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concluding that judicial interference via injunction would interfere with internal operations and could diminish efficacy of response of New York City Police Department
Summary of this case from Conn. Judicial Branch v. GilbertOpinion
No. 97 Civ. 7895 (SAS), 98 Civ. 8202 (SAS).
October 18, 2000.
For Plaintiffs: Marshall Trager, Esq. Linda M. Cronin, Esq. Trager, Cronin Byczek, LLP.
For Defendants: James M. Lemonedes, Esq. Donald Sullivan, Esq. Assistant Corporation Counsel City of New York Law Department.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Following a jury trial in which plaintiffs prevailed, the parties have brought several post-trial motions. Specifically, defendants have moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial while plaintiffs have moved for certain equitable relief. For the reasons that follow, all of these motions are denied.
The law and facts surrounding the instant litigation are set forth in Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of New York v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp.2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Opinion"), familiarity with which is assumed for purposes of these motions.
I. Judgment as a Matter of Law/New Trial
Defendants have renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules"), and also moved for a new trial under Rules 59 and 60. Defendants raise two issues in their Rule 50(b) motion. First, at the close of plaintiffs' case, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) on all of plaintiffs' Title VII and state and local discrimination claims on the ground that plaintiffs failed to establish any adverse employment action. Second, defendants also moved for a directed verdict on their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983 on the grounds that no reasonable juror could find that: (1) there was not a crisis which justified transferring minority Police Officers into the 70th Precinct, because of their race, pursuant to the operational needs of the New York City Police Department; and (2) the transfers in issue were not narrowly tailored to satisfy this compelling state interest.
Rule 50 permits a court to enter judgment against a party where "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). In making this determination, a court "must give deference to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences of the jury, and may not weigh the credibility of witnesses or otherwise consider the weight of the evidence." Caruolo V. John Crane, Inc., 99 Civ. 7501, 2000 WL 1233181, at *3 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, judgment as a matter of law should be granted only if: "(1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or (2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair mined [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it]." Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 289 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
The first prong of defendants' Rule 50(b) motion is limited to the jury's verdict as to Oscar Espinal, the only plaintiff to obtain a favorable verdict under Title VII because the jury found he suffered an adverse employment action. As the jury found no adverse employment action as to the remaining twenty-three plaintiffs, defendants cannot move to overturn a favorable verdict. See Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 884 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (under Rule 50, a court may "enter judgment as a matter of law against a party that receives a favorable jury verdict if there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for that party) (emphasis added).
When ruling on defendants' Rule 50(a) motion, I found that several factors surrounding the transfers could lead a reasonable jury to find that plaintiffs suffered an adverse employment action. Such actions might include: decreased opportunities for promotion; increased probability of receiving civilian complaints; loss of special assignments and of seniority within a special bureau or division; and the hostile work environment in the 70th Precinct. See Trial Transcript ("Tr.") at 2292-2299. The issue was then submitted to the jury which found that only one of the twenty-four plaintiffs, Oscar Espinal, had established an adverse employment action. I now conclude, for the same reasons listed above, that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's finding. Accordingly, defendants' renewed motion under Rule 50(b) with regard to plaintiffs' discrimination claims is denied.
With regard to the adverse employment action suffered by Oscar Espinal, he testified that he lost his position as a domestic violence officer, which he held at the 68th Precinct, upon being transferred to the 70th Precinct and that he was unable to secure that position at his new precinct. See Tr. at 1366, 1372. Oscar Espinal also testified that there was no communication among officers at the 70th Precinct, that morale was very, very low, See Tr. at 1373, and that the public would often make fun of him while he was on patrol. See Tr. at 1374.
This conclusion is, of course, limited to the jury's verdict as to Oscar Espinal. I reach no such conclusion as to the remaining twenty-three plaintiffs.
Defendants' renewed motion with respect to the §§ 1981 and 1983 claims is denied for similar reasons. Because defendants conceded that the transfers were based solely on race, the only issue decided by the jury was whether defendants had sustained their burden of proving that the transfers were permitted due to exigent circumstances. See Opinion, 74 F. Supp.2d at 330 n. 10. The jury heard conflicting evidence as to whether the so-called "Louima incident" was a crisis which justified race-based transfers. The jury apparently credited the testimony presented by the plaintiffs when it found that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the transfers and that such transfers were not narrowly tailored to respond to such circumstances. Because this Court cannot make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence on a Rule 50 motion, and because there was adequate evidence in the record to support the verdict, it would be inappropriate to usurp the jury's finding with regard to liability. See Caruolo, 2000 WL 1233181, at *3 Therefore, defendants' renewed motion on plaintiffs' §§ 1981 and 1983 claims is also denied.
Defendants also moved for a new trial, pursuant to Rules 59 and 60, on the following grounds: (1) the verdict was inconsistent, punitive, and constituted a compromise verdict; (2) the charge regarding causation was erroneous; (3) the charge regarding corroboration of claims of emotional distress was erroneous; and (4) it was error to marshal the evidence in the jury instructions. "As a general matter, `[a] motion for a new trial should be granted when, in the opinion of the district court, the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result . . . or the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.'" DLC Management Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Song v. Ives Labs., Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). While the first and third grounds raise serious issues that present difficult legal questions, I do not find that they meet the standard for a new trial on either liability or damages. Accordingly, defendants' motion for a new trial is denied. See DLC Management, 163 F.3d at 134 (court should only grant a motion for a new trial where the jury's verdict is "egregious"). Defendants must now pursue their claims in the Court of Appeals.
Rule 60 is clearly inapplicable as that Rule provides for relief from judgment for such things as clerical mistakes, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence and fraud. Fed.R.Civ. p. 60(a) (b). None of these categories apply here. Rule 59, on the other hand, provides for a new trial for "any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a).
Once judgment is entered this case will be immediately appealable despite the fact that the amount of attorneys' fees has not yet been determined. In White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 452 n. 14 (1982), the Supreme Court held that Rule 59(e) was inapplicable to fee requests under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In dictum, the Supreme Court stated:
If a merits judgment is final and appealable prior to the entry of a fee award, then the remaining issue must be "collateral" to the decision on the merits. Conversely, the collateral character of the fee issue establishes that an outstanding fee question does not bar recognition of a merits judgment as "final" and "appealable."
The Second Circuit has held that "a judgment on the merits in favor of a plaintiff is a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 even though statutory attorneys' fees remain undetermined." Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Baden v. Koch, 79 Civ. 4296, 1984 WL 859, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1984) (there is no question about the appealability of a judgment where "an outstanding fees issue remains to be determined or the merits judgment finds entitlement to fees but leaves that amount undetermined").
Although the Second Circuit has held that "[w]here attorney's fees and costs have been awarded, but not determined, the order is not final," Krumme V. Westpoint Stevens Inc., 143 F.3d 71, 86 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1041 (1998), that was done in the case of contractually stipulated attorneys' fees. In so doing, the Circuit relied on Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 4 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[A] sanction order that leaves the amount of the sanction for later determination is not final and, therefore, not appealable under § 1291.") and F.H. Krear Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 776 F.2d 1563, 1564 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("We have held that where attorneys' fees are a contractually stipulated element of damages, a judgment is not final until the fees have been determined."). Neither White nor Abrams are cited in Krumme. Accordingly, Krumme's holding is limited to those situations where attorneys' fees are a contractual element of damages. Here, the statutory attorneys' fees are collateral to the judgment on the merits.
II. Equitable Relief
Plaintiffs have requested the following equitable relief:
(1) That the Defendants be enjoined from making race based transfers absent exigent circumstances or, in the alternative, that the Defendants be enjoined from making race based transfers of the individual Plaintiffs absent exigent circumstances;
(2) That the individual Plaintiffs be afforded the opportunity to transfer from the 70th Precinct within 60 days of the entry of judgment giving the Police Department a "wish-list" of three (3) precincts, one of which being the precinct from which the individual Plaintiff was originally transferred to the 70th Precinct.
Letter from Marshall D. Trager, Esq. dated July 10, 2000, at 1.
In determining whether to grant this requested relief, it is noteworthy that defendants deny ever making or intending to make race-based transfers absent exigent circumstances. See Letter from Donald C. Sullivan, Esq. dated September 11, 2000, at 1. Given defendants' voluntary commitment to abstain form race-based transfers absent exigent circumstances, plaintiffs are seeking, in effect, an injunction limiting the City's ability to make race-based transfers until a court has found the particular circumstances to be exigent.
There are a number of difficulties inherent in enforcing such an injunction. First and foremost is the fact that such an injunction represents an undue intrusion into a matter of state sovereignty, namely, the internal operation of the New York Police Department ("NYPD"). As the Supreme Court has counseled, "appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief." Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976) (citation omitted). Accordingly,
[w]hen a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the activity of a government agency, even within a unitary court system, his case must contend with the well-established rule that the Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs.Id. at 378-79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Portland Police Assoc. v. City of Portland, 658 F.2d 1272, 1274 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1981) (equitable relief not available where it would require "federal courts to disturb the inner workings and structure of a local police department").
Here, plaintiffs would require a court to define "exigent circumstances" and determine when and if particular circumstances fell within that definition before the Police Department could make race-based transfers. Not only is a court ill-equipped to make such decisions but the delay occasioned by such judicial interference could diminish or negate the efficacy of the NYPD's response. This Court declines to "inject itself by injunctive decree" into the internal operations of the NYPD. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 380. See also Miller v. Silberman, 951 F. Supp. 485, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("where the equitable relief sought would inappropriately require the federal court to supervise institutions central to the state's sovereignty, it should not be entertained") (citations omitted).
Other considerations also weigh against granting this equitable relief. In order to obtain the requested relief, plaintiffs "must not only succeed on the merits, [they] must also demonstrate that there is no available remedy at law and that the balance of equities favors granting the requested relief." Nieves v. Coggeshall, 96 Civ. 1799, 2000 WL 340749, at *3 (D. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000) (citation omitted). In evaluating the equitable factors, a court must consider "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated." Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 385 (2d Cir. 1973) (citation omitted). Here, plaintiffs concede that situations that would justify race-based transfers are of a "rare and unlikely character." Letter from Linda M. Cronin, Esq. dated September 25, 2000, at 2. The NYPD asserts that in its entire history, this is the only incidence of race-based transfers. See Sullivan Letter, at 1. Thus, there is little reason to believe that another such incident will occur. See United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assoc., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968) (injunctive relief may be unnecessary where likelihood of further violations is remote) (citing United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633-36 (1953)). For all of these reasons, plaintiffs' first request for injunctive relief is denied.
Plaintiffs' second request for injunctive relief is denied because it is unnecessary. The transfer options requested by plaintiffs are already provided by the NYPD. See Sullivan Letter, at 2. of the twenty-four plaintiffs, eight are no longer working at the 70th Precinct. See id. Moreover, two officers who were transferred from the 70th Precinct subsequently requested that they be permitted to return. See id. Several of the remaining officers testified that they were not interested in seeking a transfer at this point in their careers. See id. Those officers who are still interested in transferring out of the 70th Precinct can do so under the currently available transfer options. Accordingly, plaintiffs' second request for injunctive relief is denied.
III. Conclusion
Because all pending motions other than that for attorneys' fees are now decided, plaintiffs are directed to submit a Proposed Judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict forthwith.