Summary
In Payne, supra, the wife had started divorce proceedings against the husband on several occasions, and she finally secured a divorce shortly after the husband had transferred his interest in a motel to her.
Summary of this case from Sol v. MillerOpinion
7 Div. 859.
November 7, 1969.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, In Equity, Calhoun County, Robert M. Parker, J.
Robert J. Hooton, Hooton Hooton, Roanoke, for appellant.
Marriage creates between husband and wife a relationship of confidence and trust, exacting utmost good faith in dealing with each other. Putnam v. Putnam, 274 Ala. 472, 150 So.2d 209, 210 (par. 6). In transactions inter vivos, where parties stand in confidential relationship, and the grantee, who is the beneficiary, is the dominant spirit in the transaction, the law raises the presumption of undue influence and casts on the grantee the burden of repelling such presumption by satisfactory evidence whenever the transaction is assailed. Dillard et al. v. Hovater et al., 254 Ala. 616, 49 So.2d 151 (par. 1); McLeod et al. v. McLeod, 145 Ala. 269, 40 So. 414. Equity will, in general, relieve a husband from his contracts with, or conveyance or transfer to, his wife, obtained by her fraud, undue influence, overreaching of him, or the like, by means of her confidential relation with him, especially where the circumstances are such that the husband is so dependent on the wife and so aged and weak in mind and body that he may easily be subjected to her undue influence and overreaching. In such a situation, a conveyance or transfer from him to her will not be sustained or enforced without affirmative proof that his act was intelligently done without undue influence. Hence, if a wife by fraud and imposition on her husband induces him voluntarily to transfer property to her benefit, a court of equity will afford him relief and compel a reconveyance. 41 Am.Jur.2d 225, § 272. Where confidential relation exists between grantor and grantee of deed in which grantee is dominant party, burden of proving that transaction was fair, free from undue influence or fraud and that grantor had disinterested, independent, and incompetent advice is cast upon grantee. Milliner v. Grant, 253 Ala. 475, 45 So.2d 314 (par. 6). Habitual intemperance is not sufficient to avoid an instrument executed during an interval when the maker avoided excessive indulgence and was capable of transacting business. However, where the maker's mind has become so impaired by habitual intoxication that he cannot act with an agreeing mind and there is a showing that he has been overreached, the rule is otherwise, even though he executed the instrument in a sober interval. 13 American Jurisprudence 2d 509.
Sam H. Hamner, Anniston, for appellee.
In transactions between husband and wife during lifetime, the husband is to be presumed the dominant party. Merchants' Natl. Bank of Mobile v. Hubbard, 222 Ala. 518, 133 So. 723, 74 A.L.R. 646; Rash v. Bogart, 226 Ala. 284, 146 So. 814; Barnett v. Barnett, 262 Ala. 655, 80 So.2d 626. In jurisdictions where a married woman may contract with her husband as though they were not married . . . . such a transaction is presumptively valid and effectual without proof of its equity and justice, the burden of proving fraud, coercion, or undue influence being on those who attack the validity of the conveyance or transfer. 41 Am.Jur.2d 227, § 275. Only when evidence is sufficient to rebut presumption that the husband is dominant party in marriage and to show undue influence exercised by the wife against the husband, will courts of equity intervene to protect against such undue influence. Barnett v. Barnett, 262 Ala. 655, 80 So.2d 626. In equity, as well as at law, every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the trial judge's ruling, and a final decree rendered by him will not be reversed unless clearly shown to be erroneous. Ritter v. Hewitt, 236 Ala. 205, 181 So. 289; American Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 234 Ala. 469, 175 So. 554, 112 A.L.R. 1215.
The appellant, Grover B. Payne, Jr., was the complainant in the trial court. He filed an action in equity against his ex-wife, Celeste A. Payne, and others, asking that the trial court set aside a deed of conveyance executed by him which transferred to his former wife property in Calhoun County known as the Annistonian Motel. He also sought to set aside other conveyances, including a deed from Celeste A. Payne to third parties, and mortgages given as security. Appellant contends that his ex-wife exercised undue influence upon him at a time when she was the dominant party in a confidential relationship and during a period when he was ill. The trial court heard the testimony ore tenus, and after consideration, entered a final decree dismissing the complaint because:
"* * * the complainant has failed to prove any of the material allegations of his Bill of Complaint and that the relief prayed for therein should be denied. * * *"
The main thrust of the appellant's argued assignments of error is that he proved undue influence and the trial court erred in not making such a finding and setting aside the conveyance he had made to his ex-wife, and the conveyance she had subsequently made to third parties.
We will not set out all the evidence. Briefly, the testimony shows that the appellant and appellee had been married for several years, that the wife had started divorce proceedings on several occasions, and that she had finally secured a divorce shortly after the transaction in question. Appellant purchased the Annistonian Motel in December, 1964, for $50,000.00. He paid $10,000.00 in cash and gave two separate notes for the remainder. He made certain improvements on the property and was operating the motel in 1966 when he was hospitalized for alcoholism, once in April and once in May. In November, 1966, he was hospitalized at Bryce in Tuscaloosa for 18 days. The conveyance here sought to be set aside was executed on September 19, 1966, at a time when appellant claims that he had a severe drinking problem and during a time when he and his ex-wife occupied a confidential relationship in which she was the dominant party.
Under the provisions of Code of Alabama, Title 34, § 74, contracts between a husband and wife are subject to the rules of law as to contracts by and between persons standing in confidential relations, but the husband is presumed to be the dominant of the two parties. The presumption is rebuttable, and in cases where the evidence is sufficient to rebut this presumption, and to show undue influence exercised by the wife against the husband, courts of equity will intervene to protect against such undue influence. Barnett v. Barnett, 262 Ala. 655, 80 So.2d 626 (1955).
The evidence was ore tenus and every presumption will be indulged in favor of the trial court's findings of fact which will not be disturbed unless palpably wrong. Deese v. Odom, 283 Ala. 420, 218 So.2d 134 (1969); State v. Matthews Electric Supply Co., 284 Ala. 9, 221 So.2d 126 (1969).
The trial court heard the evidence and saw the witnesses and a complete examination of the record fails to show that his findings of fact are either palpably wrong or unjust. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON, MERRILL, and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.