Opinion
October 16, 1995
Appeal from the County Court, Suffolk County (Weber, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
At his trial in 1988, the defendant was acquitted of intentional murder and was convicted of depraved indifference murder for the shooting death of his girlfriend. The judgment was reversed on appeal due to trial error ( see, People v. Moore, 172 A.D.2d 778). Prior to his retrial, the defendant moved on collateral estoppel and double jeopardy grounds to preclude the People from introducing into evidence all of his custodial statements to the police. He contended that, because he was acquitted of intentional murder, the jury necessarily rejected the factual account of the shooting contained in his statements. The court granted the motion only insofar as redacting those statements in which the defendant indicated that he intended to kill his girlfriend. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of manslaughter in the first degree.
Contrary to the People's contention, the defendant's plea of guilty does not preclude appellate review of his claim based on collateral estoppel. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is part of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy ( see, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436; People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478; People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32), and a plea of guilty does not operate as a forfeiture of a claim based on constitutional double jeopardy ( see, People v. Prescott, 66 N.Y.2d 216, cert denied 475 U.S. 1150).
The County Court properly granted the defendant's motion only insofar as redacting those portions of his statements to the police in which he indicated that he intended to cause the death of his girlfriend. Clearly, the ultimate issue as to whether the defendant intended to kill his victim was decided in his favor when he was acquitted of intentional murder. To preclude admission of other portions of his statements in which he described the shooting, and the events leading up to his act, the defendant had the burden of establishing that such evidentiary factual issues concerning the shooting were necessarily decided by the jury in his favor as well ( see, People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478, supra). We conclude that the defendant failed to meet this burden as the jury could have rationally based its verdict of depraved indifference murder upon the same evidentiary facts which he now seeks to foreclose from consideration ( see, e.g., People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, supra).
Because the defendant pleaded guilty with the understanding that he would receive the sentence actually imposed, he now has no basis to complain that the sentence was excessive ( see, People v. Williams, 189 A.D.2d 910; People v. Kazepis, 101 A.D.2d 816). Sullivan, J.P., O'Brien, Copertino and Krausman, JJ., concur.