Opinion
A151254
12-04-2019
In re JUAN R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN R., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Marin County Super. Ct. No. JV26402)
Fourteen-year-old Juan R. committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and was placed on probation. He challenges the validity of a probation condition authorizing the search of his electronic devices. The case returns to this court following a grant of review and transfer by the California Supreme Court. Having complied with our high court's order directing us to vacate the prior opinion and reconsider the cause in light of In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.), we dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2017, Juan admitted committing second degree robbery. As recounted by the probation report, after asking the victim for money, Juan and three other juveniles males chased the victim, pushed him to the ground, and repeatedly punched and kicked him. One juvenile reportedly had a gun and threatened to shoot the victim. Another reached in the victim's pocket and took his wallet, which contained approximately $150 to $200. Juan denied being in a gang but several of his coparticipants were admitted gang members. Juan's mother, and sole caretaker, reported being illiterate and overwhelmed by Juan's behavior.
At the contested dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adjudged Juan a ward of the court and placed him on probation. Numerous probation conditions were imposed, including, over objection, an electronic search condition. Juan was also prohibited, inter alia, from associating with gang members and his coparticipants. The juvenile court indicated the electronic search condition was necessary to ensure Juan's compliance with these conditions and because his mother was unable to monitor his electronic activities.
Juan appealed, challenging the electronic search condition under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and as constitutionally overbroad. A different panel of this Division rejected both arguments and affirmed the judgment.
The California Supreme Court granted review (July 25, 2018, S249256) and deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Ricardo P. In August 2019, our supreme court decided Ricardo P. As relevant here, the court held an electronic search condition was invalid under the third prong of Lent where there was no evidence the defendant had used or would "use electronic devices in connection with . . . illegal activity." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1116, 1119-1120.) Ricardo P. did "not 'categorically invalidate electronic search conditions' in juvenile delinquency cases. . . . The court held only that the broad search condition, as written and imposed by the juvenile court, was invalid under Lent because it was not reasonably related to [the minor's] future criminality." (In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 165-166.)
After issuing its Ricardo P. decision, the California Supreme Court transferred this case back to this court, directing us to vacate our decision and to reconsider the cause in light of Ricardo P. We requested supplemental briefing. The parties' joint brief informed us Juan's probation terminated in September 2019.
DISCUSSION
"As a general rule, ' " 'the duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.' " ' [Citation.] Thus, an ' "action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events." ' [Citations.] Put another way, ' "[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief." ' " (People v. Pipkin (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1149-1150.)
The parties agree the appeal is moot because Juan's probation has terminated. They are correct. The termination of a defendant's probationary period moots an appeal challenging probation conditions. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, fn. 5.) Here, too, a ruling on the validity of Juan's electronic search condition would have no practical effect and would not provide him with effective relief.
We decline to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this moot appeal. Because our high court has already spoken on the validity of a similar probation condition, this appeal does not present "a novel question of continuing public interest" (In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1232) that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review" (Ogunsalu v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 107, 111), such that we should review the issues notwithstanding mootness. No other exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply.
DISPOSITION
The opinion previously filed, People v. Juan R. (May 2, 2018, No. A151254) 22 Cal.App.5th 1083, is vacated. The appeal is dismissed as moot.
/s/_________
BURNS, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
JONES, P. J. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J.