Opinion
A148591
07-20-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GENESIS C. SHELLOCK, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC083423A)
A jury convicted Genesis C. Shellock of various felonies and misdemeanors, including felony false impersonation (Pen. Code, § 529, subd. (a)(3)). The trial court found Shellock's prior conviction allegations true and sentenced him to state prison.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Shellock appeals, contending insufficient evidence supports the false impersonation conviction. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The prosecution charged Shellock with seven crimes arising out of a January 2015 incident: unlawful taking of a vehicle after a prior conviction (Veh. Code, § 10851; § 666.5); fleeing a pursuing peace officer's motor vehicle while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)); misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)); false personation (§ 529, subd. (a)(3)); two misdemeanor counts of giving false information to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)); and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). The information further alleged Shellock had two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and eight prior prison terms (§ 667.5).
Prosecution Evidence
On a January 2015 afternoon, California Highway Patrol Officer William Torr was on Interstate 280 when he saw a man — later identified as Shellock — driving a motorcycle over 100 miles per hour in a 65-mile-per-hour zone. As Officer Torr pursued the motorcycle in his patrol car with lights and sirens activated, Shellock weaved through traffic, traveling approximately 110 miles per hour. Shellock exited the freeway and Officer Torr followed.
Along the freeway offramp, Officer Torr found the motorcycle on its side, just behind the rear of a Volvo. The motorcycle had collided into the Volvo. Shellock ran away, and jumped over a fence. Officer Torr ran a record check on the motorcycle and learned it had been reported stolen. Law enforcement officers searched for Shellock; about 30 minutes after the collision, Shellock crawled out from underneath the fence.
Officer Torr asked Shellock why he was crawling underneath the fence, and Shellock said he was looking for " 'just stuff.' " Then Officer Torr asked Shellock for his name and date of birth, and Shellock responded, "William Shescec," April 28, 1974. Shellock did not provide an identification card. With this information, Officer Torr conducted a DMV check, but there was "no match," meaning "that person has never had a California Driver's License or identification card." Shellock claimed he did not have a driver's license.
During a search of Shellock's pockets, Officer Torr found a wallet, which contained a credit card with the name Genesis C. Shellock. The credit card "didn't look real." In Shellock's jacket, Officer Torr found a Michigan state identification card in the name of C. P. The photograph on the card did not resemble Shellock; when Officer Torr asked Shellock about the picture, Shellock said, " 'Okay, you got me.' " Officer Torr ran a records check in California and Michigan, but there was no match.
We use the victims' initials to protect their privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b).)
Officer Torr arrested Shellock and took him to jail. Officer Torr performed a more thorough search of Shellock's clothing and filled out booking and property forms. Officer Torr found seven baggies of cocaine and a California state driver's license in the name of M.F. When he asked Shellock to whom the driver's license belonged, Shellock responded, " 'I'm [M.F.].' " The photograph on the driver's license somewhat resembled Shellock. Officer Torr asked Shellock about the credit card bearing the name Genesis C. Shellock, and Shellock said he " 'found it in the bushes.' " Shellock was booked as M.F. The "booking deputy" took over booking responsibilities and asked Shellock to identify himself. Shellock said he was M.F. At that point, Officer Torr left the jail and returned to the CHP office. Shellock was fingerprinted. The fingerprints "go to the Department of Justice and FBI."
M.F.'s driver's license was stolen in October 2014.
At the CHP office, Officer Torr spoke with a colleague "to confirm the identity of the subject . . . booked under the name . . . [M.F.]." Officer Torr did this because he was not convinced the person in the driver's license photo was Shellock. At the CHP office, Officer Torr ran a records check for Genesis Shellock and pulled up Shellock's driver's license. At this point, Officer Torr was "convinced" the person he booked into jail was not M.F. Officer Torr called the jail and told a deputy "we positively identified another suspect. We booked in . . . [M.F.] as Genesis Shellock." Shellock's "[M.F.] alias" will appear on Shellock's rap sheet. If the "actual [M.F.] gets stopped for anything, he could get arrested for a warrant that's not his." Motion for Acquittal, the Verdict, and Sentencing
At the close of evidence, defense counsel moved for acquittal on the false impersonation charge, arguing "the simple failure to stop the identification process" by allowing himself to be fingerprinted was not "affirmatively an act" under section 529. In response, the prosecutor explained, "when you're being booked into jail, the act of a fingerprint rolling, which is actually a step further than even just signing your name on a citation . . . is enough of an overt act for purposes of [section] 529. You're giving your name in the booking intake area saying who you are, yes, it is required that you give your fingerprints [as] part of the booking process, but you're still completing that act, holding out yourself as being another person."
The prosecutor continued, if Shellock "had stopped right there and said, you know, you're about to roll my fingerprints, this actually is not my name, . . . then it would be just the [section] 148.9," misdemeanor providing false identification to a peace officer. According to the prosecutor, Shellock took "it a step further, by allowing his [finger]prints to be rolled" and "transmitted to the Department of Justice, which then gets generated in a rap sheet." Additionally, the prosecutor noted Shellock put M.F. at "risk of being the one who was going to be charged had the officers not figured out . . . that it was, in fact, someone else." The court denied the motion for acquittal.
The jury convicted Shellock of the charges. The court found Shellock's prior convictions true and sentenced him to a total of 9 years and eight months in state prison.
DISCUSSION
Shellock contends insufficient evidence supports his false impersonation conviction. Section 529 makes it a criminal offense to falsely personate or impersonate another person, "and in that assumed character" do "any . . . act whereby, if done by the person falsely personated . . . might . . . become liable to any suit or prosecution, or to pay any sum of money, or to incur any charge, forfeiture, or penalty, or whereby any benefit might accrue to the party personating . . . ." (§ 529, subd. (a)(3).)
"Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish a violation of the statute under a proper construction of the statute is subject to deferential review. [Citation.] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, our 'task is to "review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ' " (People v. Guion (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1447.)
A person "must commit two acts to violate . . . section 529. He . . . first must falsely impersonate another person and, while doing so, commit an additional act that ' "is something beyond, or compounding, the initial false personation." ' " (Collier v. Harris (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 41, 56; People v. Chardon (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 205, 212 (Chardon) [section 529 requires an additional act but "does not require the additional act to occur on a separate occasion"].) Shellock concedes he falsely impersonated M.F., but claims he did not commit an additional act within the meaning of section 529. According to Shellock, he did not "do" anything; instead, the fingerprinting "was done to [him] by someone else." Shellock reasons that "allowing himself to be fingerprinted" is not an additional act under section 529.
We disagree. Section 529 does not require an affirmative act, only an act that might subject the person falsely personated to become liable to any suit or prosecution or to pay any sum of money, or specifically intend to benefit defendant himself or another person. (§ 529, subd. (a)(3).) A refusal to act satisfies the statute. (See People v. Stacy (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1235-1236 [refusal to complete mandatory chemical testing constituted an additional act within the meaning of section 529].) Here, Shellock's consent and submission to being booked and fingerprinted while masquerading as M.F. satisfied the additional act requirement in section 529. This act was not merely part of Shellock's initial impersonation of M.F., when Shellock said, "I'm [M.F.]" as Officer Torr presented M.F.'s driver's license. (See, e.g., People v. Cole (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1676 [giving a false middle name and birth date do not qualify as additional acts]; People v. Casarez (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1192 [defendant's act of representing a birth certificate as his own was merely reiterating his original claim that he was his brother].)
Instead, Shellock allowed himself to be booked and fingerprinted as M.F., an additional act which heightened M.F.'s criminal liability by permanently identifying his name as one of Shellock's aliases, and by exposing M.F. to potential arrest if Shellock failed to appear and a warrant was issued. Two cases support our conclusion. (Chardon, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 212; People v. Robertson (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1282-1283 (Robertson), abrogated on another point in People v. Rathert (2000) 24 Cal.4th 200.) For example, in Chardon, the defendant gave her sister's name during a traffic stop. (Chardon, at pp. 208-209.) When the law enforcement officer returned with a citation in the sister's name, the defendant signed her sister's "name to the citation's 'promise to appear.' " (Id. at p. 209.) Chardon determined the defendant's act of signing her sister's name on the citation's promise to appear was "an additional act which exposed her sister not only to liability for the citation but also to potential criminal liability for failing to appear at the scheduled hearing." (Id. at p. 212.)
Robertson reached a similar conclusion. There, the defendant was arrested and "falsely identified himself to the arresting officer as his brother. (Robertson, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1282.) Then the defendant "continued masquerading as his brother throughout his arraignment," signed "a booking form and a release form again using his brother's name" and failed to appear at a scheduled hearing, resulting in the issuance of a bench warrant for his brother's arrest. (Ibid.) As in Chardon and Robertson, Shellock's consent and submission to fingerprinting while masquerading as M.F. was "something beyond, or compounding, the initial false personation" and, as a result, it constituted an additional act within the meaning of section 529. (People v. Stacy, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.)
We are not persuaded by Shellock's passing suggestion that M.F. did not face "potential liability" as required by section 529, nor by his claim that any potential liability was attributable solely to the Department of Justice. --------
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Jones, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Needham, J. /s/_________
Bruiniers, J.