Opinion
B319762
02-21-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TERRY TYRONE EVANS, Defendant and Appellant.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. MA007943 Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
DAUM, J. [*]
INTRODUCTION
The appellant here, Terry Tyrone Evans, argues that Penal Code section 3051 violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. This is not the first case to consider this argument. A majority of the appellate courts that have considered this issue have not found an equal protection problem with section 3051. However, the decisions are not unanimous, and the issue is currently under consideration by the California Supreme Court. Here, we concur with the majority view, and reject Evans's equal protection argument.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In 1997, a jury convicted Evans of two counts of first degree murder for the deaths of Ronald Greene and Latonya Walker. Evans committed these crimes when he was 18 years old. The jury also returned true findings that the murders occurred during the course of a robbery, that Evans personally used a firearm, and that Evans committed multiple murders. The trial court sentenced Evans to two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
After Evans's conviction, the Legislature developed a youth offender parole hearing procedure. Although at first available only to persons who committed offenses when they were juveniles under the age of 18, eventually the Legislature expanded the parole hearing procedure to offenders who were under 26 years old at the time they committed an offense. That is the scheme currently contained within section 3051. Section 3051 specifically excludes certain offenders from its parole hearing procedures, including offenders (like Evans) sentenced to LWOP for offences committed between the ages of 18 and 25.
In 2022, Evans moved in the superior court to preserve evidence for use at a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051. Evans acknowledged that he was ineligible for such a hearing under section 3051, subdivision (h). But he contended that this exclusion violated the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution. The superior court rejected this contention and denied Evans's motion. On appeal, Evans contends (1) the superior court erred in rejecting his equal protection challenge to section 3051; and (2) as a result of section 3051's denying him eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing, his LWOP sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the state Constitution. For the reasons below, we reject Evans's arguments and affirm the superior court.
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In 1997, a jury convicted Evans of the first degree murders of Ronald Greene and Latonya Walker, committed in 1994 when Evans was 18 years old. The jury also found that the murders were committed during a robbery and that Evans personally used a firearm during their commission. The trial court (Judge John Fisher) sentenced Evans to two consecutive terms of LWOP. On Evans's direct appeal, we affirmed the judgment as modified in a manner irrelevant to this appeal. (People v. Evans (September 24, 1998, No. B113243) [nonpub. opn.].)
We grant Evans's request for judicial notice of excerpts from our opinion on direct appeal.
In January 2022, Evans filed a motion to preserve evidence for use at a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051. Evans acknowledged that section 3051 expressly did not apply to young-adult offenders, like himself, who were sentenced to LWOP. (§ 3051, subd. (h).) Evans contended, however, that in treating him differently from juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP and from young-adult offenders who received lesser sentences, section 3051 violated the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution.
In March 2022, the superior court (Judge Daviann Mitchell) issued an order denying Evans's motion. The court reasoned that Evans's equal protection challenge was foreclosed by In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, review denied Nov. 10, 2021, in which the Court of Appeal rejected a very similar challenge. Evans timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 3051
Section 3051 gives eligible juvenile and young-adult offenders the opportunity for parole at youth offender parole hearings. (§ 3051, subd. (b).) The Legislature enacted section 3051 in response to judicial decisions establishing constitutional limits on the length of sentences for juvenile offenders. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.) Initially, section 3051's youth offender parole procedure applied only to juvenile offenders-i.e., those who were under 18 years of age at the time they committed their crimes. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.) The Legislature later extended the statute's operation to certain young-adult offenders who committed their crimes when under the age of 23, and, ultimately, under the age of 26. (Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1; Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1.)
This extension reflected the Legislature's recognition that young adults are not yet fully matured, and that because of their youth, these offenders have a lower degree of culpability and an increased potential for rehabilitation when compared with older adult offenders. (See In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 459 (Williams); Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1308 (20172018 Reg. Sess.), at 2-3.) Section 3051 provides tiered parole eligibility dates based on the severity of the offender's sentence. (See § 3051, subd. (b)(1)-(3) [young-adult offender is eligible for release on parole at youth offender parole hearing during 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration where sentence on controlling offense was determinate, indeterminate but less than 25 years to life, or 25 years to life, respectively].)
Section 3051's parole hearing scheme applies to juvenile offenders even if they were sentenced to LWOP. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4).) The statutory scheme also applies to certain young-adult offenders who committed their offenses between the ages of 18 and 25 and were sentenced to non-LWOP life sentences, i.e., life sentences with a possibility of parole. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(3).)
However, the Legislature specifically excluded young-adult offenders who, like Evans, were sentenced to LWOP for offenses committed between ages 18 and 25. (§ 3051, subd. (h) ["This section shall not apply . . . to cases in which an individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age"].) The LWOP exclusion was not the only exclusion from section 3051's scheme. The Legislature also excluded offenders sentenced under California's "Three Strikes" law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), those sentenced under California's "One Strike" law (§ 667.61), and offenders who, after reaching the age of 26, commit an additional crime involving malice aforethought or who are sentenced to life in prison. (§ 3051, subd. (h).)
B. Section 3051 Does Not Violate Evans's Equal Protection Rights
Evans contends that section 3051 violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. Evans's theory is that the Legislature had no rational reason, in enacting section 3051, to exclude offenders like him from its grant of parole eligibility while allowing two purportedly similarly situated groups to receive the possibility of parole under its terms: (a) juvenile offenders who, like Evans, were sentenced to LWOP but who, unlike Evans, committed their relevant offenses before they reached the age of 18; and (b) young-adult offenders who, like Evans, committed offenses between the ages of 18 and 25 but who, unlike Evans, were sentenced to lesser terms than LWOP (for example, who received parole-eligible life terms). Our Supreme Court recently granted review in a case raising these identical issues. (See People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273 (Hardin), review granted Jan. 11, 2023, S277487.) Pending guidance from the Supreme Court, we reject Evans's equal protection claim for the reasons discussed below.
We review equal protection claims de novo. (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469.) "The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause." (Ibid.) Here, Evans concedes that "rational basis" equal protection review applies. To assert a successful claim under either the federal or California equal protection clauses under the standard of rational basis review, Evans must first show that the Legislature has drawn an unequal distinction between two groups that are similarly situated with respect to the purposes of the challenged law, i.e., section 3051. (Ibid.) Second, because Evans does not contend that section 3051 involves a suspect classification or interferes with a fundamental constitutional right, he must show that the Legislature lacked any rational basis for drawing the challenged distinction. (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage).)
Here, we need not address whether Evans is similarly situated to the groups he identifies, because we conclude that the second prong of rational basis review is fatal to Evans's appeal. The Legislature had a rational basis for denying section 3051 hearings to offenders sentenced to LWOP who committed their crimes between the ages of 18 and 25, while affording those hearings to juvenile (i.e., under 18) offenders sentenced to LWOP. Equally, the Legislature had a rational basis for denying section 3051 hearings to offenders between the ages of 18 and 25 sentenced to LWOP, while granting such hearings to 18-to-25-year-old offenders who were not sentenced to LWOP, but instead received lesser sentences (such as an indeterminate life term with possibility of parole).
We start by emphasizing the nature of rational basis review. When rational basis review applies, a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute on equal protection grounds has a "high bar" to clear. (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 289 (Chatman).) That "high bar" protects the important democratic value of leaving policy decisions to the Legislature, not the courts-it prevents even a well-intentioned judiciary from overturning statutes merely because "a statute's tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair." (Id. at 289; see also ibid. [explaining that rational basis review does not allow courts to "'"judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices"'" or to "'"sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations"'" (quoting Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 319)].) Thus, under this standard, "[a] classification in a statute is presumed rational until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable." (Chatman, 4 Cal.5th at 289.)
The rational basis standard requires upholding legislative distinctions when any rational basis can be found for them, even if the Legislature does not identify reasons that justify the distinctions it made. "This standard of rationality does not depend upon whether lawmakers ever actually articulated the purpose they sought to achieve. Nor must the underlying rationale be empirically substantiated. [Citation.] . . . [A] court may engage in '"rational speculation"' as to the justifications for the legislative choice. [Citation.] It is immaterial for rational basis review 'whether or not' any such speculation has 'a foundation in the record.'" (Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 74-75.) And, because rational basis review affords respect to legislative discretion to make policy trade-offs, the Legislature may legislate incrementally to afford different protections to different groups-it "has 'broad discretion' to proceed in an incremental and uneven manner without necessarily engaging in arbitrary and unlawful discrimination." (People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1110.) "At bottom, the Legislature is afforded considerable latitude in defining and setting the consequences of criminal offenses." (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 887.)
Applying those standards here, we reject Evans's equal protection argument. First, as every other appellate court to address the issue to date has concluded, we conclude that the Legislature had a rational basis for drawing the challenged distinction between young-adult offenders serving LWOP sentences and juvenile offenders serving the same sentences. The Legislature rationally could have concluded that young-adult offenders, despite not being fully matured, were more culpable and less likely to rehabilitate than juveniles who committed similar crimes. As stated in In re Murray, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 456, on which the superior court relied: "When it comes to criminal sentencing, the United States and California Supreme Courts have found the line drawn between juveniles and nonjuveniles to be a rational one." (Id. at 464, citing Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471, Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574, People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1380, and People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 405.) Moreover, the federal Constitution prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences only for juvenile offenders, i.e., offenders under 18-making clear that federal law finds a rational basis for distinguishing between offenders under 18 and over 18. (People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204.) "We agree with the other courts of appeal that the Legislature could rationally decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further." (Ibid. [collecting cases]; accord, Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 285, rev.gr.)
Second, we conclude that there is a rational basis for section 3051's disparate treatment of young-adult offenders serving LWOP sentences and those serving lesser sentences. We agree with the analysis in Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th 427, in which our colleagues in Division Five rejected a claim nearly identical to Evans's: "The Legislature has prescribed an LWOP sentence for only a small number of crimes. These are the crimes the Legislature deems so morally depraved and so injurious as to warrant a sentence that carries no hope of release for the criminal and no threat of recidivism for society. In excluding LWOP inmates from youth offender parole hearings, the Legislature reasonably could have decided that youthful offenders who have committed such crimes-even with diminished culpability and increased potential for rehabilitation-are nonetheless still sufficiently culpable and sufficiently dangerous to justify lifetime incarceration." (Id. at 436; accord, People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 780, review den. June 9, 2021.)
Put differently, section 3051 is a procedure for granting parole. It was at least rational for the Legislature to exclude from that scheme offenders (like Evans) whom the law has already deemed ineligible for parole because of the particular culpability inherent in an LWOP sentence. Moreover, it was at least rational for the Legislature to distinguish between offenders like Evans who received sentences without the possibility of parole, and generally less culpable offenders who received lesser sentences.
Evans urges us to follow the reasoning set forth in Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 273, rev.gr. There, a young-adult offender sentenced to LWOP appealed from the superior court's denial of his motion to preserve evidence for a youth offender parole hearing, challenging section 3051, subdivision (h) on the same equal protection grounds advanced by Evans. (Id. at 279-280, 284.) Our colleagues in Division Seven held that the statute violated equal protection doctrine, concluding that the Legislature had no rational basis for denying youth offender parole hearings to young-adult offenders sentenced to LWOP while affording such hearings to young-adult offenders serving other sentences, such as life with the possibility of parole. (Id. at 286-291.) According to Hardin, the Legislature's sole purpose in enacting the current iteration of section 3051 was to account for juvenile and young-adult offenders' potential for rehabilitation, "not to assess culpability." (Id. at 287; see also id. at 279, 288.) Proceeding to assume, arguendo, that assessing culpability had a "proper" role in the statute, Hardin concluded that this purpose bore no rational relationship to the challenged exclusion of young-adult offenders sentenced to LWOP, because the statute failed to further exclude equally or more culpable young-adult offenders whose sentences were the "functional equivalent" of LWOP. (Id. at 289-290.)
We decline to follow Hardin. In our view, Hardin's narrow characterization of section 3051's purpose is belied by the statute's provision of tiered parole eligibility dates based on the severity of the offender's sentence, which shows that the Legislature was not blind to the varying degrees of culpability even within the groups of eligible offenders. (See § 3051, subd. (b).) As discussed, the Legislature rationally could have determined that young-adult offenders serving LWOP sentences are generally more culpable than those serving lesser sentences. Indeed, that is why, as explained by Williams, the law reserves LWOP sentences for a limited number of cases, those involving the "harshest penalties available under our penal system" and "crimes of the most heinous nature." (Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at 436.)
We do not agree with Hardin's conclusion that, for purposes of the rational basis review we are tasked with here, an LWOP sentence like Evans's is the "functional equivalent" of a life sentence with the possibility of parole. (Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 289.) Evans's case helps explain why. Here, Evans was charged with, and a jury found, special circumstances justifying his LWOP sentence. That included Evans's commission of multiple murders, his use of a firearm, and his commission of the murders during a robbery. Those were all indications of a degree of increased culpability for Evans. It was at least rational for the Legislature to distinguish the culpability level of a murder committed in situations like Evans's case (i.e., situations justifying an LWOP sentence) from first degree murder committed without those circumstances. Of course, one could devise hypothetical scenarios in which some similar degree of guilt might attach to an LWOP sentence and a non-LWOP sentence. (Cf. Hardin, 84 Cal.App.5th at 289 [distinguishing between a murder committed in the course of a robbery, justifying an LWOP sentence, and a murder committed one day followed by a robbery the next, justifying an indeterminate-term sentence].) But that does not mean that the Legislature was irrational for drawing the line where it did. (People v. Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 204205 ["The Legislature's distinction is not irrational simply because some offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole are arguably less culpable than some offenders receiving lesser sentences. A legislative classification does not fail rational basis review because it is '"imperfect"' or '"because it may be 'to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive'"'"].) On rational basis review, "plausible reasoning for distinguishing between" two scenarios "need not exist in every scenario in which the statute[] may apply." (Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 77-78; see also id. at 77 ["we must accept any gross generalizations and rough accommodations that the Legislature seems to have made"].) The Legislature was entitled to view the culpability that attached to LWOP sentences differently from the culpability attached to life sentences with the possibility of parole, and we cannot say it was irrational in doing so.
We do not address, and do not decide, whether these sentences are "functional equivalents" in any context other than the one addressed here.
Moreover, even had the Legislature solely focused on rehabilitation, it rationally could have concluded that youngadult offenders sentenced to LWOP are more dangerous and less likely to be rehabilitated than those subject to lesser sentences. That this conclusion might not obtain in some individual cases does not render the Legislature's measure irrational. (See People v. Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 204-205; cf. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 77.)
To be clear, we are not tasked with assessing the wisdom or desirability of the Legislature's choice, and we do not conclude that the Legislature's choice was wise or desirable. Rather, our duty is to determine whether its choice had a sufficient rational basis. (See Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 74.) We conclude it did.
C. Evans's Claim of Cruel or Unusual Punishment Lacks Merit
Evans disclaims any contention that his LWOP sentence violated our state Constitution's ban on cruel or unusual punishment when his sentence was first imposed. He contends, however, that his sentence has since become cruel or unusual punishment, as a result of section 3051's denying him a youth offender parole hearing while affording such hearings to the eligible groups discussed above. We reject this argument. As Evans acknowledges, we held in People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478 that an 18-year-old offender's LWOP-equivalent sentence was not cruel or unusual punishment, as we were required to respect the line drawn at 18 years of age by our society and the United States Supreme Court. (Id. at 1482.) While Evans argues that the Legislature has redrawn this line at age 26, he cites no authority for the proposition that the Legislature had the power to expand the reach of the Constitution, much less that such an expansion was the intent or effect of section 3051. We agree with our colleagues in Division Five that LWOP sentences for young-adult offenders remain constitutionally permissible notwithstanding such offenders' exclusion from section 3051. (See Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at 430, 437-439 [rejecting young-adult offender's contention that his two consecutive LWOP terms constituted cruel or unusual punishment as a result of "the denial of a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051"].)
We do not address, and do not decide, the People's argument that Evans forfeited his cruel and unusual punishment claim by failing to raise it below.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: COLLINS, J. CURREY, Acting P.J.
[*] Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California Constitution.