of Appeals decision in People v Hill , 9 NY3d 189 (2007). It argues that by bringing this writ, petitioner is attempting to circumvent the prescribed postrelease supervision element of his sentence which was imposed by operation of law. Respondent argues that it had no administrative discretion as to whether to enforce the postrelease supervision; rather, it says, it was automatic since it was mandated by statute. Respondent contends that if petitioner is unhappy with his status, he may pursue the vacatur of his plea, the remedy discussed by the Court of Appeals in Hill, supra.

The purpose of habeas corpus is "to test the legality of the detention of the person who is the subject of the writ." People ex rel Robertson v New York State Div. of Parole, 67 NY2d 197 (1986); People ex rel Shapiro v Keeper of City Prison, 290 NY 393 (1943); People ex rel Menechino v Warden, 27 NY2d 376 (1971); People ex rel Von Fossen v Dillon, 72 AD2d 166 (4th Dept 1980). Under CPLR 7002 (a),

A person illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his liberty within the state . . . may petition without notice for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such detention and for deliverance. A judge authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus having evidence, in a judicial proceeding before him, that any person is so detained shall, on his own initiative, issue a writ of habeas corpus for the relief of that person.

Here, petitioner was imprisoned on a parole violation after he was sentenced to a determinate period of time, served his period of incarceration, and was given an additional period of supervision by DOCS, an executive branch agency, which had not been imposed by the sentencing court. A writ of habeas corpus is a proper remedy to address the legality or illegality of an administratively imposed period of postrelease supervision. See People ex rel White v Warden, 15 Misc 3d 360 (Sup.Ct. Bronx Co. 2007, Marcus, J.); People ex rel Santos v Warden, 17 Misc 3d 1120 [A] (Sup.Ct. Bronx Co. 2007, Gross, J.); People ex rel Lewis v Warden , 14 Misc 3d 468 , 471 (Sup.Ct. Bronx Co. 2006, Cirigliano, J.); People ex rel Brown v Warden, Index No. 757036/07 (Sup.Ct. Bronx Co., April 4, 2007, Boyle, J.,); People ex rel Mazario v Warden, 16 Misc 3d 1109A (Sup.Ct. Bronx Co. 2007, Dawson, J.).

This court believes that it is required to grant petitioner's application by virtue of the November 8, 2007 decision of the Appellate Division, First Department, in People v Figueroa, — AD3d —, 846 NYS2d 87, 2007 NY Slip Op 08352 (1st Dept 2007). In that decision, the First Department unequivocally held that DOCS lacked the authority to add a period of postrelease supervision which had not been mentioned during sentencing nor included in the court's order of commitment; rather, it held that DOCS was " conclusively bound" by the contents of the commitment papers. Id. (emphasis in original). The Appellate Divisions in the Second and Third Departments have subsequently held to the same effect. Matter of Dreher v Goord, ___ AD3d ___, 2007 NY Slip Op 10430, 2007 WL 4530872 (3rd Dept Dec. 27, 2007); Matter of Quinones v Goord, — AD3d —, 2007 NY Slip Op 10435, 2007 WL 4530991 (3rd Dept Dec. 27, 2007); People ex rel McBride v Alexander, — AD3d —, 2007 NY Slip Op, 2007 WL 4463596 (2nd Dept Dec. 18, 2007).

Respondent contends that the Court of Appeals' decision in Hill, supra, cannot be reconciled with the First Department's decision in Figueroa and that Figueroa is not good law. This court disagrees. In Hill, the defendant, who was serving a fifteen year sentence, moved to vacate his conviction, pursuant to CPL 440.10, apparently having learned from a fellow inmate that DOCS would impose a period of postrelease supervision at some time in the future, claiming that a sentence which included postrelease supervision would render his guilty plea involuntary. Supreme Court, discovering its own error in having failed to impose postrelease supervision, sought to remedy the situation by resentencing the defendant to twelve and one-half years incarceration, to be followed by two and one-half years of postrelease supervision. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed. People v Hill , 39 AD3d 1 (1st Dept 2007). In reversing, the Court of Appeals reiterated its decision in People v Catu, 4 NY3d 42 (2005), holding that the constitutional defect was in the plea, which was not knowing and voluntary, rather than in the sentence, and that the sole remedy was the one sought by the defendant, namely the vacatur of his guilty plea.

The issue presented to the Court of Appeals in Hill was quite different from the issue presented to this court and to the Appellate Divisions in Figueroa, Dreher, Quinones and McBride, supra. Defendant in Hill sought to have the judgment of conviction vacated, a remedy to which he was clearly entitled under Catu. The Court of Appeals was not presented with the issue of whether DOCS had the authority to modify the sentence which had been imposed. That is the issue presented here, as to which appellate authority is on point and controlling. It would not be appropriate for a trial court, in the face of that authority, to hold that the Court of Appeals' decision in Hill controlled on an issue not presented to that Court and as to which at least one appellate court has indicated that it has no application. See Matter of Quinones, supra.

Accordingly, petitioner's writ is sustained, parole violation warrant #483245 is vacated and, pursuant to CPLR 7010(a), it is directed that petitioner be discharged from detention on this matter.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.