Opinion
2018–07286 Ind. No. 8761/15
09-11-2019
The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Dwayne OTTEY, Appellant.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Isa Chakarian and Iskuhi Grigoryev of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Joyce Slevin of counsel), for respondent.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Isa Chakarian and Iskuhi Grigoryev of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Joyce Slevin of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER ORDERED that the order is affirmed.
In 2015, the defendant, a citizen of Jamaica, who had been brought into this country illegally when he was 22 months old, and his codefendant, were charged with 30 counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, 2 counts of criminal possession of forgery devices, and 5 counts of petit larceny in connection with the possession of forged and blank Target RED cards. The defendant was also charged in a separate indictment with grand larceny in the third degree and attempted grand larceny in the third degree in connection with the purchase of merchandise using stolen account information. The two indictments were later consolidated.
At the plea proceeding, defense counsel stated on the record that he had advised the defendant that the crimes of grand larceny in the third degree and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, as charged in the indictments, constituted aggravated felonies. Counsel stated that conviction of those crimes would result in mandatory deportation and be a permanent bar to reentry into the United States and to obtaining a green card or citizenship. Counsel also stated that he had explained to the defendant that the defendant's best alternative would be to plead guilty to criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, which was not an aggravated felony. Counsel also advised the defendant that pleading guilty to that crime would nevertheless still carry immigration consequences, in that the defendant could not seek to cancel removal proceedings if apprehended by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter ICE). Counsel then proceeded to advise the defendant in the presence of the court that if the defendant married his longtime girlfriend, with whom he shares two children, all of whom are United States citizens, the defendant would have to obtain an I–601 waiver of his inadmissibility, upon a showing that his denial of admission into the United States would cause an extreme hardship on her, before he could file to become a lawful permanent resident.
The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and received a sentence of five years' probation. Several months later, he was apprehended by ICE and ordered to be deported to Jamaica.
The defendant filed a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment of conviction on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel advised him that his plea would avoid deportation and allow him to obtain a green card through marriage to his girlfriend. The People opposed the motion on the ground that the advice that defense counsel provided to the defendant was correct. The Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing, finding that both defense counsel and the court correctly advised the defendant of the immigration consequences of his plea of guilty.
"A criminal defendant is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under both the federal and the state constitutions" ( People v. Bassi , 111 A.D.3d 845, 845, 975 N.Y.S.2d 158 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see U.S. Const. Amend VI ; NY Const. art I, § 6 ; People v. Turner , 5 N.Y.3d 476, 806 N.Y.S.2d 154, 840 N.E.2d 123 ). Under the United States Constitution, an attorney's misadvice or misstatements regarding the removal consequences in the context of a plea of guilty constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel (see Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 369, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 ; Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ; People v. McDonald , 1 N.Y.3d 109, 114–115, 769 N.Y.S.2d 781, 802 N.E.2d 131 ). Generally, "the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense" ( Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. at 687–688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). To demonstrate prejudice, "the defendant ‘must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial’ " ( People v. Hernandez , 22 N.Y.3d 972, 975, 978 N.Y.S.2d 711, 1 N.E.3d 785, quoting Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 ; see Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. at 694–695, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). Under the New York Constitution, a defendant must show that he was not afforded "meaningful representation" ( People v. Baldi , 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 ), which entails a "prejudice component [that] focuses on the ‘fairness of the process as a whole rather than its particular impact on the outcome of the case’ " ( People v. Caban , 5 N.Y.3d 143, 156, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213, quoting People v. Benevento , 91 N.Y.2d 708, 714, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 ).
Here, the record supports the Supreme Court's finding that the defendant's attorney did not provide him with misadvice. In addition, the record reflects that the court advised the defendant that his plea of guilty carried adverse immigration consequences and the defendant indicated that he understood and entered the plea of guilty. As such, the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that his attorney provided him with constitutionally deficient advice or that he was deprived of meaningful representation.
RIVERA, J.P., COHEN, MALTESE and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.