Opinion
No. 579 KA 22-00444
07-28-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. ARTHUR M. JANES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN, AUBURN, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. BRITTANY GROME ANTONACCI, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUBURN (CHRISTOPHER T. VALDINA OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN, AUBURN, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
BRITTANY GROME ANTONACCI, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUBURN (CHRISTOPHER T. VALDINA OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., LINDLEY, CURRAN, OGDEN, AND GREENWOOD, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Cayuga County Court (Thomas G. Leone, J.), rendered January 20, 2022. The judgment convicted defendant upon his plea of guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39 [1]) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.16 [12]). We affirm.
Defendant contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered and that County Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea without first conducting a hearing. We reject defendant's contention that the court should have conducted a hearing on his motion (see People v Harris, 206 A.D.3d 1711, 1711-1712 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1188 [2022]; see generally People v Mitchell, 21 N.Y.3d 964, 967 [2013]). Contrary to defendant's further contention, the court properly denied his motion. Defendant's contention that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because of coercion and innocence is based on conclusory and unsubstantiated statements made by defendant and defense counsel at sentencing and is belied by the plea colloquy, wherein defendant admitted his guilt and stated, inter alia, that he was fully advised of the consequences of his plea, that he was confident in his attorney's abilities, and that he was not coerced into entering the plea (see People v Fox, 204 A.D.3d 1452, 1453 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 940 [2022]; People v Alexander, 203 A.D.3d 1569, 1570 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1031 [2022]; People v Garcia, 203 A.D.3d 1585, 1586 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1133 [2022]). We reject defendant's contention that the court's statements during the plea colloquy regarding the possible sentences that could be imposed if he were convicted after trial were coercive inasmuch as those statements were merely "a proper explanation of defendant's sentence exposure in the event that defendant chose not to plead guilty" (People v Boyd, 101 A.D.3d 1683, 1683 [4th Dept 2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Ross, 117 A.D.3d 1342, 1343 [3d Dept 2014]).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for an adjournment of sentencing to give defense counsel the opportunity to file a written motion to withdraw the plea (see People v Shanley, 189 A.D.3d 2108, 2108 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1100 [2021]; see generally People v Spears, 24 N.Y.3d 1057, 1059-1060 [2014]; People v Howard, 210 A.D.3d 1383, 1384-1385 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1111 [2023]).
Finally, contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that the bargained-for sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.