BOYLE, J.

We granted leave in this case to consider whether an award of "exemplary and punitive" damages under Michigan's libel statute impermissibly duplicates an award of actual damages for injury to feelings arising from the libel. In addressing that question, we reaffirm that "exemplary and punitive" damages under the libel statute are purely compensatory in nature, but hold that their availability requires a showing of common-law malice. We further hold that, under proper instruction, a jury may award exemplary and punitive damages that are not duplicative of actual damages for injury to feelings. Because exemplary and punitive damages were awarded in this case in the absence of a proper malice instruction, we affirm the Court of Appeals judgment remanding for a new trial on damages, but modify that decision in accordance with the principles set forth below.

I

Plaintiff Balfour Peisner, an attorney, brought this action against defendants The Detroit Free Press and its reporter Louis Heldman claiming actual and punitive damages for libel arising from the publication of an article written by Heldman that appeared in the Free Press in November, 1973. Following two pretrial appeals to the Court of Appeals on issues not relevant here, the case was tried before a jury and a verdict returned against Heldman and the Free Press jointly in the amount of $52,000 actual damages and against the Free Press alone for $100,000 "additional" damages. The Free Press' motion for a new trial and remittitur was denied.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the Free Press' arguments relative to liability, but remanded for a new trial on damages on the basis of a finding that the damage instructions given permitted the jury to compensate Peisner twice for injury to feelings, as an element of both "actual" and "exemplary and punitive" damages. The Court found that such a double recovery of mental injury damages was "a form of punishment which is not permitted in this state," requiring a redetermination of damages to compensate Peisner only once for injury to feelings. Peisner v Detroit Free Press, Inc, 104 Mich. App. 59, 71; 304 N.W.2d 814 (1981). Judge V.J. BRENNAN concurred in a separate opinion expressing his concern with the confusion arising from use of the term "punitive" to describe a purely compensatory element of damages. Id., 71-72.

Peisner appealed to this Court, requesting, inter alia, that we rule true punitive (punishment-type) damages to be recoverable under the Michigan libel statute and that the Court of Appeals remand order be modified accordingly. No cross-appeal as to liability was taken by the Free Press.

In short, we reject Peisner's invitation to depart from an established rule precluding true punishment-type damages in libel cases. We find however that common-law malice is a prerequisite — unsatisfied in this case — to recovery of "exemplary and punitive" damages for libel. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but remand for a new trial as to punitive and exemplary damages only.

II

The starting point in our analysis is § 2 of the Michigan libel statute, MCL 600.2911; MSA 27A.2911, which in separate subsections provides for the recovery of "actual" damages and "exemplary and punitive" damages:

"(2)(a) Except as provided in (b), in actions based on libel or slander the plaintiff is entitled to recover only for the actual damages which he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession, occupation, or feelings.

"(b) Exemplary and punitive damages shall not be recovered in actions for libel unless the plaintiff, before instituting his action, gives notice to the defendant to publish a retraction and allows a reasonable time to do so, and proof of the publication or correction shall be admissible in evidence under a denial on the question of the good faith of the defendant, and in mitigation and reduction of exemplary or punitive damages. The retraction shall be published in the same size type, in the same editions and as far as practicable, in substantially the same position as the original libel."

Subsection (a) defines "actual damages" to include damages suffered in respect to feelings, while subsection (b) permits recovery of "exemplary and punitive damages" provided a request for retraction is made and a reasonable time allowed for the defendant to publish the retraction. The publication of such a retraction does not preclude an award of exemplary and punitive damages, but is admissible on the question of defendant's good faith and in mitigation and reduction of such damages.

At first blush the use of the terms "exemplary and punitive" suggests a legislative intent to permit an award of damages — in addition to actual damages — for the purposes either of punishing (i.e., specifically deterring) defendant or of making an example of defendant for the benefit of other potential purveyors of libel (i.e., generally deterring). The history of that provision and the Michigan cases interpreting it, however, reveal that not to be the case.

Even before the original version of our libel statute was enacted, this Court had established the principle that "vindictive or exemplary" damages for libel are merely a species of "actual" (i.e., compensatory) damages awarded to compensate plaintiff for the increased injury to feelings directly attributable to defendant's fault in publishing the libel:

"It is in connection with the various degrees of blameworthiness chargeable on wrong-doers, that the discussions have arisen upon the subject of vindictive or exemplary damages, which, inasmuch as they rest upon actual fault, are by some authorities said to be designed to punish the wrong intent, while, according to others, the damages usually so called are only meant to recompense the sense of injury which is in human experience always aggravated or lessened in proportion to the degree of perversity exhibited by the offender. While the term exemplary or vindictive damages has become so fixed in the law that it may be difficult to get rid of it, yet it should not be allowed to be used so as to mislead, and we think the only proper application of damages beyond those to person, property or reputation, is to make reparation for the injury to the feelings of the person injured. This is often the greatest wrong which can be inflicted, and injured pride or affection may, under some circumstances, justify very heavy damages." Detroit Daily Post Co v McArthur, 16 Mich. 447, 452-453 (1868).

See also Scripps v Reilly, 38 Mich. 10, 23-24 (1878).

The first version of the libel statute, enacted in 1885, omitted any reference to injury to feelings as an element of actual damages. Perhaps due to Justice CAMPBELL'S criticism of that omission in Park v The Detroit Free Press Co, 72 Mich. 560; 40 N.W. 731 (1888), the Legislature in 1895 added injury to feelings as an element of actual damages, separate from the existing provision for "exemplary or punitive" damages. Thus, beginning with the 1895 enactment, all reenactments and compilations of the libel statute through the present-day version have provided for recovery both of actual damages — including compensation for injury to feelings — and of "exemplary or punitive damages."

Notwithstanding the separate treatment of "actual" injury-to-feelings damages and "exemplary or punitive damages" in the statute, this Court continued to interpret the terms "exemplary or punitive" as referring to damages intended solely to compensate plaintiff for the increase in injury to feelings attributable to defendant's fault (or malice, in the common-law sense) in publishing the libel. See, e.g., Long v Tribune Printing Co, 107 Mich. 207; 65 N.W. 108 (1895); Boydan v Haberstumpf, 129 Mich. 137, 140; 88 N.W. 386 (1901); Poledna v Bendix Aviation Corp, 360 Mich. 129, 144; 103 N.W.2d 789 (1960).

Because the Legislature, cognizant of this longstanding judicial gloss limiting exemplary and punitive damages to a compensatory role, has on several occasions through the years reenacted the libel statute without change, we conclude the Legislature intended that any award of "exemplary and punitive" damages comport with the established common-law gloss on those terms. Indeed, the latest reenactment of the libel provision in 1961 was accompanied by a committee comment stating that the new enactment was to be "considered in light of the interpretation of the present statute." See Postill v Booth Newspapers, Inc, 118 Mich. App. 608, 629; 325 N.W.2d 511 (1982), lv den 417 Mich. 1050 (1983).

In reaffirming that both "actual damages" for injury to feelings and "exemplary and punitive damages" are intended only to compensate, we stress that these two categories of compensation damages are independent. The difference between them was highlighted by Justice WIEST in a case involving assault damages, Wise v Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 233-234; 190 N.W. 746 (1922):

"If a cow kicks a man in the face the consequent physical hurt may equal that from a kick in the face with a hob-nailed boot, but the `cussedness' of the cow raises no sense of outrage, while the malicious motive back of the boot kick adds materially to the victim's sense of outrage. If a man employs spite and venom in administering a physical hurt he must not expect his maliciousness to escape consideration when he is cast to make compensation for his wrong. If the defendant maliciously inflicted the injury then the jury had a right to take into consideration such fact together with all the circumstances disclosed and award such sum by way of compensation as the plaintiff ought to receive, and the defendant ought to be made to pay."

In the libel context, actual damages for injured feelings are comparable to those attributable to the kick by the cow, i.e., the plaintiff is compensated for injured feelings attributable simply to the fact and effect of the libel. Exemplary and punitive damages, however, compensate for the incremental injury to feelings attributable to the sense of indignation and outrage experienced by the plaintiff due to the defendant's bad faith or ill will in publishing the libel — i.e., the "malicious motive back of the boot kick."

Thus, while both types of damages do indeed compensate for injured feelings, exemplary and punitive damages pick up where actual damages leave off by in effect compensating the plaintiff for injured feelings attributable solely to the egregiousness of defendant's conduct. To avoid confusing these two components of mental injury damages, thereby leaving open the possibility of double recovery for the same element, we urge that instructions be formulated to specify both "actual" damages for injured feelings and "exemplary and punitive" damages (for incremental injury to feelings), with a direction to the jury permitting them to increase the actual damages award with exemplary and punitive damages only if the required elements (discussed below) are established. We suggest that development of a special verdict form directing the jury to address the discrete issues that must be resolved in cases involving such exemplary and punitive damage awards would assist both the deliberative process and the task of judicial review.

III

By our ruling above, we necessarily reaffirm that exemplary and punitive damages for libel cannot be awarded in the absence of a finding that the defendant acted with common-law malice — in the sense of ill will or bad faith — in publishing the libel. This principle, most recently stated by this Court (with respect to medical malpractice) in Veselenak v Smith, 414 Mich. 567, 574-575; 327 N.W.2d 261 (1982), also has a long history of application in libel cases. See, e.g., Orth v Featherly, 87 Mich. 315, 321; 49 N.W. 640 (1891) ("[Plaintiff] was entitled to recover punitive damages, if the facts proved establish express and wanton malice"); Couch v Mining Journal Co, 130 Mich. 294, 297; 89 N.W. 936 (1902) ("[Whether plaintiff] was entitled to punitory damages would depend upon whether the publication was malicious . . ."); Lawrence v Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 146; 97 N.W.2d 719 (1959) ("The existence of ill will or the absence of honest belief . . . may affect the measure of damages to be imposed, particularly as to punitive damages . . ."). See also Kewin v Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins Co, 409 Mich. 401, 419; 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980). Since we define exemplary and punitive damages as compensation for injured feelings attributable solely to defendant's bad faith or ill will (i.e., common-law malice), the foregoing rule simply implements our definition of exemplary and punitive damages in the form of a requirement of proof.

We recognize that a private defamation plaintiff must face an imposing array of barriers to recover exemplary and punitive damages. In this case, for example, plaintiffs were required to prove constitutional "actual malice" — i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth — simply to defeat defendants' qualified privilege to report on matters of public interest and thereby establish liability for actual damages. Under the principles we adhere to today, an award of exemplary and punitive damages further requires the plaintiffs to prove compliance with the statute's retraction request procedure as well as defendant's common-law malice in publishing the libel. We do not find these extra burdens unreasonable, however, in light of the special significance attached to the reporting of matters in the public interest. In essence, our balance is struck to limit the reporter acting recklessly, but in good faith, to liability for actual damages only, while the reporter acting recklessly and in bad faith must bear the additional liability for exemplary and punitive damages. This scheme protects the legitimate interests of both constituencies, providing full and fair compensation to plaintiffs while avoiding unduly burdensome damage awards, save in the exceptional case where the defendant is motivated by ill will or bad faith.

IV

In the instant case, the trial judge gave the following instructions regarding the award of actual damages:

"Now, if you decide that the Plaintiff husband is entitled to damages, it is your duty to determine the amount of money which reasonably, fairly and adequately compensates him for each of the elements of damage which you decide has resulted from the publication by the Defendant. You should include each of the following items of damage which you decide have been sustained by the Plaintiff to the present time, and they include:

"The actual damages which the Plaintiff has suffered in respect to his property or business, trade, occupation or feelings, his mental anguish, his denial of social pleasures and enjoyment, his embarrassment, ridicule, humiliation, mortification or fear. You may also include any of those elements of damage which you determine that the Plaintiff is reasonably certain to sustain in the future.

"Now, which, if any, of those elements of damage has been proved is for you to decide. But you have to decide that based upon evidence and not upon speculation, not upon guess and not upon conjecture. The amount of money to be awarded for certain of these elements of damage — such as: mental anguish, denial of social pleasures, embarrassment, mortification and ridicule and things like that — the amount of money awarded for those elements can't be proved in a precise dollar amount. The law leaves both amounts to your sound judgment. But your verdict must be solely to compensate the Plaintiff for his damages and not to punish the Defendants."

As to exemplary and punitive damages, the judge further instructed:

"Now, members of the jury, the Michigan statute which I have just quoted mentions punitive damages. Now, under our law — and I want to correct any possible misimpressions — under our law the purpose of these `punitive damages' is not to punish the Defendant[s] for their misdeeds. The purpose of these damages, which I prefer to refer to as additional damages rather than punitive damages, is to compensate the Plaintiffs for injuries suffered by them because of the Defendants' actions.

"I charge you, that although the focus is upon the Plaintiff's injuries, in measuring these additional and exemplary damages, the focus is on the Defendant[s'] actions in determining if these additional damages should be awarded.

"It has long been the position of the Courts of Michigan that the sting of libel will be much greater when the Defendants have acted with either knowledge of the falsity of the material, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. Since the injury is greater because of the Defendant[s'] actions, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover greater damages than the actual damages. And this is what this punitive damages, which I referred to as additional damages means.

* * *

"If you also find that the Plaintiff, Balfour Peisner, has established by a clear and convincing evidence that the Defendants published the article knowing the facts stated in it were false, or that the Defendants published the article with a reckless disregard for whether the facts stated were false or not, then you may also award him exemplary or additional damages, as I have explained them to you before. Such additional damages may be awarded only if the evidence of the known falsity or reckless disregard for the truth is clear and convincing. A simple preponderance of evidence which is sufficient in the actual damages, is not sufficient to award additional damages.

* * *

"If you also decide that the Plaintiff, Mr. Peisner, is entitled to what I have labeled additional damages because the publishers of the — I'm sorry. Because the publisher knew that the facts were false or because the article was published with a reckless disregard for the truth, then you may award additional damages to the Plaintiff Peisner, and these additional damages are allowed to compensate him because the sting of libel is much greater — it's made much greater when the Defendants have acted with knowledge of the falsity.

"You may estimate such additional damages in order to fairly compensate the Plaintiff for the purposes of such additional damages. As I said, although they're called punitive, it's not to punish the Defendants."

We commend the trial judge's effort to adhere to our earlier cases in fashioning both sets of instructions.

A. Actual Damages

Our rule confining exemplary and punitive damages to a purely compensatory role necessarily limits the permissible scope of actual damages in libel actions. This has led to understandable confusion, since actual damages for injury to feelings would appear to encompass any award for "compensatory" exemplary and punitive damages. See Veselenak, supra, 414 Mich. 576-577. We avoid that overlap, however, by defining exemplary and punitive damages as compensating only the incremental injury to feelings attributable to defendant's malice. Thus, while in fact both "actual" and "exemplary and punitive" damages compensate the plaintiff, the latter operates to increase "actual" compensation only in cases where the defendant is proved to have acted with common-law malice towards the plaintiff.

The instruction on actual damages given in this case accurately sets forth the elements of actual injury to feelings as they are defined in this state; and the jury was told that additional damages were not to punish the defendant. While an instruction that limited the award of actual damages to injury arising from the fact and effect of the libel might have been more accurate, we find that the instructions properly expressed the distinction between actual and exemplary and punitive damages. The jury was admonished that the latter category must be compensatory, and we therefore find no reversible error in this regard.

B. Exemplary and Punitive Damages

Under our rule defining exemplary and punitive damages with reference to defendant's common-law malice, we find the instruction given defective. Rather than instructing the jury to find common-law malice (bad faith or ill will) toward the plaintiff as a prerequisite to awarding exemplary and punitive damages, the judge instructed that a finding of constitutional actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth) would justify such an award. While a finding of "actual malice" (to establish liability) may in some instances supply the elements necessary for a finding of "common-law malice," the lack of congruence between the two standards requires that the jury be instructed specifically on common-law malice — in the sense of ill will or bad faith towards the plaintiff — as a prerequisite to this increased recovery.

V

In sum, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding for a new trial solely on the issue of damages, but modify that decision in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion. Because the jury was not properly instructed on the necessity for a finding of common-law malice as a prerequisite to an award of exemplary and punitive damages the issues to be tried on remand are the existence of any common-law malice on the part of either or both of the defendants in publishing the article, and, if common-law malice is shown, the existence and amount of any incremental injury to feelings attributable to such malice to be compensated by exemplary and punitive damages increasing the award of actual damages.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KAVANAGH, RYAN, BRICKLEY, and CAVANAGH, JJ., concurred with BOYLE, J.

LEVIN, J., concurred in the result only.