RESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court.

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Law Division. No. 2012L0414 The Honorable Brigid Mary McGrath, Judge Presiding. PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Howse and Taylor concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

Held: In consolidated appeal, trial court properly found the elements of res judicata such that subsequent suit is barred and parties' motion to dismiss was properly granted; other appeal asking this court to review the denial of a motion to dismiss is dismissed. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part. ¶ 1 In this consolidated appeal, plaintiffs-appellants John J. Pappas, Sr., individually and d/b/a Shamrock Farms, and Sarah Scott Grubner (Pappas) appeal the granting of defendants-appellees, two lawyers and their law firm, Yvonne Ocrant, Richard Kolodziej, and Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP's (the Hinshaw defendants) motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2012)), dismissing with prejudice Count C and Count J of plaintiffs' complaint to recover compensatory and punitive damages stemming from a disagreement about a horse. On appeal, Pappas contends that the trial court erred in finding the Pappas claims were barred by res judicata. ¶ 2 Defendants-appellants Patrick Hurst and Chris Dickerson (Hurst and Dickerson or the Hurst defendants) also appeal, contending the circuit court erred when, although it dismissed all other claims against them, it did not dismiss the count alleging slander per se (Count A). Pappas also appears in this case as the plaintiffs-appellees regarding the circuit court's treatment of Count A.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Due to the complex nature of this cause, we offer here a brief summation of the underlying facts. This tort action involves a dispute concerning the ownership of a horse and whether the parties and their agents, including their lawyers, committed torts in a tug-of-war over the horse. A previous suit was filed and adjudicated in Lake County regarding the same horse and the same owners. In the Cook County action, the individuals and the entity who ultimately won ownership of the horse in the Lake County action sued the individuals against whom they litigated in Lake County, as well as their lawyers. Plaintiffs also sued an individual who was a third party potential buyer of the horse. ¶ 5 The Hinshaw defendants moved to dismiss the case pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code based on res judicata. The Hinshaw defendants also moved, in the alternative, for dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims for trespass and conspiracy based on section 2-615 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)). After briefing and hearings, the circuit court found all elements of the defense of res judicata present on the record. It granted the Hinshaw defendants' motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. ¶ 6 The Hurst defendants also filed a motion to dismiss the Cook County action pursuant to section 2-619, arguing that plaintiffs' claims were barred by res judicata. The circuit court granted the Hurst defendants' motion to dismiss as to all counts except Count A, alleging slander per se.

¶ 7 II. FACTS

¶ 8 In January 2012, the Pappas plaintiffs filed a complaint in Cook County against the Hurst defendants and the Hinshaw defendants. The following facts are taken from the pleadings in the record. ¶ 9 John Pappas, Sr. owns and lives at a property in Lake County, Illinois, where he does business as Shamrock Farms. Since 1983, Shamrock Farms has been a boarding and training facility for horses owned by John and by third party customers of Shamrock Farms. Sarah Scott Grubner is the farm manager and a professional horsewoman who trains, cares for, markets, and sells horses owned by third parties. ¶ 10 In June 2009, Nancy Hurst hired Sarah and John to board, care for, have custody of, and train their horse, Orion. She also hired Sarah to teach Lauren, her daughter, how to ride Orion. Over time, Sarah and Shamrock Farms took Lauren and Orion to several horse competitions. ¶ 11 In the late summer of 2009, Patrick Hurst met with Sarah and John to discuss the possibility of entering into joint ventures together. Specifically, Patrick wanted to, along with Sarah and John, purchase investment horses, have them trained and exhibited at competitions, and then sell them for profit. According to the Pappas claim, it was agreed that Patrick would advance the funds to purchase a horse, and Sarah and John, as part of the joint venture, would contribute money, tack, equipment, professional training and medication; charge reduced fees for boarding; would not charge the joint venture or Patrick for Shamrock Farms shipping the horse to horse shows or for day fees at horse shows or professional rides at horse shows. As part of the joint venture, Patrick would pay veterinary bills, blacksmith bills, and "expenses charged by the entities that conducted horse competitions." At the same meeting where these things were discussed, it was also agreed that Sarah and Shamrock Farms would be responsible for the care, custody, control, and training of all joint venture investment horses. ¶ 12 In the winter of 2010, Dr. Rachel Kane, a veterinarian horsewoman, contacted Sarah and asked her to accept two of Dr. Kane's horses and to try to market them. One of these horses was the horse in question here, Altair. Sarah accepted, and began training Altair. ¶ 13 Sarah discovered that Altair had such raw talent that he could be improved and, eventually, marketed for a profit. Sarah had Lauren Hurst ride Altair and opined that Lauren could successfully show the horse. ¶ 14 John and Sarah approached Patrick and Nancy about creating a joint venture in the ownership of Altair, providing that Altair could be acquired from Dr. Kane at a reasonable price. Sarah contacted Dr. Kane, who offered Altair at $25,000. Sarah thought this price was reasonable. Neither Patrick nor Nancy communicated with Dr. Kane regarding Altair. According to the complaint, Sarah, acting as a member of the joint venture, tendered a contract and a check for $25,000 to Dr. Kane, d/b/a Entropy Farm LLC, to purchase Altair. Further according to the complaint, on May 8, 2010, Nancy signed the contract to purchase Altair on behalf of the joint venture and gave Sarah a check in the amount of $25,000 drawn on the Hurst account to present to Dr. Kane for the purchase of Altair on behalf of the joint venture. ¶ 15 Also on May 8, 2010, Nancy, Sarah, and John signed the joint venture agreement. Patrick, however, did not sign the joint venture agreement. Nonetheless, according to the complaint, the check written and signed by Nancy was drawn on an account in the name of Patrick and Nancy and funded by Patrick. The agreement the complaint refers to as the joint venture agreement is included in the record, titled "Akaya Agreement May 2010." In its entirety, it reads:

"Hurst's Investment will be:



Initial expenses:

Pre-purchase exam



Purchase price of $25,000 payable to Rachel Kane



Insurance—minimum to provide major medical

Ongoing expenses:

Shoeing



Veterinary services



Board of $600 per month



Horse show entry fees, stall fees, etc.



Braiding

Shamrock Farms investment will be:

Reduced Board



Daily supplements



All professional schooling



All lesson charges



Shipping fees



Horse show expenses (day fees, ride fees, shared expenses)



Tack and equipment



Vaccines and worming costs



Routing medication and supplies (bute, medroxy, salves, etc.)



Marketing charges (DVD production, showings, ads)

Upon Final Sale:

Hursts receive original $25,000 purchase price



Hursts and Shamrock Farms split equally all funds remaining"

"a. That the horse was dehydrated, mistreated, mismanaged, that they would suffer irreparable harm if Altair was further damaged or died due to the continuing mismanagement by the defendant when, in fact, defendants and their attorneys were made aware of the fact that he horse was not dehydrated, mistreated, mismanaged or exposed to damage, or death by two veterinarians, a licensed State of Illinois humane animal investigator; and the blacksmith who cared for the horse's feet throughout the existence of the joint venture."

"It is hereby ordered:



1) The Court finds an ascertainable claim for relief;



2) The Courts finds plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on the merits;



3) The Court finds that, to the extent the horse, Altair, is injured and dehydrated, the Court finds a possibility of irreparable harm and damage and no adequate remedy at law.



4) The Court finds that the status quo is that the Defendants remain in possession of Altair; however:



5) The Court is granting the TRO ordering Defendants to allow Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' agents full access to Altair to ensure proper care, feeding, water, shelter, veterinary care and blacksmith care effective immediately and continuing through June 22, 2011.



6) Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' agents shall be allowed full and unrestricted access to Altair and at no time shall Altair's stall or barn door(s) be padlocked

thereby preventing Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' agents access to Altair effective immediately and through June 22, 2011.



7) Defendants are prohibited from selling Altair to a third party without Plaintiffs' prior written authority and Defendants are prohibited from transferring possession of Altair to any person other than plaintiffs or Chris Dickerson."

"This matter is continued for status to enter a dismissal order if the above payment is made in accordance with this order on September 13, 2011."

"AGREED ORDER



This matter coming on to be heard upon the Stipulation to Dismiss Complaint by Plaintiffs Patrick Hurst and Nancy Hurst, and Defendants John J. Pappas, Sr., Shamrock Farms, and Sarah Grubner, by and through their respective Attorneys, to dismiss with prejudice the Complaint in the above captioned action against John J. Pappas, Sr., Shamrock Farms, and Sarah Grubner, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;



IT IS ORDERED that this action against Defendants John J. Pappas, Sr., Shamrock Farms, and Sarah Grubner be, and the same hereby are, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to agreement of the parties hereto.



The Court finds and holds that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of this order."

¶ 56 III. ANALYSIS

¶ 57 A. Appeal No. 1-13-1656 ¶ 58 We first address appeal 1-13-1656. In this appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred when it granted the Hinshaw defendant's motion to dismiss counts C and J, conspiracy and trespass, of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the trial court's finding that plaintiffs' causes of action were barred by the doctrine of res judicata was error. We disagree. ¶ 59 A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the sufficiency of the complaint, but asserts an affirmative matter that acts to defeat the claim. Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31; King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp, 215 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2005); Wallace v. Smyth, 203 Ill. 2d 441, 447 (2002); see 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a) (9) (West 2012) (allowing dismissal when "the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim"). The question on review is whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes dismissal or whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law. Fuller Family Holdings, LLC. v. Northern Trust Co., 371 Ill. App. 3d 605, 613 (2007). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a reviewing court must construe the pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 55. Disputed issues of fact are reserved for trial proceedings. Advocate Health and Hospital Corp. v. Bank One, N.A., 348 Ill. App. 3d 755, 759 (2004). "Under section 2-619, the defendant admits to all well-pled facts in the complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts [Citation.], but asks the court to conclude that there is no set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to recover. As long as there is no genuine issue of material fact and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the complaint may be properly dismissed." Advocate Health and Hospital Corp., 348 Ill. App. 3d at 759. The circuit court's decision to grant such a motion will be reviewed de novo. Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 55. ¶ 60 Res judicata is an equitable doctrine designed to encourage judicial economy by preventing a multiplicity of lawsuits between the same parties where the facts and issues are the same. Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 533 (2004). The doctrine also "protects the parties from being forced to bear the unjust burden of relitigating essentially the same case." Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d at 533. ¶ 61 "The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action." Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 389 (2001). The essential elements of res judicata are: (1) a final judgment on the merits; (2) an identity of parties or their privies; and (3) an identity of causes of action. Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (2008); Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp. v. Chicago Union Station Co., 358 Ill. App. 3d 985, 1000 (2005). "Moreover, the doctrine of res judicata applies not only to claims that have been fully litigated in an earlier proceeding, but also those that could have been raised or decided ,but were not, thus barring such claims from relitigation at a later date." Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1000; Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 334-35 (1996) (Res judicata "extends not only to what was actually decided in the original action, but also to matters which could have been decided in that suit."). In addition, the issue of whether a claim is barred by res judicata is an issue of law which mandates de novo review by this court. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp. v. Chicago Union Station Co., 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1000. ¶ 62 Under the "transactional analysis" adopted by our supreme court in River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290 (1998), separate claims are considered the same cause of action and are barred by the doctrine of res judicata where they arise from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 311. Claims may be considered part of the same cause of action "even if there is not a substantial overlap of evidence, so long as they arise from the same transaction." River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 311. The River Park court explained that, in the transactional analysis, the claim is viewed in "factual terms" and considered " 'coterminous with the transaction, regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff; * * * and regardless of the variations in the evidence needed to support the theories or rights.' " River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 309, quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, Comment a, at 197 (1982). Additionally, a "final judgment bars a plaintiff's claim to all or any part of a transaction or series of connected transactions from which the action arose." Doe v. Gleicher, 393 Ill. App. 3d 31, 37-8 (2009) (relying on River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 309). ¶ 63 i. Identity of Action ¶ 64 Plaintiffs urge us to determine that res judicata does not apply here because there is no identity of action, in part because the Lake County action focused on the rights to the horse, while the Cook County action focused on alleged intentional torts committed by the owners of the horse. Our analysis here is driven by the principles described in River Park, that is, we consider herein whether the claims in the Cook County case and the Lake County case "arise from the same transaction." See River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 311. A comparison of the complaints, both of which are found in the record on appeal, show that they do, in fact, arise from the same group of operative facts. Both cases are based upon the parties' right to possession and ownership of Altair. Specifically, the Lake County action centered on the parties' rights to possess and sell the horse, as well as their conduct surrounding the implementation of the joint venture agreement. In that case, the Hursts contended that Pappas and Grubner were guilty of conversion when they denied the Hursts access to Altair, intentionally took control of Altair, and denied the Hursts the right to sell Altair to Chris Dickerson; and also guilty of unjust enrichment by using Altair for personal gain via, among other things, providing horseriding lessons to paying students. The Hursts also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief. Pappas and Grubner responded, contending that the sale of the horse to Dickerson was a sham arising from a conspiracy. Pappas and Grubner alleged that attorney Ocrant directed and Hunter's trespass upon Shamrock Farms in order to transport the horse. In the subsequent Cook County action, plaintiffs asserted the same allegations, describing the joint venture agreement, the parties' actions surrounding the implementation of the joint venture agreement, the alleged conspiracy between Chris Dickerson, Ocrant, Patrick, and Nancy regarding the sale of Altair, and the alleged trespass onto Shamrock Farms by defendants. ¶ 65 We recognize that, under the law as it existed prior to River Park, plaintiff may have been able to successfully argue that this cause should not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata because, although both cases arise from the same set of facts, different evidence would need to be provided in support of each case. That is no longer the case. Prior to River Park, some Illinois courts also used the same evidence test, which bars a second suit if the evidence needed to sustain the second action would have sustained the first action, or if the same facts were essential to maintain both actions, to determine if there was an identity of causes of action. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 307-08. Therefore, under the same evidence test, different claims arising out of one set of facts could have been considered independent causes of action because the evidence needed to support each claim differs. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 309. Under the broader transactional test, which was adopted by our supreme court in River Park, however, the inquiry is whether the first and subsequent suit arise from the same operative facts. Lane v. Kalcheim, 394 Ill. App. 3d 324, 332 (2009). If they arise from the same operative facts, the second suit is, then, barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Lane, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 332. ¶ 66 Both the Lake County case and the Cook County case relate to the ownership and sale of Altair. In Lake County, the Hursts' pleadings focused on possession and ownership of the horse, as well as the parties' rights under the joint venture agreement. Pappas and Grubner's responsive pleading in Lake County addressed the horse's ownership, arguing that the Hursts, represented by the Hinshaw defendants, conspired to orchestrate a sham sale of Altair to Chris Dickerson; that Hinshaw defendants provided false information to the police department regarding the health and circumstances of the horse; and that the Hinshaw defendants and the Hursts conspired to sell the horse to Chris Dickerson, that Ocrant aided the Hursts and Dickerson in a trespass on Shamrock Farms in order to illegally take possession of Altair. In similar fashion, plaintiffs filed their claim in Cook County, alleging that Ocrant aided the Hursts and Dickerson in a trespass on Shamrock Farms in order to illegally take possession of Altair. The fact that these two lawsuits present differing issues is not material to the question of whether they stem from the same group of operative facts; the operative facts, that is, the possession and ownership of the horse, Altair, and the parties' acts surrounding the joint venture agreement, are the same. ¶ 67 Plaintiffs also contend on appeal that there is no identity of action because the Cook County case "has absolutely nothing to do with the ownership and possession of the horse," but rather "pertain to the numerous intentional torts committed by the various defendants including trespass, civil conspiracy, slander per se, breach of fiduciary duty" which were "never filed, pursued, or adjudicated in the Lake County action." As discussed above, however, plaintiffs' failure to assert all of their theories in the Lake County action does not change our res judicata determination, where the doctrine of res judicata extends not only to what was actually decided in the original action, but also to matters which could have been decided in the prior suit. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 334-35 (Res judicata "extends not only to what was actually decided in the original action, but also to matters which could have been decided in that suit."); Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1000 ("[T]he doctrine of res judicata applies not only to claims that have been fully litigated in an earlier proceeding, but also those that could have been raised or decided, but were not, thus barring such claims from relitigation at a later date."). Plaintiffs' conspiracy and trespass allegations, raised in Lake County and again in Cook County, arise out of the same set of operative facts. ¶ 68 ii. Final Judgment on the Merits ¶ 69 Plaintiffs also contend the trial court erred in dismissing this cause pursuant to the principle of res judicata where the Lake County lawsuit did not result in a final judgment on the merits. The Cook County trial court found that the agreed order dismissing the complaint in Lake County was not made pursuant to a settlement agreement or negotiated settlement of any kind. The parties do not argue differently. Rather, plaintiffs allege that res judicata does not apply here because: (1) the Lake County ruling was not final where it was only a ruling on a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, wherein the Lake County court did not hold a hearing on the merits and merely stayed the action; and (2) the Lake County case was dismissed by agreement of the parties rather than by an involuntary dismissal based on a ruling on the merits. For the following reasons, we disagree. ¶ 70 First, we note that plaintiffs are misdirected insofar as their argument focuses on the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs argue that a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction cannot support the application of res judicata because they are "merely provisional in nature and conclude no rights; they merely preserve the status quo pending resolution of the case." The problem with plaintiffs' position, however, is that, along with the orders for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, the Hursts also filed a complaint against Pappas alleging conversion and unjust enrichment. This complaint centered around the possession and sale of Altair. The Lake County court determined the ownership of the horse, had the parties submit bids for its review, and the plaintiffs then obtained title to Altair through the bidding process. The Lake County court reached the merits of the issue, that is, the possession and sale of Altair, decided the merits, and awarded the horse to the plaintiffs. The adjudication was not limited solely to the TRO and preliminary injunction. ¶ 71 An order is final for purposes of res judicata if it disposes of the rights of the parties. Doe v. Gleicher, 393 Ill. App. 3d 31, 36 (2009). Here, the order dismissing the Lake County case dismisses the case in its entirety, specifies that it is dismissed with prejudice, and includes the statement: "there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of this order." Plaintiffs argue that, pursuant to DeLuna v. Triester, 185 Ill. 2d 565 (1999), an order dismissing a case is not dispositive of whether the dismissal was an adjudication on the merits for purposes of applying the doctrine of res judicata. We find that, in considering the record as a whole, the dismissal was a final order. See Kiefer v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 394 Ill. App. 3d 485, 494 (2009) ("The orders of the trial court must be interpreted from the entire context in which they were entered, with reference to other parts of the record including the pleadings, motions and issues before the court and the arguments of counsel. Orders must be construed in a reasonable manner so as to give effect to the apparent intention of the trial court. The effect of a dismissal order is determined by its substance and not by the incantation of any particular magic words, and therefore, a trial court's description of a final judgment as being 'without prejudice' or 'with prejudice' is not determinative." (Internal quotation marks and internal citations omitted)). Here, a review of the Lake County pleadings as contained in the record and as described in this order, which include the Hursts' verified complaint, their motions for injunctive relief, and Pappas' brief in opposition, establishes that the Lake County court did, in fact, intend to dismiss the case with prejudice in a final order. The court defined the merits of the parties' dispute, that is, who had what rights to Altair. The trial court interpreted the May 8 joint venture agreement, which established rights to Altair. Eventually, the trial court ordered bidding on the horse and Pappas submitted the winning bid. Once the determination of the parties' rights, including actual possession of the horse, occurred, there was no further dispute between the parties, and the court properly dismissed the case with prejudice. ¶ 72 Additionally, plaintiffs raised these issues and had opportunity to litigate trespass and conspiracy claims in Lake County. They failed to do so. They argue that they should not have been required to file a counterclaim in Lake County, and speculate, "[o]bviously if plaintiffs would have presented a motion for leave to file a counterclaim and/or received a court order permitting the filing of a counterclaim after first appearing in the case on June 9, 2011, then that motion to file a counterclaim or an order allowing a counterclaim, and any counterclaim that had been filed would have been stayed by [the Lake County court's] June 30, 2011 order staying the entire proceeding." Unlike plaintiffs, we are unwilling to speculate as to what would have happened had plaintiffs filed a counterclaim in Lake County regarding trespass and conspiracy. We are left here with the facts and the law, which provides that whether a counterclaim is compulsory is irrelevant to whether the doctrine of res judicata applies, but rather, the proper inquiry is " 'whether the claim should have been considered during the prior action.' " Cabrera v. First Nat. Bank of Wheaton, 324 Ill. App. 3d 85, 94 (2001), quoting Sanders Confectionary Products, Inc. v. Heller Financial, Inc., 973 F. 2d 474, 484 (1992). The proper place for the claim was in the prior Lake County case. ¶ 73 iii. Same Parties or their Privies ¶ 74 Plaintiffs, without citation to authority or to the record, also claim that the trial court erred in finding an identity of the parties or their privies in the Lake County and Cook County actions. A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues on appeal clearly defined with pertinent authorities cited and a cohesive legal argument presented. Thrall Car Mfg. Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719 (1986). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) requires that the appellant provide an argument section which includes "the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefore, with citation of the authorities and pages of the record relied on.* * * Points not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing." "An issue not clearly defined and sufficiently presented fails to satisfy the requirements of [Illinois] Supreme court Rule 341(h)(7) and is, therefore, waived." Express Valet, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill. App. 3d 838, 847 (2007). Plaintiffs here offer no citation to case law, no citation to the record, and virtually no argument or analysis other than to essentially state that neither Dickerson nor Ocrant were named parties in the Lake County action and, accordingly, they are not in privity with the Hursts for purposes of res judicata. In light of plaintiffs' failure to define and present this issue on appeal, we determine that the issue is waived. ¶ 75 Waiver aside, we find no error in the trial court's determination that the Hinshaw defendants were in privity with the Hursts for purposes of res judicata where their interests were intertwined and deeply aligned in the Lake County suit. "In order to be bound by a prior judgment in an action where it was not a party, the party in the subsequent lawsuit must have been in privity with one of the parties in the prior lawsuit. Agolf v. Village of Arlington Heights, 409 Ill. App. 3d 211, 220 (2011). In general, privity exists between parties who adequately represent the same legal interests. People ex rel Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 285 (1992). "In determining whether privity exists, the identity of the interest controls, not the nominal identity of the parties." State Farm Fire & Cas. v. John J. Rickhoff Sheet Metal Co., 394 Ill. App. 3d 548, 559 (2009). The Restatement explains that " 'privity' refers to a cluster of relationships, under which the preclusive effects of a judgment extend beyond a party to the original action and apply to persons having specified relationships to that party." State Farm Fire & Cas., 394 Ill. App. 3d at 559. The existence of privity is determined on a case-by-case basis. Agolf, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 220. This court has explained:

" 'Privity expresses the idea that as to certain matters and in certain circumstances persons who are not parties to an action but who are connected with it in their interests are affected by the judgment with reference to interests involved in the action, as if they were parties.' (Internal quotation marks omitted). City of Chicago v. St. John's United Church of Christ, 404 Ill. App. 3d 505, 513 (2010), quoting Purmal [v. Robert N. Wadington and Associates], 354 Ill. App. 3d [715,] 722-23 [(2004)], quoting Restatement of Judgments § 83, cmt. a (1942). Simply put, privity exists between a party to the prior suit and a nonparty when the party to the prior suit 'adequately represent[ed] the same legal interests' of the nonparty. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 285, 296 (1992). And, more specific to the instant cause, privity clearly exists between parties who share a mutual or successive relationship in property rights that were the subject of an earlier action. See Board of Education of Sunset Ridge School District No. 29 v. Village of Northbrook, 295 Ill. App. 3d 909, 919 (1998); see also St John's, 404

Ill. App. 3d at 513. Ultimately, a nonparty to a prior suit may be bound pursuant to privity if its interests 'are so closely aligned to those of a party' in that prior suit that the party was, essentially, a virtual representative of the nonparty. Purmal, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 723; accord St. John's, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 513; see also City of Rockford v. Unit Six of the Policemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 362 Ill. App. 3d 556, 563 (2005)." Agolf, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 220.

"7. On May 6, 2011 [Ocrant] sent a letter by messenger and fax which is attached hereto as Exhibit '10'. In this correspondence Ms. Ocrant announced that she had been engaged by Patrick and Nancy to facilitate possession of 'their horse'. Interestingly, Ocrant wrote that the prior week Patrick Hurst requested possession of Altair for a couple of weeks so that his daughter could enjoy Altair at a facility closer to their other horse in Elgin, Illinois. In this correspondence, [Ocrant] further wrote that Nancy Hurst directed a transporter to pick up Altair from Shamrock and that John had called the Barrington Hills Police which is another fabrication on the part of Ms. Ocrant. As demonstrated by the May 5, 2010 Barrington Hills Police Department Incident Report, Exhibit '2', it was [Ocrant] and Nancy Hurst who had called the Barrington Hills Police Department for police assistance regarding Altair."

"16. *** Ms. Ocrant, Patrick, Nancy and Chris, who is an attorney, should understand that civil disputes are not resolved by trespass, self-help, or police interference into a civil matter."

"3. Although not currently a party to this litigation, Christopher Dickerson, hereinafter 'Chris' is a co-conspirator with Patrick and Nancy and he has made false assertions in this controversy to various person, including the Barrington Hills Police Department during an official investigation conducted on May 28, 2011.



***



5. Defendants will show herein at any hearing the following evidentiary facts:



***



2. That Chris does not have a claim and ascertainable right to the ownership and/or possession of Altair as the alleged sale of the horse on May 28, 2011 is fraudulent in that it was not consented to John and Saran [sic]; that the alleged price was well below the fair market value of this horse; that Chris is acting as a strawman purchaser and had arranged for the horse not to be taken to

the facility where his daughter's horse was located, but to the facility where the other Hurst horse, Aramis was located; further evidence of the fraudulent sham transaction by Chris will be demonstrated that at no time did he have a pre-purchase examination conducted to determine to health [sic] of the horse; that neither Chris, nor his daughter or any agent acting on or behalf [sic] ever saw the horse being ridden, nor did they ride the horse to determine its suitable [sic] for Chris's daughter or its market value.



***



***



***



***



6. That Chris has conspired with Patrick and Nancy to have them breach their fiduciary duty to John and Sarah with respect to the Altair joint venture/partnership;



7. That Chris's misconduct is and has been and will continue to be a tortious interference with John and Sarah's contractual relationship with Patrick and Nancy with respect to Altair;



8. That Chris's conduct has been, is and will be[an] interference in the business relationship between John, Sarah, Patrick, Nancy in the Altair partnership/joint venture"

"Rule 304. Appeals from Final Judgments That Do Not Dispose of an Entire Proceeding

(a) Judgments As To Fewer Than All Parties or Claims—Necessity for Special Finding. If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both. Such a finding may be made at the time of the entry of the judgment or thereafter on the court's

own motion or on motion of any party. ***In the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties." (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 304.

"As plaintiffs note, it is a general rule that a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is not a final and appealable order, but here a final order was entered dismissing plaintiffs' suit against Owens-Corning, and once the final order was entered, all of the preliminary orders in the suit were also reviewable. (People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 167, 57 Ill. Dec. 585, 429 N.E. 2d 483.) Plaintiffs principal authority People v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 115, 203 N.E. 2d 897, supports our denial of the motion to dismiss, for while the court there noted the general rule that orders denying motions to dismiss are not appealable, the court allowed an appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss since other portions of the order in question made final determinations affecting substantive issues in the case. The granting of Owens-Corning's motion for summary judgment dismissed all of plaintiffs' claims against Owens and the preliminary order denying Owens-Corning's motion to dismiss is now properly before us." Handley, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 67.

¶ 96 IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 97 For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County with regards to appeal 1-13-1656, and dismiss appeal 1-13-3051. ¶ 98 Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.