Opinion
No. 2-17-0191
03-08-2018
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PETER J. DIAZ, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County. No. 14-CF-325 Honorable C. Robert Tobin III, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hutchinson and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: (1) Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to submit defenses of self-defense and defense of another as well as accident: given that defendant had asserted that he did not act intentionally, he did not defeat the presumption that counsel's decision was the product of sound strategy and not a misunderstanding of the law, and in any event there was no reasonable likelihood that those defenses would have succeeded; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain alleged threats by the victim, as under the circumstances those threats did not make more likely that the victim threw a chair at defendant; in any event, any error was harmless, as it was essentially undisputed that the victim threw the chair. ¶ 2 While in his home late at night on December 20, 2014, defendant, Peter J. Diaz, discharged a gun when his son, Dallas Simpson, threw a folding metal chair at him. A jury found defendant guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.5 (West 2014)) and not guilty of aggravated assault (720 ILCS 5/12-2(c)(2) (West 2014)). The trial court denied defendant's posttrial motion and sentenced defendant to 24 months of conditional discharge. This timely appeal followed. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) his attorney was ineffective for failing to raise self-defense and defense of another in addition to accident and (2) the trial court erred in excluding various threatening statements Simpson made that night. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The count of the indictment charging defendant with reckless discharge of a firearm provided "[t]hat on or about the 20th day of December, 2014, *** defendant, endangered the bodily safety of *** Simpson in that, while acting in a reckless manner, he discharged a firearm in the direction of *** Simpson's body." The count charging defendant with aggravated assault provided "[t]hat on or about the 20th day of December, 2014, *** defendant, while committing an assault *** knowingly discharged a firearm, thereby placing *** Simpson in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery." ¶ 5 Evidence presented at trial revealed that Simpson had lived with defendant periodically for seven years. In December 2014, Simpson had lived with defendant for the past five or six months, and defendant had asked Simpson to move out of the house. Accordingly, Simpson admitted that he was not supposed to be in defendant's home on December 20, 2014. No one but Simpson was living with defendant in the home at that time. ¶ 6 On December 19, 2014, defendant and Christine Grube, defendant's girlfriend and employer for several years, dropped Simpson off at a friend's house at around 8 or 8:30 p.m. Defendant and Grube then went to a bar close to defendant's home and consumed two or three beers each. At around 11:30 p.m., defendant and Grube went back to defendant's home and went to sleep in the lower level of the house. No one else was in defendant's home at that time. ¶ 7 Simpson, who went to a pub with some friends, consumed some alcoholic beverages there and left the pub at around 1:20 a.m. with his girlfriend, Erica Miranda. Miranda had left their child at her house with her mother. Miranda testified that she had consumed a few beers at her sister's house before going to get Simpson at the pub, but she insisted that she was not drunk. ¶ 8 Miranda drove Simpson to defendant's home. The two entered the house and went to the living room on the upper level of the home where there was a bed. According to Simpson, Miranda passed out, and he took her car keys from her because he did not want her to drive. Miranda testified that she and Simpson lay on the bed talking and watching television. ¶ 9 A little while later, Miranda "kind of freaked out a little bit." She was upset because Simpson would not give her her car keys so that she could go home. Simpson and Miranda began arguing loudly. Miranda began to cry, and according to Simpson she threw herself on the floor, having a "temper tantrum" of sorts. Although Miranda denied that she threw herself on the floor or was out of control, she admitted that she did scream at Simpson a couple of times to " '[p]lease let [her] go.' " Miranda denied that she screamed " '[h]elp.' " Both Simpson and Miranda agreed that Simpson never struck, threw, or kicked Miranda that night. ¶ 10 Defendant testified that he woke up at 1 or 1:30 a.m. and heard a girl crying, " 'Stop. Let me go, please, please. Please let me go. I want to go home.' " Defendant testified that the screaming became more intense and he could hear people engaged in a struggle. He also stated that, although he had met Miranda before, he did not know her well, and he did not recognize her voice. Soon after hearing the commotion coming from upstairs, defendant, who was "kind of scared," began looking for his phone to call the police. He could not locate it. He then yelled, " 'Whatever is going on upstairs, it better stop. The police are on their way.' " ¶ 11 In response, Simpson told defendant that everything was fine and that just he and Miranda were upstairs. After doing so, Simpson pleaded with Miranda to calm down. Defendant said nothing more at that point. ¶ 12 Around that same time, Grube was awoken when defendant began yelling her name and telling her to phone the police. Grube described defendant as being very loud and rushing around like there was an emergency. Grube called 911 while she listened to what was going on upstairs. She said that she heard several voices coming from upstairs but could identify only defendant's. Grube, who was scared, asserted that the people upstairs were arguing "very loud[ly]" and that she heard a lot of "banging around." ¶ 13 Simpson went into the bathroom on the upper level of the home, leaving Miranda on the bed crying. Miranda saw defendant ascending the stairs with a gun in his hands. Miranda testified that defendant was angry. Miranda pleaded with defendant to calm down, identified herself, and told defendant that she was going to go home. ¶ 14 Defendant stated that, as he went up the stairs, he kept his gun, which was ready to fire, behind his back. He saw no one upstairs once he reached the top of the stairs. Defendant testified that he yelled, " 'Stop. Let the girl go' " and " 'Everybody needs to come out where I can see them.' " Miranda stated that she could not recall defendant saying "[l]et the girl go." ¶ 15 According to Simpson, he opened the bathroom door and saw Miranda standing there with defendant off to the left. Defendant was pointing a gun at them. Defendant testified that he had his gun behind his back. Simpson told defendant to calm down, explaining to him again that it was just he and Miranda in the house. ¶ 16 According to defendant, Simpson yelled, " 'Do you know me? You know who I am *** motherfucker.' " The State objected to defendant's testimony about what Simpson said. Although the court never expressly ruled on the objection, it noted that, because this was not a self-defense or defense-of-another case, Simpson's statement was irrelevant. Simpson testified that he could not remember whether he said to defendant " 'I've got a gun, motherfucker.' " Simpson also could not remember whether he said to Miranda, " 'Baby, get my gun.' " According to Miranda, Simpson never asked her to get his gun, and Simpson asserted that he did not own a gun. When the police searched the house, no gun besides the one defendant had was found. According to defendant, Simpson threatened, " 'I'm going to take the gun from you and I'm going to shoot you with it.' " The trial court sustained the State's objection to this testimony. Simpson testified that he did not remember whether he made such a statement. ¶ 17 Then, according to Simpson, Miranda ran into the bathroom with him. When Simpson opened the door, defendant was still standing there with the gun. Simpson, who testified that he was scared, turned on the bathroom light and put his hands in the air. Simpson continued asking defendant to put the gun down, reiterating to defendant that he was defendant's son. ¶ 18 Defendant testified that, when Simpson exited the bathroom, Simpson started walking toward him. Defendant, who had the gun behind his back and was concerned only with getting Miranda to safety, told Simpson " 'Stop. Just let the girl go.' " Simpson then grabbed a metal folding chair. According to defendant, he pulled the gun from behind his back, held it out in front of him to protect himself, and began backing up. Simpson moved closer to defendant in an attempt to scare him. When, according to Simpson, defendant did not budge, Simpson dropped or threw the chair down. Simpson then took a step closer to defendant, and the gun defendant was holding discharged. ¶ 19 According to defendant, "[he got] hit with the chair, [his] finger pull[ed] the trigger, and the gun [went] off." Although defendant asserted that he did not attempt to squeeze or pull the trigger, Officer David Dammon, a firearm expert who arrived at the scene, testified that it is impossible to fire a gun like the one defendant had without pulling the trigger. When asked if he "ever tr[ied] to shoot [his] son," defendant said, "No." Relatedly, when asked if he "ever intentionally tr[ied] to pull the trigger [or] fire a round," defendant said, "No." ¶ 20 On cross-examination, Simpson testified that the incident was a "blurry situation[ ]." That is, Simpson could not remember whether he grabbed the chair and hit defendant with it or whether he just let the chair fall. All Simpson remembered was that defendant was pointing his gun at him before the gun discharged and that the gun fired at some point after Simpson picked up the chair. Miranda testified that she did not see what transpired when the gun discharged and did not hear a metal chair hit anyone. ¶ 21 After the gun discharged, Simpson ran toward defendant and threw defendant against the wall. Miranda ran out of the house and to a neighbor's home. The two men continued to struggle, with Simpson attempting to get the gun from defendant, until the police arrived. ¶ 22 Dammon spoke to Miranda, Simpson, and defendant. According to Dammon, Miranda was upset, but she did not appear to be injured. Dammon, who used to work as a paramedic, elaborated that he illuminated Miranda with his flashlight and saw that Miranda did not have a black eye, red marks, bruising, or any blood on her. Dammon asked Miranda if she was hurt, and she said no. Officer Julie Grubar, another officer who arrived at the scene, confirmed that Miranda did not appear to be bleeding or injured in any way. Grube, who was outside with the police, did not see any officer shine a flashlight on Miranda and examine her in any way. ¶ 23 When Dammon spoke to Simpson, Simpson said that he picked up the chair and threw it at defendant and that the "gun went off after he threw the chair at [defendant]." ¶ 24 Dammon denied that defendant told him that he should get an ambulance for Miranda. Defendant testified that he did. Dammon testified that he advised defendant of his rights, a claim that defendant denied but another officer confirmed; put defendant in the back of the squad car; and then spoke with him about what had happened. Defendant told Dammon that he and Grube were awoken when they heard Simpson and Miranda arguing upstairs. Defendant retrieved his gun and went upstairs to investigate. Defendant told Dammon that "[t]hey were making too much noise, [and defendant] wanted them to quiet down." Defendant also told Dammon that "[h]e had fired a round at [Simpson] when [Simpson] threw a chair at him." Dammon clarified that defendant did not say that the chair hit him, causing the gun to go off. Later, defendant told Dammon that he fired a shot into the floor. When asked about Miranda, defendant told Dammon that she had been held against her will in the bathroom and that she was injured. Defendant claimed at one point that he went upstairs with his gun to help Miranda escape. ¶ 25 Defendant contended that he never told the police that he fired the gun at Simpson. He also testified that he told Dammon that he had been "hit by a chair and the gun went off." ¶ 26 After the jury found defendant guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm and not guilty of aggravated assault, defendant obtained new counsel and filed a posttrial motion. In that motion, defendant argued, among other things, that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to raise self-defense and defense of another. Defendant also argued that the trial court erred when it prevented him from testifying about various threatening statements Simpson made to him that night. Attached to the motion were defendant's and Grube's affidavits. In these affidavits, defendant and Grube attested that defendant had continually asked his trial attorney to raise self-defense and defense of another. Trial counsel told defendant that he could not raise such defenses for him, because "[defendant] was saying that the gun went off accidentally" and "[defendant] would have to say that [he] intentionally pulled the trigger." Defendant did not attach to his motion an affidavit from trial counsel, and when asked at the hearing on his motion if he was going to call trial counsel, defendant said that he was not. In its response, the State asserted that, "[b]ecause defense counsel's theory of accidental firing was reasonable and not deficient, this court should not have to decide whether counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." ¶ 27 The trial court denied the motion. In doing so, the court found missing from defendant's allegations any claim that his attorney misunderstood the law. Rather, the court determined that counsel believed that raising self-defense and defense of another would be challenging given, among other things, the fact that it would be difficult to establish that defendant was not the aggressor. As to the threatening statements Simpson made, the court found that they were properly excluded, as they were irrelevant and hearsay and no applicable exception for their admission was presented.
Although a recording of what happened in the squad car was made, the squad car was destroyed a few days after December 20, 2014, and thus no recording existed to present at trial.
In his amended motion, defendant claimed only that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise self-defense. In the affidavits attached to his motion, however, defendant claimed that he continually asked his attorney to raise self-defense and defense of another.
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 At issue in this appeal is whether (1) defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise self-defense and defense of another and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to admit various threatening statements Simpson made to defendant. We address each issue in turn.
¶ 30 A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
¶ 31 The first issue we consider is whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise self-defense and defense of another in addition to accident. Whether counsel provided ineffective assistance presents a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Davis, 353 Ill. App. 3d 790, 794 (2004). Thus, we defer to the findings of fact the trial court made, but we review de novo whether counsel's omission supports an ineffective-assistance claim. Id. ¶ 32 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 688 (1984). A defendant must satisfy both prongs to prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective. People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 304 (2002). ¶ 33 The first prong requires showing that counsel's performance, as measured objectively against prevailing professional norms, was so deficient that counsel was "not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the sixth amendment." People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 317 (2000). Decisions that involve matters of trial strategy typically will not sustain a claim of ineffective assistance, as they are presumed to be sound. People v. Sanchez, 2014 IL App (1st) 120514, ¶ 30. Courts have found that counsel's decision not to raise self-defense or defense of another is a matter of sound trial strategy. Id. ¶ 31. Thus, to succeed on a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise self-defense or defense of another, a defendant must establish that counsel's decision not to do so was unsound. See People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 54-55 (1992). That is, the defendant must establish that no reasonably effective defense attorney, when confronted with the circumstances of the defendant's trial, would engage in similar conduct. People v. Fletcher, 335 Ill. App. 3d 447, 453 (2002). This standard is met when counsel lacks an understanding of the applicable law. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 56. ¶ 34 Under the second prong, the defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's conduct, the result of the trial would have been different. Id. at 55. A reasonable probability exists if counsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair. People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 376-77 (2000). ¶ 35 As noted, defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise self-defense and defense of another in addition to accident. "A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such other's imminent use of unlawful force." 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West 2014). To raise self-defense or defense of another, a defendant must show that (1) there was a threat of force against the defendant or another, (2) the defendant was not the aggressor, (3) the danger of harm was imminent, (4) the force threatened was unlawful, (5) the defendant actually and subjectively believed that a danger existed, force was necessary to avert the danger, and the amount of force used was necessary, and (6) the defendant's beliefs were objectively reasonable. 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 2014). Self-defense or defense of another is not available to a person who (1) is attempting to commit or is committing or escaping after the commission of a forcible felony, (2) provokes the use of force against himself or another, with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant, or (3) otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself or another, unless the force is so great that he believes that he or another is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and they have exhausted every reasonable means to escape, or he withdraws in good faith and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force but the assailant continues the use of force. 720 ILCS 5/7-4 (West 2014). ¶ 36 Here, in addressing defendant's claim, we first observe that the trial court found that trial counsel did not misunderstand the law. The court reached this conclusion based on its recollection of what transpired during the trial proceedings and what was alleged in the affidavits. We cannot conclude that this assessment was wrong. Although it is true that an attorney may raise self-defense or defense of another in addition to accident (see People v. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d 147, 156-57 (1990)), nothing indicates that counsel believed that he could not legally raise self-defense and defense of another in addition to accident. Rather, the evidence revealed that counsel would not do so based on the evidence. In the affidavits, defendant indicated that counsel told him that he could not raise self-defense and defense of another when defendant was saying that the gun discharged accidentally. In Everette, our supreme court concluded that the trial court's refusal to tender a jury instruction on self-defense was proper precisely because the defendant, who believed that the victim was going to hit him, testified that the gun discharged accidentally and that he never intended to shoot the victim because he believed that he was in imminent danger. Id. at 153, 162-63. As in Everette, defendant repeatedly testified that the shooting was an accident. He told Dammon that he proceeded up the stairs with his gun ready to fire not because he was scared, but because he wanted Simpson and Miranda to be quiet. When specifically asked, defendant asserted that he never tried to shoot Simpson and never intentionally tried to fire the gun. Even assuming that defendant believed that he needed to protect himself when Simpson grabbed the chair, defendant's use of deadly force in such a situation was dubious. See id. at 160; see also 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West 2014) (person may use deadly force only when necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another). Given these facts, we find misguided any claim that counsel here misunderstood the law. ¶ 37 Moreover, given that defendant was charged with aggravated assault in addition to reckless discharge of a firearm, counsel very well might have made the strategic choice not to argue self-defense or defense of another in addition to accident. The count charging defendant with aggravated assault provided that defendant "knowingly discharged a firearm." Presenting evidence that defendant had intended, at least at one point, to fire the gun in self-defense or defense of another could have brought the jury closer to finding that defendant "knowingly" fired the gun and, thus, was guilty of aggravated assault. ¶ 38 Even assuming that counsel misunderstood the law, we cannot conclude that defendant was prejudiced when counsel did not raise self-defense and defense of another. The evidence presented at trial revealed that defendant was angered when he was awoken by Simpson and Miranda arguing. Although defendant claimed that he did not know who was upstairs, the evidence suggested otherwise, as Simpson had lived with defendant for many years, Miranda was the mother of his grandchild, and Simpson told defendant numerous times that only he and Miranda were upstairs. At first, defendant was going to call the police, but when he could not find his phone, he decided to grab his gun, ensure that it was ready to fire, and proceed upstairs instead of leaving the home or waiting downstairs with Grube while she phoned the police. Defendant claimed that, once he reached the top of the stairs, he demanded that Simpson let Miranda leave, as he believed that she was injured and being held against her will. Although defendant claimed that Miranda was in the bathroom with Simpson at that time, both Miranda and Simpson indicated that Miranda, who was sitting on the bed crying, certainly could have walked out of the house at that point. Moreover, all of the evidence, including the testimony of Simpson, Miranda, Dammon, and Grubar, clearly indicated that Miranda was not harmed in the slightest degree that night. During defendant's exchange with Simpson, defendant made it known that he had a gun. Both Simpson and Miranda stated that they saw defendant point the gun at them when he reached the top of the stairs. Although defendant testified that he had the gun behind his back when he encountered Simpson and Miranda, defendant's posture likely indicated that he had a gun or a weapon of some sort. Moreover, Simpson's statements, which defendant argues were wrongly excluded, clearly indicated that Simpson was aware that defendant was armed. In response to defendant, Simpson grabbed a metal folding chair to scare defendant. Although defendant believed that Simpson might have had a gun, the testimony of Simpson and Miranda indicated that he did not, and the police found no gun on the premises other than the one defendant had. Given this evidence, we cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted defendant based on self-defense or defense of another. ¶ 39 Supporting our conclusion that counsel was not ineffective is the fact that, as intimated above, the evidence strongly suggested that defendant was the aggressor and as such could not successfully claim self-defense or defense of another. Illustrative of this point is People v. Sloan, 111 Ill. 2d 517 (1986). There, the defendant went to the home of his former girlfriend and shot and killed her boyfriend during an argument. Id. at 518. Our supreme court found that self-defense was not viable, as the defendant was clearly the aggressor. Id. at 521. In so concluding, our supreme court observed that "[the victim's] slight display of force, or resistance, was provoked by the defendant's own conduct." Id. Here, as in Sloan, defendant is the one who brought the loaded gun upstairs, and any force Simpson used or might have used, such as picking up the metal folding chair, was provoked by that. This "force" was not so great that defendant could reasonably believe that he or another was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and he clearly could have taken other actions to escape, such as retreating downstairs or leaving the home. 720 ILCS 5/7-4 (West 2014). ¶ 40 Even in light of Simpson's threatening statements, we cannot conclude that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise self-defense and defense of another in addition to accident. Although it is true that mere words may be enough to qualify one as an initial aggressor (see, e.g., People v. Barnard, 208 Ill. App. 3d 342, 350 (1991)), Simpson's statements were made only after he knew that defendant had a gun, or some weapon behind his back, and Simpson's alleged "threatening" question posed to defendant, asking if he knew who he was, though vulgar, certainly was not the type of threat that would justify defendant's use of deadly force. ¶ 41 We also note that, although scant evidence was presented that defendant was attempting to help Miranda and he testified at one point that he pulled the gun from behind his back to protect himself, at issue is not whether the court should have instructed the jury on self-defense and defense of another. See Everette, 141 Ill. 2d at 156. Rather, at issue is whether counsel was ineffective for not pursuing self-defense and defense of another in addition to accident. The cases on which defendant heavily relies do not address that issue. See, e.g., id. at 162-63; People v. Bedoya, 288 Ill. App. 3d 226, 238-39 (1997) (trial court erred when it found that the defendant could not advance both theories of self-defense and accident); People v. Robinson, 163 Ill. App. 3d 754, 770-71 (1987) (trial court erred in refusing to allow testimony of and instructions on self-defense even when the defendant's theory was that the shooting was accidental). Although another case on which defendant relies does address counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to have the jury instructed on self-defense (see People v. Jaffe, 145 Ill. App. 3d 840 (1986)), we find Jaffe inapplicable here. Not only was counsel ineffective in that case because he failed to present the jury with the only defense available to the defendant, i.e., self-defense, but the defendant's version of the events that resulted in a victim's death revealed that the other victim pointed a gun at the defendant, leading to a struggle wherein the one victim was shot and killed. Id. at 852-53. Here, in contrast, defendant presented the defense of accident; he was the one who, armed with a gun, threatened Simpson; and Simpson never attempted to get the gun from defendant before the gun discharged. ¶ 42 In reaching our conclusion, we emphasize that defendant obtained new counsel when he filed his posttrial motion claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective. At the hearing on that motion, the court, which was well aware of counsel's performance during trial, heard defendant's arguments and sufficiently considered defendant's claims. We also note that, although the affidavits could be read to indicate that counsel misunderstood the law, the affidavits do not make that clear, and thus defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that counsel's strategy was sound. See People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 247 (1989). In any event, because defendant has not established that he was prejudiced by counsel's decision not to pursue self-defense and defense of another in addition to accident, his ineffective-assistance claim must fail.
Although the State addressed only the deficiency prong in the trial court and on appeal the State argues only a lack of prejudice, we address the claim in its entirety, because the State, as the appellee, can raise any basis to support the trial court's judgment. See Shaw v. Lorenz, 42 Ill. 2d 246, 248 (1969) ("[T]he appellee may urge any point in support of the judgment on appeal, even though not directly ruled on by the trial court, so long as the factual basis for such point was before the trial court."). --------
¶ 43 B. Admissibility of Simpson's Threatening Statements
¶ 44 We next consider whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit various threatening statements Simpson directed toward defendant. Resolution of that issue turns on whether the evidence was relevant. "Relevant evidence ordinarily should be admitted, unless 'otherwise provided by law.' " People v. Prather, 2012 IL App (2d) 111104, ¶ 21 (quoting Ill. R. Evid. 402 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011)). "Evidence is relevant if it tends 'to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action either more probable or less probable.' " Id. (quoting Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011)). Whether evidence makes a fact at issue more or less probable depends on "logic, experience and accepted assumptions as to human behavior." Marut v. Costello, 34 Ill. 2d 125, 128 (1965). Evidence can be relevant even if it does not conclusively establish the fact for which a party seeks to introduce it. Prather, 2012 IL App (2d) 111104, ¶ 22. ¶ 45 "Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed unless the trial court has abused that discretion." People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001). "An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id. ¶ 46 The statements with which defendant takes issue are (1) " 'Do you know me? You know who I am, motherfucker' "; (2) " 'Go get my gun' "; (3) " 'I've got a gun, mother fucker [sic]' "; and (4) " 'Baby, get my gun.' " Defendant also alleges that he should have been allowed to testify about how Simpson asked whether defendant had a gun behind his back, threatened to take defendant's gun and shoot him with it, and threatened to kill defendant when Simpson picked up the chair. Defendant argues that, regardless of whether he was allowed to raise self-defense and defense of another, such statements were relevant to the issue of why the gun discharged. That is, these statements, showing that Simpson was angry and threatening defendant, "all made it more probable that Simpson threw the chair at [defendant], causing the gun to discharge." ¶ 47 Putting aside the facts that the trial court never ruled on the first statement, that nothing presented at trial indicated that Simpson threatened to kill defendant when he picked up the chair, and that defendant failed to make an adequate offer of proof as to the admissibility of the remaining statements, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when such statements were not admitted. We fail to see, as defendant claims, that "[t]he statements went directly to the key issue in the case—whether [defendant] fired intentionally into the floor or whether the gun went off accidentally when [defendant's] arm was struck by the thrown folding chair." Both defendant and Simpson testified that defendant pointed a gun at Simpson, or at least in his general direction, before the gun fired. Thus, in our view, it was just as likely that Simpson threw the chair to defend himself as it was that he threw it out of anger at defendant. ¶ 48 In any event, even if the statements should have been admitted, we find their exclusion to be harmless error. See In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 43 (2008). No real dispute exists as to whether the chair was thrown at defendant. Although Simpson stated that the situation was "blurry," he also asserted that he either threw or dropped the chair, and defendant unequivocally testified that Simpson threw the chair at him. Thus, any error in excluding the statements was harmless, as we cannot say that that contributed to the jury's verdict. Id. ¶ 49 Because we conclude that the statements were properly excluded as irrelevant, we will not consider whether the statements were also hearsay.
¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION
18 ¶ 51 For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Boone County. As part of our judgment, we grant the State's request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2016); see also People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 178 (1978). ¶ 52 Affirmed.