Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA299300, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.
California Appellate Project, Jonathan B. Steiner, Executive Director, and Ronnie Duberstein, Staff Attorney, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Tannaz Kouhpainezhad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KRIEGLER, J.
Defendant and appellant Patrick Moore appeals from the judgment and sentence imposed after the trial court found defendant in violation of probation. Defendant argues there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that he violated probation. Because the evidence supports the trial court’s finding, we affirm.
Defendant pled no contest to resisting a public officer (Pen. Code, § 69), battery upon an officer or emergency personnel (§ 243, subd. (b)), and resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court struck two prior convictions alleged under the three strikes law before defendant entered his plea. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for the high term of three years. Execution of sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on formal probation for a period of three years with probationary conditions, including one year in a live-in drug program.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated.
The minutes of the trial court contain no statement of reasons in furtherance of justice to support the order dismissing the strikes under section 1385. The prosecution objected to dismissal of the strikes, but did not appeal from the order.
Probation was summarily revoked, based on allegations that defendant violated Vehicle Code sections 10851 and 12500. Defendant was held to answer on the Vehicle Code section 10851 charge following a felony preliminary hearing in superior court case No. BA310745. The trial court conducted a formal probation violation hearing, based upon the facts supporting the charge in case No. BA310745. Defendant was found in violation of probation. Probation was reinstated on the original terms and conditions, with a modification that defendant serve 365 days in county jail.
Facts from the Probation Violation Hearing
Werner Piedrasanta parked his 1995 Toyota Camry, license No. 4FOU982, at the Dunkin’ Donuts at 4862 Santa Monica Boulevard on October 9, 2006, at 5:10 a.m. He left the key in the ignition and engine running. He was advised that his car was being driven away, but it was already gone by the time he looked. He did not give anyone permission to take the car. He reported the car stolen and eventually retrieved it from an impound lot. He did not see who took his car.
Officer Elpidio Orozco of the Los Angeles Police Department stopped defendant on October 11, 2006, at 2:05 a.m., as defendant drove Piedrasanta’s stolen Camry. The car had its original license plate, the ignition was intact, no windows were broken, and the key was not shaved. It was stipulated by the prosecution that there was no indicia of the car being stolen. Defendant gave his correct name when pulled over and did not attempt to flee.
The trial court found defendant in violation of probation. The court found that the absence of any indicia the car was stolen had no significance, as the key was in the ignition at the time of the theft. Defendant was in possession of the stolen car one and a half days after the theft, and in light of his possession of recently stolen property, only slight evidence was necessary to establish commission of the crime. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence defendant either took the car or was involved in the taking of it.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
“The standard of proof required for revocation of probation is a preponderance of evidence to support the violation. (People v. O’Connell (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066.) Trial courts are granted great discretion in deciding whether or not to revoke probation. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 445.) ‘Absent abuse of that discretion, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s findings.’ (People v. Self (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 414, 417.)” (People v. Kelly (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 961, 965.) Preponderance of the evidence is a lower degree of proof than that needed to support a new criminal conviction. (People v. Martinez (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1161.)
Possession of recently stolen property is sufficient to support a conviction where accompanied by slight corroboration tending to show guilt. (People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754.) The absence of an explanation by a defendant for his possession of recently stolen property may provide the necessary corroboration. (Ibid.; People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1575.)
“Exemplary of the short period of time which appellant believes only appropriate for inclusion in the concept of ‘recent’ are the periods referenced in People v. Hallman (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 638, 640 (within 25 hours); People v. Banks (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 38, 40-41 (within one hour); People v. Clark (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 342, 345 (about 12 hours); People v. Reynolds (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 290, 295 (six days); People v. Conrad (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 184, 185 (following day); People v. Owens (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 290, 295 (morning after burglary discovered); People v. Smith (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 723, 724 (14 hours); People v. Citrino (1956) 46 Cal.2d 284, 286 (within a few days).” (People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 421-422, fn. 2.)
The evidence here was plainly sufficient to satisfy the requirement of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was in violation of probation. Defendant was driving Piedrasanta’s vehicle within 45 hours of the theft. No explanation of how defendant came into possession of the recently stolen car was introduced at the formal probation violation hearing. The trial court reasonably drew the inference defendant was either involved in the theft or aware of it, conclusions well within the broad discretion of the court.
There is no merit to the argument that defendant did not know the vehicle was stolen due to the absence of indicia of a theft. As pointed out by the trial court, the car was stolen with the key in the ignition, so there was no reason for there to be a damaged ignition, broken window, or any other circumstance often found in car theft prosecutions. The trial court considered the evidence and found defendant’s unexplained possession of the car was indicative of guilt. That determination was a reasonable exercise of discretion afforded to a trial court in ruling on a probation violation.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., MOSK, J.