Summary
In People v. Jenkins, 286 AD2d 634 (1st Dept. 2001), CPL § 30.30 time was held properly excluded where, unlike this case, defense counsel's unavailability due to engagement on trial was the "predominant cause" of the adjournment, citing CPL § 30.30 (4) (f) which excludes that period of time where a defendant is "without counsel through no fault of the court."
Summary of this case from People v. SamuelOpinion
September 25, 2001.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Herbert Adlerberg, J. on speedy trial motion; Laura Visitacion-Lewis, J. at jury trial and sentence), rendered November 3, 1999, convicting defendant of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 5 to 10 years, unanimously affirmed.
Madeleine Guilmain, for respondent.
Jan Hoth-Uzzo, for defendant-appellant.
Before: Nardelli, J.P., Williams, Tom, Andrias, Marlow, JJ.
Defendant's speedy trial motion was properly denied. The period from February 9, 1999 to March 9, 1999 was correctly excluded as an adjournment granted at the request of the defendant (CPL 30.30[b]; People v. Delacruz, 241 A.D.2d 328, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 939). The period from March 23, 1999 to April 14, 1999 was also correctly excluded, since the record establishes that defense counsel was on trial on both March 23, 1999 and April 6, 1999 and that defense counsel's unavailability was the predominant cause of these adjournments (CPL 30.30[f]; People v. Douglas, 264 A.D.2d 671, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 862). In view of these determinations, the amount of time that could be charged to the People falls below the statutory threshold and we therefore need not consider any other periods of delay.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.