People v. Anderson

Full title: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID K…

Court: APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

Date published: Jun 2, 2014

2014 Ill. App. 4th 120960 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

Opinion

NO. 4-12-0960

06-02-2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID K. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.

APPLETON

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Champaign County

No. 10CF1192

Honorable

Thomas J. Difanis,

Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Pope and Holder White concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: After performing an adequate preliminary investigation of defendant's pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the trial court found no potential merit in the allegations, declined to appoint new counsel, and denied defendant's pro se motion for a new trial; this decision by the trial court is not manifestly erroneous, and therefore it is affirmed. ¶ 2 A jury found defendant, David K. Anderson, guilty of four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 2010)). The trial court sentenced him to 30 years' imprisonment for each count, ordering that the four prison terms run consecutively. ¶ 3 Defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and its progeny, the trial court performed a preliminary inquiry into his allegations of ineffective assistance, both initially and on remand from the previous appeal (People v. Anderson, 2012 IL App (4th) 110275-U). As before, the court found the allegations to be devoid of potential merit. Therefore, the court declined to appoint substitute counsel, and it denied the pro se motion for a new trial. Defendant again appeals. Because we find no manifest error, we affirm the trial court's judgment in this second appeal.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 A. The Jury Trial (December 2010)

¶ 6 1. Opening Statements

¶ 7 In his opening statement, the prosecutor, Duke Harris, told the jury that, from January through May 2010, P.C. and her family lived in a trailer in Bondville and that defendant was their landlord. P.C. and her family became close acquaintances of defendant, and she and her sister S.P. spent a lot of time at his residence. "And during the course of those times when [P.C.] and [S.P.] were at [defendant's] residence[,] the relationship turned dark." Harris said the jury would hear from P.C. "about what [defendant] did to her." His wrongdoing came to the attention of P.C.'s mother, who called the sheriff's department, which in turn called the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). An investigator with DCFS, Heather Forrest, interviewed P.C. on July 14, 2010, and P.C. described to Forrest in some detail "how and where [defendant] had touched her." The jury would hear from Forrest. The jury also would hear from Jody Ferry, the investigator from the Champaign County sheriff's department who interviewed defendant. ¶ 8 Defense counsel, Scott Schmidt, told the jury the evidence would suggest that P.C. had been coached but he cautioned that in the end, it might be impossible to identify who coached her or figure out why they did so. He said:

"So, of course the only conclusion that we can draw is that somebody told [P.C.] to say this, that her statements are coached. The evidence may not show specifically who did it. It will probably be even more difficult to get to the bottom of why someone would do that. But at the end of the evidence I'm certain that you're going to be convinced that somebody told [P.C.] to say this and her statements are coached and my client's not guilty of any of the charges brought against him in this case."

¶ 9 2. The Testimony of P.C.

¶ 10 The State called P.C. as its first witness, and she testified as follows. She was five years old and in kindergarten. Sometimes she and her eight-year-old sister, S.P., would go over to defendant's house, walking or biking there from their nearby trailer. (She identified defendant in court; in her testimony, she referred to him as Dave.) They overnighted at his house every once in a while. ¶ 11 According to P.C.'s testimony, defendant touched her on the "pee-pee" and on the "booty". She could not specify, however, when and where this happened. ¶ 12 When staying overnight at defendant's house, P.C. slept in his bed or on his couch. When she slept in his bed, he and S.P. would be in the bed, too. ¶ 13 Sometimes only P.C. and defendant slept in his bed. When the two of them alone were in his bed, he would lie on the edge, and she would lie on the edge. Harris asked her:

"Q. Okay. And were you laying on the edge or were you
laying on top of David?
A. On the edge.
Q. Okay. Did David ever ask you to marry him?
A. Yes."

Harris asked her:

"Q. Okay. What happens when people get married? Do you remember what you told the lady at the place with the play room?
A. No."

¶ 14 P.C. had taken a bath in defendant's bathroom. He was in the bathroom when she did so. Harris asked her:

"Q. Did he touch you while you were in the bathtub?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Did he, did he touch you in a way that didn't make you comfortable?
A. No.
* * *
Q. When you first—who was the first person that you told about what David had done to you?
A. Mama.
Q. You told your mama first?
A. Yes.
Q. Did anyone tell you what to say to your mother?
A. No.
Q. And what you told your mother, was it the truth?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And when you went and talked with the lady in the building with the big play room, what you told her, was it the truth?
A. Yes.
Q. Did anyone tell you what to say when you talked to her?
A. No."

¶ 15 On cross-examination, Schmidt asked P.C.:

"Q. Okay. Did you think it was weird when Dave asked you to marry him when he already lived with Ella?
A. Yes.
Q. You told Mr. Harris about places that Dave touched you. Did you go to the doctor because Dave touched you in those places?
A. No."

¶ 16 3. The Testimony of S.P.

¶ 17 The State next called S.P. She testified that when she first met defendant, she lived with her family in a trailer in Bondville and defendant lived close by. She and P.C. were at defendant's house a lot, and sometimes they spent the night there, playing games and watching TV. ¶ 18 During these overnight stays, S.P. slept on the couch or on defendant's bed. Defendant and P.C. slept on the bed at the same time as S.P. There were times when only defendant and P.C. slept on the bed. Sometimes P.C. slept on the couch. Ella always slept in her own bedroom. ¶ 19 S.P. and P.C. had taken a bath or shower in defendant's bathroom. S.P. would be alone in the bathroom when taking a bath, and the door would be closed. Defendant would be in the bathroom when P.C. was taking a bath, and the door would be open. He was the only one who checked on P.C. when she was taking a bath. ¶ 20 Defendant and Ella had no rules related to doors except that S.P. and P.C. were not to lock doors.

¶ 21 4. The Testimony of Heather Forrest

¶ 22 The State next called Heather Forrest, who testified she was employed as an investigator for DCFS. Her job was to "go out and investigate any suspected reports of abuse or neglect." She had been doing forensic interviews of children for seven or eight years. She had been through "ongoing forensic interview training throughout the years." Her approach was to "try to use non-leading questions, open-ended questions" and to "rarely use yes/no questions." She tried to "frame questions for children so that they would be able to tell [her] in their own words, elaborate in their own words, rather than saying yes or no." ¶ 23 On July 14, 2010, during the morning hours, Forrest interviewed P.C. in the Child Advocacy Center (Center). It was the first time she ever met P.C. Forrest identified a digital video disc as a recording of the interview. She had signed her initials on the disc after watching it the morning of the trial. With the trial court's permission, Harris played the disc for the jury. (Previously, on November 29, 2010, in a hearing pursuant to section 115-10(b)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-10(b)(1) (West 2010)), the court held that the out-of-court statements P.C. had made to Forrest and to P.C.'s mother would be admissible as substantive evidence in the trial.) ¶ 24 The disc is in the record. In the interview, Forrest did indeed ask nonleading questions for the most part. Her questions were scrupulously nonleading in the crucial parts of the interview. Usually, when she asked a leading question, it was merely to repeat and confirm what P.C. already had said in response to a nonleading question. ¶ 25 When Forrest asked P.C. whether her mother had told her what they would be talking about today, she answered no. After establishing a rapport with her, Forrest took out a drawing of a naked girl and asked her if she could identify the body parts, from head to toe. One side of the drawing showed the front of a naked girl. P.C. identified, among other body parts, the "pee pee," used for going potty. The other side of the drawing showed the naked girl from the rear. P.C. identified the "booty," used for sitting on the potty. Forrest asked her whether there were any body parts others should not touch. She answered, "Your pee pee." Forrest asked her if anyone had touched her on her "pee pee". She replied, "Dave has. My landlord." On the drawing, Forrest requested her to draw an X where Dave had touched her. Using a crayon, P.C. drew an X over the vagina. ¶ 26 P.C. said this happened in a house that Dave was working on. He had taken her, only her, to that house. Both of them had their clothes on, and he touched her on her "pee pee", over her clothes. He said not to tell anybody about this. Forrest asked her, "Did it happen only one time or more than one time?" "A lot," she answered. ¶ 27 Forrest asked her if Dave had touched her anywhere else. P.C. turned over the diagram and pointed at the buttocks, saying, "There, too." It "happened at the same house [she] was talking about," the house Dave was working on. It happened after he took her there. ¶ 28 Forrest asked her if Dave had touched her on the inside of her body or on the outside. On the inside of her body, she answered. "How did that make you feel?" Forrest asked her. "Not nice," she said. ¶ 29 Immediately thereafter, P.C. remarked: "He wanted me to marry him." "What happens when you marry someone?" Forrest asked. "You have sex," she answered. "How do you know that?" Forrest asked. "Because my mom showed me on TV. I see it all on TV." She could not describe, however, what sex was; she just knew that people had sex when they got married. ¶ 30 When staying overnight at Dave's house, P.C. sometimes would sleep on the couch and sometimes would sleep on his bed, a "huge bed." Forrest asked her where she was when she was asleep. "I sleeped on top of him," she replied. Both of them had their pants pulled up when she slept on top of him. ¶ 31 Forrest asked P.C. whether Dave had ever asked her to touch any part of his body. "Yeah," she said. "What part?" Forrest asked. "His pee pee," she replied. He had asked her to touch his pee pee with her hand. "And I didn't do it," she added. She had never seen his "pee pee". "Did anything like that happen with anybody else?" Forrest asked. "No," she answered. ¶ 32 At first, P.C. told Forrest that Dave had forbidden her to take a bath at his house. Then she told Forrest she had taken a bath at his house. While she took a bath, he showed her how to "get stuff inside your pee pee and your booty," using something like a rag. Forrest asked her, "Did he put it inside your pee pee and inside your booty?" "Yes," she answered. Forrest asked her what he had used. "That thing you were talking about and I was talking about," she said. "That scrubby thing?" Forrest asked. "Yes," she replied. Dave had not put anything else in there.

¶ 33 5. The Testimony of Joseph Ferry

¶ 34 Joseph Ferry testified he was an investigator with the Champaign County sheriff's department and that, from a remote video observation room, he witnessed Forrest's interview of P.C. on July 14, 2010, at the Center. At 3 p.m., shortly after the interview, Ferry went to 106 East Chestnut Street in Bondville and took defendant into custody. He transported defendant to the jail and interviewed him in the video arraignment room. ¶ 35 In the interview, defendant said the girls had stayed overnight at his house six or seven times, sleeping either in his bed or on the couch in the living room. He also said they had taken baths or showers at his house and that he was present in the bathroom when P.C. took a bath. He said he merely had washed her back. ¶ 36 Harris asked Ferry:

"Q. During this conversation—you had been at the CAC interview when [P.C.] had talked about some sort of scrubby type of thing?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And during the course of your conversation with him you had a discussion about a loofah sponge or a fishnet thing; is
that correct?
A. Yeah. He, Mr. Anderson, said he would put body wash soap on a—what I believe was a loofah sponge. He described it as a fishnet, kind of a fishnet, sponge-type thing that you wash yourself with. And he said he would give it to her and he had concerns about how she washed herself with that.
Q. During the course of your conversation with him was there any discussion about [P.C.] washing her privates?
A. Yes.
Q. What, if anything, did he say about that?
A. I asked him if he assisted her in washing her privates, and he said he did not. However, he was concerned that due to the texture of the loofah sponge that he felt that she was—might push too hard on her private area when she was washing herself with the loofah sponge."

¶ 37 Defendant told Ferry he "had previous conversation with both girls in the past about their private areas and whether anybody should touch it and who should and should not touch their private areas." Harris asked:

"Q. Was there any discussion about [P.C.] asking Mr. Anderson about his privates?
A. Yes, there was.
Q. What did Mr. Anderson tell you about that?
A. He said at one point when he was drying her off—drying [P.C.] off—she had mentioned or asked him if his private looked like her daddy's private and that she had seen her daddy rub her private—his private—on her mom's private.
Q. And, again, at that point did Mr. Anderson indicate to you that he was still at a loss as to what had happened to whom?
A. Yes.
Q. During the course of this conversation that you had with Mr. Anderson was there any conversation between yourself and Mr. Anderson about him ever talking to [P.C.] about getting married?
A. Yes, there was.
Q. What, if anything, did Mr. Anderson say about that?
A. When I asked him the question, if he had ever had a discussion with [P.C.] about getting married, he kind of set [sic] back and laughed out loud openly and said yes, he had. He said that she had a little dress that she would often wear, she would get dressed up—and he described it as kind of like a little wedding dress—and he said it was kind of a running joke, a standing joke for a while, that he was gonna marry her in that dress.
Q. Did you finally tell Mr. Anderson that the allegation was that he had touched [P.C.] in her private areas?
A. I did.
Q. What was his response?
A. He denied touching her at all."

¶ 38 On cross-examination by Schmidt, Ferry admitted that although he photographed the inside of defendant's house, he never went inside unit No. 4, the vacant trailer, which also was allegedly a crime scene. ¶ 39 Ferry also admitted it was "fairly standard practice to seek an examination of an alleged victim of sexual assault by what's called a sexual assault nurse examiner," and yet, to his knowledge, "no sexual assault kit was ever done." He did not know why. ¶ 40 On redirect examination by Harris, Ferry testified that a deputy sheriff named Ferriman "took the initial report" and that, according to Ferriman's report, "these events *** occurred some number of months prior to July 14th." By then, there would have been no "fresh evidence to be collected." ¶ 41 On re-cross-examination, however, Schmidt asked Ferry:

"Q. Okay. But a sexual assault examination is not merely to find trace evidence like DNA, but it's also to examine physically for any sign of sexual abuse or trauma; isn't that right?
A. I would think so, yes.
Q. Including digital penetration of a five-year-old; is that right?
A. I would think so, yes.
Q. So there's really not a reason not to have a sexual assault
examination done just because there's no allegation of penetration with a penis and ejaculation?
A. It certainly wouldn't have hurt probably to have one done.
Q. And you stand by your answer that you don't know why that was not completed?
A. That's correct."

¶ 42 6. The Testimony of Ella Breeden

¶ 43 After unsuccessfully moving for a directed verdict, Schmidt called Ella Breeden as the first witness for the defense. Breeden testified that, for the past 8 or 10 years, she and defendant had shared a house adjacent to a trailer park of four trailers. They had separate bedrooms. He had been taking care of her because she had "a lot of crippling and stuff." ¶ 44 P.C. and S.P. frequently came over, and sometimes they would spend the night. Sometimes their two younger sisters, "the two babies," would come over, too. ¶ 45 S.P. would come in and take her own bath, but P.C. had to be lifted in and out of the big claw-footed tub. Breeden testified:

"A. But she couldn't climb out very good so he'd pick her up by the waist and stand around and let her dry.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. And then she'd wrap the towel around her before she got dry, wantin' to play, and she'd just get up and wrap her feet around him."

There was romping and there was wrestling when the kids were over. ¶ 46 Schmidt asked Breeden:

"Q. All right. You didn't have any problem with those girls staying at your house?
A. Well, we like kids and they wanted to stay and their mom and dad said okay. Even when [P.C.] come there and said she wanted a bath, David went over and asked her mother what he should do. She said[,] ['W]ell, go ahead and give her a bath if you feel comfortable with it."

P.C. and her family lived in unit No. 2. A man with four boys lived in unit No. 1. Two of the boys stayed overnight at defendant's house a lot. Defendant babysat them as well. ¶ 47 Schmidt asked Breeden:

"Q. Were there explicitly stated rules in the household when children were visiting?
A. Yes. We had a rule of not goin' in and shuttin' the door or havin' the door shut when they're in there."

¶ 48 Breeden insisted that she and defendant were "not boyfriend and girlfriend." They merely "share[d] in rent." She did the cooking and never "touch[ed] his bedroom."

¶ 49 7. The Testimony of Defendant

¶ 50 Defendant testified he was a general contractor and that he was 54 years old. He had been living with Breeden in a small white frame house in a trailer park, which he was buying on a contract for deed. The trailers dated from the 1960s, and their owner had tried without success to give them away on condition that they be hauled off the premises. Defendant was renovating them as best he could. Breeden was merely his friend, and she was afflicted with arthritis. She needed a single-level residence. That was part of the reason why they moved, initially, into unit No. 1 and, later, into the house as caretakers of the trailer park. ¶ 51 P.C. and her family moved into unit No. 2 in the last week of January 2010. Tenants in the trailer park were more than tenants; they soon became friends of defendant and Breeden. He liked to help out young families because he knew what it was like to be on the bottom. ¶ 52 P.C. and S.P. got into the habit of visiting him quite frequently. This was not unusual for kids in the trailer park. The eight-year-old and six-year-old boys from unit No. 1, often came over and spent the night. ¶ 53 In response to the question of why P.C. and S.P. took baths at his house even though their trailer was right across the driveway, defendant testified that the first time they took a bath at his house was on their second visit, when the girls' parents wanted a date night, a chance to be alone together for the evening. Defendant had all four girls at his house, and he needed a baby bottle for one of the younger girls. As he was leaving his house to head over to unit No. 2 and get a baby bottle, he called out for the girls to use the bathroom and get ready for bed. P.C. said she wanted to take a bath because Thursday was her bath night. Defendant went over to unit No. 2 and asked their mother what to do about P.C.'s request for a bath. Their mother said to go ahead and give the girls a bath because she trusted him and, besides, if he did anything wrong, P.C. and S.P. would come over and tell her. It was necessary for defendant to help P.C. in and out of the big tub; Breeden could not do so. He denied, however, touching her privates with a sponge or scrubber. She washed herself. ¶ 54 He denied that P.C. ever slept on top of him. ¶ 55 He denied taking her into unit No. 4 and touching her privates. The only time P.C. was in unit No. 4 was when her parents were thinking of renting it, considering that unit No. 2 had only two bedrooms, whereas Unit No. 4 had three bedrooms. Unit No. 4 was crammed with construction supplies, but defendant denied working on unit No. 4 itself during the period when P.C. resided in the trailer park. He used it strictly for storage. ¶ 56 He denied touching her privates at any time. In fact, he had talked with her about good touches and bad touches after hearing she had gone missing for a while. ¶ 57 The jury found defendant guilty of four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. The trial court sentenced him to 4 consecutive terms of 30 years' imprisonment.

¶ 58 B. The Krankel Proceedings

¶ 59 Defendant appealed on a single ground: that the trial court had violated Krankel, and its progeny by failing to make an adequate preliminary inquiry into his allegations of ineffective assistance, allegations he made in a pro se motion for a new trial. Because we found paragraphs 14(I) and (K) of his motion to be vague and enigmatic (common deficiencies in pro se pleadings), we were unable to say that the trial court had made an adequate inquiry into those paragraphs. People v. Anderson, 2012 IL App (4th) 110275-U, ¶ 12. It seemed to us that an adequate inquiry into defendant's claims would entail asking him what he meant in paragraphs 14(I) and (K) if it was unclear what he meant. Id. We wrote:

"In paragraph 14(I) of his pro se motion for a new trial,
defendant asserted that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by 'flatly refus[ing] to take steps necessary to defend this case when [the] State changed its intended course of prosecuting the case, depriving defendant [of] the right to confront witnesses against him[] and to present his defense to the jury.' How did the State 'change its intended course of prosecuting the case'? And what 'necessary steps to defend this case' should trial counsel have taken in view of this change of course? ***
Also, in paragraph 14(K) of his pro se motion for a new trial, defendant said that '[c]ounsel failed to sufficiently prepare the called witnesses for testifying at trial.' How, specifically, in defendant's view, could the witnesses have been better prepared? What does defendant believe these witnesses would have said in their testimony if they had been better prepared?" Id. ¶¶ 13-14.

We remanded the case with directions to perform a preliminary inquiry into these paragraphs of defendant's pro se motion for a new trial, such as by asking defendant what he meant. Id. ¶ 17. ¶ 60 On October 10, 2012, upon remand, the trial court held another Krankel hearing, in which the court sought clarification from defendant regarding paragraphs 14(I) and (K), interacted with him, patiently listened to him, and made a good-faith attempt to understand specifically what he meant in those paragraphs. The court also allowed defendant to question Schmidt after Harris finished questioning him. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found no potential merit in defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance. Therefore, the court declined to appoint new counsel, and the court denied the pro se motion for a new trial. ¶ 61 This appeal followed.

¶ 62 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 63 A. The Decision by Schmidt Not To Call the Logues To Testify

¶ 64 Defendant admits that, on remand, the trial court adequately investigated the allegations of ineffective assistance in paragraphs 14(I) and (K) of his pro se motion for a new trial. He argues, however, that the court erred in its evaluation of the potential merits of those allegations. He argues that paragraphs 14(I) and (K), as amplified in the Krankel hearing of October 10, 2012, merited the appointment of new counsel to represent him in posttrial proceedings. ¶ 65 Under Krankel and its progeny, a defendant is not automatically entitled to the appointment of new counsel whenever the defendant files a pro se motion for a new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance. People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 134 (1991). Rather, the trial court must "conduct[] a preliminary investigation of the defendant's allegations." Id. If this preliminary investigation reveals that the allegations are "spurious" or that they "pertain[] only to trial tactics," the defendant has no right to the appointment of new counsel. Id. If, on the other hand, "the defendant's allegations of incompetence indicate that trial counsel neglected the defendant's case, the court should appoint new counsel to argue [the] defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 134-35. ¶ 66 Because the trial court, on remand, determined the merits of defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance, we ask whether the court's decision is manifestly erroneous. See People v. McLaurin, 2012 IL App (1st) 102943, ¶ 41. " 'Manifest error' is error that *** is plain, evident, and indisputable." Id. ¶ 67 Defendant considers the trial court's decision to be manifestly erroneous because once Schmidt suggested to the jury, in his opening statement, that P.C. had been coached, it thereafter was necessary for Schmidt to call P.C.'s parents, to establish a motive for the coaching. Defendant says: "[I]nstead of helping establish the Logue family's motive for bringing a false charge, [Schmidt] had refused to call [P.C.'s] parents to bring out their criminal records, their custody battle, and their monetary problems." Defendant infers the Logues are battling for custody of P.C., and he draws that inference from a witness list revealing that she resides with her aunt, her "guardian." Even so, defendant does not explain how the Logues' criminal records or custody battle gave them a motive to falsely incriminate him. ¶ 68 As for the Logues' insolvency, Schmidt testified, on remand, that he had decided against presenting that as a motive. He said:

"[M]y former client[] did propose a theory of innocence where the—the parents of the young girl put her up to this because they were behind in their rent and he thought that they may have—they may have had a motive to—to coach her and get her to fabricate these allegations so that they could eventually assume ownership of—my client's property. I considered that. I thought it a fairly weak rationale. Decided not to—not to pursue that—that angle."

Thus, Schmidt made a strategic decision not to call the Logues as witnesses in the trial. ¶ 69 The supreme court has said:

"Decisions concerning which witnesses to call at trial and what
evidence to present on [the] defendant's behalf ultimately rest with trial counsel. [Citation.] As matters of trial strategy, such decisions are generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation.] The only exception to this rule is when counsel's chosen trial strategy is so unsound that counsel entirely fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing. [Citation.]" People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 310 (1997).

The same analysis applies to the choice of a defense theory. The supreme court has said:

"We also note that the choice of defense theory is ordinarily a matter of trial strategy, and counsel has the ultimate authority to decide this trial strategy. [Citation.] The court will generally not review a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel based on inadequate trial strategy. [Citation.]
This court, however, has recognized an exception where counsel entirely fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing. [Citation.]" People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1995).

¶ 70 Schmidt chose a defense theory, which he introduced at the beginning of the trial, in his opening statement. His theory was as follows: P.C. had been coached, but, in the very nature of things, it would be difficult to prove who did the coaching, let alone the motive for the coaching. Schmidt told the jury:

"So, of course the only conclusion that we can draw is that somebody told [P.C.] to say this, that her statements are coached.
The evidence may not show specifically who did it. It will probably be even more difficult to get to the bottom of why someone would do that. But at the end of the evidence I'm certain that you're going to be convinced that somebody told [P.C.] to say this and her statements are coached and my client's not guilty of any of the charges brought against him in this case."

¶ 71 Consistent with that defense theory, Schmidt decided not to call the Logues as witnesses. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we may even review his strategic decision, the decision arguably was reasonable because (1) Kassandra Logue might have testified, in vivid and convincing detail, to what P.C. had told her, thereby buttressing P.C.'s credibility; and (2) by not calling the Logues, Schmidt could take advantage of the State's not doing so. In his closing argument, he argued to the jury:

"Ladies and gentlemen, allegations of this nature are easier to make than they are to disprove, and I can't prove who influenced [P.C.] to make these allegations, much less why. It is, however, I think worth noting that the individual who we are told [P.C.] first made these statements to, her mother, did not testify in this trial. Neither did her father, neither did any officer who spoke to either of those—either of her parents.
The only sworn officer who testified in this trial couldn't even explain why a routine sexual assault examination was not conducted on [P.C.] And that was answer to the question, don't
know.[']
Excuses may be made when a police officer or other investigator doesn't do something that the defense feels they should have. Defense—excuses may be made along the lines of, well, it might not have shown anything; well, we're not really looking for DNA.
When you have a case like this, when it's based solely on what people say, no direct eyewitness to it, it's hard to say, well, you had an opportunity to maybe break this case, you had an opportunity maybe to get some corroboration, some real physical corroboration, and for reasons that you can't explain you didn't do that.
Should that be to my client's detriment?"

¶ 72 Schmidt also pointed out that, in the video recorded interview in the Center, when P.C. answered, "My mommy showed me on TV," in response to Forrest's question of how P.C. knew that people had sex when they married, Forrest never explored that incident further. ¶ 73 In these various ways, Schmidt subjected the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing. He highlighted the inexplicable failure to perform a routine sexual assault examination. He highlighted the lack of physical evidence. He highlighted the State's decision not to call either of the parents, implying that their testimony would have been damaging to the prosecution because they had coached P.C. and that fact would have come out. Because Schmidt subjected the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing, his choice of a defense strategy and his decision not to call the Logues are immune to a claim of ineffective assistance. See Reid, 179 Ill. 2d at 310; Guest, 166 Ill. 2d at 394.

¶ 74 B. Defendant's Inability To See P.C. as She Testified

¶ 75 Defendant contends that Schmidt rendered ineffective assistance by failing to make an objection when defendant complained to him of his inability to see around the podium. Upon review of this issue, the judge who had presided over the trial found defendant's claim of his inability to see around the podium to be without merit. It would be an exaggeration to say that the failure to make this objection amounted to "possible neglect of the case." People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78 (2003).

¶ 76 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 77 Because we find no manifest error in the trial court's decision to deny the pro se motion for a new trial without appointing substitute counsel, we affirm the trial court's judgment. We award the State $50 in appeal costs against defendant. ¶ 78 Affirmed.