MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

THIS is an original proceeding brought pursuant to Rule 116, R.C.P. Colo., involving a question of great public importance, to-wit; Which of the two defendants is lawfully entitled to hold the office of county commissioner in district No. 1, in Garfield County, Colorado. The facts are stipulated.

The late Freeman S. James entered upon the office of county commissioner on January 13, 1959, the term of said office to expire on January 8, 1963. On November 6, 1962, James was re-elected as county commissioner for the new term beginning January 8, 1963. Nine days after the election he died.

To the vacancy thus created the defendant Robert L. Quimby was appointed by the then Governor of Colorado, Hon. Stephen L. R. McNichols, his appointment stating: " * * * to hold office as by statute provided, to-wit: until the next general election and until his successor elected thereat shall be duly qualified * * *." Commissioner Quimby took office pursuant to said appointment on the 21st day of November, 1962, and claims to be entitled to continue therein until after the general election in 1964, when whomsoever is elected "thereat" qualifies.

Believing that a vacancy existed in the commissioner's office at the expiration of the term of Commissioner James on January 8, 1963, the present Governor of the State of Colorado, Hon. John A. Love, on January 29, 1963, appointed defendant Diemoz to the office. Defendant Diemoz having taken his oath of office, assumed to take over the same, but defendant Quimby has refused to recognize the vacancy or the appointment.

The question is thus presented as to whether Quimby, by virtue of his appointment in November of 1962, or Diemoz, by virtue of his appointment on January 29, 1963, is rightfully entitled to the position of commissioner of Garfield County.

Several sections of the Colorado Constitution and several of the state statutes are involved. Article XIV, section 9, reads:

"Vacancies — how filled. — In case of a vacancy occurring in the office of county commissioner, the governor shall fill the same by appointment; and in case of a vacancy in any other county office, or in any precinct office, the board of county commissioners shall fill the same by appointment; and the person appointed shall hold the office until the next general election, or until the vacancy be filled by election according to law."

Article XII, section 10 of the Constitution, provides:

"Refusal to qualify — vacancy — If any person elected or appointed to any office shall refuse or neglect to qualify therein within the time prescribed by law, such office shall be deemed vacant."

C.R.S. '53, 35-3-9, is merely a re-statement by the Legislature of Article XIV, section 9 of the Constitution. Considering Article XIV, section 9 of the Constitution alone, it would seem that there is no ambiguity and that the answer is readily apparent. Nevertheless, this court in 1909, faced with a similar problem involving the appointment of a county officer, a sheriff, rather than a county commissioner, but nevertheless being confronted with the same article of the constitution, held that it was not capable of interpretation without also taking into consideration Article XII, section 10. Considering the one relevant to the other, the court in People ex rel. Callaway v. De Guelle, 47 Colo. 13, 105 Pac. 1110, held that a new vacancy exists when the one term expires and the new term of office begins. The court said:

"It is clear to our minds that a person elected or appointed to fill a vacancy in an unexpired term of a public office, such as sheriff, holds precisely as his predecessor would have held had he continued in office, and in other no way; and has the same rights, and none other, that such predecessor would have had.

* * *

"Considering together the several constitutional provisions involved, and giving to each the meaning which the language necessarily implies, it is clear that when a person is elected to a term, under the constitution, a contingent or inchoate right to the office is vested in him, which becomes absolute upon his qualification. He is elected to the term and no one else can enter therein until he is ousted therefrom, which can never be until the commencement of the term. When he does not qualify, the contingent right is gone. There is no one legally entitled to the term, and when the date of the term arrives there is a vacancy under the constitution, though there be some one actually and legally performing the duties of the office.

"The law that created the office established the right to hold the office by terms of two years each. — § 848, Mills' Ann. Stats. It, in effect, divided the future into periods of two years, and designated each period a term. When the law created the term, and fixed the commencement and ending of each term, it provided for the filling of each term by a biennial election, but does not permit the person chosen to assume the duties of the office until he files a bond and oath of office, which must be done before the commencement of the term, or 'the office shall be deemed vacant.' — § 10, art. XII, Colo. Const.

"'Vacancy applies not to the incumbent, but to the term, or to the office, or both, whether to the term, or to the office, or both, depending generally upon the context,' is the doctrine declared in People ex rel. v. Le Fevre, 21 Colo. 218, 230.

* * *

"We have no hesitancy in declaring that an appointee to fill a vacancy under our law holds until the next general election, if no new term intervenes between the time of his appointment and the time of such election, but if a new term commences during the interval, the term of the appointee ends and the one entitled to the new term has a right thereto, but if such one on the arrival of the term does not appear and qualify, though the reason thereof be death, there is a vacancy in the office for the term; that until an appointment is made, the incumbent of the previous term holds over, but when an appointment is made, and the appointee qualifies, the previous term, and the rights of the incumbent to the office, are ended."

[1, 2] The doctrine of "stare decisis" should be adhered to in the absence of sound reason for rejecting it. If a decision is palpably wrong or great social changes have been wrought so as to make the prior decision repugnant to rather than in aid of the constitution, a court may be justified in overruling prior interpretation of the constitution. No such compelling reasons present themselves here. The prior decisions give full credence to a rule of construction that requires two sections to be construed, if possible, so that both may stand and effect may be given to each. As recently as November 20, 1961, in a case not similar in facts but on an occasion when this court determined to re-state the doctrine of "stare decisis," Chief Justice Hall, writing for the court, in Creacy v. Industrial Commission, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384, commented:

"* * * Under the doctrine of stare decisis courts are very reluctant to undo settled law. This doctrine has for its object, uniformity, certainty, and stability of the law and the rights acquired thereunder. The rule of stare decisis is not a doctrine of mortmain; it does not exclude room for growth in the law and the courts are not without power to depart from a prior ruling, or to overrule it, where sound reasons exist and where the general interests will suffer less by such departure than from a strict adherence."

In the same case the language of Mr. Chief Justice Burke, speaking in Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d 926, was adopted:

"* * * the question would thus seem to be definitely and finally disposed of in this jurisdiction under the rule of stare decises (sic). We are not unconscious of the fact that rule is frequently ignored, with the general approval of the courts, for certain definite and often valid reasons. Among these are doubtful decisions handed down by closely divided courts and recent decisions establishing rules not yet firmly embedded in the jurisprudence of the jurisdiction. No such reason can possibly exist here. The best reason, and the one perhaps most frequently invoked to justify a departure from the rule, is that the case under consideration by the court demonstrates that adherence thereto will either promote injustice or defeat justice. No such reason exists in the instant case for any present change in the rule * * *."

There is considerable authority contrary to the Colorado view in other jurisdictions (see 74 A.L.R. 486) with the Colorado view being classified as that of the minority. If we were confronted with this question for the first time, or even for the first time since 1909, there might be some justification for following the majority rule. However, ten years after the De Guelle decision, the court had an opportunity to re-examine its position and interpretation in Gibbs v. People, 66 Colo. 414, 182 Pac. 894 (1919). There the court, expressly affirming the De Guelle case, stated in reference to the latter that:

"* * * we there held unqualifiedly that under such provision a vacancy occurs, whether the failure to qualify comes through wilful neglect or refusal, or through impossibility because of death. And we also there held, which question was likewise then necessarily before us for decision, that the word 'vacancy' relates to term of office as well as to the office itself, either or both, according to the facts of the particular case.

"In strict conformity with the conclusion in the De Guelle case, and upon general principles and authority, we hold that, under the undisputed facts, there was a vacancy in the term of office of the County Clerk and Recorder of Delta County at the time the Commissioners appointed Watts. That his appointment was in all respects regular and proper, and that he having duly qualified, is entitled to the office. * * *"

Accordingly, we hold that the law in the situation presented is controlled by Article XIV, section 9, and Article XII, section 10 of the state constitution, which this court has previously held must be read and construed together.

It follows that Adolph Diemoz is the rightful holder of the office of County Commissioner of District No. 1 of Garfield County, Colorado, pursuant to his appointment by the Governor to fill the vacancy existing in the office for the term beginning January 8, 1963. Judgment will enter accordingly.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FRANTZ dissents.

MR. JUSTICE SUTTON not participating.