Opinion
23A-CR-1923
12-06-2024
Phillip Patterson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT LISA JOHNSON BROWNSBURG, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA JENNIFER ANWARZAI DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Mark D. Stoner, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D32-2109-F5-28586
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT LISA JOHNSON BROWNSBURG, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA JENNIFER ANWARZAI DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
May, Judge
[¶1] Phillip Patterson appeals his convictions of Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon.Patterson argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On September 11, 2021, Patterson's friend, Jason Bennett, invited him to hang out. On his way to Bennett's house, Patterson purchased bourbon and beer. When Patterson arrived at Bennett's house, Curtis Reeves, whom Patterson did not know, was also at Bennett's house.
[¶3] Throughout the evening, Patterson, Bennett, and Reeves drank alcohol and socialized. At some point, Patterson decided to retrieve marijuana from his house, and Reeves drove him there. They returned approximately fifteen minutes later with the marijuana, whiskey, and "a bong[.]" (Tr. Vol. II at 96.) Within three hours, Bennett consumed eighteen beers, "moonshine [out of a] mason jar[,]" (id. at 215), and some "homemade wine." (Id. at 97.) In addition, Bennett and Reeves "drank more than half" of Patterson's bourbon "[o]ut of the bottle." (Id. at 214.) Patterson drank beer, had one shot of bourbon, and smoked a marijuana joint.
[¶4] Around 10:00 p.m., Patterson wanted to get his beer from the refrigerator in Bennett's garage and go home. Patterson and Bennett entered the garage as Reeves went home to put his dog to bed. When Reeves left, Patterson was uninjured. When Reeves returned approximately fifteen minutes later, Patterson was sitting on the ground in the garage with "blood on his leg, and arm, and chin." (Id. at 57.) Reeves retrieved a rag from Bennett's house and cleaned Patterson up.
[¶5] Reeves turned around to throw the rag on scaffolding in the garage, and when he turned back around, Patterson was engaged in a physical altercation with Bennett, who eventually fell unconscious. He grabbed Patterson around the neck and chest area and held him like that for "three to four minutes . . . to get him to calm down and stop." (Id. at 59.) Reeves "loosened up" on Patterson to "let [Patterson] go." (Id. at 59.) Patterson then "whip[ped] around real quick" and stabbed Reeves in the arm with a knife. (Id.)
[¶6] Bennett had regained consciousness and saw Patterson stab Reeves. Bennett yelled at Patterson to stop and to leave, but Patterson stabbed Reeves again in the stomach and wrist. Bennett attempted to grab Patterson's knife and, in doing so, received a stab wound to his finger. Reeves pulled out his knife, which had the tip "[b]roken off." (Id. at 61.) Reeves "held [his] knife . . . to get [Patterson to] . . . stop what he's doing or try to get out the back door." (Id. at 62.) At some point, Reeves "made contact" with Patterson with the knife. (Id.) Patterson fell "all the way backwards onto his butt." (Id.) As Reeves left the garage, Patterson stabbed him two times in the leg. Reeves was able to leave the garage and go home, where his girlfriend called 911.
[¶7] When Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") Officer Colton Smith arrived at Bennett's garage, other officers had already detained Patterson. Patterson was "very angry[,]" and Officer Smith noted Patterson had "slurred speech." (Id. at 160.) Officer Smith observed Patterson had "blood on his chin[.]" (Id. at 187.) Another officer on the scene, IMPD Officer Travis Leung spoke to Patterson and noticed Patterson had cuts "[o]n the backs and the fronts of his hands" and "blood around his mouth." (Id. at 58.)
[¶8] As Officer Smith entered Bennett's garage, he observed "a broken beer bottle, substantial amount of blood in there, and blood trail leading out of the garage over to next door." (Id. at 161.) When Officer Smith spoke to Bennett about the incident, he noticed Bennett had slurred speech as well and "it was difficult to get him to speak chronologically." (Id. at 169.) Bennett told Officer Smith that "he didn't remember anything that was happening from the time that he took the beer out of the refrigerator to the time that he woke up and saw Curtis Reeves being stabbed[.]" (Id. at 188.)
[¶9] Police went to speak with Reeves at his house, but the ambulance had already rushed Reeves to the hospital "due to a heavy amount of blood loss" (id. at 158), and because he lost "consciousness from loss of blood." (Id. at 64.) Officer Smith entered the house after Reeves had been taken to the hospital. The walls had "[a] large amount of blood in the living room going down over to the kitchen and maybe in the bathroom" as well as "on the stovetop." (Id. at 161.)
[¶10] In the emergency room, Reeves was "awake but unresponsive at times" and "pale[.]" (Ex. Vol. 5 at 174) (formatting omitted). Reeves admitted he had consumed alcohol. Reeves was treated for stab wounds in his abdomen, thigh, knee, elbow, and left wrist. After he stabilized, the hospital social worker, Jeri Rozzell, came to perform an assessment. Reeves told Rozzell that "he was in the garage with a neighbor and a friend. The friend began to choke the neighbor and [Reeves] attempted to pull the neighbors [sic] friend off and the neighbors [sic] friend began to stab [Reeves]." (Id. at 60.) Reeves stayed in the hospital for two days. At a post-hospital appointment, medical staff determined Reeves had permanent nerve damage to his thumb from his injuries.
[¶11] On September 14, 2021, Officer Smith obtained a search warrant to photograph any injuries on Patterson from the incident. Officer Smith met with Detective Quinn in the jail where Patterson was being held. Detective Quinn took pictures of Patterson's face, hands, arms, chest, and buttocks because Patterson had a small cut on his chin, a small cut on his upper lip, an abrasion on his elbow, three small cuts on his hands, abrasions on his legs, and a bruise on his buttocks.
Detective Quinn's first name is not in the record.
[¶12] On September 15, 2021, the State charged Patterson with Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon for his alleged actions against Reeves and Level 6 felony strangulation for his alleged action against Bennett. Patterson waived his right to a jury trial, and the trial court held a bench trial on June 7, 8, and 12, 2023. The trial court found Patterson guilty of the Level 5 battery charges and not guilty of the strangulation charge. On July 20, 2023, the trial court sentenced Patterson to three years for each of the Level 5 battery convictions, to be served concurrently.
Discussion and Decision
[¶13] Patterson claims the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. "Our standard for reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same standard used for any claim of insufficient evidence." Ervin v. State, 114 N.E.3d 888, 895 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018), trans. denied. We neither judge the credibility of the witnesses nor reweigh the evidence. Id. If sufficient evidence of probative value supports the conclusion of the trier of fact, then we cannot overturn the verdict. Id. "A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting A.A. v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1277, 1280-1 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015)).
[¶14] "A valid claim of self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act." Turner v. State, 183 N.E.3d 346, 355 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022), trans. denied. "[I]t is the policy of this state that people have the right to defend themselves and third parties from physical harm and crime." Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(a). Accordingly, the legislature provided:
(c) A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person:
(1) is justified in using deadly force; and
(2) does not have a duty to retreat;
if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony. No person, employer, or estate of a person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). "When self-defense is asserted, the defendant must prove he was in a place where he had a right to be, 'acted without fault,' and reasonably feared or apprehended death or great bodily harm." Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699700 (Ind. 1999)), reh'g denied.
To employ self-defense, a defendant must satisfy both an objective and subjective standard: he must have actually believed deadly force was necessary to protect himself, and his belief must be one that a reasonable person would have held under the circumstances. The phrase "reasonably believes," as used in the self-defense statute, requires both subjective belief that force was necessary to prevent serious bodily injury and that such actual belief was one that a reasonable person would have under the circumstances. The second part of this analysis requires the [trier of fact] to consider what a reasonable person would believe if standing in the shoes of the defendant.Passarelli v. State, 201 N.E.3d 271, 276 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.
[¶15] "The amount of force that an individual may use to protect himself must be proportionate to the urgency of the situation. When a person uses more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, the right of self-defense is extinguished." Hall v. State, 231 N.E.3d 868, 874-5 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024) (quoting Pinkston v. State, 821 N.E.2d 830, 842 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. denied. Additionally, "[a] person claiming self-defense cannot reasonably base a belief that the threat is imminent on the actions of another who has withdrawn from the confrontation." Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. 2003). "Once a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements." Hughes v. State, 153 N.E.3d 354, 360 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied.
[¶16] Patterson argues the State did not disprove his claim of self-defense because: (1) Patterson had a right to be in Bennett's garage; (2) he was not the initial aggressor in the confrontation with Reeves; and (3) he used the amount of force reasonably necessary to defend himself against Reeves's attack. We agree that Patterson had a right to be in Bennett's garage and that, for the purposes of the altercation between Reeves and Patterson, Reeves was the initial aggressor because he grabbed Patterson to prevent Patterson from continuing to engage in a physical confrontation with Bennett. However, the amount of force Patterson used, and the timing thereof, allowed the trial court as fact-finder to reject Patterson's claim of self-defense.
[¶17] The facts most favorable to the judgment demonstrate that, when Reeves came into Bennett's garage, Patterson and Bennett were in a physical confrontation. Reeves testified he grabbed Patterson around the neck and chest for "three or four minutes . . . [t]rying to get him to calm down and stop." (Tr. Vol. II at 59.) He told Patterson that Patterson "needed to stop" and then eventually released his hold on Patterson. Once released, Patterson "whip[ped] around real quick" and stabbed Reeves in the arm. (Id. at 60.) Bennett attempted to intervene, but Patterson continued to stab Reeves in the stomach and wrist. When Reeves turned to leave the garage, Patterson stabbed him twice in the leg. Reeves's initial aggression ceased when he released Patterson from the chokehold. Patterson attacked Reeves after Reeves raised his hands in surrender. He continued to stab Reeves even as Reeves was leaving the garage. Patterson's alternate version of events is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Ervin, 114 N.E.3d at 895 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). The evidence most favorable to the judgment was sufficient to permit the trial court, as fact-finder, to determine the State had disproven Patterson's claim of self-defense. See Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) (State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Hollowell's claim of self-defense because Hollowell stabbed and continued to pursue the initial aggressor, even after the initial aggressor had retreated from combat).
Conclusion
[¶18] The State presented sufficient evidence to disprove Patterson's claim of selfdefense because Patterson continued to attack Reeves after Reeves disengaged from the confrontation. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶19] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.