MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EWING WERLEIN JR., District Judge.

Pending are defendants The Prudential Insurance Company of America's ("Prudential") and AON Employee Benefit Committee's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 44). After having considered the motion, response, the applicable law, and the administrative record, Defendants' motion will be granted.

I. Background

July 2002: Plaintiff's Injury

Plaintiff fell down a flight of stairs at work on July 22, 2002. He incurred injuries to both of his knees, both wrists, his lower back, one testicle, and his neck; he also complained of depression. He underwent arthroscopic knee surgery on both knees in September and October 2002, and suffered from decreased range of motion and pain due to his back. Plaintiff saw Dr. Angel Perez for pain management; his medications included Celebrex, Trazadone, Vicodin, and Paxil. In September 2003, Plaintiff also received epidural blocks in his back from Dr. David Tomaszek in an attempt to relieve his pain.

As a result of the injuries and corresponding surgeries, Plaintiff received Short Term Disability benefits through their maximum duration, January 20, 2003.

Relevant Plan Language and Approval of Claim for LTD Benefits

"Total Disability" exists when Prudential determines that all of these conditions are met:

(1) Due to Sickness or accidental Injury, both of these are true:

(a) You are not able to perform, for wage or profit, the material and substantial duties of your occupation.

(b) After the Initial Duration of a period of Total Disability, you are not able to perform for wage or profit the material and substantial duties of any job for which you are reasonably fitted by your education, training or experience. The Initial Duration is shown in the Schedule of Benefits.

(2) You are not working at any job for wage or profit.

(3) You are under the regular care of a Doctor.

In June 2003, Prudential approved Plaintiff's claim for LTD benefits, retroactive to January 21, 2003. Benefits were offset by Plaintiff's successful workers compensation and Social Security Disability benefits claims.

April 2004: Prudential's First LTD Denial and Subsequent Reinstatement

2004-2005: Continued LTD Approval Past Initial Duration

In April and May 2005, Plaintiff reported a pain level of 5/10 to Dr. Nguyen, but in May said his neck was feeling better. Dr. Nguyen indicated the possibility of lumbosacral artificial disc replacement surgery. Prudential further extended Plaintiff's LTD through August 2005, and again through December 31, 2005.

A September 2005 electrodiagnostic study under Dr. S. Kahkeshani of Pars Neurological, P.A., revealed two "old" radiculopathies. In a visit to Dr. Esses in October, Plaintiff complained about his neck and lower back; his range of motion was reduced, but he exhibited normal strength in his lower extremities.

November 2005 — May 2006: Prudential's Investigation and Second Denial of LTD

On November 15, 2005, Plaintiff also submitted a self-report of his daily living activities to Prudential. He reported difficulty sleeping due to pain waking him up, but also indicated he drives 6-20 miles, six times per week, without assistance. He indicated that he spends 1-2 hours monthly doing household activities, including laundry, vacuuming, washing dishes, and taking out the trash. He reported shopping for thirty minutes to an hour each week, but would ask for help if he was "having a bad day." He also indicated that he fished, bowled, played tennis, and watched movies, though he only tried tennis three to four times in the previous year.

Plaintiff further reported to Prudential, by way of a December 2005 phone conversation, that he could not return to his former job because the position no longer existed, and because he would be unable to deal with the stress of the job due to his medications causing him to lose focus. He noted his bachelor's degree in teaching, and indicated his plan to take computer and other courses to prepare himself for a career in teaching social studies and/or physical education, which he asserted would be less physically and mentally demanding than his former occupation.

Prudential obtained from the Texas Workers Compensation Commission the report of Dr. James Hood, an orthopedic surgeon, who undertook an independent medical evaluation of Plaintiff for his Texas Workers Compensation claim in December 2005. Based on his review of the medical records and his personal examination of Plaintiff, he concluded that Plaintiff could work at least in a sedentary setting; he could stand for four hours straight, walk for two hours, and sit for eight hours with 15-minute stretch breaks every two hours, but he could not climb any stairs, repetitively reach overhead, or drive heavy equipment.

In May 2006, Dr. Joyce Bachman of Prudential performed an internal review of Plaintiff's medical history since Dr. Kowalski's April 2004 review. She concluded that Plaintiff was capable of sedentary activity. She indicated that due to his "documented ongoing radiculopathy" and lower back pain, Plaintiff should avoid prolonged standing, walking, or sitting; should not lift greater than 20 pounds more than occasionally; and that he should avoid prolonged neck flexion and repetitive overhead work.

Prudential issued its decision to terminate Plaintiff's LTD in a May 24, 2006 letter to Plaintiff. The letter summarized Plaintiff's medical history since the 2002 accident, as well as Plaintiff's self-reported activities, and concluded that Plaintiff was "capable of performing activities within a sedentary level of physical demand."

In support of its conclusion, Prudential cited several aspects of the record, including:

(1) Dr. Esses's post-operation report that Plaintiff was doing extremely well, and exhibited full motor strength in his upper extremities;

(2) Plaintiff's ability to perform his "normal daily activities and hobbies" which was "indicative of [his] capability to perform sedentary work";

(3) That the information on file indicated Plaintiff could "drive without observable difficulty which requires significant range of motion (ROM) of the neck"; and

(4) That Plaintiff's knee "conditions appear to have resolved through surgical interventions," that surveillance indicated Plaintiff walked without assistive devices and without a limp, and that there was otherwise "no functional impairment evidenced."

Prudential also noted Plaintiff's ongoing back pain and the fact that, despite an earlier recommendation for surgery, none had been undertaken. Nonetheless, it asserted that Plaintiff was at least able to perform activities within a sedentary level, as evidenced by his self-reported activities of driving, bowling, fishing and vacuuming the house, as well as his plans to return to work as a teacher at the start of the 2006 school year. According to Prudential, it would be reasonable for Plaintiff "to self-accommodate between standing, walking and sitting activities when necessary or when [he] experience[s] discomfort throughout a normal work day." Prudential authorized benefit payments through June 30, 2006, "to allow [Plaintiff] additional time [to] transition back to work."

May 2006: Plaintiff's First Appeal

I will be unable to return to my prior occupation, working in the insurance industry. The working conditions in the insurance industry (stress related/mental agility), will cause me to suffer physically with back spasms, back pain and depression. Due to my injuries I sustained on 7/22/2002, I require that I take anti depressants from now due to chronic pain and pain medication, hydrocodone, when I have pain.

. . . .

The profession of teaching student [sic] with special needs would not place me in harms [sic] way and I would be gainfully employed.

Plaintiff added on June 6 that he had not bowled in 10 years, and asserted that he will need further surgery due to pain — but also noted that the "surgery is not currently required as the pain has not gotten to the point where surgery is necessary." Drs. Esses and Perez continued to recommend he stay out of work.

Dr. Jack Denver independently reviewed Plaintiff's entire record, including both of Plaintiff's appeal letters. He concluded that Plaintiff had no restrictions on his ability to sit and for "fine and gross motor movements of the hands," but that Plaintiff should not stand or walk for more than 60 minutes consecutively (or four hours total) in an 8-hour workday. He also concluded that Plaintiff should not balance, climb, reach overhead, kneel, or push or pull over 20 pounds, and that Plaintiff should bend or stoop only on occasion.

In September 2006, Plaintiff informed Prudential that Dr. Esses advised him a bone spur had developed on the surgical site on Plaintiff's back, which Plaintiff claimed caused neurological impairment. Prudential requested updated medical records from Dr. Esses, as well as a recent MRI of Plaintiff. At Prudential's request, Dr. Denver in November reviewed these documents and reports, and they did not alter his previous conclusion. The MRI showed nothing new to alter the restrictions previously provided, and, despite "patient complaints of subjective weakness involving his right arm," Dr. Esses's examinations revealed "normal" strength in Plaintiff's right arm and associated muscles.

Prudential notified Plaintiff on December 1, 2006, that his first request for reconsideration of the LTD denial was denied. In its letter, it listed the relevant Plan definitions, then gave its reasoning for denying the request:

You portray yourself as being more limited that [sic] what is demonstrated by physician evaluation findings and medical and surgical history. Your complaints and degree of self-reported chronic pain do not correlate with your past operative, diagnostic testing and clinical findings. Your residual functional status suggests that you can perform physically at a higher level than you self-report. We maintain that you possess the capacity to perform work at a sedentary physical demand level. . . .

Prudential concluded that Plaintiff would be capable of performing his former occupation of Client Specialist, based upon the restrictions denoted by Dr. Denver.

February 2007: Plaintiff's Second Appeal

[H]ave side effects including severe drowsiness, inability to concentrate, apathy, lessen physical activity and unable to operate machinery (computers) as well as other effects. There was no need to list the side effects in medical records or reports.

Dr. Perez said Plaintiff would require pain medication to sit for long periods of time, which would then "alter his ability to think logically and act quickly," and that, despite Plaintiff's attempts to teach part-time, his "injuries and medications are having a negative affect [sic] on him and his ability to teach."

Dr. Esses's opinion was that Plaintiff "was unable to return to work from the time of his surgery through December 2006 and that he could return to work in December 2006, but part-time only."

Prudential again sought independent medical review. Dr. Thomas Lazoff, a doctor certified by the American Board of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation and the Board of Pain Medicine, reviewed the entire administrative record, and concluded that the medical documentation supported a finding of "mild functional impairment from 7/01/06 forward as it pertains to [Plaintiff's] lumbar spine, cervical spine, and bilateral knee conditions." He listed the same restrictions as Dr. Denver had noted in reviewing Plaintiff's medical records for his first appeal, and also opined that Dr. Perez's allegation of adverse side effects caused by Plaintiff's pain medications was not supported by the record, as it was "not conveyed in the numerous office notes over the last few years." Finally, he believed Plaintiff's "self-reported pain complaints are out of proportion to his physical exam findings."

Prudential sent a letter to Plaintiff on March 12, 2007, again upholding its LTD denial, indicating that Plaintiff's impairment was not as severe as he self-reported and that Plaintiff's medical record did not support a conclusion that he was unable to perform the material and substantial duties of his former occupation, let alone any occupation.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Once the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment should not be granted.Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in a pleading, and unsubstantiated assertions that a fact issue exists will not suffice. Id. "[T]he nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a `genuine' issue concerning every essential component of its case." Id.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the evidence "through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "If the record, viewed in this light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the nonmovant, then summary judgment is proper.Kelley v. Price-Macemon, Inc., 992 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1993). On the other hand, if "the factfinder could reasonably find in [the nonmovant's] favor, then summary judgment is improper."Id. Even if the standards of Rule 56 are met, a court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment if it believes that "the better course would be to proceed to a full trial." Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2513.

III. Discussion

Plaintiff challenges (1) Prudential's interpretation of its Plan and (2) factual findings regarding the scope of Plaintiff's occupational duties and his functional limitations. The Court will first address Prudential's interpretation of its Plan, then review Prudential's fact-finding.

A. Prudential's interpretation of its Plan

ERISA confers jurisdiction on federal courts to review benefit determinations by fiduciaries or plan administrators. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). "[A] denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Estate of Bratton v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 215 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2000) (citingFirestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 956-57 (1989)). When a plan administrator or fiduciary is given discretionary authority, a denial of benefits is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Liberty Life Assur. Co., 394 F.3d 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2004); Robinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 443 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 2006).

Whether a plan grants discretionary authority does not depend upon any "magic word" or "linguistic template." Chevron Chem. Co. v. Oil, Chem. Atomic Workers Local Union 4-447, 47 F.3d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1995); Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 979 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the plain language of the plan still must expressly confer discretionary authority to the administrator or fiduciary. Chevron Chem. Co., 47 F.3d at 142. The Court looks to the plan as a whole to determine the appropriate standard to apply. Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 637.

Here, Prudential's determinations will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The Plan states that "Prudential determines" when both "Total Disability" and "Partial Disability" exist, and, "at its own expense, has the right to examine the person whose loss is the basis of the claim" as often as is "reasonable" while the claim is pending. Prudential also determines, for example, "the type of expenses that will be covered" for claimant rehabilitation, and when such expenses "may be incurred." Thus, the Plan expressly grants Prudential discretionary authority over its determination whether to terminate Plaintiff's LTD benefits. See, e.g., Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 637 (plan grants discretionary authority where it "expresses, i.e., puts into words, the authority of the administrator to determine eligibility").

In the Fifth Circuit, review for an ERISA plan fiduciary's abuse of discretion follows a two-step process. Stone v. UNOCAL Termination Allowance Plan, 570 F.3d 252, 257 (5th Cir. 2009). First, the Court determines whether the plan administrator's determination was legally correct. Id. Whether an interpretation of a plan is legally correct requires consideration of (1) whether a uniform construction of the plan has been given by the administrator, (2) whether the interpretation is fair and reasonable, and (3) whether unanticipated costs will result from a different interpretation of the plan. Id. at 258. If the determination was legally correct, there is no abuse of discretion. Id. at 257. Otherwise, the Court proceeds to step two to determine whether the administrator's interpretation was nonetheless not an abuse of discretion. Id. However, the Court is not confined to this test; it may skip the first step if it can more readily determine that the administrator's decision was not an abuse of discretion. Holland v. Int'l Paper Co. Retirement Plan, 576 F.3d 240, 246 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, the Court need not reach step two because Prudential's determination, in the context of the facts of record, is a legally correct interpretation of the Plan's terms.

There is no evidence of record regarding either the first or third commonly reviewed factors, and therefore those are not discussed. See, e.g., Collinsworth v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., No. 3:03-CV-0457, 2005 WL 1189841, at *10 (N.D. Tex. May 19, 2005); Atteberry v. Memorial-Hermann Healthcare Sys. ex rel. Atteberry, 405 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2005). The determinative factor, therefore, is whether Prudential's reading of the Plan was fair, which is at any rate the "most important" factor of the three. Stone, 570 F.3d at 260.

Plaintiff asserts that the description of Plaintiff's occupation relied upon by Prudential in determining whether he could perform his former occupation was too generalized. Specifically, in his second appeal, Plaintiff argued that the job description Prudential used "covers a general job for a large number of employees," but omitted other functions Plaintiff performed, such as moving furniture, retrieving office supplies, retrieving mail and faxes daily from another floor, and sometimes lifting heavy files.

The Plan's definition of "Total Disability" requires that Plaintiff be unable to "perform . . . the material and substantial duties" of his "occupation." The terms "material and substantial duties" and "occupation" are not defined in the Plan; hence the terms are given their ordinary and generally accepted meaning. House v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 2007). Particularly, the term "occupation" has been found to be a "general description, not a specific one." Ehrensaft v. Dimension Works Inc. Long Term Disability Plan, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1259 (D. Nev. 2000) (quoted in Schmidlkofer v. Directory Distrib. Assocs., Inc., 107 Fed. App'x 631, 634-35 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also House, 499 F.3d at 454 n. 8 (quoting Ehrensaft in interpreting "regular occupation"). As the District of Nevada noted:

A person may not be able to perform a specific job assignment, but still be able to perform the duties generally understood to be part of his or her "occupation." For example, a secretary is not disabled from his or her "occupation" just because he or she cannot also perform additional tasks assigned by an employer, such as moving furniture or lifting heavy objects.

Prudential used the "Client Specialist — Client Connection" position description provided by AON in determining the "material and substantial duties" of Plaintiff's "occupation" under the Plan. The document contains descriptions for three sub-sets of the position: Associate, Specialist, and Senior Specialist. The descriptions focus upon the general requirements for each position, such as: the employee's degree of understanding of claims operations; an ability to field client requests over the telephone; an ability to utilize "PC office products such as Word, Excel, and Lotus Notes"; and an ability to type 35-40 words per minute. Given Prudential's factual determination that the description provided by AON accurately represented the general duties of Plaintiff's former occupation, its conclusion that those general duties — and not specific functions performed by Plaintiff in his particular job — comprise the "material and substantial duties" of Plaintiff's "occupation" was fair and reasonable, and in accordance with the legally correct interpretation of the Plan's terms.

B. Prudential's Determination of the Facts

Plaintiff nevertheless contends in his response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment that Prudential abused its discretion in its finding of what Plaintiff's occupational duties were, and in its finding of Plaintiff's physical capabilities and limitations. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the "Client Specialist — Client Connection" position description provided by AON, in addition to being too generalized, was also incorrect. He also asserts that Prudential did not accord proper weight to the evidence in determining his capabilities.

"[A] factual determination, such as whether a beneficiary is totally disabled under the terms of a plan, always warrants an `abuse of discretion' review." Gellerman v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 376 F. Supp. 2d 724, 731 (S.D. Tex. 2005); see also Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1999).

To determine whether an administrator or fiduciary abused its discretion in denying benefits, the Court inquires whether the administrator acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Meditrust, 168 F.3d at 214. An administrator's decision should be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence, and is arbitrary "only if `made without a rational connection between the known facts and the decision or between the found facts and the evidence.'" Id. at 215 (quoting Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 97 F.3d 822, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1996)). "Substantial evidence is `more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Cooper v. Hewlett-Packard Co., Disability Plan, 97 F.3d 822, 2009 WL 4842458, at *5 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2009) (quoting Ellis, 394 F.3d at 273); see also Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 299 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc), abrogated in part by Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008), as recognized in Holland, 576 F.3d at 247-48 n. 3 (administrator's decision to deny benefits must be "based on evidence, even if disputable, that clearly supports the basis for its denial"). The district court, in reviewing the administrator or fiduciary's factual determinations, should consider only the evidence that was before the administrator or fiduciary. See Meditrust, 168 F.3d at 215.

Here, Prudential operates under a conflict of interest; it has both discretionary authority to determine "Total Disability" and is responsible for paying benefits under the Plan. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2008). Though evidence of a conflict is not determinative, nor does it merit converting the "abuse of discretion" review into a more onerous standard of review, it does factor into the Court's analysis of Prudential's denial of benefits. See Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 2350-52 (2008); Holland, 576 F.3d at 247-48 n. 3.

1. Plaintiff's occupational duties

Plaintiff asserts he was not a "Client Specialist" before his accident. Instead, he alternately asserts in his response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment that he was a "Senior Insurance Specialist" or a "Senior Insurance Specialist in charge of the call center." Indeed, according to AON staff emails regarding Plaintiff's appropriate job description, Plaintiff's position was eliminated soon after he took disability leave. AON nonetheless submitted the "Client Specialist" position description to Prudential in its Group Disability Insurance Employer Statement as an apparent closest match to Plaintiff's former position, and indicated it was Plaintiff's occupation. There is no summary judgment evidence to support Plaintiff's assertion that AON intentionally submitted an incorrect job description to Prudential. The descriptions for the three levels of the Client Specialist position — Associate, Specialist, and Senior Specialist — all appear to qualify as "sedentary," which is in line with Prudential's repeated classification of Plaintiff's physical occupational demands, which Plaintiff has never contested. Moreover, Plaintiff himself appears to have admitted the accuracy of the description in at least a general sense: he argued on his second appeal that, "[w]hile it covers a general job for a large number of employees, I also was responsible for" the occasional lifting, stair-climbing, and other functions discussed previously.

The evidence of record does not support a finding that Prudential acted arbitrarily or capriciously in using, and continuing to use, the "Client Specialist" position description sent by AON as a representation of the duties of Plaintiff's former occupation. See Vega, 188 F.3d at 298-99 (refusing to impose duty even reasonably to investigate facts surrounding claims on plan administrators); cf. also Wright v. R.R. Dunnelley Sons Co. Group Benefits Plan, 402 F.3d 67, 77-78 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that "integral part" of plaintiff's "burden to provide evidence that he was unable to perform the duties of his occupation" is a "statement of what his job required").

2. Plaintiff's functional limitations

Prudential determined in its first denial of Plaintiff's LTD benefits that Plaintiff was subject to the following restrictions: "no prolonged standing, walking, or sitting; avoidance of lifting above 20 pounds occasionally; no prolonged neck flexion or extension; and no repetitive overhead work."

On the whole, substantial evidence supports this finding. Prudential appears to accept, based on the objective medical data and diagnoses, that Plaintiff suffers from radiculopathy and degenerative disc disease; its decision to deny LTD benefits instead rests upon its assessment of what those data and diagnoses mean in terms of Plaintiff's physical limitations. Prudential first determined that Plaintiff could perform within these restrictions based on Dr. Bachman's review of Plaintiff's medical records, self-reported activities, and video surveillance. Dr. Bachman appeared to accord significant weight to limited video surveillance evidence and an apparent over-simplification of Plaintiff's self-reported activities. Surveillance reports here indicate that Plaintiff was observed driving his pickup truck and walking short distances three times over the course of three days, once while carrying a small bag. This limited observation over a very short period of time does not by itself support a conclusion either way as to Plaintiff's capabilities. Furthermore, Dr. Bachman characterizes Plaintiff's self-reported activities as including "driving, bowling, fishing, [and] vacuuming the house," without any apparent recognition of the limited context in which Plaintiff reported the activities. For example, Plaintiff reported engaging in household chores, including vacuuming, only one to two hours per month; and, according to Plaintiff, he had not bowled in ten years.

However, Dr. Bachman also reviewed Plaintiff's medical history, including all reports from his various treating doctors and surgeons. While the surveillance and self-reported activities alone might not justify her conclusion, they do tend to support it when considered with her analysis of Plaintiff's medical reports. See Braddock v. Baker Hughes Inc. Long Term Disability Plan, 461 F. Supp. 2d 490, 502 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (plan administrator was not unreasonable in concluding that video evidence showed that Plaintiff did not demonstrate physical limitations that would prevent him from performing sedentary occupation, "especially when viewed in light of the other evidence in the record"). For example, Dr. Bachman noted Dr. Esses's post-surgical evaluations that Plaintiff had done "extremely well," that he had "full motor strength in his upper extremities," and that his "X-rays show excellent position." Dr. Bachman's assessment is also confirmed by three different doctors — Drs. Denver, Lazoff, and Hood — none of whom appeared to emphasize either the surveillance or Plaintiff's self-reported activities.

Both Drs. Denver and Lazoff in subsequent independent reviews of the entire administrative record, including Plaintiff's arguments on each respective appeal, concluded that Plaintiff was subject to substantially the same restrictions. While both included the surveillance and self-reported activities in their reviews, they also explicitly relied upon medical documentation in reaching their conclusions. For example, Dr. Denver indicated that Plaintiff's "subjective complaints and degree of self-reported chronic pain do not correlate with the past operative, diagnostic testing, and clinical findings," particularly in light of the "relatively normal neuromuscular and musculoskeletal exams noted by Dr. Stephen Esses," and Dr. Hood's independent medical exam. Dr. Denver also found "no evidence of any adverse side effects due to medications" in the "extensive data set provided." Dr. Denver also specifically addressed a follow-up MRI and examination by Dr. Esses, determining that neither altered his original conclusions. Dr. Lazoff similarly relied upon Plaintiff's medical examination reports in finding, for example, that his self-reported levels of pain were out of proportion to documentation of his physical examinations. Regarding adverse side effects due to Plaintiff's pain medication, Dr. Lazoff also noted the lack of supporting evidence on the record when specifically addressing Dr. Perez's assertion that Plaintiff's pain medications would impair his abilities to focus and think clearly.

Moreover, Dr. Hood, an orthopedic surgeon, personally-examined Plaintiff and reviewed his medical history in December 2005, though Plaintiff refused to undergo a functional capacity evaluation. Dr. Hood nonetheless reached conclusions about Plaintiff's limitations similar to the later conclusions of Drs. Bachman, Denver, and Lazoff, without having before him the video surveillance and self-reported activities Prudential obtained for its reviews.

Though Plaintiff's treating physicians, Drs. Esses and Perez, disagreed with the conclusions of Drs. Hood, Bachman, Denver, and Lazoff, Prudential was entitled to rely upon the conclusions of the latter four doctors. Nothing in ERISA "suggests that plan administrators must accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians." Black Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 123 S. Ct. 1965, 1970, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003). Moreover, courts may not "impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of explanation when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician's evaluation." Id. at 1972. Still, "Plan administrators, of course, may not arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant's reliable evidence, including the opinions of a treating physician." Id. Here, Prudential and its reviewing physicians did, indeed, consider Plaintiff's treating physicians' diagnoses and opinions; Prudential simply "was not required to give those opinions determinative weight." Vercher v. Alexander Alexander Inc., 379 F.3d 222, 233 (5th Cir. 2004). That none of the reviewing doctors except Dr. Hood personally examined Plaintiff does not alter this conclusion. See, e.g., Braddock, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 502 (collecting cases and noting that "numerous courts have upheld administrator's decisions where the administrator chose to rely upon medical opinions from doctors other than treating physicians . . . even where those doctors did not personally examine the claimant").

Finally, although there is evidence in the administrative record that Plaintiff may be considered "totally disabled" under the Social Security Act, "the disability determinations of federal agencies are obviously not binding on [Prudential]."Guillot v. C.F. Indus., Inc., No. 06-3987, 2009 WL 152543, at *6 n. 3 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 2009); see also Horton, 51 Fed. App'x 928, at *3 ("[W]hile an ERISA plan administrator might find a social security disability determination relevant or persuasive . . . the plan administrator is not bound by the social security determination." (citing Moller v. El Campo Aluminum Co., 97 F.3d 85, 87 (5th Cir. 1996))). Based on a careful review of the entire administrative record, there is substantial evidence to support Prudential's findings; thus, Prudential did not abuse its discretion.

IV. Order

Based on the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that Defendants The Prudential Insurance Company of American and AON Employee Benefit Committee's Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 44) is GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Non-Jury Trial (Document No. 43) is DENIED AS MOOT.

The Clerk will enter this Order, providing a correct copy to all counsel of record.

ORDER

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a motion for reconsideration of the Court's ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Moreover, the Motion for Summary-Judgment, as set out in this Court's Order dated January 28, 2010, was extensively briefed by both sides and considered carefully by the Court before ruling. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion to set aside the Court's decision (Document No. 58) is DENIED.

It is SO ORDERED.

The Clerk will enter this Order, providing a correct copy to all counsel of record.