Opinion
No. 1-12-0159
03-03-2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL SHANNON, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from
the Circuit Court
of Cook County
05 CR 6899
Honorable
Diane Cannon,
Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hoffman and Delort concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of a witness regarding a prior conviction and arrest; defendant was not denied a fair trial when the trial court admonished defense counsel in front of the jury, or when the trial court made its own objections during defense counsel's cross-examination; and the prosecution's remarks during closing arguments did not deny defendant the right to a fair trial or violate a trial court order. ¶ 1 Defendant Darryl Shannon was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and sentenced to natural life in prison. Defendant now appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of one of the State's witnesses, (2) he was denied a fair trial when the trial court admonished defense counsel in front of the jury, (3) he was denied a fair trial when the trial court acted like a prosecutor in the case, and (4) he was denied a fair trial when the State argued that defendant had fled the state to avoid prosecution in this case. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Defendant was charged with armed robbery, aggravated vehicular highjacking, and the first-degree murder of the victim Warren Johnson. A jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder and he was sentenced to natural life in prison. ¶ 4 At trial, Timikyo Johnson testified that in October 2003, she lived at 2450 South State Street in a housing project. The victim, who was 46 years old at the time, was her uncle. Her uncle's son, Antonio Johnson, lived in the same complex. Timikyo testified that on October 11, 2003, at around 10 p.m., she was outside her building with Antonio when the victim arrived in a white Mercedes Benz with a man Timikyo did not know. He parked the car in the liquor store parking lot across the street and came over with the man, whom he introduced as "Shannon." Timikyo left a short time later and learned the next day that her uncle had been killed. She later identified "Shannon" as defendant in a photo array. ¶ 5 Michael Banks testified that the victim was his best friend, and that he had known him for over 30 years. On October 11, 2003, at around 10 p.m., Banks was outside the building at 2450 South State Street with Timikyo and Antonio. The victim arrived in a white Mercedes Benz and parked in the liquor store across the street. The victim was with another man, who Banks identified in court as defendant. The victim gave Banks $15 to wash the car, and when the victim pulled out a "wad of money," defendant's "eyes got bigger." The victim then drove away with defendant. Banks identified defendant in a photo array and at a lineup at the police station. ¶ 6 Banks admitted he had felony convictions for possession of a controlled substance in 2007 and 2008. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked if Banks smoked crack cocaine in 2003, to which Banks responded that he did not. Defense counsel then attempted to question Banks regarding a 2001 conviction and a 2002 arrest. The State objected and the trial court sustained the objections. ¶ 7 Christine Primbas testified that in October 2003, she was married to Joe Pelagrino and they lived at 7356 South Shore Drive in a six-flat building. Primbas was self employed. She acquired apartment buildings to rehabilitate and then rented them out. She also worked for Pelagrino, who owned apartment buildings. In October 2003, the victim worked for Pelagrino as a caretaker of the buildings that Pelagrino owned. Primbas saw the victim every day, and he was like family to her. She testified that she trusted him, and that the victim had a key to her apartment. The victim did chores for her and was in charge of collecting rents from tenants. As part of his payment, the victim lived rent free in one of Pelagrino's buildings. ¶ 8 On October 11, 2003, Primbas saw the victim in the parking lot of her building. She was on her way to a hospital in Minnesota because her husband was sick. A white Mercedes Benz that belonged to Primbas' son was in the garage when she left. The victim did not have permission to use it. Primbas later learned that the victim had been driving her son's white Mercedes just before he died. ¶ 9 Lawrence White testified that on October 12, 2003, at around 1 a.m., he was driving southbound on the 7200 block of Cornell Street when he came to a stop because a white Mercedes Benz was stopped in the street at an angle and White could not get around it. White observed a man lying on the ground and another man standing over him. No one was inside the car and the driver's side door was open and the lights inside were on. White then heard two gunshots as the man on the ground called for help. Another car then pulled up and White heard someone yell to call 9-1-1. The man who had been standing got into the Mercedes and drove away. White pursued the Mercedes, but lost the car and was unable to get the license plate number. White did not return to the scene. White testified that he read about the incident the next day in the paper, and learned that the man had died. He called the police and met with police officers, but he was unable to identify the shooter because he did not see the man's face. He was able to identify the white Mercedes. ¶ 10 Lieutenant Reyes Moran testified that on October 12, 2003, at around 1 a.m., he and Commander Ernest Brown received a call about a shooting at 7209 South Cornell. They arrived on the scene within two and a half to three minutes of the call. Moran observed a black male leaning to the side and holding the left side of his chest. Two witnesses came out of their houses after the police car pulled up. Brown spoke to the two men while Moran asked the victim who shot him. The victim responded that he was shot by "Shannon," who was from the neighborhood, and when the victim was giving him a ride home. The victim described Shannon as a black male in his forties. Moran asked the victim if anything had been taken and the victim informed Moran about the 1992 Mercedes Benz, and he also stated that his wallet had been stolen. Moran wrote down the victim's responses in his notebook. ¶ 11 Moran testified that two more officers arrived on the scene about three minutes later and took control of the scene. Commander Brown transmitted the information about "Shannon" and the white Mercedes by radio. ¶ 12 On cross-examination, defense counsel held up a copy of Moran's notebook page and asked Moran about it. The trial court stated that the page was not admissible and that defense counsel should not refer to it. The court also instructed the jury that police reports were inadmissible. ¶ 13 Chicago Police Officer Juanakeasha Jones testified that she arrived on the scene just after Officers Moran and Brown. Jones approached the victim and Moran informed Jones that the victim had been shot. Jones asked the victim who shot him and he responded it was "Shannon," a guy from the neighborhood. Jones asked why Shannon shot him and the victim responded that Shannon took his car and his wallet. An ambulance then arrived and transported the victim to the hospital. ¶ 14 Dr. Mitra Kalelkar testified that the victim died from multiple gunshot wounds, and that a blood test revealed a blood alcohol level of .028 and a small amount of cocaine. ¶ 15 Maurice Lyons testified that on October 12, 2003, at around 3 a.m., he was at a party. He was out on the street with his friend Vallejo Nicholas, who was talking to a man Lyons had never seen before. The man introduced himself as "Dwayne." Dwayne asked Lyons if he wanted to rent a white Mercedes in exchange for crack cocaine. Lyons did not have drugs so he offered Dwayne twenty dollars. Dwayne gave Lyons the keys to the car. ¶ 16 Lyons testified that he noticed blood in the back seat of the car so he washed the inside and outside before he drove to his girlfriend's place. Lyons also observed a large hole in the back seat. He found a wallet in the glove compartment that contained identification for the victim, Warren Johnson. When Lyons returned the keys to Dwayne, Lyons asked why there was blood in the car. Dwayne claimed his daughter had hurt her knee. Lyons identified "Dwayne" as defendant in a photo array at the police station the next day. ¶ 17 Arraqueeb Abdullah testified that on October 12, 2003, he was at Vallejo Nicholas' house with Nicholas and Lyons. A man, who later identified himself as Al, arrived in a white Mercedes and asked if Abdullah wanted to rent the car in exchange for crack cocaine. Abdullah spoke to his friend Will, who provided the drugs, and Abdullah and Will took the car. ¶ 18 Abdullah testified that the next day, on October 13, 2012, he picked up his friend Eugene in the Mercedes. He noticed a pinkish stain in the back seat and a hole that looked like a cigarette burn. At around 1:30 p.m., he and Eugene were pulled over by a police officer. At the police station, Abdullah identified a photo of defendant as the person he knew as "Al." ¶ 19 Chicago Police Officer Gerald Ostapin testified that he was assigned to process the Mercedes. He observed red stains in various areas which appeared to be blood, and he observed a hole in the back passenger seat on the driver's side which could have been a bullet hole. He found a wallet which contained the victim's identification, and a book of checks for Thomas Primbas. Ostapin found a hole in the trunk and a fired bullet in the trunk. Swabs were taken of the blood stains, which later were found to contain a single DNA profile that belonged to the victim. ¶ 20 Chicago Detective Timothy Murphy testified that after interviewing witnesses, he began looking for defendant. He went to several addresses but was unable to find him. After Murphy spoke to Carla Phillips on October 30, 2003, he started looking for defendant in Memphis, Tennessee. Murphy then obtained an arrest warrant for defendant and on January 19, 2004, Murphy located defendant in Memphis. Murphy began extradition proceedings to bring defendant back to Illinois and on February 7, 2005, Murphy and his partner went to Tennessee where they arrested defendant and brought him back to Illinois. ¶ 21 Paulette Sutton, an expert in blood stain pattern analysis, testified for the defense. She testified that the crime scene was not properly documented in this case and that she was unable to determine whether the victim was shot inside or outside the car. ¶ 22 After closing arguments, defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to natural life in prison, and he now appeals.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of one of the State's witnesses, (2) he was denied a fair trial when the trial court admonished defense counsel in front of the jury, (3) he was denied a fair trial when the trial court acted like a prosecutor in the case, and (4) he was denied a fair trial when the State argued that defendant had fled the state to avoid prosecution in this case. ¶ 25 A. Defense Counsel's Cross-Examination of Michael Banks ¶ 26 Defendant's first argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of Michael Banks regarding Banks' prior convictions. Specifically, defendant contends that defense counsel should have been allowed to question Banks regarding a 2001 conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia and a 2002 arrest for theft. The State responds that the trial court properly limited the cross-examination where the court's comments and instructions to defense counsel merely corrected defense counsel's strategic decision to inject improper evidence into the record. ¶ 27 The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VI) guarantees a defendant the right to cross-examine a witness against him for the purpose of showing the witness' bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely. People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 536 (2000). However, a trial judge may impose limits on a defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness without offending defendant's sixth amendment right. People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 144 (1988). "A trial judge retains wide latitude to impose reasonable limits based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or of little relevance." People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 355 (2009). ¶ 28 On review, we are not required to isolate the particular limitation on cross-examination to determine whether reversible error has occurred. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145. Rather, the question is whether " 'defendant's inability to make the inquiry created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving him of the ability to test the truth of the witness's direct testimony.' " Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145 (quoting United States v. Rogers, 475 F. 2d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 1973)). We look to the record in its entirety and the alternative means open to defendant to impeach the witness. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145. Any limitation of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 357 (1992). ¶ 29 In regards to Banks' 2001 conviction, defendant contends that Banks claimed he did not use crack cocaine in 2003, at the time of the incident, and that defense counsel had the right to impeach him on this point with evidence of his prior conviction in 2001 for possession of drug paraphernalia, which defense counsel believed was a crack cocaine pipe. On direct examination the State had elicited testimony from Banks that he had felony convictions for possession of a controlled substance from 2007 and 2008. On cross-examination, Banks stated that he was not smoking crack in 2003, at the time of the incident. Defense counsel asked about Banks' felony convictions for smoking crack in 2007 and 2008, to which Banks answered "[b]y that time, that was afterwards." Defense counsel then attempted to ask Banks if he had been arrested for possession in 2001, but the State objected and the trial court sustained the objection. ¶ 30 Defense counsel then asked Banks, "You weren't smoking crack until 2007 and 2008 when you were convicted?" To which Banks responded, "Yeah." Defense counsel again tried question Banks about the 2001 conviction, but the State objected and the trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel asked if Banks was still smoking crack today, to which he responded, "No." Then defense counsel stated: "You carry around a lot of drug paraphernalia for someone not smoking crack." The State objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel then asked, "you have [been] arrested several times?" The trial court sustained the State's objection and then stated, "Counsel, there are no when did you stop beating your wife questions in this courtroom." ¶ 31 Defendant now argues that he had a right to impeach Banks' testimony that his crack cocaine use did not start until 2007 with his prior 2001 conviction, which defense counsel "believed was a crack cocaine pipe." Defendant also argues that questioning Banks about this prior conviction was relevant because it could have revealed whether he believed that it was in his best interest to cooperate when the police questioned him in this case. ¶ 32 Here, there is no indication from the record that Banks' 2001 drug paraphernalia conviction was related to or had anything to do with crack cocaine, or a crack cocaine pipe. Moreover, the 2001 conviction was a misdemeanor conviction, which cannot be used for impeachment. See People v. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d 463, 475 (1985) (witness may be impeached by attacking his character, but only with felony convictions, not with proofs of arrest, indictments, charges, or actual commissions of crimes). While the fact that a witness has been arrested or charged with a crime may be shown or inquired into where it would reasonably tend to show that his testimony might be influenced by interest, bias, or a motive to testify falsely, defendant has presented no evidence to show how the 2001 conviction would tend to show that his testimony regarding the 2003 incident was in any way influenced by a motive to testify falsely. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d at 475. ¶ 33 In regards to Banks' 2002 arrest for theft, which was stricken off with leave to reinstate, defendant contends that he should have been allowed to question Banks about the arrest because it was relevant to show Banks' potential interest, bias, or motive to testify favorably for the State. However, the State may reinstate a cause that has been stricken with leave to reinstate if done within the limitation period, which is three years for a felony prosecution and one year and six months for a misdemeanor prosecution. 720 ILCS 5/3-5 (West 2010). Here, the theft arrest took place in 2002, and Banks testified in the instant case in 2011. We therefore do not see how the 2002 theft arrest showed Banks' potential motive to testify favorably for the State. ¶ 34 Moreover, we find that defendant's inability to inquire into Banks' 2001 conviction and Banks' 2002 arrest did not create a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving him of the ability to test the truth of Banks' direct testimony. See Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145.
¶ 35 B. Trial Court Admonishment
¶ 36 Defendant's next argument on appeal is that the trial court violated defendant's right to a fair trial when it stated, at the end of Banks' testimony: "Counsel, there's no when did you stop beating your wife questions in this courtroom." The State maintains that defendant received a fair trial and that defendant failed to prove that the remark by the judge was prejudicial and that he was harmed by it. ¶ 37 A criminal defendant has the right to a fair and impartial trial by jury, free from influence or intimidation by the trial court. People v. Mitchell, 228 Ill. App. 3d 167, 169 (1992). Every defendant, regardless of the nature of the proof against him or her, is entitled to a trial that is free from improper and prejudicial comments on the part of the trial judge. People v. Stokes, 293 Ill. App. 3d 643, 648 (1997). Allegations ofjudicial bias or prejudice must be viewed in context and should be evaluated in terms of the trial judge's specific reaction to the events taking place. People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247, 277 (2001). The fact that a judge displays displeasure or irritation with an attorney's behavior is not necessarily evidence of judicial bias against the defendant or his counsel. People v. Urdiales, 225 Ill. 2d 354, 426 (2007) (citing Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d at 277). Comments by a court do not require reversal, however, unless they are prejudicial and harm the defendant. Stokes, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 648. Judicial comments can amount to reversible error if the defendant can establish that such comments were "a material factor in the conviction or were such that an effect on the jury verdict was the probable result." People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 137 (1988). ¶ 38 Here, defense counsel repeatedly attempted to question Banks regarding his 2001 conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sustained the State's objection to that line of questioning three times before it made the comment at issue. We do not find that the remark in question amounted to reversible error. Taken in context, the remark did not show such animosity towards defense counsel that the trial court's attitude affected the jury. See People v. Rivers, 294 Ill. App. 3d 601, 605 (1998). Rather, the trial court was attempting to prevent defense counsel from continuing to pursue a line of questioning that was improper. Defendant does not point to any evidence, and there is nothing in the record, to indicate that defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's remark to defense counsel.
¶ 39 C. Trial Court Acted as Prosecutor
¶ 40 Defendant's next contention on appeal is that the trial court violated defendant's right to a fair trial when it acted like a prosecutor in the case. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court interrupted defense counsel during her cross-examination of two of the State's witnesses, and during the State's closing arguments. During the cross-examination of Lieutenant Moran, the trial court interrupted defense counsel as she began to question Moran regarding a copy of a page from Moran's notebook. The trial court noted that the page was not admissible and that counsel should not refer to it. The trial court also told the jury that police reports were not admissible. ¶ 41 During cross-examination of Maurice Lyons, defense counsel asked Lyons if he told police he obtained the Mercedes from a man named "Dwayne." The trial court noted that was an attempt to elicit a prior consistent statement, and that unless defense counsel had impeachment testimony, the police officers would testify as to what Lyons told the police. Finally, during closing arguments, the trial court struck two of defense counsel's statements without an objection from the State. One was regarding where Christine Primbas lived, and the other was a statement about cutting the victim slack for drug usage, addiction, and the tendency to take things without permission. The State responds that each of these "interruptions" by the trial court were proper, and did not amount to the trial court acting as a prosecutor. We agree. ¶ 42 The right of a defendant to an unbiased, open-minded trier of fact is rooted in the constitutional guaranty of due process of law and entitles defendant to a fair and impartial trial. People v. Eckert, 194 Ill. App. 3d 667, 673 (1990). Although a trial judge has great latitude in the courtroom, his or her discretion is not without limit. People v. Phuong, 287 Ill. App. 3d 988, 993 (1997). "The standard of judicial conduct requires a judge to be fair and impartial whether the defendant has a jury trial or a bench trial." People v. Cofield, 9 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1051 (1973). ¶ 43 From our review of the record in the instant case, we find that the trial judge at no point assumed the role of prosecutor. The trial judge did not call witnesses or conduct its own examination. See Cofield, 9 Ill. App. 3d at 1051 (trial judge acted as prosecutor where it called State's witnesses, conducted the examinations, asked questions directed at eliciting testimony to support the allegations against the defendant, and called witnesses to refresh recollections). Rather, the trial judge merely made rulings without objections from counsel, which was wholly within its discretion. A court has the power to ensure that proceedings before it are orderly. People v. Griffin, 194 Ill. App. 3d 286, 294 (1990). "[A] court is permitted to make rulings without objections from counsel." People v. Thigpen, 306 Ill. App. 3d 29, 40 (1999) (citing People v. Jackson, 250 Ill. App. 3d 192, 204 (1993)). ¶ 44 Moreover, even if the trial judge's actions were improper, in order for a trial judge's comment to merit reversal, there must be prejudice. People v. Snulligan, 204 Ill. App. 3d 110, 115 (1990). The defendant must establish that the comments were a material factor in his or her conviction. People v. Thompson, 234 Ill. App. 3d 770, 773 (1991). Here, defendant makes no argument regarding prejudice resulting from the judge's comments.
¶ 45 D. State's Rebuttal Closing Argument
¶ 46 Defendant's final argument on appeal is that defendant was denied a fair trial when the State argued during closing arguments that defendant fled Chicago to avoid prosecution. Defendant contends that prior to closing arguments, the trial court granted defendant's motion in limine barring the State from arguing flight, yet the State repeatedly violated the ruling and the trial court overruled all of defendant's objections to the improper argument. The State responds that its closing arguments were based on the evidence and did not violate the motion in limine. ¶ 47 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting that the State be precluded from arguing that defendant fled the Chicago area because he was wanted for the murder of the victim. The trial court ruled that the State could introduce evidence that defendant was arrested in Tennessee. The trial court noted that it was permissible to elicit that the crime occurred in Chicago and that defendant was arrested two years later for the crime in the state of Tennessee, but "[w]ith regards to the flight and why he fled or when he fled of course, I will reserve ruling until I hear the evidence." ¶ 48 At trial, evidence was introduced that the victim was shot and killed on October 11, 2003, and that the police began looking for defendant on October 14, 2003. The police spoke to defendant's sister who told police officers that defendant was in Memphis, Tennessee. The police then began looking for defendant in Memphis. On January 14, 2004, the police obtained an arrest warrant for defendant, and on January 19, 2004, the police began extradition proceedings to bring defendant back to Illinois from Memphis. Defendant was arrested and extradited from Memphis on February 19, 2004. ¶ 49 Prior to closing arguments, defendant contended that evidence of "flight" had not been established, and thus the State should be precluded from arguing flight during closing arguments. The trial court found that the State could argue that defendant left the jurisdiction, but said, "[d]on't use the word flight." ¶ 50 During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that the evidence of defendant's guilt was weak because police did not recover a gun, a bullet, or a magazine from defendant. Defense counsel commented that gunshot residue evidence and trace evidence was never collected. During rebuttal closing arguments, the State made the following remarks in response:
"On October 13 two days later - one day later actually when police went¶ 51 Defendant contends that although the State did not specifically use the word "flight," its argument clearly violated the motion in limine. Generally, prosecutors have wide latitude in the content of their closing arguments. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 225 (2004). Statements must be considered in the context of the closing arguments as a whole, and counsel may comment upon defense characterizations of the evidence or case. Id. "The prosecutor has a right to comment on the evidence and draw all legitimate inferences deducible therefrom, even if they are unfavorable to defendant." People v. Jackson, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1016 (1997). Further, in the context of rebuttal argument, "when defense counsel provokes a response, the defendant cannot complain that the prosecutor's reply denied him a fair trial." People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 445 (1993); People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 43 (1996) (because the comments were invited, they cannot be relied upon as error on appeal). We will find reversible error based upon improper comments during closing arguments only "if a defendant can identify remarks of the prosecutor that were both improper and so prejudicial that 'real justice [was] denied or that the verdict of the jury may have resulted from the error.' " People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 247-48 (1993) (quoting People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 503, 533 (1983)). ¶ 52 In this case, the State's comments in rebuttal closing argument were based on the evidence, and any legitimate inferences therefrom, and were invited by defense counsel's closing argument. As stated above, evidence showed that police officers eventually located defendant in Memphis, and that the officers then arrested him and extradited him to Illinois. Therefore, the State's comments that defendant was nowhere to be found after the car was recovered, and that he was not in Illinois, but had to be dragged back here pursuant to an extradition, were all based on the evidence or inferences therefrom. The State never mentioned the word "flight" and was therefore not in violation of the trial court's ruling regarding that issue. Additionally, the comments made by the prosecutor were invited by defense counsel's closing arguments where defense counsel noted that no evidence of a gun or gun residue was found on defendant. The prosecutor responded to those comments by stating that defendant was not brought back from Tennessee until February of 2005, which is why there was no gun evidence found on defendant after the car was located. Moreover, even if we were to have found that the remarks made by the State were improper, defendant has not produced any evidence to show that the remarks were so prejudicial that real justice was denied or that the verdict of the jury was a result of the improper remarks. See Jones, 156 Ill. 2d at 247-48.
looking for [Lyons] where was he? In his house. He didn't run away. He didn't go hide somewhere because [he] had nothing to hide. They didn't find him in Memphis, Tennessee.
***
Once the car got recovered by police, [defendant] was nowhere to be found in Chicago or Illinois." *** He took off. And he had to be dragged back here *** pursuant to an extradition after a warrant was issued for his arrest. *** And if he had bothered to stick around, they could have swabbed his hands and found the gun shot [sic] residue so it would have been there after he shot Warren Johnson. But he ran. He went to Tennessee, and wasn't brought back *** until February of 2005. So why is anyone talking about gun shot [sic] residue?"
¶ 53 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 54 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgement of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 55 Affirmed.