Opinion
8383 Ind. 550/16
02-14-2019
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lonnie KNIGHT, Defendant–Appellant. The Legal Aid Society, Bronx Defenders, and Brooklyn Defender Services, Amici Curiae.
Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Robert S. Dean of counsel), and Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP, New York (Christopher J. Spelman of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Brent Ferguson of counsel), for respondent. The Legal Aid Society, New York (Martin J. LaFalce of counsel), for amici curiae.
Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Robert S. Dean of counsel), and Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP, New York (Christopher J. Spelman of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Brent Ferguson of counsel), for respondent.
The Legal Aid Society, New York (Martin J. LaFalce of counsel), for amici curiae.
Renwick, J.P., Manzanet–Daniels, Oing, Moulton, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Maxwell Wiley, J. at motions; Robert M. Mandelbaum, J. at jury trial and sentencing), rendered March 16, 2017, as amended June 16, 2017, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and theft of services, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate term of three to six years, unanimously modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, to the extent of reducing the sentence to two to four years, and otherwise affirmed.
The challenged statutes defining and prohibiting possession of gravity knives (see Penal Law §§ 265.00[5], 265.01[1], 265.02[1] ) are not unconstitutionally vague, either facially or as applied to defendant, because they provide "notice to the public and clear guidelines to law enforcement as to the precise characteristics that bring a knife under the statutory proscription" ( People v. Herbin, 86 A.D.3d 446, 446–47, 927 N.Y.S.2d 54 [1st Dept. 2011], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 859, 932 N.Y.S.2d 24, 956 N.E.2d 805 [2011] ; see Copeland v. Vance, 893 F.3d 101 [2d Cir. 2018] ). Police testimony established that defendant's knife met the statutory definition in that it could be opened by the centrifugal force produced by a wrist motion,and that it locked into place. To establish this strict liability offense, the People were not required to prove "that defendant[ ] knew that the knife in [his] possession met the statutory definition of a gravity knife" ( People v. Parrilla, 27 N.Y.3d 400, 404, 33 N.Y.S.3d 842, 53 N.E.3d 719 [2016] ). To the extent that defendant is also arguing that the verdict was not based on legally sufficient evidence or was against the weight of the evidence, we reject those arguments.
Defendant's claim that his conviction violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms is unavailing because defendant (who, we note, has multiple felony convictions) was convicted under Penal Law § 265.02(1), which criminalizes possession of weapons by persons previously convicted of crimes. States are broadly empowered to prohibit convicted criminals from possessing weapons (see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 [2008] ; People v. Johnson, 111 A.D.3d 469, 470, 974 N.Y.S.2d 453 [1st Dept. 2013], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 1157, 984 N.Y.S.2d 641, 7 N.E.3d 1129 [2014] ). Accordingly, defendant lacks standing to claim that Penal Law § 265.01(1)'s absolute prohibition of possession of gravity knives, by anyone, violates the Second Amendment (see People v. Di Raffaele, 55 N.Y.2d 234, 241, 448 N.Y.S.2d 448, 433 N.E.2d 513 [1982] ; People v. LaPage, 25 Misc.3d 890, 896, 885 N.Y.S.2d 566 [St. Lawrence Ct. 2009] ). We do not reach any other Second Amendment issues.
The trial court correctly rejected defendant's request that the jury be given the "opportunity" to experiment with defendant's knife to determine whether it had the characteristics of a gravity knife. At trial, defendant offered no explanation of how such an experiment could be performed safely by jurors (see People v. Kelly, 11 A.D.3d 133, 144, 147, 781 N.Y.S.2d 75 [1st Dept. 2004], affd 5 N.Y.3d 116, 799 N.Y.S.2d 763, 832 N.E.2d 1179 [2005] ). Moreover, the jurors observed an officer's in-court demonstration of how the knife operated. In any event, the deliberating jury never requested to experiment with the knife or even look at it, and the court was under no obligation to invite the jury to do either of these things.
By reading the statutory definition, the court properly instructed the jury on the meaning of the term gravity knife (see People v. Berrier, 223 A.D.2d 456, 637 N.Y.S.2d 69 [1st Dept. 1996], lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 876, 645 N.Y.S.2d 450, 668 N.E.2d 421 [1996] ). The court was not required to include additional language requested by defendant concerning the type or amount of centrifugal force needed to open the knife.
We find the sentence excessive to the extent indicated.