Opinion
B227476
09-28-2011
In re J.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.H., Defendant and Appellant.
Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback, II and Sonya Roth, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KJ35331)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed.
Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback, II and Sonya Roth, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
J.H. appeals from the juvenile court's dispositional order. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On June 24, 2010, sheriff's deputies arrested appellant minor J.H. for repeatedly biting C.M., who was the mother of his child, during a fight earlier that day. The deputies took appellant to juvenile hall, and the next day the People filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging he had inflicted corporal injury to his child's parent. The juvenile court sustained the petition. The court's July 20, 2010 dispositional order released appellant from juvenile hall and ordered his placement at home on probation. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the court erred in not awarding him 27 days of predisposition custody credits for his confinement in juvenile hall from his arrest on June 24, 2010, until his release to home on July 20, 2010. Respondent Attorney General asserts appellant is not entitled to predisposition custody credits because his release to home did not constitute physical confinement. Respondent's discussion of the point cites Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c). That statute dictates that a juvenile court may not order physical confinement for a minor that lasts longer than the maximum term of incarceration an adult could suffer for the same offense. (§ 726, subd. (c).)
All further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Section 726, subdivision (c) states: "If the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court."
Appellant is asking, however, for something different than the court's declaration of a maximum period of physical confinement. A court which orders a minor's physical confinement must credit the minor for time served in predisposition physical confinement; awarding those credits ensures that a minor's total physical confinement does not violate section 726, subdivision (c)'s cap. (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 536; accord In re Randy J. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1503-1504.) Here, appellant's disposition was release to home, which is not physical confinement. (See § 726, subd. (c).) Thus, strictly speaking, appellant has nothing against which to credit his 27 days of physical confinement in juvenile hall. Appellant nevertheless relies on In re Harm R. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 438 to claim predisposition confinement credits. In that decision, the court placed the wayward minor in a series of open facilities, from each of which he ran away. Following each escape, minor was recaptured and placed temporarily in juvenile hall until authorities returned him to an open facility. Eventually, however, the juvenile court "gave up" after minor's multiple run-aways and placed him home with his mother. (Id at p. 441.) On appeal, minor noted that 180 days was the maximum penalty for an adult who had committed minor's offenses, but he had spent 191 days in open facilities and 145 days in juvenile hall. Thus, the minor reasoned, the court no longer had jurisdiction over him. (Ibid.) The Harm court concluded otherwise. It held that placement in juvenile hall was physical confinement, and therefore must not exceed 180 days, but placement in an open facility was not physical confinement. Because minor had spent only 145 days in juvenile hall between his flights from his open facilities, the juvenile court still had jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 443-445.) In finding jurisdiction existed, the Harm court noted minor was entitled to credit for the 145 days he had been physically confined in juvenile hall, and made that observation even though the court was placing minor at home. (Id. at p. 445.)
Likewise here. The record appears to show appellant spent 27 days in juvenile hall between his arrest and his release to home. The juvenile court correctly avoided the error of stating a maximum period of physical confinement because the dispositional order did not impose physical confinement. (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541; In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 571.) But when, and if, appellant is in the future placed in physical confinement for his offense of inflicting corporal injury, it appears he would be entitled to 27 days of pre-confinement credit.
Appellant's opening brief also contended the court erroneously failed to declare on the record whether his offense was a felony or misdemeanor. Appellant's reply brief withdrew that contention after respondent's brief directed appellant's attention to the court's declaration that appellant's offense was a felony.
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DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
RUBIN, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR:
FLIER, J.
GRIMES, J.