Judgment unanimously affirmed. Appellant was properly tried before a City Magistrate, holding a Court of Special Sessions. Section 102-a of the New York City Criminal Courts Act does not divest the Court of Special Sessions of jurisdiction over violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which, by the provisions of that statute, are constituted misdemeanors, nor does it repeal, expressly or by implication, sections 31 or 130 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act. The provisions of law, rule or regulation relating to vehicular traffic, referred to in section 102-a, do not include the offense of which appellant was convicted. Although the record is silent as to whether or not appellant was informed, on his arraignment, of his liability, not only to a penalty, but to possible suspension or revocation of his operator's license, and his certificate of registration, as provided by section 335-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is a strong presumption that the provisions of the statute were complied with. ( People v. Fisher, 223 N.Y. 459.) If we assume, however, that they were not, the record, nevertheless, discloses that appellant entered a plea of not guilty, was represented upon trial by counsel, and vigorously contested the charge made against him. No question was raised, on trial, or on the occasion of sentence, as to any defect in the prior procedure, nor does it appear that appellant could have done anything more, or protected his rights more effectively, had he been informed as to the possible results of his conviction. Under such circumstances, the error, if any, may be disregarded. ( Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82; People ex rel. Kennedy v. Hunt, 21 N.Y.S.2d 302, affd. 257 App. Div. 1039; Code Crim. Pro., § 542.) Other contentions by appellant are without merit.